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This thesis asks the question: what does it mean to ―discern the body‖ (1 Cor. 
11:29)? Answering this begins with the question‘s origin in the sacramental context of a 
particular Christian community‘s attempt to observe what became known as the 
Eucharist. In their physicality, sacraments act as reminders that theological concepts, 
while they systematise experience and knowledge, can never be simply abstract; 
theology must never forget the particular, discrete nature of human beings, the 
separation of creatures, the otherness that allows true plurality and mutuality.  
My thesis is divided in three parts, to address bodies and their stories in theory, 
literary art, and sacramental liturgy. The first part of the thesis offers a critical reading 
of various theologies of body and story, applying to them insights from feminist 
epistemology concerning situated knowledge. The critique examines the work of 
Graham Ward, Stanley Hauerwas, Marcella Althaus-Reid, and Paul Ricoeur, looking at 
the way that even their attempts to take the body into account tend to downplay the 
concreteness of particular people and their stories. 
The second part of the thesis explores the way that literature handles the 
problems of particularity and universality, looking at specific stories in specific novels, 
and examining the way they treat bodies and the meeting of bodies. I address five 
novels. In conversation with Anil’s Ghost, by Michael Ondaatje, I discuss the 
importance of touch in defining meaning. With A Map of Glass, by Jane Urquhart, I 
look at bodies as tactile maps and geographies of memory. Fugitive Pieces, by Anne 
Michaels, leads me to a discussion of the place of artistic form in the determination of 
meaning both for the body and for literature. The Man on a Donkey, by H. F. M. 
Prescott, leads to reflections upon disjunctions in bodies as various narratives make 
claims upon them. The discussion of Godric, by Frederick Buechner, centres upon 
personal identity being constructed physically, artistically and relationally through 
proximity with others. 
The third part investigates the nature of sacraments and sacramental theology as 
a place of attending to both the abstract and the particular, to the person—seeking a 
geography of love. To do this, I begin with a discussion of the search for a normative 
liturgical pattern as exemplified by Dom Gregory Dix‘s The Shape of the Liturgy, 
focusing on the consequences for acknowledging the unruliness of the materiality of 
bodies. I then examine the approach of Gordon W. Lathrop, who uses the image of the 
map for describing liturgy. But his use of this metaphor construes the liturgical map as a 
given, turning away from interactive, creative possibilities. As a response, I look to the 
theologian Charles Winquist, who writes about the particularity of love. Finally, I bring 
together my reflections from the first two parts of the thesis to make suggestions about 
the liturgical body: that it is discerned by paying attention to the stories that the body 
carries, to the relationships in which bodies are implicated and to their locations, and to 
the vulnerabilities manifested by love and grief, by care. 
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 Fingers have a memory, 
to read the familiar braille of another‘s skin. 
The body has a memory;  
the children we make, 
places we‘ve hurt ourselves, 
sieves of our skeletons in the fat soil. 
No words mean as much as a life. 
Only the body pronounces perfectly 
the name of another. 
 (Anne Michaels, from ‗Words for the Body‘)
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And the Word became flesh and dwelt in us, and we saw his glory, a 
glory as the only one from the Father, full of grace and of truth. 
John 1:14 
 
Those who eat my flesh and drink my blood abide in me and I in them. 
John 6:56 
 
Therefore Jesus went outside, while wearing the thorny crown and the 





*   *   * 
 
hat does it mean to discern the body? 
In this thesis, I seek an answer to that question. My method is 
interdisciplinary, drawing upon theology, literature, and liturgy. Here, to 
discern the body is to practise a sacramental hermeneutic. A sacramental hermeneutic is 
not primarily for interpreting sacraments themselves, however, but instead goes in the 
other direction: sacraments, in the physicality through which they join materiality and 
meaning, provide a key for interpreting the relational nature of bodies in all their 
particular contingencies, their flesh-and-blood untidiness and vitality. To discern the 
body is not to consider the body as first and foremost a stepping-stone to a metaphor, 
nor is it to hold the body as a tabula rasa which waits to be filled with values and 
understandings. Practising a sacramental hermeneutic entails attending to bodies made 
known in their proximity to one another, in their desires and weaknesses, their fear of 
frailty in the touch just as much as their joy in skin‘s contact.2  
                                                                                                                                               
1
  These verses are my own translations from Aland, et al., The Greek New Testament. Unless noted 
otherwise, Biblical quotations in this thesis are from the New Revised Standard Version. 
2
  None of this discourse on bodies could proceed without the benefit of many other conversations, 
queries and reflections. Sociological and socio-historical investigations such as those by Michel 
Foucault in Discipline and Punish, Mary Douglas in Purity and Danger, Judith Butler in Bodies That 
Matter, and Elaine Scarry in The Body in Pain intersect to form a theoretical matrix behind any 
contemporary discussions on the nature and meaning of the body, and the importance of embodiment 
for thinking about how human beings relate to one another and to the world around us. Works of 
theology, Biblical studies, and church history also shape the context of this thesis. As exemplified in 
works as diverse as John A. T. Robinson‘s The Body, Peter Brown‘s The Body and Society, James B. 
Nelson‘s Body Theology, Paula M. Cooey‘s Religious Imagination and the Body, Diane L. Prosser 
MacDonald‘s Transgressive Corporeality, Caroline Walker Bynum‘s The Resurrection of the Body in 
Western Christianity, Dale B. Martin‘s The Corinthian Body, and Eugene F. Rogers, Jr.‘s Sexuality 
W 
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Because of links between body and story and between person and person, 
because of the very physicality of such elements as water, bread and wine, and of the 
contact between those elements and participants, this sacramental hermeneutic functions 
as a check against any theological tendency towards an abstraction which diminishes the 
value of creation‘s materiality. Discerning the body suggests that  a proper theological 
account of all that is not only attempts to formulate a truth that is valid ultimately and 
everywhere, but also should address the needs and desires of particular people and the 
relationships portrayed in their particular stories. This has a number of implications. 
Paying attention to the body acts as a call to keep form in mind when doing theology: in 
essence, this means treating theology as a type of creative writing. This also suggests 
that theology as a discipline should go beyond tolerance in accepting a plurality of 
accounts of truth; if bodies are particular, then they are also partial—they cannot include 
everything within their bounds—and if they are partial, then the best way to seek a 
fuller understanding of creation and life is through collaboration with those who hold to 
those different accounts. Difference, together with partiality, suggests that bodies, in 
their distinctiveness, need one another in a dialogical relationship of support. In the end, 
a sacramental hermeneutic asks people to make room for one another, for other bodies 
and other stories, without forgetting their own accounts. 
To explore such a sacramental hermeneutic, this thesis begins with a survey of 
various theological viewpoints on bodies and their narrated relationships, then moves in 
the second part to studies of novels and what they might declare about embodiment, 
                                                                                                                                               
and the Christian Body, Christian theologians of many different perspectives have attempted 
expositions of what the body is according to faith. 
  Theological scholarship concerning the body is even more complex because, beside the many 
works unraveling the specific religious significance of the human body, Christian theologians add 
discussions relating to the doctrine of incarnation; see Sallie McFague‘s The Body of God and 
Margaret R. Miles‘s The Word Made Flesh. Connected to this are investigations into churches‘ ritual 
practices which both to describe and to prescribe that relationship between the body of God and 
human bodies (and the world), particularly in discussions of the theology of sacraments. In writing a 
thesis which looks at the body and sacraments, I follow in the footsteps of a long line of thinkers, and 
my own perspective is shaped (consciously and unconsciously) by such works of the past century as 
Gregory Dix‘s The Shape of the Liturgy, Donald M. Baillie‘s The Theology of the Sacraments & other 
papers, James F. White‘s Sacraments as God’s Self Giving, John D. Zizioulas‘s Being as Communion, 
B.A. Gerrish‘s Grace and Gratitude, Gordon Lathrop‘s Holy Things, and Louis-Marie Chauvet‘s The 
Sacraments. Pointing to liturgical scholarship actually brings us full circle, insomuch as many of the 
liturgical theologians of the last century have situated their work alongside theorists of the body and 
religion, particularly in the case of anthropologists, like Catherine Bell, who have presented ritual as 
embodied practice; for example, see her Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions. Even when they seem 
to ignore one another, all of these discourses are bound together in exceedingly complex ways, and 
generate the context and the background for any discussion of the issues involved with notions of the 
body.  
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before ending with an examination of liturgy in the light of both of these sets of 
investigations. 
But I am leaping ahead a little too quickly. 
 
When Paul, writing his first letter to the Corinthians, recorded what is probably 
the first account of the Lord‘s Supper, he put the narrative into a very specific context. 
He was admonishing the members of the Corinthian church for shortcomings in their 
behaviour toward one another—particularly for the failure of those with wealth and 
power to apportion respect to the poor and needy. Instead of sharing, some ate like 
gluttons while others went hungry, all in what was supposed to be a context of worship.
3
 
To address this, Paul reminded his readers of the events at the heart of their liturgical 
meal and the exhortation Jesus gave to shape their action: ‗Do this in remembrance of 
me‘.4 Although Paul explicitly connects this with Christ‘s death and anticipated return,5 
the act of re-membering Jesus the Christ—piecing together again the fragments of his 
person, his story, his body—also means holding on to the character of his life and 
ethical teaching. Accordingly, Paul goes on to state that 
Whoever, therefore, eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord in an 
unworthy manner will be answerable for the body and blood of the Lord. 
Examine yourselves, and only then eat of the bread and drink of the cup. 




The proper celebration of communion is thus tied to seeing and recognising, being 
attuned to the form and physical being of a person or persons—‗discerning the body‘. 
At first glance, the body requiring discernment is Jesus‘, but, in the context of an epistle 
whose previous chapter asks rhetorically if sharing bread is not a sharing in Christ, 
‗body‘ increases its reference to incorporate at least the members of the Christian 
community.
7
 However, one could take a still larger view, reading this as not confined to 
an identification of one‘s own group of friends and family, but as a call for 
consideration of the enfleshed needs of all God‘s embodied creatures. In this wider 
                                                                                                                                               
3
  1 Corinthians 11:17-22. 
4
  1 Corinthians 11:24. 
5
  1 Corinthians 11:26. 
6
  1 Corinthians 11:27-29. 
7
  1 Corinthians 10:16-17. 
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interpretation, ‗discerning the body‘ involves paying attention to the neighbour, the 




But, again, what exactly does it mean to discern the body? 
Here are two sets of options. 
 
I. Three Stories 
 
A man stands before a hostile crowd, exposed to their scrutiny. He has just been 
tried, flogged and humiliated. Soldiers mock him by clothing him in a purple gown, and 
abuse him by placing a crown of thorns upon his head. This beaten man stands at the 
precarious point when a decision is about to be made on the fate of his life, and his 
judge says, ‗Behold the human being!‘ 
In this image from John‘s Gospel, the evangelist proclaims that the essence of 
humanity is demonstrated in the vulnerability of mortality, that being human is 
inextricably connected to one‘s physical existence. We are shown that human nature is 
                                                                                                                                               
8
  The phrase in New Testament Greek is ‗διακρίνων το σωμα‘ (see Aland, 1 Corinthians 11:29, 594). 
According to A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament (Frederick William Danker, et al., eds., 
231) the word as used in this verse means to ‗recognise‘, and the verb falls within the semantic range 
of ‗to evaluate by paying careful attention to‘. Elsewhere in the New Testament, the word appears in 
Matthew 16:3, where it refers to interpretation, specifically the ability ‗to interpret the appearance of 
the sky‘ (NRSV). Danker, et al., also point to the word being used thus in the Septuagint‘s translation 
of Job (12:11 and 23:10), passages in which the NRSV translates the it as forms of the verb ‗to test‘. 
The notions of evaluation and interpretation seem to go together here, so that ‗discerning the body‘ 
refers to seeing the body correctly and acknowledging its essential character. 
 It should be noted that Martin‘s perspective on the body and its permeability in 1 Cor. leads to a 
somewhat narrower interpretation of this passage. While he argues that ‗body‘ here refers to a number 
of different things—the bread shared in the Eucharist, the body of Christ, the Church, and the bodies 
of individual Christians—Martin does restrict Paul‘s resulting exhortations to a charitable ethic 
particular to the Christian community. ‗Discerning the body‘ is necessary to keep Christians from 
participating unworthily in the sacrament and bringing judgement upon themselves; to discern the 
body rightly would mean to cease acting in a schismatic way that hurts other members of the body of 
Christ (see The Corinthian Body, 190-7). William T. Cavanaugh, in Torture and Eucharist, presents a 
similar interpretation, though emphasising the reference to the corporate Church, in order to argue that 
excommunication of those who sinfully damage the body of Christ (such as torturers) is the only 
conscientious thing to do when eating and drinking the bread and wine unworthily can kill a person; 
the hope is that the excommunicated people will repent and be able to discern the body once again 
(246). However, although these and other commentators do not go further with the idea of ‗discerning 
the body‘ than the boundaries of Christian communities, I still argue that the passage can bear an 
expanded reference, not just because it does not explicitly read ‗discerning the body of Christ‘. If it 
does refer to the way Christians should act—to an ethics of the body which is based upon love—then 
there is no reason to confine that body to a Christian one. Even Cavanaugh, in an earlier mention of 1 
Cor. 11:29, has no problem connecting Paul‘s chastising of Christians who fail to discern the body to 
Ignatius‘ complaints about those who spare no thought for ‗the afflicted, the captive, the hungry or the 
thirsty‘ (Torture and Eucharist, 231). 
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enfleshed in the body: a person is made manifest in the space and time of the world by 
filling up a particular space and taking up a particular time with one‘s material presence. 
In this scene, we human beings, pointedly and poignantly, are embodied creatures. 
This is easy enough to declare. We perceive the world through our senses; we 
become aware of our location on this earth through the extension of our matter, in air, 
against the ground, in relation to one another. Yet, even more than this, when Pilate 
declares, ‗Behold the human being!‘ and points to Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Mary, 
he is pointing to a man in a particular predicament. He presents a man in the fully 
evident weakness of his flesh, a man at the mercy of the world around him. If being 
human indicates embodiment, then embodiment means recognizing the fragility of the 
body, the ease at which our matter may disintegrate, as shown in the fourth Gospel. 
Here is the human person, the human body, made manifest, not in the deeds of power 
which John recounts, not in turning water into wine or making the blind see, but in 
standing, exposed, at the dawn of one‘s last day. What you get is what you see, too—or, 
rather, how you see: to gaze upon this being who has been exposed means being 
exposed yourself, means being naked at the point of your own fragility. 
 
A man stands at the window, looking out at the street. He has resisted the urge to 
pick up his mobile phone, to call, to check the time again. None of that would bring his 
beloved home faster; worse, it might make her think that he was trying to control her by 
keeping tabs on her every move. Telling her about how, at this point in their 
relationship, every absence opens a door to the fear that she will not return would not, 
could not, perhaps should not, make her change her mind on those matters. So he waits, 
teetering on a knife edge of anticipation, straining for the least sign of a familiar shadow 
on the pavement. 
The problem is that he does not know what to do with his body. He picks up a 
book, puts it down. He picks it up again, flips it open, but does not really attend to the 
words while he reads a sentence, maybe two—he is not sure—before lowering the 
volume out of reading range. The man becomes conscious that his foot is tapping 
anxiously. He neatens the flotsam on the table near the window. He looks outside again. 
He would pace, but that would mean moving too far from his vantage point. And when 
she arrives, should he be at the door already? Or should he try sitting as nonchalantly as 
possible, writing maybe, doing something else, averting his gaze as soon as he knows 
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it‘s her who is coming up the walk? But his body will not let him stay still, upsetting his 
every attempt to remain anchored in place.  
This, too, is the body‘s vulnerability, this desire for another‘s presence. The 
heart beats time with footsteps closing down the distance, and has no defence. Disorder 
accompanies the tuning of the gaze towards an irreplaceable beloved: this particular 
one, in becoming precious to you, calls on you to rearrange the habits of your body, 
learning another body‘s rhythms and another voice‘s timbre, the shape of the space that 
limbs gather to themselves. Turning towards another creates the potential to miss them 
when they are gone. The man at the window knows by heart a couplet by one of his 
favourite poets, cutting clear in subtle simplicity: ‗To love as if we‘d choose/ even the 
grief‘.9 This is why his body whirls near the window, like a tiny compass needle in the 
field of the world, seeking its magnetic north. 
Of course, the aches of embodied desire hold more than the promise of future 
suffering. They also offer the possibility of someone who knows you back, who chooses 
to walk beside you and keep you company. The body‘s vulnerability waits for the lilt of 
the steps up the pavement. If being human means being embodied, and being embodied 
is described in the proximity of one to another, being an embodied human being means 
recognising that fragility can be made manifest in joy, too. Bodies turn and call one 
another: 
Arise, my love, my fair one, and come away. 
O my dove, in the clefts of the rock, in the covert of the cliff, 
let me see your face, let me hear your voice; 
for your voice is sweet and your face is lovely.
10
 
Embodiment lies in the unpredictability of the turn and the call, in offering to the 
beloved the serious levity of dancing, the laughter of a kiss, the spark of touch. 
 
It is, perhaps, but a step away from those two moments to a third instance of the 
body. Bread and wine sit upon a table. A minister stands at the edge, in front of the 
people, inviting them to join. The minister prays and picks up the bread, fracturing it, 
breaking it in half while repeating words attributed to Jesus, ‗This is my body which is 
                                                                                                                                               
9
  SD 63. 
10
  Song of Songs 2:13b-14. 
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for you‘.11 No matter how hard the minister tries, that fraction is not neat and cannot be 
contained; crumbs scatter, even though they might only be seen in the aftermath. The 
bread is shared out in fragments, then handed person to person, and eaten. 
To what, exactly, does the ‗this‘ refer, though? Is it the bread, lifted up, 
presented before the people? Is it the action of fracture or, more precisely, the bread as it 
is broken, the bread being shared, so that the body is the collection of fragments even as 
they are dispersed to be consumed? Is it the group that has gathered to partake, this 
disparate worshipping community, or even the minister recapitulating the action of the 
institution of the Lord‘s Supper? Or is ‗this‘ the entirety of these things, and more? Any 
simple connection of ‗this‘ to ‗body‘ and to ‗bread‘ is challenged by the imprecision of 
the language that is used. Meaning arises from the overall complexity of the event. The 
fluidity of the terms and instability of the sense echo the uncontainability and, 
vulnerability of the human body made manifest by Pilate‘s presentation of Jesus and by 
the anxieties of a lover‘s heart. The possibilities of elements, words, remembrances, 
actions and shifting relationships generate meaning in their dynamic contact with one 
another, sparking off touch and encounter in the multiple understandings of body, flesh 
and blood. 
Nothing stays still in this world of liturgy. Meetings shift boundaries. A ritual 
action of devotion meets the remembered story of a faith tradition meets the comedies 
and tragedies of the participating bodies. In contact, one body can become aware of 
another, and can change direction in relation to that other—for a moment of possibility, 
at least. Even then the moment cannot be taken for granted. After the minister breaks 
the bread, when the servers are distributing the body‘s pieces to the bodies, eyes meet 
and share a knowing and known glance—or eyes are cast down, turned away, seeing 
nothing but a pew‘s dusty wood or the plate laden with bread. One person strains to 
catch every word, feels an intensity of connection with everyone in that place. Another 
person is so worried about acting out of turn—do you hold onto the bread when it 
comes, or do you eat it right away, and how exactly is the wine served?—that the 
Eucharist is nothing but an anxiety of motions. 
                                                                                                                                               
11
  The words, as they appear in the three Synoptic Gospels (Matthew 26:26; Mark 14:22; Luke 22:19) 
and Paul‘s first letter to the Corinthians (11:24), vary slightly, but the phrase ‗This is my body‘ occurs 
in all four instances. The liturgical rendition of the saying is also variable, with the most common 
insertion being that this body ‗is broken for you‘.  
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But maybe even if one sees only the bread, or cannot look farther than the wine, 
this is a sufficient beginning. Maybe it still permits Christ to be present, bidding us to 
open our eyes and to listen, to turn outwards and make room for those who are not 
ourselves. Maybe this bread, this loaf of fashioned grain torn and eaten, is enough 
sustenance to bid a person to a passion for the presence of another. Maybe this wine is 
enough of a sip of joy to gain a taste for the euphoria of other people‘s idiosyncratic 
truths. Maybe it is enough to lead bodies to share their stories, and know as they are 
known—to begin discerning the body. 
 
II. Disciplinary Negotiations 
 
What does it mean to discern the body? One way to respond, the way attempted 
above, is to attend to the body‘s poetry, reading the word that the form of the flesh 
inscribes upon the world in the act of living. This way attempts to imagine the truths of 
the body through artistic presentation and evocation. The route is as inexhaustible as 
creativity; although I presented three vignettes, the possible depictions of the body in 
relationship with other bodies are endless. 
A second way to go about answering the question is one, perhaps, more 
appropriate for a doctoral thesis: the essay of exposition, an attempt to dissect and 
ascertain meaning using all the scholarly tools available. The researcher engages in 
conscientious dialogue with all those who have trod this ground before. This way, 
finding out what it means to discern the body requires painstakingly and logically 
weighing evidence and setting parameters for judging the nature of bodies and their 
relationships. Such a method applies to literary studies and theology: paying attention to 
both requires careful, prosaic work—systematically outlining connections, trying to 
make realities plain and understandable. Still, the first path—that of story and poetry—
can never be far away. The untidy fleshiness of the body resists total systematisation. In 
other words, what explanatory discourses reveal about bodies cannot cover every 
nuance of the reality of human experience; creative, artistic discourses also speak of 
realities. Not that these two paths of discourse are totally distinct from each other, one 
picking up where the other leaves off: they intermingle, existing at different levels of 
tension in the same space, wandering over each other‘s terrain. That is why this thesis is 
actually interdisciplinary in (at least) two ways. First, it attempts to do both a 
theological and a literary study of bodies and their relationships. Second, the style shifts 
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as the subject demands; sometimes a more poetic register of reflection encroaches upon 
the explicative in my attempt to account for the unruliness of bodies.  
The interdisciplinary nature of this thesis also arises from my investigation‘s 
liturgical context—that is, from its foundation in a discussion of sacraments. Liturgy 
itself, as the worship discourse of a faith community, has a hybrid nature; it contains 
elements that function both theologically and artistically. While the ordering of prayers, 
hymns, sacraments, and preaching expresses a community‘s theological beliefs, the 
communication of knowledge about a faith is only a part of liturgy; liturgical practice 
also involves the attempt to orient participants towards a posture of responding to God‘s 
gifts and to human needs and desires. There is a creative aspect to even the most set 
form of liturgy. The experience of liturgy can thus be considered interdisciplinary, and 
the thesis echoes this by trying to follow where paying careful attention to bodies and 
their relationships might lead.
12
 
The work proceeds by assuming certain principles. First, bodies are specific to 
particular locations and times; they have locality and position. This means that one of 
the chief characteristics of a body is that it is physically limited: in a very real sense, a 
body is distinct from its surroundings, or from other bodies, though the boundaries 
which keep that body discrete are, paradoxically, simultaneously irreducible and porous. 
                                                                                                                                               
12
  It should be noted that ‗liturgy‘ is almost as hard to define as ‗body‘. Commentators sometimes 
choose to begin etymologically, as Harmon K. Smith does in the preface to his book Where Two or 
Three Are Gathered, noting that ‗The literal meaning of liturgy is ―the people‘s work‖‘, before 
continuing to explain that ‗in the pages which follow, a community‘s liturgy serves as one of the 
principal ways in which we do our work of prayer‘ (xi). Such definitions seem to provide a general 
method for describing the worship discourse of any faith community. However, it appears that 
Christian liturgists and liturgical theologians have a marked tendency to slip from ‗liturgy‘ to ‗the 
liturgy‘ without making a clear distinction. Smith does this in his preface‘s very next sentence: 
‗Understood as a form of prayer, the liturgy throughout adores and praises and petitions and worships 
God‘ (xi). The definite article narrows the reference, and also suggests that there is some universal 
liturgy behind any actual liturgical practice. Gordon Lathrop, after referring to ‗the liturgy‘ both as a 
synonym for ‗the Sunday meeting‘ of the Church and as ‗the ancient name of the assembly for 
worship and its actions‘, writes that ‗the similarity—in the patterns and in the problems, in the full 
Christian heritage and in the current human horizon—of all the actual local gatherings for worship 
makes possible an ecumenical liturgical theology‘ (HT, 1, 3, 4). I suspect the use of the definitive 
article springs from a desire to account for an excessive nature in worship; that is, what happens 
during worship in word and action cannot be exhaustively defined—it is unruly, much like the body. 
(See HT 5) Appealing to ‗the liturgy‘ functions to reach towards a mystical realm to help explain the 
way liturgy seems to mean more than what literally is said and done. The difficulty that arises from 
this is the slippage towards a confusion in terms, from ‗liturgy‘ used as a general descriptive category 
and ‗liturgy‘ used as a name for a very specific theological role of the Christian Church, such as in the 
definition supplied by J. D. Crichton: that liturgy is ‗the communal celebration by the Church, which 
is Christ‘s body and in which he with the Holy Spirit is active, of the paschal mystery‘ (Crichton 28). 
 To help forestall any confusion here, references to ‗liturgy‘ in this thesis are to the more general term, 
unless otherwise noted. 
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Second, each human body is distinct and individual in its character. Third, the body 
carries its story with it. Bodies have a history, a narrative which is available for 
interpretation; the form of the body is not static, but alters over time. As Jean Vanier has 
written, ‗[w]e are the fruit of our history, the sum of all that we have experienced since 
our conception; each event, happy or sad, is inscribed in our flesh, and even if our 
memory does not remember it, our body, itself, remembers everything‘.13 Because of 
our existence as embodied creatures, being born, growing old, and dying, all while 
interacting with the world around us, our bodies function as living narratives, marked by 
experience and encounter. But I would expand Vanier‘s summary of the storied nature 
of the body to include a person‘s connection to ancestors and descendents; these also 
give form to a body. Fourth, a human body is actually many bodies. One can understand 
one‘s body through many different systems all at the same time: one can have a 
religious body, a biological body, a social body, and more. The same boundaries that 
make each body discrete also generate plurality by organising matter into separate 
entities.  
These assumptions are important because they govern the discussion and method 
of my thesis. If bodies are particular, and specifically located, and if they carry stories 
and exist in plurality, then any account which reduces or sidesteps this complexity 
ignores a portion of reality, potentially allowing some facets of life and being to slip by 
unperceived. The body‘s form, the shape of what plays on and under the skin, the eye 
on the predicament of the heart: all of these things, and more, tell us something of the 
true weight of a person. While Christian theology, in part because of the doctrine of the 
incarnation, does not ignore creation and the materiality of life, Christian theologians 
have not always accounted for the form of the body when considering the nature and 
function of human beings. Too often, meaning has been separated from matter, and the 
latter seen merely as a vehicle for some other real substance.
14
 This provides another 
                                                                                                                                               
13
  Jean Vanier, La source des larmes 43. My translation from the French text: ‗Nous sommes le fruit de 
notre histoire, la somme de tout ce que nous avons vécu depuis notre conception; chaque événement, 
heureux ou malheureux, s‘est inscrit dans notre chair, et même si notre mémoire ne s‘en souvient pas, 
notre corps, lui, se souvient de tout.‘ 
14
  Or worse. Douglas John Hall, while decrying the paucity of traditional Christian theology‘s profession 
of the goodness of creation, notes that one can ‗discern a strong propensity to equate sin and finitude‘ 
(Professing the Faith 81). To the degree that form involves the shaping of a body by the binding of its 
material into a specific and limited location (or range of locations), form and finitude are linked; 
connecting finitude to the sinful condition of humanity‘s existence then results in a suggestion that 
form is only important insomuch as it reflects something that is not chained to material finitude. 
Feminist theologians, such as Rosemary Radford Ruether, have noted the oppressive consequences of 
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reason for the interdisciplinarity of this thesis: that the tension between certain literature 
and certain theology might push towards a stronger consideration of the form of bodies. 
It could be said that, in literary art, a reader is asked to apprehend the sense of what is 
being told not just through the content of what is written but also through the way it is 
written—through the sound of phrases, the lie of the letters on the page, and so forth. 
Thus, works of literature might help teach theologians the significance of form, insofar 




What all this discussion of meetings between disciplines and genres translates 
into is the basic structure of this thesis: theology, literature, liturgy. Before I move on, 
however, some further foundational matters remain. First, there remains the question of 
definition: what, exactly, is the body? After that, I examine works that move in similar 
territory, and propose why this project is different. This introduction then ends by 




One of the problems with theological discourse about bodies arises from the 
elusive meaning of the word ‗body‘. When you speak about a body, you could be 
speaking of quite a wide range of possible things or situations, a range that is extremely 
challenging to delimit. The word refers to several different organisations of matter: a 
                                                                                                                                               
a theological adoption of a hierarchy of meaning (spirit) over matter, especially in the way some 
persons and creatures are portrayed as more earthy, more connected to their finite, material forms, and 
so less valued (see Ruether, ‗Woman, Body, and Nature: Sexism and the Theology of Creation‘, 
Sexism and God-Talk 72-92). From another point of view, Charles E. Winquist begins his project 
Desiring Theology with a reflection upon the type of thinking at the heart of theology from the 
Enlightenment to the end of the twentieth century. He posits that the end project of the philosophy of 
René Descartes in his search for certainty was ‗a smaller world than the world he began with‘ 
(Winquist 14). The thinking such a philosophy heralded—and which theology took up—excluded all 
that was not neat and distinct, including the messiness of the body. (It should be noted that, in 
response, Winquist called for a ‗messier‘ interrogation in which ‗Truth, instead of being a clean, well-
lit place, will be an experiment that will include in its data the body and its desires‘ (Winquist 15). 
15
  This is not to say that literature eclipses theology, or that all theologians are ignorant of questions 
concerning form (I have already referred to the work of Charles Winquist, and another example would 
be Rubem A. Alves, The Poet, The Warrior, The Prophet). Instead, I am arguing that the accounts of 
the body given in much of theology and those given in much of literature go about their work in 
different ways, such that a meeting of the two is fruitful for my essay in discerning the body. In their 
attempts to imagine worlds, some novelists and poets pay a great deal of attention to form; in this 
thesis, I explore some examples of this.  
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part of an existing whole (e.g. a ‗torso‘); the physical fabric of a particular person or 
other creature; a collection of individuals. Where theology and religious studies are 
concerned, it appears that a frequent solution to the thorny issue of definition is 
avoidance. For example, the entry ‗Body‘ in the book Critical Terms for Religious 
Studies never states what precisely the body is (beyond the use of the adjective 
‗human‘) and uses most of its pages to discuss what might be done religiously and 
ethically to or with this nondescript body.
16
 This shrug of the shoulders is not restricted 
to theological discourse, as can be seen in The Oxford Companion to the Body, a 
reference work which attempts to present the body from the perspective of both science 
and the humanities; the Companion‘s preface begins by declaring that 
We are our bodies. The evolution of humanity is the adaptation of 
bodies. Bodies are the tangible material of being. Bodies contain us, 
restrain us, perplex us, attract us, disgust us. They are the objects of most 
of the thoughts and actions of human beings. Scientists, writers, artists 
and poets are bodies with a mission. It is no surprise that the mission has 
centred so intensely on the body itself.
17
 
This suggestion that the body is that aspect of a human being that can be touched is the 
closest to a definition that the reference work offers. Even this must be teased out from 
competing statements, first that ‗We are our bodies‘ and then that ‗Bodies are the 
tangible material of being‘. Bodies are subjects (‗we‘ equals ‗our bodies‘) and objects 
(of human ‗thoughts and actions‘) at the same time. Bodies seem to slide back and forth 
between being human persons and being some ‗other‘ which can act upon us. 
As long as the word fits under such broad headings as ‗human‘, ‗material‘, and 
‗form‘, ‗body‘ can mean almost anything. But if this is so, is there not a danger that it 
could also mean nothing? The sociologist Bryan S. Turner summarizes the paradoxical 
problem in the introduction to the first edition of The Body and Society: 
In writing this study of the body, I have become increasingly less sure of 
what the body is. The paradoxes illustrate the confusion. The body is a 
material organism, but also a metaphor; it is the trunk apart from head 
and limbs, but also the person (as in ‗anybody‘ and ‗somebody‘). The 
body may also be an aggregate of bodies, often with legal personality as 
in ‗corporation‘ or in ‗the mystical body of Christ‘. Such aggregate 
bodies may be regarded as legal fictions or as social facts which exist 
independently of the ‗real‘ bodies which happen to constitute them. 
There are also immaterial bodies which are possessed by ghosts, spirits, 
demons and angels. In some cultures, such immaterial bodies may have 
                                                                                                                                               
16
  William R. LaFleur, ‗Body‘, Critical Terms for Religious Studies 36-54. 
17
  Colin Blakemore and Sheila Jennett, Preface, The Oxford Companion to the Body. 
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major social roles and have important social locations within the system 
of stratification. There are also persons with two bodies, such as 
mediaeval kings who occupied simultaneously their human body and 
their sovereign body. Then there are heavenly bodies, the geometry of 
bodies in space, the harmony of spheres and corpuscular light. Given 
this elusive quality of ‗the body‘, it is perhaps appropriate that the Old 
English bodig, corresponding to the Old High German botah, is of 
unknown origin. Like ontic, bodig is everywhere and nowhere. The body 
is our most immediate and omnipresent experience of reality and its 
solidity, but it may also be subjectively elusive.
18
 
All of this suggests that, rather than one ‗body‘, there are many. They nest within one 
another, and as they do so, they rub off on one another semantically. You cannot isolate 
one understanding of the body from other understandings, one body from the others.
19
 
In their consideration of these many bodies, theorists have developed various 
methods for coping with the elusive nature of an irreducibly material body. Judith 
Butler begins her landmark work, Bodies that Matter, with several quotations, including 
this one from Gayatri Spivak: 
                                                                                                                                               
18
  Bryan S. Turner, The Body & Society 42. 
19
  The Oxford English Dictionary‘s entry for ‗Body‘ contains an amusingly bewildering array of 
definitions, clustered under five broad headings, which start with ‗The material frame of man (and 
animals)‘ and move from there until ending with a group referring to ‗body‘ as a technical or scientific 
term for disparate entities (OED, vol. II 354-5). A reader can observe a number of interesting notions 
from the Dictionary. 1. While the entry attempts to be as generic as possible, it retains the old-
fashioned (and exclusivist) term ‗man‘ for ‗human being‘, inadvertently reminding us that human 
bodies are not homogeneous: ‗man‘ as a word for the species ignores women, calling attention to the 
fact that bodies are sexual and gendered. 2. There can be quite an eccentric fluidity under a single 
heading. For example, in the first group, concerning the ‗material frame‘, definitions include: the 
structure of a creature, or material organism; a corpse; the application of the word to the element of 
bread in the Eucharist; and obsolete ‗oaths and forcible ejaculations‘ such as ‗God‘s body!‘ (OED, II, 
354). This reinforces the sense of the multiplicity of usages of the word. 3. One of the groups of 
meanings refers to ‗body‘ as a synonym for ‗person‘ or ‗individual‘; this includes a definition of the 
word as ‗The material being of man, as the sign and tangible part of his individuality, taken for the 
whole, the person‘ (OED, II, 355). Here, the body is not the whole, but only ‗taken for the whole‘, so 
that, the physical presence of a person is deemed a walking, breathing synecdoche. On the one hand, 
this points to a dualistic tendency in thought about the body—if the body is a sign, what matters more 
is whatever it is that the body is a sign of—a tendency persisting throughout the OED‘s entry, which 
includes phrases such as ‗often contrasted with the soul‘ (OED, II, 354, italics in original) and 
associates the body with the material as opposed to the immaterial. On the other hand, the tangibility 
of this sign also suggests that what cannot be seen or touched can only be known through that which 
can be seen or touched. The body as sign becomes the mediator of personality and individual identity. 
4. Another main group of definitions comes under the heading ‗A corporate body, aggregate of 
individuals, collective mass‘ (OED, II, 355). With this, applying the term ‗body‘ to a collective gives 
it an organic character. It also suggests that the whole is greater than any of its individual parts—that 
the organisation has a more important place than the individual people who compose it. Such an 
extrapolation of the creaturely body to a collective becomes a way to theorise the body at a distance 
from its vulnerability; that is, the emphasis on the aggregate whole is an emphasis on the desired 
neatness of organisational structure rather than the untidiness of flesh and blood. 
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If one really thinks about the body as such, there is no possible outline of 
the body as such. There are thinkings of the systematicity of the body, 
there are value codings of the body. The body, as such, cannot be 
thought, and I certainly cannot approach it.
20
 
In other words, the body is the understanding with which you fill it; the idea that the 
body has ‗value codings‘ suggests that what defines the body are the values with which 
a human being encodes that body, whether theirs or other‘s. In this formulation, ‗body 
as such‘, then, does not really exist. The body becomes the arena of various 
understandings of what humanity is, how society functions, and how human 
consciousness meets the world. 
Further on, Butler demonstrates more fully how this approach to the body works. 
She writes that 
The body posited as prior to the sign, is always posited or signified as 
prior. This signification produces as an effect of its own procedure the 
very body that it nevertheless and simultaneously claims to signify and 
discover as that which precedes its own action. If the body signified as 
prior to signification is an effect of signification, then the mimetic or 
representational status of language, which claims that signs follow 
bodies as their necessary mirrors, is not mimetic at all. On the contrary, 
it is productive, constitutive, one might even argue performative, 
inasmuch as this signifying act delimits and contours the body that it 
then claims to find prior to any and all signification.
21
 
Butler argues that our language about the body (with language taken quite broadly, 
including both words and communicative practices) is what produces the body—at 
least, our language produces our understanding of the body. She notes a circularity: the 
assumption that the body is irreducible as the locus of the expression of human 
experience functions, in itself, as an act of language; the body can never simply be the 
starting point of linguistic expression. Instead, any claim about the body also defines the 
body. The key word here is ‗performative‘. Any systems of signs which constellate 
around the body perform what their speakers mean when they say the word ‗body‘. This 
performativity works not as an instantaneous change, but as a habit, instances repeated 
over time.
22
 The identifications of a body‘s shape receive form over time, as a plurality 
of rituals, or reiterations of practices, accruing from biological, social and personal 
                                                                                                                                               
20
  Qtd. in BM 1. 
21
  BM 30. Italics in original 
22
  BM 9-10. 
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To the extent that the body becomes the site for investigations into the function 
of the organisation of matter, theorists admit little need to define what the body is. For 
example, in Discipline and Punish Michel Foucault portrays the body as the location 
where power works its hegemony over human flesh. While charting the evolution of 
punishment in Europe and North America and the rise of the modern prison, Foucault 
notes the way the ‗politics of the body‘ involved in societal acts of justice changed from 
an inscribing of monarchical sovereignty in the flesh of criminals to a system in which 
punishment applied to a body transformed it into a sign of the proper order of things for 
all who witnessed it, then to an understanding of punishment as the training of the body 
to make a person fit their place in society.
24
 The book chronicles the social body‘s 
implication of power within the physical body. Mary Douglas‘s account of the body in 
her classic work, Purity and Danger, is quite similar. Writing about the beliefs of 
various societies concerning bodily pollution and purification, she declares that ‗We 
cannot possibly interpret rituals concerning excreta, breast milk, saliva and the rest 
unless we are prepared to see in the body a symbol of society, and to see the powers and 
dangers credited to social structure reproduced in small on the human body‘.25 Douglas 
examines rules of cleanness and uncleanness, arguing that the physical body‘s 
regulation through ritual represents the social relations of the body politic. Although one 
presents the body as symbolic and the other as demonstrative of society‘s beliefs, both 
Douglas and Foucault investigate the individual body in order to illuminate aggregate 
bodies. The body is defined as a microcosm of society, and treated as a resource for 
understanding the macrocosm. 
                                                                                                                                               
23
  Butler‘s primary interest in BM lies with the formation of gender and sexuality. If the body‘s 
materiality depends upon the nature of social and other practices, then gender or sexuality also is 
constructed by the systems of signs ritually attached to a person. Butler, however, warns against 
construing this to mean that any person‘s sexual identity is created by their free choice. While her 
presentation of the performativity of the body denies biological essentialism (that sex and gender are 
determined genetically and fixed by the physical specifics with which a person is born), this does not 
mean that biology is not included among the many levels of constraint which shape the body with a 
‗forced reiteration of norms‘ (94). Butler thus argues that performativity works by imposing upon a 
body a set of limits within which what a person imagines (and is able to imagine) helps to determine a 
final shape. 
24
  Foucault 103, 130-1. 
25
  Douglas 142. 
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This theoretical urge to utilise the body as an avenue for exploring social 
relations causes particular bodies and their stories to fade from view. The more unruly 
aspects of the body, the messy and concrete oddities of joy and pain alike, elude the 
focus on organising principles, while that part of the body which represents an overall 
system stands out. Some theorists do proceed differently: for instance, in The Body in 
Pain, Elaine Scarry examines the body as the site of a person‘s opening (or closing) to 
the world. When a person suffers pain or is tortured by another, the world of their 
imagination contracts to the edge of their flesh; creativity, on the other hand, expands a 
person‘s world as experienced through their body.26 To explore this more closely, 
Scarry first examines human actions which inflict pain and unmake the world (torture 
and war), and then activities which imagine the body as part of the larger world 
(religious/political belief, and the fashioning of artefacts), expanding, rather than 
diminishing, human reach. Rather than being a microcosm of the social body, the flesh-
and-blood body functions as a link to what is other than the self. Nonetheless, Scarry 
never actually defines ‗body‘ beyond referring to it as the point at which person and 
world meet. Thus, along with Foucault and Douglas, and similar to Butler, Scarry treats 
the body as a field of inquiry, a locus which attaches to certain narratives about being 
human. 
 
Bodies and Texts 
 
The body is everything and nothing. Embodiment is every story and none. The 
body is where we are located in the world, but also where we locate the world, as we 
socially construct the body and give ourselves direction through our bodies. Is the body 
itself the great human text, or is the body the medium on which we write—reflective 
humanity‘s living parchment, the vulnerable paper of our creative writing? Or are body 
and blood human pen and ink for the stories that we leave on the skin of earth and time? 
The problem is that none of these ideas is wrong. Whenever one tries to talk 
about ‗the body and theology/story/sacraments/humanity/meaning/world/love/scripture/ 
other‘, one finds that subject and object in the discussion refuse to stay still. The 
plurality of meaning attached to the word ‗body‘ undermines any attempt at precise 
                                                                                                                                               
26
  BP 22-3. 
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definition and subverts any borders one might attempt to erect in an effort to confine the 
topic of study under one‘s surveillance. The ‗body‘ is nearly impossible to pin down. 
In an article published in 1995, Caroline Bynum describes how reference to the 
body has meant many different things to many different people.
27
 Over many 
disciplines, conversations about the body have multiplied, but each conversation has 
involved a remarkably isolated group of enquirers, who for the most part remain 
oblivious to the other conversations going on in the world around them. At the same 
time, the welter of conversation about the body tends to use the idea of the body—to 
turn the body into a cipher, a shell shaped by the purpose of the enquirer (as I noted 
above). Bynum quotes a friend: 
―There‘s so much written about the body,‖ she groans, ―but it all focuses 
on such a recent period. And in so much of it, the body dissolves into 
language. The body that eats, that works, that dies, that is afraid—that 
body just isn‘t there.‖28 
To talk about the body makes it far too easy to forget that there are many bodies. With 
that forgetfulness, particularities can collapse; with the collapse of particularity, the 
danger arises that, since no one body can be the body, only the most convenient body 
will matter. 
You can reverse Bynum‘s observation, however, to note that the persistent 
unruliness of the body undermines the steadily theoretical corporate body. No body is 
simply a cog in a machine. The capacity to feel pleasure and pain in one‘s body, and to 
attempt to negotiate an understanding or incorporate them into one‘s character, unsettles 
any neat categorisation. The idea of the body is fragmented, but those fragments are not 
separate from each other. This is not only a lexographical problem. Theologically 
speaking, interest in the body has involved seeking to control its instability. For 
example, if you look to the Biblical ―body‖ you will find Leviticus‘ careful locating of 
the body within society,
29
 or the Pauline body which ―grows into a holy temple in the 
Lord.‖30 Christian theology has struggled with flesh and body, body and soul, heaven 
                                                                                                                                               
27
  Caroline Bynum, ‗Why All the Fuss about the Body? A Medievalist‘s Perspective‘. 
28
  Bynum, ‗Why all the fuss‘, 1. 
29
  See, for instance, Leviticus 19:27-8 where certain hairstyles and tattoos are forbidden; these laws are 
connected to the exclusivity of the Israelites‘ relationship to God and the way their bodily practices 
reflect that relationship. 
30
  Ephesians 2:21.  See also throughout 1 Corinthians where Paul dwells upon the nature of the body and 
its connection to the church as a community as well as its connection to God in Christ. 
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and earth—all tendencies towards dualism rooted in seeing the body‘s flesh as both the 
site of sin and the dwelling place of the incarnate Lord. Christianity admits many 
―bodies‖ but seldom permits them to touch one another. Sociology has its own problems 
with the body; for the most part, that discipline has tried to systematize the body 
through its place in a culture, to list the effects which social beliefs have upon the 
human body and aggregates thereof. As Simon J. Williams and Gillian Bendelow note, 
the tendency has been towards ―a sociology of the body, which ‗objectifies‘ and 
‗subjectifies‘ the body from ‗outside‘.‖31  But, again, the body refuses to remain still.  
This thesis follows a long line of theological projects which have attempted to 
pin down an understanding of the body. These works fall into several broad categories.  
 
1. Some theologians seek to explore the meaning and significance of the body 
starting from theological or scriptural doctrine, basically taking a close look at what 
religious voices say about physical, fleshly life. Mary Timothy Prokes demonstrates this 
line of thought in Toward a Theology of the Body, stating that the book ‗locates the 
meaning of embodiment within the core revealed mysteries of the Christian faith‘ and 
undertakes to connect ‗this meaning to concrete historical experience‘.32 Such a project 
investigates the body according to theological beliefs and reflections on it, focusing on 
the place of the body in religious culture. Thus, many investigations which follow this 
route are specifically historical or biblical studies. The works of Caroline Bynum and 
Margaret Miles fall into this category. Miles writes that ‗As the religion of the 
Incarnation, Christianity is about the construction of Christian bodies and, according to 
Christian belief, the perfection of Christian bodies in the resurrection of the flesh‘.33 
Therefore, the historical approach, as demonstrated by Miles and Bynum, looks not only 
at what beliefs Christian thinkers expressed, but also at the habitual practices of 
members of churches at particular times in history and, like all historical investigation, 
relies on the interpretation of available documentary evidence. 
Various biblical studies connect to this historical model in a range of ways. At 
one end of the spectrum are works like Dale Martin‘s The Corinthian Body, which 
draws upon an array of sources to produce a portrait of the way Paul and the Corinthians 
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  Simon J. Williams and Gillian Bendelow, The Lived Body:  Sociological Themes, Embodied Issues 5. 
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  Mary Timothy Prokes, Toward a Theology of the Body x. 
33
  Miles, Word Made Flesh 2. 
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probably would have understood the notion of ‗body‘; Martin places the epistle to the 
Corinthians in the wider context of the Roman Empire, and uses what is known about 
mentalities and approaches of that time to interpret the apostle‘s writings. At the other 
end, in God’s Gym: Divine Male Bodies of the Bible, Stephen D. Moore performs a 
close reading of Scripture and interpretations thereof to examine both the affinity of 
biblical studies with medicine (especially surgery) and the corporeal nature of God.  
Gathering together textual images of God from the Old Testament and Christ from the 
New to present a ‗gigantic God‘ and a ‗colossal Christ‘, whose own bodily self-creation 
and self-perfection becomes the narcissistic model to which faith calls human beings, he 
argues that bodybuilding is the best metaphor for being made in God‘s image.34 
Scholarship such as Martin‘s really stands as historical research, focused on a very 
specific text and time period; Moore‘s scholarship is a more explicitly interdisciplinary 
exploration of textual meaning, though, in the end, the weight of the metaphor tends to 
lean in one direction, with the images of bodybuilding presented as a way to understand 
the scriptural body, rather than vice versa. 
The emphasis of my thesis is neither biblical nor historical. I examine 
theological texts, and behind these stand readings of the Bible (including my own), but I 
leave detailed reconstructions of the body in specific eras of the past to the historians 
and biblical scholars. Instead, this thesis employs literary studies, placing fictional 
narratives of the body beside those of modern theologians. However, much can be 
learned from the historical and biblical studies, on which a study like mine depends. I 
try to heed some of the warnings and instructions they provide. As Caroline Bynum 
writes, when considering critical questions concerning the body and thinkers concerned 
with the body, ‗the past is seldom usefully examined by assuming that its specific 
questions or their settings are the same as those of the present‘.35 Theorising the body 
depends upon the questions that a person asks, and the questions a person asks depend 
upon the culture in which one lives; I have tried to keep this in mind in my own 
                                                                                                                                               
34
  The first part of Stephen D. Moore, God’s Gym: Divine Male Bodies of the Bible describes the Bible 
as Christ‘s risen body and then argues that the science of Biblical criticism is an act of dissection, 
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  Bynum, ‗Why All the Fuss‘, 29. 
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investigations. Yet the present is also a product of what has been inherited, including 
discourses about bodies.
36
 Nothing that I write is free from the web of concerns which 
have shaped thinking, nor from all the historic particularities and varieties of bodies 
which have existed. 
 
2. Another category of theological work on the body is closely related to the first 
group in starting, generally, from doctrine (whether theological or critical/theoretical), 
but is distinguished from the first by purpose and motivation: this category is composed 
of investigations into the meaning of bodies which spring from justice issues, such as 
Liberation, Feminist, and Queer Theologies. From this standpoint, Douglas John Hall 
provides a good, succinct statement of what Christian theology is for, writing that ‗What 
is called for, in short, is a dynamic discipleship that combines realism about the awful 
discrepancy between the world as it is and as God intends it to be, with the confidence 
that it is realizable, and in part through our discipleship‘.37 The term ‗dynamic 
discipleship‘ suggests an activist theology, stressing the role that Christians have in 
moving the world closer to what God intends. To move the world also means attending 
to justice for bodies and their relationships. Liberation Theologies focus on economic 
issues which are, of course, bodily determined, and seek to remedy the plight of the 
poor through a theological response to systematic sin in the world; many Feminist 
Theologies also focus on bodily issues, emphasising questions of gender and 
sexuality.
38
 In any case, because these politically and social-justice oriented 
investigations ask particular questions of the body, prompted by their various 
emancipatory goals, they tend to focus on very particular aspects of corporeality. For 
                                                                                                                                               
36
  Bynum, ‗Why All the Fuss‘, 30. 
37
  Hall 172. 
38
  Feminist Theologies are often associated with struggles toward equality involving gender, seeking to 
undermine patriarchal systems. In Sexism and God-Talk, Rosemary Radford Ruether declares that 
‗The critical principle of feminist theology is the promotion of the full humanity of women‘. The 
determination of the reference of the term ‗women‘ involves discussions of biology, cultural 
stereotypes, social performance, desires and imaginations. For an example of Christian feminist 
theological discourse concerning gender, sexuality, and God, see Julie Clague, ‗The Christa: 
Symbolizing My Humanity and My Pain‘, in which Clague points to artistic renderings of crucified 
women as actions subverting the androcentric assumption that ‗masculine‘ is the default gender for 
human beings. 
However, there are other ways of construing Feminist Theology which focus less on the goal of 
systematic justice (not that this disappears) and more on providing a platform for previously-unheard 
female voices to speak. For instance, the Jewish feminist Judith Plaskow critiques theology‘s 
exclusion of women‘s experience in ―Male Theology and Women‘s Experience‖ 42. 
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example, in his 1999 book, Sexuality and the Christian Body: Their Way into the Triune 
God, Eugene F. Rogers, Jr., discusses the place of homosexual love and same-sex 
marriage in the body of Christ, raising issues which are currently controversial for 
church and society, but does not examine sexuality beyond the one specific question.
39
 
The aims of Queer Theologies, in particular, centre on interpretations of bodies 
and relationships, and appear close to what I attempt in attending to the plurality of 
stories of bodies. However, the presentation of Queer Theology in the collection Queer 
Theology: Rethinking the Western Body raises some questions about the fit. The editor, 
Gerard Loughlin, presents Christian theology as an exercise that ‗has always been a 
queer thing‘.40 God, the incarnation, the church, salvation: all are queer, set apart from 
what the world considers normal.
41
 Loughlin suggests that the collection pursues the 
idea that same-sex love‘s legitimacy lies in the fact that Christian men have been falling 
for a male Saviour for two millennia.
42
 This rethinking of the western body seems 
remarkably bloodless, however. Little attention is paid to particular stories, comic or 
tragic, except in the first chapter, which tells the story of a theologian‘s estrangement 
from her church and job when she came out as a lesbian; Loughlin‘s introduction 
minimizes even this, saying that other contributors are more hopeful.
43
 The introduction 
declares that ‗Queer seeks to outwit identity‘ and that ‗Elizabeth Stuart‘s chapter is 
programmatic‘ for the book.44 This chapter maintains that ‗At my death all that has been 
written on my body will be once again overwritten by my baptism‘ so that ‗Gender, 
race, sexual orientation, family, nationality, and all other culturally constructed 
identities will not survive the grave‘.45 The vision for equality of sexualities thus 
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presented really is the end of sex; all of the stories of the lived body, the narratives 
which create identity, get subsumed by the queerest story ever told, that of God with 
God‘s people. For this version of Queer Theology, the concentration on sex becomes a 
forgetting of the body, while my project seeks to do exactly the opposite. 
Studies of the body from a social justice perspective do not have to focus 
exclusively on one aspect of the body, or diminish the variability of flesh. An example 
quite close to my own argument is Paula M. Cooey‘s Religious Imagination and the 
Body: A Feminist Analysis, in which the central question is: ‗What is the relation 
between an imagining subject and the body in the context of religious life and 
practices?‘46 Cooey examines the connection between bodies and people‘s imaginative 
employment of religion in the construction of their worlds, complete with values and 
meanings. She begins with a survey of relevant theory before working through her own 
hypotheses with attention to creative work, such as author Toni Morrison‘s and painter 
Frida Kahlo‘s.47 The book focuses on women‘s bodies and feminist theory, probably 
because, as Cooey states, ‗the cultural identification of ―woman‖ with ―body‖ requires 
that any discussion of the relation between the imagination and the body acknowledge 
the necessity for analysis and critique on the basis of gender difference‘.48 Cooey 
concludes ‗that the body serves as a compelling moral and religious authority to claims 
for justice‘; she posits that the ‗relationship between a ―bodied,‖ imagining subject and 
the body imagined…is one of mapping‘, where a person charts on and through her flesh 
the many levels of reality she encounters and imagines while interacting with herself, 
other people, and the world.
49
 The body becomes the place where human values 
materialise. Cooey‘s approach and mine are very similar in that both appeal to artistic 
making to analyse the body. Still, the projects are not the same. The difference lies in 
Cooey‘s focus on symbolic systems, and the body‘s construction as an expression of 
those systems: my thesis focuses less on systems and the relationship between the 
imagination and the body per se, and more on the relationship between bodies, plural, as 
seen in the imaginative worlds our stories create. But from Cooey I learn that there are 
multiple inflections of body and imagination involved in the complex of identities 
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composing any person, visible in the body ‗as [an] artifact‘ of human efforts to map 
one‘s position in relation to others. 
 
3. Other theologians attempt to rescue the body‘s image and value for theology, 
which has, in James B. Nelson‘s words, ‗mistrusted, feared, and discounted our 
bodies‘.50 Nelson‘s Body Theology is a good example of this. In the preface, he defines 
the approach that he follows as ‗doing theology in such a way that we take our body 
experiences seriously as occasions of revelation‘.51 Nelson‘s book reflects many of the 
usual locations for theological discussions of the body: sexuality, gender (for Nelson, 
men‘s) issues, and medical issues.52 His analysis follows the usual tropes of theological 
investigations of the body: saying that ‗We do not just have bodies, we are bodies‘; 
taking issue with the mind/body dualism of Descartes and his mechanistic portrayal of 
the body; and calling upon Christians ‗to move into the deeper meanings of our body 
and sexual experience‘.53 This approach treats the body and its experiences as a source 
for theology, a route for learning about God. ‗Body theology begins with the concrete‘, 
Nelson writes, in order to become ‗critical reflection on our bodily experience as a 
fundamental realm of the experience of God‘.54 He describes bodies as ‗words‘ that ‗In 
Christ…are redefined as body words of love‘ in order to ‗speak of God to us, and of us 
to God‘.55 The idea of the body communicating meaning is very similar to the method 
used by many of the sociological and anthropological theorists: the body becomes a sign 
to be deciphered, which gives information about something other than the body. This is 
not necessarily something separate from the body—God may be said to ‗work through‘ 
or ‗dwell in‘ a person—but the approach takes the point of connection as a focus, 
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A recent trilogy of books by the theologian David Brown should be mentioned 
here, not only because the books fall into this category of interpreting the body as a 
source for theology, but also because their perspective is a broadly sacramental one and 
they seek an understanding of materiality through a wide range of creative arts.
57
 While 
only one of the books specifically focuses on body, all three explore experiences which 
are enacted or known by or through the body, examples of matter manipulated or met by 
human beings. Brown looks at varied subjects, such as pilgrimage, architecture, pop 
music, poetry, and drama. He declares that the trilogy is about ‗religious experience as 
mediated through culture and the arts‘.58 In short, Brown strives to demonstrate how the 
presence of the divine is transmitted ‗through the material universe‘.59 This includes the 
idea of God ‗speaking through‘ bodies.60 The books largely represent an apologetic 
exercise: Brown argues that, at one time, all of human life was viewed as an arena for 
encountering the transcendent, but modern theology has increasingly restricted such 
encounters to specifically religious forms of experience; by looking at the 
communication of God through the physical world, Brown hopes to prompt a return to 
an attitude that refuses to bound God by the narrowly religious.
61
 It is at this point that 
Brown‘s series differs from my own project. While it may be necessary to remind some 
Christian theologians that God is present throughout all of God‘s creation, my interest 
lies in what may be said theologically about bodies themselves and their own story, and 
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the way sacraments point to the relationality of bodies. Though Brown‘s books also 
look at artistic works, they treat such works as instrumental to a specific way of thinking 
about God, rather than as valuable for their own sakes. 
 
4. One final theological approach to comprehending the body focuses on the 
constellation of meanings around one particular body, that of Christ. For such studies, 
any discussion of bodies relates to Christ‘s body understood in any of three ways: the 
body of Jesus of Nazareth (in life, death or resurrection); a synonym for the Church; or, 
in the sacramental sense, as that in which one shares when one participates in the 
Eucharist.
62
 The second sense, of course, is the purview of ecclesiology; certain strands 
of Christian ethics and systematic theology also privilege the aggregate definition for 
organising the followers of Christ.
63
 Several Christian theologians build their 
discussions of the Church as body of Christ around the sacramental figure of the body 
of Christ in the Eucharist, seeing the Church‘s liturgical sense of corporeality as 
emblematic or programmatic for the Church‘s actual action as an institution and 
community.
64
 Concentrating on the social definition of ‗body of Christ‘ lets such 
theologians emphasise the corporate, relational nature of Christian faith, reminding 
believers that following Christ does not involve an isolated bond between oneself and 
God, but also calls for companionship with other Christians (fellow members of the 
body of Christ) and with strangers (fellow children of God). However, it should also be 
noted that stressing the aggregate body of Christ carries perilous temptations, too: one 
might ignore the concrete realities of many churches for sight of the body as one 
Church, or lose sight of particular bodies and their stories, including both Jesus of 
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Nazareth and the many individual bodies of the members of churches (not to mention 
what might be forgotten about non-Christians), all because any such aggregate body 
makes a much neater organisation of matter than individual, flesh-and-blood bodies tend 
to do. 
Certainly, any mention of the body in the worship life of Christian communities 
tends to be of the body of Christ, and centres round the church and sacraments.
65
 Still, 
Christian worship does involve concrete, physical bodies in their participation in the 
various rites and liturgical activities, as pointed out earlier in this introduction. Because 
of this, I locate investigations into liturgical rites and the celebration of sacraments as a 
subset of this ecclesiological focus on the body of Christ. Two specific works draw near 
to the subject and method of my thesis. First, there is Bridget Nichols‘s Liturgical 
Hermeneutics: Interpreting Liturgical Rites in Performance, an examination of the 
meaning of Anglican liturgy as discerned in both texts and their performance. Nichols 
turns to works of general hermeneutics by such thinkers as Paul Ricoeur, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, and Jacques Derrida to find principles instructive for a particular 
hermeneutics for liturgy.
66
 She proclaims that her aim ‗is to present bearings for finding 
and appropriating the world of the Kingdom through the experience of the liturgy, and 
this demands a habit of attention to the words and the actions of rites which nevertheless 
does not make them ends in themselves‘.67 Nichols‘s study is akin to mine in its 
attention to hermeneutics and to the form and context of liturgical rites; however, our 
aims differ. Nichols strives to interpret liturgy, whereas I strive for a hermeneutics 
based on sacramental theology as a method for interpreting the materiality of life.
68
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Second, Regina M. Schwartz‘s book about the Eucharist in the works of 
Shakespeare, Milton, Donne, and Herbert appears, with its move from discussion of 
theological ideas to examination of literature, to presage the form and method of my 
thesis. In Sacramental Poetics at the Dawn of Secularism: When God Left the World, 
Schwartz argues that the sacramental mentality which theology stripped from the world 
at the Reformation reappeared in poetry; she declares that ‗sacramental poetics‘ refers to 
an artistic sensibility in which ‗Entering the world of the poem‘ means that one 
‗participates in its discoveries‘.69 The book brings this survey full circle, joining the 
liturgical, poetic body to the historical studies discussed above. When she is finished 
with her literary analysis, Schwartz even presents a similar view of the gift that 
sacramental thought might bestow: ‗a particular that honors other particulars, one that 
opens out toward a potential universal without coercion‘, a movement across difference 
not by abolishing difference but by reconciliation.
70
 Again, though, my thesis has some 
elements of contrast. The main difference is not literary era (I look at twentieth-century 
literature), but what Schwartz and I seek in the literature: Schwartz looks for poetic 
permutations of the Eucharist to show the sacramental nature of the art, I try to see what 
writers show about bodies because sacraments remind me not to forget the particularity 
of instances of materiality. But both of us wish to apply our hopes more widely than on 
the ground from which we start. 
 
Bodies and This Text: An Overview of This Thesis 
 
In the first part of my thesis, I examine work concerning embodiment from four 
different thinkers—three theologians and a philosopher with theological interests. All 
four strive to take the body seriously, though from quite different directions; however, I 
believe that, by the various theological choices that they make, they all end up at more 
or less the same place: obscuring, diminishing, or devaluing particular, concrete and 
physical bodies. Each chapter of the first part follows a similar pattern, starting with an 
attempt to discern what the thinker‘s writings say about the body, then moving to an 
analysis of problematic consequences of their position, and finally suggesting what can 
be built from their particular insights. 
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The first chapter examines the work of Graham Ward, focusing upon what he 
means by ‗the transcorporeality of the body‘ and ‗the displaced body of Christ‘. For 
Ward, the Pauline metaphor of church-as-body combined with the fraction of bread in 
the Eucharist takes centre stage; in order to minimise the exclusion of people based 
upon their difference from the majority, he places all bodies within the all-inclusive 
body of Christ. I contend that, although Ward provides an extremely robust, dynamic 
view of bodies, considering embodiment not in static, essential physicality but in action 
and relationship, his theology ultimately subsumes all bodies into one body, ignoring 
actual bodies and their stories. In response, I suggest that the robust relationality of 
Ward‘s bodies could be retained as companionship with God rather than subsumption, 
to maintain the importance of particularity. 
The second chapter examines the narrative Christian ethics of Stanley Hauerwas, 
who is concerned less specifically with bodies than with the stories that form bodies—
namely the story of God in which, by taking part, a person is shaped as a member of the 
body of Christ. Hauerwas links lived bodies to the stories that they tell or, rather, to the 
stories which they learn to tell, the overall vision to which they mould their 
understanding of their own embodied actions. I argue that Hauerwas‘s subordination of 
particular stories to one overall story diminishes the importance of the rich variety of 
individual stories; moreover, his notion of story devalues imagination, and turns its back 
on the non-Christian stranger. This chapter closes with suggestions that might 
recuperate Hauerwas‘s connection of bodies to the narratives which they carry and 
which shape them. I posit that the problem with Hauerwas‘s notions is a too-strong wish 
to maintain the orderliness of bodies when bodies are not very orderly at all, and that 
this could be remedied by a stronger account of the untidiness of flesh-and-blood bodies 
and the stories that they tell. 
My observations concerning Hauerwas and Ward lead to the next two chapters 
of my thesis, one on Marcella Althaus-Reid and one on Paul Ricoeur. In the first of 
these, I explore how Althaus-Reid championed the unruliness of the body with what she 
called Indecent Theology, a synthesis of Liberation, Feminist, Postcolonial and Queer 
Theologies which strives to present all experiences of the human body, including 
sexuality, as resources for doing theology. In doing this, Althaus-Reid effectively 
provides an answer to the critiques which I levelled at Ward and Hauerwas, but not 
without producing similar problems in new ways. Although she turns against traditional 
theology‘s failure to attend to the sexual body, looking for meaning in stories of 
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particular people and their untidy bodily relations, she does this by turning those stories 
and relationships into symbols and metaphors of what theology could and should do. I 
contend that this still obscures actual bodies in favour of abstract ideas of bodies. In 
response, I strive to uphold Althaus-Reid‘s critique of the absence of bodies-in-love 
from traditional theology, while asserting that theology does not only have to begin 
from those bodies, but also return to them. 
The following chapter continues the challenge of looking for an adequate 
account of bodies and narratives by scanning the wide-ranging work of Ricoeur. I find 
that Ricoeur proposes a story-making body (rather than Hauerwas‘s story-formed one), 
constructing a narrative self which is opened to the world by the body and which 
actively arranges experience of life in the world through narrative. He gives human art 
great credit as part of the reconstruction of the world, from the linguistic level of 
metaphor to the social level of relationships. Yet, in spite of this, Ricoeur still obscures 
concrete, physical bodies behind a predilection for conceptual thought and a tendency 
towards the compartmentalisation of disciplines and genres which restricts the creative 
imagination of narratives to models and types. Nonetheless, at the end of the chapter, I 
suggest that a reading of Ricoeur which emphasises the openness of stories—the 
generation of new things which augment the world—could give a stronger account of 
the particularities of bodies. 
The first part of the thesis concludes with a proposal of a method that takes the 
productive insights of the four thinkers into account, while alleviating some of the 
problems they generate. I base this idea on the work of feminist philosophers, 
particularly the standpoint epistemology formulated by such theorists as Sandra Harding 
and Nancy Hartsock, the notion of situated knowledges promoted by Donna Haraway, 
and the writings of Michèle Le Doeuff which attempt to keep in mind the 
incompleteness and partiality of the philosophical enterprise and the continued 
importance of the creative imagination. Put together, all of these conceptions of partial 
and situated knowledge provide a framework for upholding a multiplicity of voices 
from a plurality of bodies, for granting a high value to local understandings achieved 
through bodies in relationship, and to material life with all its contingency. This note of 
possibility also looks forward to the second part of the thesis, which explores the 
particularity of bodies as very locally imagined in the particular stories of creative 
fiction. 
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Each of the five chapters of the second part is a study of a different novel by a 
different author, focusing on a particular aspect of bodies that each novel underscores in 
some way. The form that a chapter takes depends upon its subject. While each of the 
five books deals in some fashion with making and art, as well as the imaginative 
construction of lives and history, the group is otherwise disparate. Of the authors, three 
are Canadian, one English, and one American; three are women, two are men; four are 
living. The books have quite different styles, and are set in different eras and parts of the 
world. The common denominator among the books is my own choosing of them. That I 
bring five disparate novels together follows Paul Ricoeur‘s notion of polysemy and 
metaphor. In his essay ‗Word, Polysemy, Metaphor: Creativity in Language‘, Ricoeur 
points to the way the multiple meanings attributed to any one word allow it to be more 
or less like and unlike another word. Metaphor, in bringing words and their semantic 
fields into relationship, plays off the multiple meanings in each word to create newly 
possible meanings.
71
 Expanding this idea to the whole narratives of texts—in my case, 
novels—one can put together any number of particular texts, arranged around an 
investigation into particular aspects of those texts, to find them interpreting one another 
under the attentive gaze of the reader. Of course, the result will be quite different from 
one particular collection of texts to another, but that is precisely the point in bringing 
forward the partiality of bodies and their stories—the approach implied by the 
discussion of feminist epistemologies with which I close the first part of the thesis. 
The order in which I place the studies is based upon my own interpretations of 
the texts, following the aspect of bodies and their stories which I have discerned in each 
work. I have arranged the chapters so that the discussion in each builds slightly upon the 
last. Of course, this runs the risk that unintended meanings will be derived from the 
order, or that some other meaning might have been missed, but that is a general 
hermeneutical risk derived from emphasising partiality and the situated nature of 
knowledge, one that I contend is worth taking.
72
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  See Paul Ricoeur, ‗Word, Polysemy, Metaphor: Creativity in Language‘, A Ricoeur Reader 65-85. 
72
  The order of the studies does not mean to imply any order of value to their subjects themselves, or 
which book is best. This is especially important to note because the five books depict various 
religions: the first is largely Buddhist; the second includes Christian imagery, but is probably best 
characterised as secular; the third is quite specifically Jewish; and the fourth and fifth have particular 
relations to Christian theology. In light of the sacramental hermeneutics which this thesis proposes—
that sacraments imply making room for others in the particularity of their bodies‘ stories and not 
absorbing them unbidden—the order is more than a little ironic, but it makes most sense out of the 
discussion of the various presentations of bodies that I have discerned.   
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The fifth chapter opens the section with a close reading of Anil’s Ghost, by 
Michael Ondaatje, about a forensic anthropologist seeking the face of truth amidst the 
political unrest of Sri Lanka. I analyse moments of bodies in touch and the many ways 
that touch defines those bodies, focusing on Ondaatje‘s characterisation of the 
protagonists and the elements of the novel which interpret them. The chapter begins 
with a survey of the characters‘ various attempts to find meaning through what I call 
‗professional touch‘, the reading of bodies by archaeology, forensics, and medicine; I 
argue that Ondaatje subverts all of these with personal touch—messy and unpredictable, 
potentially destructive, but alive with possibility. 
The next chapter explores the image of bodies as tactile maps in Jane Urquhart‘s 
novel, A Map of Glass. I note how the book unfolds the impact of bodies on the earth 
and one another, depicting the traces which mark bodies and map the world as a 
geography of intimacy. The discussion follows the lines made by bodies, first in helping 
people to construct their worlds, then through the fragility of the ‗maps of glass‘—their 
liability to shatter and, in shattering, cut—before reaching the point where I present the 
idea that this vulnerability in instability is also the location of creativity. 
Fugitive Pieces, by Anne Michaels, is the subject of the seventh chapter. The 
book tells the tale of two men: the first is a poet who was the only member of his family 
to survive the Holocaust; the second is a child of Holocaust survivors, who tries to 
model his response to the trauma of history after the poet‘s life. I set the foundation for 
my examination of Fugitive Pieces by describing the book‘s poetic linking of body, 
earth, and history. Then I analyse the similarity between the novel‘s depiction of 
destructive and creative language and Elaine Scarry‘s understanding in The Body in 
Pain. This leads, finally, to a close study of the form of the novel with its two stories, 
suggesting that it is an exercise in addressing the body to remake the world. 
In the eighth chapter, I examine The Man on a Donkey, H. F. M. Prescott‘s 
chronicle of the Pilgrimage of Grace, a Roman Catholic protest of the Reformation in 
northern England. The book follows five people with different statuses in society as 
they are caught up in the events around the nationalisation of the Church and dissolution 
of the monasteries; at the same time, though, Prescott counters their stories with that of 
Malle, a ‗fool‘ who has visions of Christ. I examine the way the protagonists find their 
bodies claimed by different stories—social, religious, political, and the like—and are 
forced to negotiate these. I employ Ricoeur (again) to illuminate how bodies act as 
pivots between different ways of understanding time, and then argue that, even as 
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different stories threaten to fragment the body, the body in relationship with other 
bodies provides an opportunity to connect constructively and creatively the various 
stories which narrate life. 
The idea of a narrated life leads to the last chapter of the second part, in which I 
read Godric, by Frederick Buechner. This is a fictionalised account of the life of an 
Anglo-Saxon saint, as told from the saint‘s point of view at the end of his life; his story 
reveals the narrative formation of a saintly body. I begin by talking about the narrated 
body as depicted in the novel, but move from there to a discussion of how this body is 
connected to Frederick Buechner‘s own self-narrative, as well as the reader‘s, ending 
with the implication of all three bodies—saint‘s, author‘s, and reader‘s—in the 
establishment of a plurality of identities. 
Together, the five book studies, with their different views of bodies and stories, 
begin to map out meanings of bodies, charting relationships and proximities, pointing to 
the importance of the form of those bodies and relationships and the way their 
unruliness and unpredictability generates a ground of positive and negative possibility. 
This is, necessarily, only a beginning, one among many, and my investigations and 
readings of fiction can only provide a partial, situated view, a map based upon my own 
choices and the place where I stand. The realisation and admission of this 
incompleteness, then, implies that my understandings can never preclude those of 
others, that there is always another story available to be told, another location from 
which to hear those stories and see bodies. This implicitly becomes an invitation to 
collaboration, an admission that the quest for understanding, theological or otherwise, is 
a joint project of vision and revision.
73
 
This leads to the third and concluding part of the thesis, in which, by turning to 
liturgy and sacramental practice, I endeavour to demonstrate that a theological discourse 
can or even must be courageous enough to admit to itself the possibility of being 
unfinished: that is, I contend that liturgy is necessarily local and particular, and that this 
grants a means for discerning the body. I survey the work of liturgical theologians, 
starting with a focus on Gregory Dix, noting the tendency towards seeking a universal, 
ideal liturgy; I respond to this by looking at Gordon Lathrop‘s notion of the sacramental 
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  This relates to Michèle Le Doeuff‘s ideas of philosophy not as the realm of eminent philosophers who 
bestow wisdom on the world, but as a group project whose shape depends upon both agreement and 
disagreement, building upon what has come before it through acceptance or resistance. See 
Hipparchia’s Choice 198-207. I discuss this further in the conclusion to the first part. 
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and liturgical system as a map which orients participants‘ understandings of the world, 
and modify this with a suggestion by Charles Winquist that theology‘s map of love, like 
that of any pair of lovers, is a map of particular values, of specific locations which are 
held dear. I argue that sacraments, therefore, help in discerning the body—or ‗bodies‘—
by aiding in orienting people toward the particularities of themselves and others, and 
their relationship in the landscape of the world. In this, I attempt to bring together the 
various discussions of the first two parts of the thesis. If (a generous) partiality is to be 
considered important, this means that theologians ought to be encouraged to start from 
where they stand, to take account of those people who are around them in their specific 
location, to be open to the particularities of other bodies and their stories rather than 
simply abstracting principles from them. If the sacrament tethers the Christian 
theologian not only to the Word but also to the flesh, then there is no abstract liturgy, 
one should look at a particular instances of celebrating sacraments. Thus, this closing 
part includes a series of interludes consisting of reflections upon liturgy from The 
Presbyterian Church in Canada—my own denomination. 
This localised theological project turns towards a geographical approach 
wherein the theologian does not try to exhaust a topic but to add to it, to be creative and 
show as much as possible the discovery that comes when things are seen from a slightly 
different angle. This approach begs for collegiality, for working in partnership and 
attending to other theology just as one calls people with their stories and bodies to 
attend to one another in passion and hospitality. Of course, there are dangers to this 
approach, mostly in the temptation to self-centredness, the refusal to listen to others 
except to hear what one wants to hear. Then bodies become things, objects for 
observation and manipulation, particular bodies in one‘s own particularly skewed world. 
But I believe the benefits of attending to concrete, physical, particular bodies, in the 
unruliness of their lived relationships, are yet of great importance—certainly if one 
wants to discern bodies as they actually are. 
Clifford Geertz has written of place as often being invisible, treated mainly as a 
background on which values are situated. He states that  
the invisibility of place has mainly to do with the fact that it is so 
difficult to free from subjectivities and occasions, immediate perceptions 
and instant cases. Like Love or Imagination, Place makes a poor 
abstraction. Separated from its materializations, it has little meaning.
74
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  Clifford Geertz, ‗Afterword‘, Senses of Place 259. 
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The same could be said for the body, for bodies. This brings us back to Jesus on trial, 
the love-smitten man at the window, the occasion of Communion: all of these, and 
others, are instances of materiality, the lived body, moments of vitality and vulnerability 
that reveal the body. They are partial; they are incomplete; they are glimpses. But this 
allows their unruliness to speak for itself, as I hope this project and its various parts do 






Keeping the Word Flesh: 
Attending to Graham Ward 
and  
the Problem of the Particularity of the Body
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Christianity needs, then, to read the spiritual, the universal in such a way 
as not to denigrate or dissolve the historical and concrete. Discovering 
the eternal and unchanging within the particular and temporal is the 




o writes Graham Ward in his book Christ and Culture, declaring the high value 
of the embodiment of human, creaturely being. By pointing to the importance of 
relationship and response, touch and sight, the permeability of the body and its 
social, historical nature, he strives to present the operation of God as the construction of 
embodiment: in physical bodies, social bodies, and the body of Christ. In doing this, 
Ward addresses what he perceives as the fragmenting tendencies of a contemporary 
culture that looks only at things as they are, at surfaces—a culture determined by 
scientific rationalism and unfulfillable desire. He hangs the value of the particular and 
the material upon the transcendent, reading creation analogically into the Creator: the 
world participates in God, is enfolded into God, and thus, materiality is given meaning. 
However, in so doing, Ward risks enacting the opposite of what he says Christianity 
needs to do. The creatureliness of humanity becomes simply a veil for the ultimately 
significant, a mere mediation of that hidden world which is more real, more valuable 
than the material.  
Yes, Ward writes about passion, about suffering, and about vulnerability in 
relationship. He focuses upon bodily action and participation. In an interview, Ward has 
declared that 
I want to come back always into bodily practices—because the heart of 
Christian theology concerns such practices. What are we doing with 
these bodies? How do these bodies change in the way that they are 
understood, the values that are given to them in different kinds of 
situations? You know, a body that is praying, a body in a hospital, a 
body making love—each of those positionings of the body reunite the 
body in some way with its value, and I want to get back that 
embodiment and its value.
2
 
Such a statement shows that Ward attaches a high worth to the stories which are 
connected to and enacted through the body. He seems to want to maintain a principle 
that bodies and bodily practices can never be separated—that what you do physically 
defines your personhood.  
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  CC 243. 
2
  Graham Ward, interview with Brandy Daniels. 
S 
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His desire to address such a view of the body and humanity is, in my opinion, 
commendable. I would also agree that the attention which he gives to the body‘s 
passions is both strong and significant, and that it is quite right not to separate a body‘s 
meaning from the actions that it pursues. Yet, ultimately, Ward‘s care to safeguard the 
transcendence of God undercuts the wish he has to uphold the body. He sketches a 
theology of love that concentrates on the relationship between God and creation, leaving 
little room for the creature‘s love with God for fellow creatures, for the neighbour. This 
theology seeks cultural transformation through an erasure of creaturely differences, too 
easily forgetting the particular pains of particular people, which leads to diminishing 
love within the bounds of the world.  
Instead of an analogical approach which organises the world into a hierarchy of 
value, I suggest that what is required is an account of embodied relationship that is 
founded upon particularity and does not separate the spiritual from the material. If we 
want to discern the body, we need an account of passion and desire that honours the 
creatureliness of human being, a passion that does not seek to inflict suffering on others, 
and a desire based upon the uniqueness of each person‘s relationship to the other as told 
in a plurality of stories.  
Looking more closely at Graham Ward‘s construal of embodiment, materiality 
and transcendence, this chapter commences with a summary of what Ward seems to be 
trying to do—with the strengths of his examination of the relational nature of bodies, 
and with the problems that he addresses. I then turn to a critique of his reading of 
transcendence, exploring how this affects what he is striving to do. Finally, I build upon 
the implications of this to begin to make suggestions for a different way to take 
embodiment seriously. 
 
Placing the Displaced Body: The Embodiment of Salvation 
 
Graham Ward sketches out his theological concerns about bodies, Christ, and 
human communities in such books as Cities of God and Christ and Culture. In the 
introduction to the former, he identifies the task of theology as the discernment of where 
the world stands in the unfolding of the history of salvation.
3
 To connect what is 
happening in the world to the practice of theology, and all of this to what Christ has 
                                                                                                                                               
3
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done and is doing, Ward looks at relationships between different bodies. He wants to 
see how Christ is woven into creation, but also how we can read culture to point to the 
presence and place of Christ. Ward writes that ‗In reading the signs of the times we 
render perceptible the watermark of Christ within creation.‘4 This is a hermeneutical 
theology of bodies: by interpreting the text of the world, we learn the story of God in 
relation to the world. 
Moreover, all bodies interpret one another. For Ward, this interpretive 
relationship is enabled by the theological doctrine that human beings (incorporated 
flesh) are created. Towards the beginning of Christ and culture, he declares that 
All the essays in this collection reflect this concern with being 'made in 
the image of'; if we make enquiry into what a culture is we find that it is 
a system of symbols and practices involving symbols, a constellation of 
interrelated meanings that can only become meaningful—and be 
communicated and taught as meaningful—because they have material 
form. The character of the form is manifold: a gesture, an event, a word, 
a sign. But there can only be culture where there is figuring.
5
 
Because we are made in an image, we make images.
6
 The images that we make include 
our own bodies—or include the way we see and interpret them in relation to those 
others around us and to our stories together. Relationship and negotiation stand as the 
keys to interpretation: the process of receiving meaning and making meaning in 
response never stops because our interaction with others and with the world remains 
dynamic. In another book, Cultural Transformation and Religious Practice, in which 
Ward outlines his theological methodology, he states that ‗the focus of [his] own 
theological project‘ is ‗the negotiation between Christian living and thinking and the 
contemporary world‘.7 This gives the sense both of a dialectical bargaining between two 
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  CG 24. 
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  CC 22. 
6
  Ward‘s discussion here is reminiscent of writers such as J.R.R. Tolkien, who wrote of notions such as 
‗sub-creation‘ in his essay ‗On Fairy-Stories‘. When speaking of the recovery bestowed by the good 
news of grace and redemption, Tolkien writes that, for a human being, ‗So great is the bounty with 
which he [sic] has been treated that he may now, perhaps fairly dare to guess that in Fantasy he may 
actually assist in the effoliation and multiple enrichment of creation‘ (‗On Fairy-Stories‘ 66). This 
‗enrichment of creation‘ through inventive and imaginative arts suggests that interpretation is not just 
communication of the meaning of existence but also adding to what already exists. 
7
  CTRP 4. Wending one‘s way back and forth between Christian life and ‗the contemporary world‘ 
would presumably be close to the way Ward might define contextual theology (he is Professor of 
Contextual Theology and Ethics at the University of Manchester). Note how this formulates church 
and world as quite distinct entities. 
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sides and of a theology taking as its task the finding of a route within a jumbled 
landscape, picking a path among different realities while trying to hold them together. 
In Christ and Culture, Ward says that he is trying to see how in and through Christ 
‗there is constructed a set of relations, a divine and dynamic operation that constitutes 
an embodiment (the body of Christ, the body of the Church, the sacramental body, the 
social body and the physical bodies of each of us)‘.8 This statement exemplifies Ward‘s 
concerns by demonstrating that, when he talks about bodies, he is talking about multiple 
ways of being incorporated: all of these different bodies co-exist because they are 
created by the relationships that people have, and that is the only way that they can be 
known. 
Ward‘s thought about bodies and the nature of corporeality starts with the 
vulnerability of the flesh, with a foundational notion that the form which bodies take is 
highly changeable because of interaction with other bodies. When considering bodies 
through the lens of the writings of Gregory of Nyssa, Ward declares that 
Bodies here are frangible, permeable; not autonomous and self-defining, 
but sharing and being shared. When I give I give myself, even though 
what I give is flowers, a smile, a sweet word, an academic account such 
as this one…. Communication is embodied giving, and what I give is 
consumed by the others to whom I give. I touch upon their bodies by the 
presence of my own body heard and seen, smelt and sometimes tasted by 
them. The fluidity of time itself is the fluidity of identity. ‗This is my 
body. Take eat. This is my blood. Drink.‘ The body is always in transit, 
is always being transferred. It is never there, as a commodity I can lay 
claim to or possess as mine. This is the ontological scandal announced 
by the Eucharistic phrase—bodies are never simply there (or here).9 
If bodies are known only in relationship, their outlines can never be static, but always 
changing in the fluctuation of the borders between one and another. In this, Ward 
acknowledges that he follows Judith Butler‘s idea that we know our bodies and the rest 
of the material world through the representations we make of materiality for ourselves.
10
 
Such representation makes the body available as a sign (or collection of signs) which 
can be communicated; in turn, communication renders bodies ‗frangible‘ and 
‗permeable‘: transferrable. 
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Ward systematises the theological relationships between bodies and their 
dependence upon one another with his idea of the displaced body of Christ.
11
 To 
summarise this: Christ is always giving way for others. His body is malleable, becoming 
a medium for God‘s glory (think of the transfiguration).12 The process of displacement 
continues through the crucifixion, the resurrection, and, ultimately, the ascension, which 
proclaims the total displacement of the body of Christ. With the absence of the physical, 
gendered body of Jesus of Nazareth, those called to become his disciples become 
Christ‘s body, making the church the next—perhaps even a fuller—step of the 
incarnation. The church re-presents this process with the Eucharist, when the broken 
body is distributed to individual members and then shared out into the world. Christ‘s 
body never stops being displaced, never stops being distributed, until Christ expands to 
hold all creation.
13
 In human beings, this process results in making possible what Ward 
calls an ‗economy of response‘, which incorporates giving, receiving and replying.14 
The acts of seeing and touching exemplify what Ward means by demonstrating the 
crossing of personal boundaries through intention and attention: perceiving a 
relationship with another, with one who cannot be you (or would not be experienced as 
other) but with whom you nevertheless desire to be connected. 
Ward uses the concepts of the displacement of the body and relational response 
to address several of his concerns. First, he worries that modernity makes the body 
disappear, arguing that a non-theological account of the permeability of bodies is not 
actually about their changeability but about their dissolution in an ‗eternal 
haemorrhaging‘ of the life-blood of the flesh.15 However, opposing ‗the endless deferral 
and unquenchable grief for a lost body‘ stands the transcorporeal body proclaimed by 
Christian theology, a truly absent-yet-present body which generates hospitably inclusive 
community through eucharistic sharing, through expanding even while it is fractured.
16
  
                                                                                                                                               
11
  See the chapter ‗The Displaced Body of Christ‘, CG 97-116. 
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  CG 99-102. 
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  CG 103-14. 
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  See particularly the first part of CC 27-110. 
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  CG 94. 
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  CG 94-6. It is not easy to see the difference between Ward‘s presentation of a body which is 
acceptably (theologically) frangible and what he decries, the endlessly dispersed body pronounced by 
postmodern critics of modernity. Why could you not consider that dispersion an expansion as well? 
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Second, but following from this, Ward is troubled by the effect of the 
disappearance of the physical body on the social body of humanity. He finds that, not 
only does the endless deferral of materiality dissolve concrete community life, it also 
replaces communities which have a ‗desire for the good‘ with ‗virtual or imaginary 
communities‘ which are ‗libidinal‘, where ‗eros is read as a purely human drive‘.17 He 
essentially argues that ‗community‘ is a misnomer for these replacement groups; they 
are collections of self-centred individuals who seek only to fulfil their own desire for 
pleasure. The metaphor which he provides for such society is the sex shop, which 
conveys ‗the conviction that sexuality is the most profound and inner sanctum of human 
experience‘.18 Cyberspace represents the end product of these substitutes for the 
communities of disappeared bodies where everything exists at a remove from the 
physical and cooperates with a desire for physical pleasure that can never be assuaged.
19
 
But while he sees this modern construal of the world as paradigmatically isolating, 
Ward points to Christ and the distribution of Christ‘s body in the Eucharist as 
maintaining a connectedness between fragments of life within concrete community. He 
declares that theology (and only theology) can redeem cyberspace by using the 
communicative power of the internet to subvert it, maintaining the materiality of human 
life by preaching ‗a transcendent order‘ in which the displaced body of Christ can 
include everyone and establish ‗judgements about what is true, good, beautiful, and 
just‘.20 
At the same time, the continuing displacement of Christ‘s body constitutes a 
‗deferral of identity‘ so that the followers of Christ never stand still as a body 
themselves, but always grow to contain other bodies.
21
 The relationality of the body 
ensures that notions of Christ are not reduced to the determination of biology but can 
accept the whole range of human sexual orientation; that is, the ascended Christ 
                                                                                                                                               
Or, what stops Ward‘s Christian formulation from also being an endless dispersion into nothingness? 
It seems that the only answer is faith. 
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  CG 118. 
18
  CG 120. 
19
  CG 149-50, 249-54. 
20
  CG 254. 
21
  CG 112-4. 
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becomes multi-gendered and thus generative of an all-inclusive body.
22
 This attempts to 
safeguard the opening of a place for all people in the kingdom of God, regardless of 
their personal corporeal identity in terms of ethnicity, gender, or class. The different 
ways of being incorporated combine with the inclusivity of Christ to work the 
transformation of culture towards salvation. Ward writes that ‗because the boundaries 
between physical bodies, civic bodies, social bodies, sacramental bodies and the body of 
Christ are fluid (and therefore vulnerable one to another), then practices of hope move 
in and through one body affecting all the others‘.23 Thus the displaced body of Christ 
changes the world. 
Overall, throughout Ward‘s theological writings, the materiality of human life 
has immense value as the location of transformation and redemption. In the construal 
which he gives, that importance depends upon relationship with the transcendent, or, to 
put it another way, the significance of the physical body filters down from the God who 
created the physical world, and can only be apprehended through a faithful 
understanding of that relationship. At times, Ward makes his point by turning expected 
terminology around; for instance, he writes that ‗The ensoulment of the body means that 
the more profound the participation in the divine, the more intensely the body becomes 
what it is‘.24 This replacement of the more usual ‗embodiment of the soul‘ emphasises 
the significance of the body in God‘s redemptive divinisation of humanity. Indeed, this 
suggests that the body‘s value is a given, and that the focus should turn towards what 
the body does. Ward specifically notes the importance of the sense of touch, and how 
the drive and desire for contact forms the impetus towards community; with this, the 
body becomes central to the ecclesial community because that community is driven by a 
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  Graham Ward, ‗The Beauty of God‘, Theological Perspectives on God and Beauty 60. 
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A Critique: The Disappearance of Particularities 
 
To a great extent, Ward‘s theology projects the body in flesh, bone and blood as 
a foundational principle of doing theology. However, the emphasis that he places on 
embodied life in creation is jarred out of place by the analogical foundation that he uses: 
when Ward makes particularity depend upon universality and materiality depend upon 
transcendence, instead of maintaining a connection between body and spirit he actually 
maintains their separation within a hierarchy. In Cultural Transformation and Religious 
Practice, Ward writes that ‗The incarnation testifies to the subsumption of the human by 
the divine‘; that ‗social activity‘ is ‗legitimate[d] by referring the local action to what is 
―ultimately significant‖‘; that ‗the local and contingent is vouchsafed only in the name 
of the universal and eternal‘.26 The material is important, but only insofar as it is 
connected to that which is beyond the material. In Christ and Culture, Ward states that 
‗Just as salvation is a matter of the body and the soul, so revelation is story, our story 
within God‘s own story‘, and that ‗The world is an allegory of love to be interpreted by 
love‘.27 Bodies and the narratives that define them allegorically represent something 
else, something better. 
One could argue that I am simply finding fault with Ward‘s use of language. 
What does it matter if Ward hints that the ‗desire for sexual gratification‘ is ‗the crudest 
form‘ of desire, or that he opposes ‗the eternity of conviction‘ to ‗the contingency of 
orgasm‘?28 You might say that these are just figures of speech; however, they betray a 
constant devaluing of physical sensation. In other words, although Ward grants great 
theological value to the body, one must look at what type of body he is talking about. In 
Cities of God, the permeability of bodies finds its true home in the Church (which Ward 
labels ‗the erotic community‘) while, as mentioned earlier, the metaphor for 
dysfunctional worldly desire is the sex shop.
29
 In Christ and Culture, there are 
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  For the church as an erotic community, see the chapters ‗The Church as the erotic community‘ and 
‗The erotics of redemption‘, CC 152-81 and 182-202. 
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metaphorical bodies—at least, there are bodies whose actions together turn out to be 
figures for a different relationship: Ward writes that ‗sexual union becomes a 
metaphorical act of the relation to Christ‘ and that ‗the erotic relation to Christ is the 
completion or perfection of what is most desired in sexual intimacy; sexual intimacy 
being an intimation of the divine relation between God and human beings‘.30 In many 
different writings, bodies are always slipping away from localisations, specifically 
moving towards what can be called a universalisation in Christ. The reader finds a 
‗multigendered body‘, one which Christ is ‗absorbing into himself‘, as well as bodies 
whose meaning is ‗ultimately ungraspable‘ because they are ‗always in transit‘ so that 
they have ‗no difference as such, only distances and affinities occurring across networks 
of relation‘.31 Ward lays the emphasis in such places on what I would call the 
eschatological body: a corporeality shaped by perfection in the risen, ascended Christ, 
viewing what the body is like now through the lens of what that body will become as a 
member of the Church, the body of Christ. From Church versus sex shop to this 
eschatological formulation, all of these bodies demonstrate a tendency towards a distrust 
of concrete bodily limitations. They yearn towards the neat and tidy, while messier (and, 
to some, less savoury) aspects of the body and sexuality—such as the culture of the sex 
shop, or physical intimacy—become either exaggerated into representations of the 
world‘s corruption or downplayed to the point they threaten to slip from view.32 Ward 
presents an extremely spiritual view of bodies. 
This spiritual view goes back to Ward‘s theological locus in the displaced body 
of Christ. The same transcorporeality of Jesus which provides for the inclusion of all 
                                                                                                                                               
30
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31
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  For example, in ‗There Is No Sexual Difference‘, Ward declares that he does not ‗want to deny the 
role that having sexual organs plays in the performance of an explicit sexual encounter or the 
adrenalin rush that comes with stimulation‘ (82). Yet, such compartmentalisation of physical intimacy 
into a medical realm of ‗adrenalin‘ and ‗stimulation‘ distances it from Ward‘s theological and 
philosophical discussion, belittling it with an emphasis on its momentary nature without any sense that 
such moments could be linked together into an overall physical life of intimacy among persons. 
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possible types of people in salvation also makes bodies depend upon Jesus‘ body to an 
extreme degree. ‗Within it,‘ Ward declares, ‗all other bodies are situated and given their 
significance‘.33 While the characteristics of Jesus‘ body as shown in his life remain 
important, the Ascension becomes the key, for that is when Christ expands to contain 
the world. The attempt not to argue away difference and particularity but to include 
them actually eclipses them. Thus, Ward declares a question such as ‗Can a male 
saviour save women?‘ to be essentially illogical because the transcorporeal Christ holds 
all genders.
34
 The male, Jewish body of Jesus does not matter as much as the ascended 
multi-gendered, multi-ethnic body of Christ. The physical individual depends upon the 
social body and, as Ward makes explicit in Cultural Transformation and Religious 
Practice, ‗The social is and can be social only insofar as it is constituted in Christo‘ so 
that ‗From the Christian standpoint, there is no other body‘.35 This stems from a 
formulation of the doctrine of the incarnation which ‗testifies to the subsumption of the 
human by the divine‘.36 Along with this, Ward‘s theology‘s ‗ethical vision looks 
towards an end-times in which a realm is established where all creation finds its true 
goodness, beauty and justice by being enfolded into, rather than alienated from, the 
Godhead‘.37 The language of subsumption and enfolding, of ‗no other body‘ and Christ 
expanding, while it may not erase the value of corporeal matter, does imply that 
particular embodiments are little more than stages on the way to something more 
valuable, and makes certain bodies—Christian ones—much more valuable than others. 
The source of the problem lies in the hierarchical nature of embodiment‘s 
analogical participation in incarnation as Ward expounds it. He depicts the relationship 
between God and creatures, between Christ and Christ‘s followers as political, and 
while no relationship exists outside of social structure or polity, Ward‘s use of the word 
‗political‘ does not seem to question whether this has to mean that some have power 
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the Mystery of All Flesh)‘, CC, 159-80. 
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  CTRP 170. 
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  CTRP 58. 
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over others. Ward analogically ‗confirms [hierarchies] as the order of things‘.38 But if 
the relationship between God and God‘s creatures is construed as a hierarchy and 
relationships among human beings are meant to be analogical representations of that 
divine relationship, what follows is that some having power over others becomes 
theologically justifiable. As discussed earlier, Ward does take pains to make sure that 
such a hierarchy does not develop along gender lines, but there are many different 
relationships of power among many different groups or bodies. Not only is the language 
that he uses about the transcendent condescending towards the material, but his 
conception results in a reading of the oneness of all in Christ as having nothing to do 
with actual social equality.
39
 Having the significance of the particular and material rely 
upon reference to the transcendent and universal allows Ward to note rather oddly that 
Christianity‘s ethical vision speaks against ‗violent inequalities‘ but not inequalities as 
such, for although all are equal before God ‗all are not equal with respect to the 
world‘.40 Ward apparently sees no violence inherent in this, suggesting that it is simply 
the way things are in creation.  
No matter how you spiritualise this, the political and social consequences are 
disturbing in a number of ways. The emphasis on Christ expanding to contain the world 
leaves little room for negotiation with those outside the Christian faith—indeed, it does 
not seem even to recognise that these others exist, but rather to absorb them relentlessly 
regardless of their choice. Ward might protest that ‗As one body mapped onto the 
sacramental and ecclesial body, located in and as the body of Christ, this ―expansion‖ is 
not concomitant with colonialism‘.41 Unfortunately, a declaration that a theology does 
not represent violence in the name of Christian imperialism does not mean that this 
theology does not support a different type of violence—a kinder, gentler type akin to 
being hugged to death. Ward actually tries to be more open towards other faiths; he 
points to the reality of life in much of the developed world where people of many 
different traditions live together, and wants to leave the outcome of their meeting 
undetermined or, as an even better possibility, productive of a kinder and more just 
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 However, the weight of his theological construction of christocentrism makes 
such openness difficult even for him to approach; in the introduction to Christ and 
Culture, Ward admits that he has ‗not engaged in the question of Christ with respect to 
our multi-faith culture‘ because he is ‗not sure how to do this‘.43 Similarly, in True 
Religion, after expressing the hope that the interaction between various traditions which 
have returned ‗to an uncompromising assertion of faith‘ might ‗redeem the spiritual 
materialisms of virtual reality or the omnivorous rule of global capitalism‘, he finds 
himself faced by the terrorist attack on New York on 11 September 2001 and writes that 
‗what I could not do was weave 11 September into my narrative as if I understood the 
part it played in the unfolding logic of ―true religion‖‘.44 The notion of one body of 
Christ saving all that is by expanding beyond physical constraints does not reconcile 
well with the particularities of bodies faithful to other traditions. 
This leads to the second, related concern: that Ward presents an extremely 
agonistic view of politics in his hierarchical constructions. In Cultural Transformation 
and Religious Practice, he argues that the present-day discourse of satisfaction 
depoliticises people, writing that 
'satisfaction' means that you, I, they, we, he or she have nothing left to 
complain about. And yet it is the visibility of complaint, of contestation 
between standpoints, that is vital for cultural transformation to come 
about. It makes manifest the irreducibility of the imaginary and the 
symbolic institutions that it engenders.... In this making visible of 
complaint, antagonism or contestation lies not only a future for politics 
and democracy, but cultural transformation tout court. A culture of 
'satisfaction' is a culture where aesthetics have become anaesthetics, 
because what it aims at is the erasure of desire: that is, stasis (or death).
45
 
The ideal politics—one which leads to cultural transformation and a vibrant society—
derives its force from struggle, as persons holding to various standpoints work to 
persuade one another of their truth. The opposition between agonistic relations and 
control through placation leaves little space for any other political possibility, such as 
consensus, making the assumption that, if people are defined in relation to others, this 
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must work out as a dyadic conflict with winners and losers. Such an understanding may 
be associated with a conception of an economy of redemption which pits the Church as 
the body of Christ against, and quite separate from, the world.
46
 If Church and world are 
so distinct, but the ecclesial realm has saving autonomy, a politics of contestation would 
not seem to work, as the struggle is already decided. While Ward‘s competitive politics 
are supposed to lead to reconciliation and new social structures, they seem more likely 
to set a stage for division and endemic violence. 
In the final chapter of Christ and Culture, Ward addresses the Christian mode of 
politics. He does so by connecting the incarnation and sacrificial suffering (as opposed 
to the suffering generated by sin). To Ward, the inherent connection between suffering 
and incarnation is ‗figured‘ early in the story of Jesus with the ‗wounding‘ that is his 
circumcision, and goes on to the Passion.
47
 But suffering is not just a part of Christ‘s 
life, it is inextricably intertwined with the passionate kenosis with which God created 
the universe, ‗primordial‘ and ‗endemic‘ to incarnation—and hence embodiment.48 
There seems to be a linguistic confusion here which mistakes ‗suffering‘ for that 
‗vulnerability‘ which comes with opening oneself to loving and being loved. Ward goes 
on to take issue with another theological response to the question of suffering, that of 
Jürgen Moltmann; Ward declares that Moltmann, taking suffering up into God‘s own 
history, ‗radicalises God being with us, compromising God‘s transcendence‘.49 This 
reveals questions that Ward does not ask: why must God be considered ‗transcendent‘? 
What is it that God transcends, and why cannot that transcendence be compromised? 
The analogical relationship with Ward‘s transcendent God finally leads to an emphasis 
on the relationship of love, but only a part of love: the desire of God for human beings 
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and of human beings for God. The emphasis on hierarchy loses sight of human love one 
for another, and forgets that suffering cannot be easily explained away or justified. 
 
Retrieving the Body in the Flesh 
 
The way Ward construes the necessity of embodiment to depend upon the 
transcendent leaves much to be desired. While attempting to keep body and flesh at the 
heart of thinking about the relationship between God and humanity, this theology ends 
up stratifying the body, pushing actual physical attributes down to the lowest rung of 
value. The conception of the transcorporeal Christ to try to formulate a salvation with 
room for all results in a rather aggressive Christ who absorbs all into himself. The very 
agonistic view of politics and society which undergirds much of this not only promotes 
violence but also helps to generate an understanding that suffering is an inevitable part 
of incarnate life. Still, there is much that Ward says which is helpful, particularly the 
ideas of relational give-and-take, of touch, and of the necessity of passion. His 
discussion of the nature of intimacy, of a ‗difference-in-relation‘ that is never static but 
‗always under construction‘, insightfully teaches readers not just about the vulnerability 
of the body but also of the part that vulnerability plays in relationships which, in turn, 
describe and inscribe our flesh.
50
 The notion of the fluidity and instability of the body 
which Ward promotes also serves to help keep the body from being just a thing which 
can be possessed and manipulated, a thing separate from mind or soul which rules it—
as long as other theological assumptions, such as the swallowing of the world by God, 
do not trump this as they seem to do for Ward.
51
 
I want to hold onto the idea that it is through touch, through being vulnerable in 
relation to one another and passionate about another‘s presence, that we are defined in 
our embodiment and construct the shape of our lives. But this bringing into being must 
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fluidity of body and gender from the point of view that it is the person of Jesus that matters most, not 
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remain specific and local. Our bodies are constructed and known in relationship with 
other bodies. As touch is received and returned the world is explored: a new geography 
is generated. Yet, this is not a geography sketched out by placing the material under the 
transcendent. Rather than the vertical hierarchy of values depicted by Ward, this moves 
towards a more horizontal, relational ethos. This geography depends upon attending to 
the local and the specific. Forming at the meeting point of two people, it is a geography 
of love in which each partner pays attention to the particular story of the other. 
In creation, God‘s vulnerability was and is to make us distinct from God and 
each other. Only in this difference can relationship exist and flourish. If there were no 
‗other‘, there would be no conversation, no touch, no meeting—nothing but the self, 
closed off and stagnant. Here finitude and even fragmentation are less a problem than a 
realisation of what it means to be human, to be creatures. We meet each other at and in 
our limits, not to get around them, not even to bemoan them, but to know them and 
perceive the world through them. In moving from Ward‘s view to this one, ideas of the 
transcendent and the material (or spiritual and physical) do not disappear; rather, the 
categories change. They become descriptions mapping the operations of creaturely life, 
so that being human and being created must include physical and spiritual elements. But 
even though there is more to everything than meets the eye, what is seen is not a lesser 
thing, not a reduction. The spirituality of the world resides in its very particularity, in 
the concrete and local; the specificity of things is created by God. 
Any relationship between persons resides in this specificity of material 
existence. This does not mean that relationship is nothing but touch, for instance, but 
that the care one has for another is worked out in the particularities of bodies in all their 
awkwardness and hesitation, vulnerabilities and joys. In the meeting of bodies, people 
pay attention to the memories and hopes embodied in the flesh. In the tension between 
bodies, born of their difference, a relationship manifests creativity, the possibility for 
something new. In the sharing between bodies, persons give of themselves, becoming 
vulnerable to change; the touch of one body upon another can linger upon skin, thought, 
and memory, becoming part of who you are, even as you become part of someone else. 
This particularity to relationship makes of embodiment both fragility and strength. No 
one ever knows if one‘s offer of touch will be received with warmth or rebuffed, and the 
possibility of hurt always remains. Yet that vulnerability to pain also makes one liable 
to joy, the knowing of love in the turning toward the other.  
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Interestingly, Graham Ward himself provides some direction towards sources of 
thought supportive to a theological valuing of the concrete and the particular when he 
brings the standpoint epistemologies of feminist philosophers such as Sandra Harding 
into his analysis of culture and society in Cultural Transformation and Religious 
Practice.
52
 Standpoint theory began as a scientific methodology with the goal of making 
scientists aware that even attempts at political neutrality reflect a situational bias which 
is potentially oppressive; the epistemological approach works by starting consciously at 
a specific location (originally women‘s experience, but other locations also are possible) 
because every investigation of the universe is specifically located.
53
 The greatest 
significance which Ward takes from standpoint theory has to do with its possibilities for 
constructing an understanding of identity. Because standpoints become known only 
through encounters with one another, any particular standpoint remains necessarily 
enmeshed with others; as any one person‘s attitude toward the world, or ‗subject-
position‘, may hold several standpoints, that subject-position may best be identified 
through the nodes where the various standpoints meet in a matrix generated by their 
implication with each other.
54
 In addition, Ward derives support for his competitive 
view of politics from standpoint theory, where positions are not given, but must be 
‗achieved‘.55 However, standpoint theory and related philosophy does not necessarily 
stop there; the approach also can be seen to support an acknowledgement of the 
contingency of the material, including that of bodies, so that beginning from a specific 
location means recognising the limitations and partiality of knowledge not in the 
negative sense that this only cramps the pursuit of knowledge but in the more positive 
sense that partial knowledge grounded in the situated, the local, the concrete, and the 
particular can generate ‗faithful knowledge‘ in creating a trust between distinct bodies.56 
This notion of faithful knowledge can stand alongside my proposal of a relational 
geography of love. 
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Whoever might hold this approach would insist that personhood is made 
manifest in the stories that each person tells and that these stories cannot be reduced to 
any one pattern, but exist in tension with one another.
57
 Rather than being allegories of 
formal categories predicated of the transcendent, the stories provide the content for our 
definitions of what is good, beautiful and just, for what is meant by faith, hope and love. 
When Ward uses standpoint theory to buttress formulations of identity, particularly 
leading up to a proclamation of the nature of Christian belief and practice, he also 
underlines the importance of a narrative understanding of the various descriptors by 
which an individual may be identified. After using himself as an example, he writes that  
Identifications are affirmed by the observations of others—‗he really 
can't drink malt whisky after nine in the evening‘—the presence of 
others (family, friends, colleagues, passers-by) and the existence 
external to me of the institutions to which I belong. These external 
factors restrain not the stories I can tell about myself but the validity of 
the stories I can tell about myself. By ‗valid‘ I mean that the truth 
contents of the story can be defended against any objections to the 
contrary. An alteration in these constraining external factors may affect 
what I can believe about myself and the way I have interpreted my 
experience; may demand a change to make my story more credible. 
Nevertheless, I am the protagonist of the narratives interlinking these 
sets of identifications and which generate my sense of what I hold to be 
true about my distinguishing tastes and myself.
58
 
Yet, the stories to which Ward refers here seem only as important as the truth contents 
that they hold. They are vehicles and mediations. In response to this, a stronger account 
of stories in plurality would go far to remedy many of the criticisms given above; that 
is, while Ward‘s view of the fluidity of bodies and their relationships is insightful, a 
more-developed sense of narrative for all persons and not just for the second person of 
the Trinity might help to keep those fluid bodies from dissolving altogether or being 
absorbed in such a way that they lose their identities and their otherness as creatures 
from their Creator. 
This world and the people in it are not shadows of something better, truer; our 
stories are not signs of something else. The goodness of materiality is not maintained by 
the transcendence of God but by God‘s choice to care for the world, to be with created 
beings, to direct creatures to attend to one another with compassion—to be in company 
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together. Rather than through a theology of analogy, human participation in the 
operation of God in this reading comes through a theology of companionship. The 
majesty of God, including the otherness of the Creator from creation, manifests itself in 
God being in relationship with God‘s creation. Love can never be solely a matter of 
God‘s love for us and our love for God. We are, instead, called to love one another with 
God—and love means attending to the needs and joys of each one you meet, even if that 
tending cannot be perfect or complete. God places us alongside one another in all of our 
particularity, specificity and singularity. This is an Emmanuel model of divine work—
God-with-us—in which incarnation is not about the divine subsuming the human, but 
rather about accompaniment. If God, from the beginning, has looked outside of God-
self, making space for that which is other than God, then God is not absent from the 
vulnerability of the concrete. God waits with us, attending to us, and calls us to wait 
with one another. 
This relationship between God and human beings, and among human beings, 
remains a sacramental one, performed and enacted in the stories which we share. The 
relationship may be construed as specifically eucharistic, though the sacrament here 
does not focus on the breaking and distributing of bread alone, but on the entire action 
of making a space for the presence of the other. Indeed, with the words ‗This is my 
body‘, Christ makes space for the particularity of bodies, manifested in their stories and 
their relationships. Our stories—the narratives of our bodies, including all our 
incorporated relationships, all the arrangements of our flesh—in their specific localities, 
and movements from place to place, then chart out the landscape of our existence. 
Indeed, our stories together recreate our topography and reorient the way we address the 
world. Our particularities, interacting with one another, generate the possibility of 
drawing out a geography of love in the company of God. Instead of suspending the 
material in the transcendent, the materiality of our stories set beside each other makes a 
grace to attend to one another, in suffering and in joy. With that in mind, I turn now to 




Keeping the Story Open: 
Stanley Hauerwas  
and  
the Problem of the Plurality of Stories
 | 57 
 
 
t first glance, Stanley Hauerwas seems a strange person to set alongside 
Graham Ward to make a pair. Each presents very different tones in their 
writing, with Ward seeming gentler and Hauerwas more forceful, while the 
two theologians have, up to now, concentrated on different aspects of theological 
inquiry, with Ward exploring Christian issues around the notion of the body, and 
Hauerwas investigating the ethical implications of a narrative construction of Christian 
values and practices. Generally, Hauerwas is known for taking a strong view of the 
difference of the Christian community from the rest of the world and promoting the idea 
that the Church and its members are shaped by the story into which they have been 
gathered. Characteristically, in a recent interview, Hauerwas said that 
Inclusivity is a way of forgetfulness. I often suggest that egalitarianism 
is the opium of the masses. This is simply because inclusivity is often 
nothing other than the direct attempt to eradicate difference. Therefore, I 
think that the presumption of inclusivity is exactly a way of preventing 
the conflicts we need to have in order to have healthy communities. I 
know that sounds counterintuitive, but I just think that‘s the way it 




These statements suggest that Hauerwas would see his work operating as the antithesis 
of much of Ward‘s theological formulations, particularly when Ward tries to bring 
people together into community by dissolving the importance of difference.
2
 Hauerwas 
also seems to agree with the critique which I give above that Ward‘s theology too easily 
allows for the hegemony of a majority position while hiding the actual violence—gentle 
or not—done when overcoming difference is achieved at the expense of one group 
subsuming another into domination. 
However, things are not quite that simple. The two theologians have more 
similar views than might first appear; note, for instance, that Hauerwas‘s conception of 
politics for ‗healthy communities‘, as quoted above, requires ‗conflicts‘ in the same way 
that Ward‘s does, as looked at in the last chapter. In fact, I would say that Hauerwas 
treats stories similar to the way Ward treats bodies; that is, although Hauerwas declares 
that theologians should take narrative seriously, in the end this means only a certain 
type of narrative and, more specifically, only one, governing story. His scheme more or 
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less ignores the possibility that there is a multitude of stories. The Christian body which 
performs the Christian story does just that: performs a part that has been scripted 
already, embodying belief in practices which enact the tradition of the faith. This lack of 
consideration for the possibility of plurality even within Christianity—let alone other 
faith traditions—maintains a similar type of violence to that of Ward‘s theology albeit 
in a different manner; Hauerwas‘s violence diminishes the significance of the creative 
nature of humanity and constructs rigid walls around communities to keep their stories 
separate, all while he promulgates a militant sort of Christianity which exists in 
opposition to a worldly enemy. 
In this chapter, I look at the place of the body within Hauerwas‘s Christian 
ethics, a system in which Christians are formed through attention to the gospel 
narrative. After outlining the connection between embodiment and stories, I turn to a 
closer, more critical reading of the consequences of his theological formulations. This is 
followed by a reflection upon possible ways to address some of the problematic issues. 
 
Hauerwas on narrative and stories  
 
As a theologian and ethicist, Stanley Hauerwas has made the narrative character 
of the moral life one of the themes of his work.
3
 Hauerwas argues that the morality 
which directs any person comes less from precepts than from the stories which form the 
way they see the world. He writes that 
The nature of Christian ethics is determined by the fact that Christian 
convictions take the form of a story, or perhaps better, a set of stories 
that constitutes a tradition, which in turn creates and forms a community. 
Christian ethics does not begin by emphasizing rules or principles, but 
by calling our attention to a narrative that tells of God's dealing with 
creation….  
Too often we assume the narrative character of Christian 
convictions is incidental to those convictions. Both believer and 
unbeliever are under the impression that narrative is a relatively 
unimportant moral category. Specifically, we tend to think of ―stories‖ 
as illustrations of some deeper truth that we can and should learn to 
articulate in a non-narrative mode. Thus, when we are children we make 
do with stories, but when we grow up we want the literal truth—that is, 
the truth that can be substantiated apart from the story….  
My contention is that the narrative mode is neither incidental nor 
accidental to Christian belief. There is no more fundamental way to talk 
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of God than in a story. The fact that we come to know God through the 
recounting of the story of Israel and the life of Jesus is decisive for our 
truthful understanding of the kind of God we worship as well as the 
world in which we exist.
4
 
By learning about God through stories, we learn our relationship to God. By learning 
our relationship to God, we learn about how we should relate to other people and the 
world. 
Hauerwas talks about certain kind of storytelling, one that forms the teller and 
the hearer, creating character. This narrating of life, relating one event in time to 
another, is finally more prescriptive than descriptive. Hauerwas writes that 
To be moral persons is to allow stories to be told through us so that our 
manifold activities gain a coherence that allows us to claim them for our 
own. Stories and character are interdependent in the sense that the moral 
life, if it is to be coherent, always has beginnings and endings. 
 Our character is constituted by the rules, metaphors, and stories 
that are combined to give a design or unity to the variety of things we 
must or must not do in our lives. If our lives are to be reflective and 
coherent our vision must be ordered around dominant metaphors or 
stories. Therefore it is crucial to our moral life to allow the metaphors 
that make up our vision to check and balance each other in terms of their 
appropriateness for the various demands of our life and the overall "life 
plan" that we live.
5
 
Although narratives have high values for human beings, they are narratives for a 
particular end—they have the purpose of shaping our lives and the choices that we 
make. These are stories told ‗through‘ us. In our interactions and the events of our lives 
we become the medium of a dominant story. For Hauerwas as a Christian theological 
ethicist, of course, the story that is being told is God's story as revealed by Christ Jesus. 
Christian life centres on ‗learning to live into the story of Christ‘.6 We locate our own 
stories within the master story which God tells, and learn to see that history has a plot.  
All of this seems a much better way to understand the world and human agency 
than simply attempting to rely upon a set of principles, for stories can flesh out such 
precepts as ‗Love your neighbour as yourself‘, helping to figure out what ‗love‘, 
‗neighbour‘, and ‗yourself‘ actually mean. The stories of Jesus of Nazareth in particular, 
but also other religious stories, embody what Christians are supposed to mean and how 




Hauerwas, 'Visions, Stories, and Character', HR 168-9. 
6  
PK 95. 
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they are supposed to act when they say such words as ‗love‘.7 Content cannot be 
divorced from form; not only does the form of what Jesus said matter—that is, whether 
a particular scriptural passage relating his words make up a parable or a 
commandment—but, also, the message that Jesus teaches does not exist apart from the 
way he lived his life. Thus, Hauerwas strives to take seriously the physical, temporal, 
this-worldly nature of the incarnate Word of God preached by the followers of Jesus. 
That stories carry and embody the meanings of the gospel proclamation of Christ 
only forms one part of the equation; the other part relies upon the response to that 
proclamation, a reply which is worked by the Holy Spirit in those who hear the story. 
This second step involves the Spirit creating a new community, the Church, which must, 
in turn, live out what has been learned. Hauerwas writes that the Church ‗is constituted 
by word and sacrament, as the story we tell, the story we embody, must not only be told 
but enacted‘.8 Just as stories embody meaning, the members of the Church and their 
actions embody those stories as a further living proclamation of the good news. Each 
body that is in the Church is called to become the image of the body of Christ, and each 
person does this insofar as she or he lives the way of life that has been modelled by the 
story of God‘s relationship with Israel and the Church, the story from creation to 
incarnation to the end of all that is. 
For Hauerwas, according to his writings, what this means is that physical bodies 
(of Christians) receive their place from the aggregate body of the Church. Portrayed as a 
part of the corporate body, the flesh-and-blood Christian stands against modernist 
individualism. In the article, ‗The Sanctified Body: Why Perfection Does Not Require a 
Self‘, Hauerwas gives some grudging credit to postmodernism for criticising modernist 
views of the self, declaring that ‗The loss of the ―self‖ and the increasing significance of 
the body, and in particular the body‘s permeability, can help us rediscover holiness not 
as an individual achievement but as the work of the Holy Spirit building up the body of 
Christ‘.9 In this, the body has a value different from the self because the body is caught 
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up in Christ‘s body, is a part of something larger which shapes (sanctifies) it, while the 
self represents the worldly tendency to separate from the divine and attempt to make 
one‘s way alone. Hauerwas goes on to declare the virtues of what he calls ‗peasant 
Catholicism‘, an understanding of Christianity in which the faith is sustained through 
habitual practices more than through intellectual understanding, much like peasants 
produce what is needed for subsistence through bodily labour, knowledge of which is 
learned and passed down experientially.
10
 This shaping of the body ‗in a manner that the 
worship of God is unavoidable‘ is set in opposition to our present-day world, in which 
we believe that we have the power to control our lives as ‗the outcome of choices we 
have made‘.11 Hauerwas takes particular aim at Protestants who have an individualist 
ecclesiology, which he wants to counter with a Christian ethic which equates holiness 
with ‗the discipline of the body‘.12 This usage of the word ‗body‘ remains ambiguous, 
possibly referring to the community of believers and possibly to the single member: the 
lines blur, I would guess purposefully, in a demonstration of the latter‘s dependence 
upon the former. To discipline the body means to train both the member and the 
community in seeing each other as integrally connected. 
The essay continues with reflections upon two books, Dale Martin‘s The 
Corinthian Body and Arthur Frank‘s The Wounded Story Teller: Body, Illness, and 
Ethics. His reading of the first of these leads him to note that, for the apostle Paul, the 
main issue concerning the body was ‗how our bodies are positioned for the upbuilding 
of the body of Christ‘.13 Of the second book, an exploration of how illness and suffering 
focus attention on the body‘s reality, Hauerwas declares that, ‗By suggesting that 
Frank‘s account might help us to imagine what it would mean for us to be in the Pauline 
sense the body of Christ, I am seeking to find the means to remind us that perfection is 
another name for submission‘.14 In other words, the discipline of the body is the practice 
of submission to God. It is a practice that comes through a life of regular worship, a life 
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  Hauerwas, ‗Sanctified Body‘, ST 80. 
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  Hauerwas, ‗Sanctified Body‘, ST 83. 
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learned liturgically, and especially, says Hauerwas, in the sacrament of the Eucharist.
15
 
He writes that ‗our body‘s story‘ is ‗the story of our desire for God‘.16 Hauerwas sets up 
a series of relationships and oppositions around the idea that practices follow narratives 
to flesh out the convictions at the core of our lives. Stories are embodied and lived, but 
there are two different kinds of life-stories: in one, the story matches the story that God 
wills for God‘s creation; in the other, the story veers away from this narrative of 
salvation within community. The body‘s story is the story of those shaped as members 
of the body of Christ together with others. The self is that which tries to tell its own tale, 
and ends up with a story with no order. The body, in this conception, outlines the 
location where people are oriented towards the kingdom of God, and makes no sense 
otherwise—a very serious place to put the body, indeed.  
Yet, for all of this seriousness, Hauerwas seems only willing to go so far in his 
declaration of the value of stories and embodiment. Only certain stories and certain 
embodiments have value. These need to be looked at in turn. 
 
On Truth and Fiction 
 
In order to make narrative into a category which is useful for discerning moral 
action, he needs to find a way to judge between one story and another. He anchors his 
account of narrative‘s worth in the truthfulness of any one narrative.17 Of course, very 
few people want to live by lies, and it seems unwise to ask theologians to accept 
untruthful stories as guides to how human beings should live. Yet, questions lurk 
beneath this. How do we know what is truthful? What exactly makes up a lie? What 
about fiction, or poetry: are they ‗lies‘ or ‗untruthful‘?  
Part of the problem with Hauerwas‘s formulation of the value of stories seems to 
be his rather low opinion of human nature, following a long-standing tendency in 
western Christian thought. In an early essay reflecting on the autobiography of Albert 
Speer, the ethicist writes that ‗To be is to be rooted in self-deception‘ and ‗A true story 
could only be one powerful enough to check the endemic tendency towards self-
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deception—a tendency that inadequate stories cannot help but foster‘.18 Apparently, a 
true story is one that shatters illusions or delusions about human nature. This is the 
closest that he seems to get to defining what he means by truthfulness. Truth is 
revelatory in the sense of uncovering what has been hidden, ignored, or denied. In the 
context of Albert Speer‘s version of his role in the architecture of Nazi Germany, it 
certainly makes sense to focus on the discernment of the truth. Yet, when it comes to 
truthful stories, nowhere does Hauerwas make a distinction among genres. That a 
narrative needs to be truthful seems for him a natural corollary of making narrative into 
a moral category. 
One can discern this by looking at what Hauerwas does when he writes about 
fiction. Let us examine two examples, the first an essay reflecting upon Richard Adams' 
novel about rabbits, Watership Down, and the second his reading of the work of 
Anthony Trollope. In ‗A Story-Formed Community: Reflections on Watership Down‘, 
Hauerwas looks for lessons concerning the essential value of stories in this story of 
rabbits with their own mythology seeking a new, safe, and stable home. He has a 
somewhat odd, instrumental approach to reading. He makes such declarations as 
‗Adams is trying to help us understand politics not only as it organizes people for 
particular ends, but also as it forms them to be inheritors and exemplifications of a 
tradition‘.19 Even stranger, Hauerwas seems surprised in remarking on how the author 
of the book has structured the novel so that stories told by characters connect to events 
in the plot, stating that ‗Adams seems to be suggesting that good communities not only 
know how to tell truthful stories truthfully, but also when to tell them‘.20 Not only does 
Hauerwas claim to know the author's intention, but he also implies that the purpose of 
the novel is to teach about political organization—all at the same time that he apparently 
forgets that it is a work of art, crafted by an author. 
More importantly, near the end of his article Hauerwas sums up his own 
intentions. He writes:  
I have reached the end of my tale (no pun intended) and some may feel 
that I have failed to make my case. But remember I have told the story of 
the rabbits only to illustrate and illuminate my ten theses for the reform 
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of Christian social ethics. The story was not meant to demonstrate that 




Thus Hauerwas does to a novel what he says people should not do when approaching 
Christian moral truth: he calls the story an illustration of something that needs to be 
articulated in a non-narrative mode. In his practice, he turns the novel into an instrument 
of the point he wants to make which, ironically, is that stories are more than 
entertainment, and should not be neglected as embodiments of the identity of a 
community. 
Hauerwas discusses Trollope's work in a book on theologically engaging with 
the present-day, secular world, declaring, ‗I intend to show why novels, or at least 
novels like Austen's and Trollope's, are an irreplaceable resource for training in moral 
virtue‘.22 Literature of a certain kind receives its justification, then, from its potential to 
teach a person, or ‗to help us be good‘.23 Art has no purpose—or little useful purpose—
beyond what it may instruct its audience, beyond its didactic quality. This goes beyond 
content even into the form of the book. Hauerwas notes that  
the very reading of the novel is a moral training. By forcing our eyes 
from one word to the next, one paragraph to the next, we are stretched 
through a narrative world that gives us the skills to make something of 
our own lives. To make something of our own lives requires our being 
able to locate our story in an unfolding narrative so that we can go on.
24
 
Literature becomes a template for our personal histories, and stories become models for 
how we should live our lives. As the narrative unfolds, we are enfolded in it. This 
makes reading the steady, studied practice of mining a book for the skills that its words 
may impart to us for constructing our character. One presumably must weigh each book 
one encounters by what enlightening insights it may hold for our life's journey. 
Although Hauerwas is attempting to attend to the temporal nature of our bodily 
existence by valuing narrative, by tying this value to morality he begins to choose which 
stories should be heard, while declaring that others would best be forgotten. He writes 
that 
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Even though moral principles are not sufficient in themselves for our 
moral existence, neither are stories sufficient if they do not generate 
principles that are morally significant. Principles without stories are 
subject to perverse interpretation (i.e., they can be used in immoral 
stories), but stories without principles will have no way of concretely 
specifying the actions and practices consistent with the general 
orientation expressed by the story.
25
 
Here stories are divided (moral/immoral, generating significantly moral principles or 
not) by the perception of their value. The problem with stories which do not generate 
significant principles is that there is no way then for the reader or hearer to find skills 
essential for living. This entire system leads to a number of conundrums, though. What 
is ‗morally significant‘? Who determines this? Should a story be judged by moral 
significance at all? Such questions must be raised with Hauerwas placing such a heavy 
burden on narratives for making meaning of our lives. The questions also arise from the 
fact that stories which are told for the sake of a community's identity need to be stories 
embraced as foundations by a group. If truthfulness is determined by the assent of a 
community, that community has to agree which stories should be dominant. The 
community then needs some way to determine how to judge the value of stories. For a 
Christian community, agreement over scriptures comes from the weight of tradition and 
canonicity, but the status of other texts remains decidedly murky, unless they, like lives 
which follow the narrative related by sacred text, also embody the message preached 
through that text.  
Because of the community‘s centrality in judging the truthfulness of stories, one 
should not be surprised that Hauerwas views modernity with suspicion. He claims that 
‗―modernity‖ names the time that produces people who believe they should have no 
story except the story they chose when they had no story‘.26 Negativity towards the 
‗self‘ and attempts to create one‘s own life though one‘s own narratives has already 
been mentioned. Political liberalism receives a similar criticism from Hauerwas, who 
writes that ‗Liberalism, in its many forms and versions, presupposes that society can be 
organized without any narrative that is commonly held to be true‘.27 Against the 
multiplication of individual stories and lack of agreement around one truthful narrative, 
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Hauerwas sets what he sees as the Christian way: that any one Christian person's story is 
only true inasmuch as it is located within the grander frame of God‘s story from 
creation to the eschaton. Your story, therefore, is only meant to be read as a part that is 
nested in God‘s. 
This may be one way to emphasize the place of tradition in Christian 
discipleship, but it also has the curious effect of brushing aside the particularity of 
stories and the specificity of texts. As we have seen with his reading of fiction, 
Hauerwas finds value in a story when that story fits into his theological structure of 
morality or, rather, the value he finds in fiction comes from seeking a way for literature 
to support the overall story where he would locate the Christian moral life. But because 
stories are only important within God's story, he becomes suspicious of narrative 
theology, too. He muses that 
Part of the difficulty with the rediscovery of the significance of narrative 
for theological reflection has been a too concentrated attention on texts 
qua texts. It is no doubt significant to rediscover the literary and 
narrative character of the texts of the Bible. But the emphasis on 
narrative can only result in scholarly narcissism if narrative texts are 
abstracted from the concrete people who acknowledge the authority of 
the Bible. Thus, I wrote a sermon in the hopes of reminding us that the 
emphasis on narrative is unintelligible abstracted from an ecclesial 
context. Indeed, I suspect the project to develop general hermeneutical 
theories by some theologians is an attempt to substitute a theory of 
interpretation for the church.
28
 
Narrative gets value in Christian theology from being with the story of Christ, and the 
only place where one can learn that story is within the church. While Hauerwas started 
as a great champion of the place of narrative in Christian life, he apparently decided to 
qualify this when he began to see that Christian narrative theology might be doing 
something very different, that theologians might start to see stories in their own right as 
something that human beings do.
29
 He discusses two choices concerning narrative and 
theology: that theologians should attend to narrative because narrative is how human 
beings understand the world and our presence within time, or that theologians need to 
attend to narrative because Scripture has a narrative framework.
30
 With the first choice, 
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investigating any narrative construction of the perception of reality means seeking an 
ontological insight into human nature. With the second, theologians examine the 
narrative nature of belief in order to re-describe for their audience the heart of text and 
tradition.
31
 Hauerwas thinks this is a false choice, that theologians do not need to extend 
narrative into the essence of human nature or to restrict it to being only a strategy of 
reading, ‗once we recognize that the church is crucial for the story that Christians have 
to tell‘.32 But the tendency to collapse particular stories of particular people remains—
they are collapsed into the Church. 
The method by which Christians are patterned after the story of God told by the 
Church is problematic because of the limits that Hauerwas sets and the conception of 
God which he implies. His seems a very coercive God, who is author, scriptwriter, 
composer, and choreographer, while human beings are actors, performers, characters, 
and, at most, narrators.
33
 In Hauerwas‘s writings, there seems little place for human 
creativity or for a true participation in the work of God. This strongly safeguards the 
sovereignty of God, but it neglects Paul‘s declaration that Christians are ―joint heirs 
with Christ‖ in God‘s work as well as Christ‘s glory.34 Hauerwas seems to fear the 
proliferation of stories, to feel that too many stories are distracting—though, to be fair, 
he is not really interested in stories, only in their traits.
35
 The phrase he uses again and 
again is ‗the narrative character‘ of Christian convictions, of the Bible, of our 
knowledge of God, of Christian ethics.
36
 He demonstrates that God‘s truth comes in the 
form of a story, and wants Christian life to conform to the traits of the narrative genre, 
but the nature of the idea of truthfulness to which he holds—and which, in a way, 
constitutes his method for determining the value in any instance of storytelling—does 
not dispute the so-called ―natural‖ association of narrative with fiction, with the creation 
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of fantasy worlds which are not real, which are merely ―poetic.‖37 Imagination, then, is 
not creative but performative.   
Granted, in his turn towards the idea of performing the faith, Hauerwas does 
admit to the place of improvisation.  However, when he refers to a sermon by Rowan 
Williams on Christ bringing us into the dance of life, and giving us space to improvise 
alone and with others, Hauerwas only concludes that ‗our Beloved….has invited us to 
join with him in the grace of his movements, performing them just as he has taught us, 
so that we might awaken to a graceful performance that God is enacting in us and 
through us‘.38 There is little, if any, space for human art in this kingdom of God; the 
story-shaped body gets set in its course, and has little room for contributing to the 
remaking of the world in the repair of all that is.  
 
On the Church’s Story-Shaped Bodies 
 
Essentially, the story-shaped body to which Hauerwas points is a Christian body, 
a body whose only proper mode of being is sanctification. It is a body that belongs in 
and longs for the Church. While such a proclamation definitely has a place in Christian 
theology, the way Hauerwas makes the proclamation raises several issues in the way 
that it sidelines other types of narrative than that of the Church. 
First, after reading Hauerwas concerning the body of Christ, you might wonder 
whose Christian body he is actually talking about. He refers to ‗the Church‘ as if it is 
self-evident exactly what body of people he means. While he assures readers that he is 
talking about the Church as a particular community within the world—declaring that the 
Christian community has ‗budgets, buildings, parking lots, potluck dinners‘ and more—
this Church remains an idealised community; the insistence upon its actuality reads 
more as if to say even though this community is such an institution, what matters more 
is the ideal.
39
 Because Hauerwas, for the most part, leaves aside the question of how any 
specific institutional church fits into the body of Christ, but still argues that there is a 
particular Christian narrative related by Scripture and tradition, he implies a unity of 
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tradition that is historically difficult to see. Yet, if there is only one tradition by which 
the Christian body is to be shaped, then whose tradition is that, and who controls its 
definition? It seems that any specific Christian community, in either having trouble 
measuring up to the ideal or deliberately choosing a variant path, could be deemed 




Second, ignoring multiplicity within the body of Christ extends outwards to non-
Christian traditions. While Hauerwas does not deny that other faith traditions have 
narratives that shape their communities also, he does seem functionally to group these 
other traditions together with ‗the world‘—with anything that is not Church. In one 
recent book, Hauerwas declares that 
If the church is in fact a community determined by a counterstory to the 
story that we story ourselves, I have suggested the church cannot help 
but appear as a counterpolitics to the politics of the world. I am, 
therefore, accused of tempting Christians to withdraw from the world 
and abandon their responsibility to work for relative justice. I confess I 
often am tempted to withdraw, but there is no place to which we can 
withdraw. Christians are, after all, surrounded. However, we can in the 
meantime draw on God‘s good patience to be a patient people in the 
world so that the world may know that the story goes on.
41
 
Despite his flippancy, Hauerwas does not really challenge the accusation that he is a 
Christian isolationist; he is committed to the particularity of the Christian story. I do not 
want to challenge the particularity per se; however, the belief that the Church has a 
―counterstory‖ and is a ―counterpolitics‖ suggests that the Church is, or is bringing into 
being, a ―counter-world.‖ Although this other world seems to be founded upon 
worship—and the Eucharist especially—it would remain an other world, not the world 
that God has made and is making. I imagine that Hauerwas would probably deny going 
so far, and might point to his proposal as simply being a different way of being in the 
world. You could also say that Hauerwas‘ notion of church, if it does not work for 
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justice in the world (his ‗relative justice‘), follows the physicians‘ dictum of ‗First, do 
no harm‘. But instead of seeking the redemption of the world, this formulation of 
sacramental ethics seems to wish for the replacement of the world. It results in a strange 
tendency to ignore the existence of non-Christians except as the generic other. For 
Hauerwas, this manifests especially in interviews: in one, as a way of opposing a 
foreign policy which asks what is best for the United States, he suggests that the better 
question to ask is ‗What would be the common good of Christians in the United States 
being in unity with Christians in Basra?‘—‗Christians‘, not ‗people‘, note—and in 
another, he says that, instead of participating in working toward a political regime 
which took care of the poor and the sick, Christians should just do such caring, and ‗the 
wider public‘ might want to ‗copy‘ the example.42 Bodies of ‗the wider public‘ live in 
the shadows at the edge, and have no face.
43
 
Lastly, along with a politics which separates Church from world, Hauerwas‘s 
ethics portrays a methodology of politics based on contest and antagonism. As much as 
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bodies are defined in relation to the community which shapes them, they are also 
defined in opposition to stories which that community deems false. The Christian social 
body and its members, as mentioned in the quote above, form a ‗counter-politics‘ to the 
world. In his nature as a provocateur, Hauerwas has even written an essay entitled ‗No 
Enemy, No Christianity: Preaching between ―Worlds‖‘, in which he makes the case that 
‗the whole point of Christianity is to produce the right kind of enemies‘ and that the 
main enemy is ‗the story of freedom‘ as well as ‗the institutions that embody it‘.44 For 
an avowed pacifist, Hauerwas‘s rhetoric is extremely militaristic, and his ethics calls for 
Christians to wage a war of persuasion. The body finds its form in struggle rather than 
collaboration; if bodies join together, it is against a common foe. Even intimate 
bodies—of people in love—seem shaped by what they struggle against: in the case of a 
married couple, the foe is a ‗sense of agency that underwrites the presumption that we 
should not be held responsible for decisions made when we did not know what we were 
doing‘; that is, the lovers must shape themselves against the tendency to think that 
people embody the fulfilment of choice when they actually embody a community that 
lives ‗into a promise‘.45 The embodied life is a struggle against forces that would pull 
the body (the aggregate body of Christ and its representative, fractal member) apart. To 
Hauerwas, it seems, the body could be defined as an arena where one is formed to the 
life of God‘s true community or not. All the rest, the unruliness of the flesh-and-blood 




As with Graham Ward, Stanley Hauerwas provides some enlightening insights 
concerning the body amid what is problematic. He notes that the body is shaped by its 
practices, with the whole of one‘s life, not just the precepts of a person‘s beliefs, being 
formative.
46
 At the end of the first chapter, I suggested that the fluidity of the body that 
Ward pins on the transcorporeal Christ could use a stronger sense of narrative to anchor 
the body‘s identity. This sense of narrative Hauerwas definitely supplies when he links 
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the formative practices of the body to the overarching story of God constructing a 
people for God‘s self and through them recreating the world into a kingdom of peace 
and joy. This narrative, which God calls the Church to tell and to live, certainly locates 
bodies, connecting any particular person to the community through cumulative practices 
which embody the narrative and, in turn, only have meaning under the auspices of the 
direction of the story‘s plot and form. The idea of a story-formed body fills the need for 
a theological account of how people relate to one another and not just to God: they share 
the same story and hence seek to follow the path of discipleship together. 
However, the sense of narrative supplied by Hauerwas not only provides bodies 
with a location, it fixes them in place. Individual, particular bodies fill their roles and 
disappear, mainly because they are not as important as the overall story. What is 
important is the neatness of the shape of the body, inexorably marching from creation to 
the fulfilment of the kingdom of God, following the pattern of the life, death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. Bodies are so fixed in their places that it is difficult even to 
conceptualise relationships which transgress the boundaries of the community‘s ideal. 
Even within the community, there is little sense of attending to another person‘s 
particular story as told by their particular body. There is little sense of collaborating 
with God in imagining and working towards the recreation of the world in a way that 
adds anything new. 
The story-formed body and the transcorporeal one both need some additional 
help to keep particular, concrete bodies from disappearing. They need a way to break up 
the neatness of their shape, an account which recognises that bodies are not really tidy at 
all, but are messy, unruly, and not always discreet in their longings for the discrete 
other. They need an account which does not fail to see God and other persons in the 
untidiness of bodies and their stories. Thus, we turn now to Marcella Althaus-Reid and 
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ot all theologians try to manage the unruly particularity of the body; neither 
do all theologies seek to discipline the incorrigibility of flesh. Marcella 
Althaus-Reid, for one, has sought to incorporate accounts of the material 
lives of human beings at what is perhaps those lives‘ most incorrigible level—the 
infinite variety of sexualities—into a theology she calls ‗Indecent‘. In her 2003 book, 
The Queer God, she writes that ‗We are referring here to the body, but not just to 
anybody, because we want to refer to the body in love, which has been notoriously 
absent in theology‘.1 She continues on to discuss why she believes Christian theologians 
need to do this: 
This highlighting of the ‗ordinariness‘ of love and sexuality as done in a 
materialist theological framework belongs to the order of Others. This is 
an order of many people‘s everyday lives which gets lost when we do 
our arithmetic of the body in Christian theology, for instance, when 
recounting how many times the word ‗body/ies‘ appears in theological 
discourse, such as the body of Christ, the body of the church and its 
tension with the academic theological body (as bodies in opposition). 
Dogmatics is the Christian Corpus (literally Christian Body; in Spanish 
it is Cuerpo Dogmático) which organises the divine body of knowledge 
that theologians have and the body of the community. Those bodies are 
organised, regulated, redeemed or condemned in a permanent 
theological discourse of bodies in loving relationships. However, as the 
Brazilian theologian Jaci Maraschin once suggested, these theological 
bodies have usually been bodies without flesh, without bones or brains, 
bodies without nervous systems or blood…and, we may add, bodies 
without menstruation or sweat or without malnutrition and bodies 
without sexual relationships….  
In order to give some concreteness to the reflection on bodies in 
theology and to engage them in a dialogue within the framework of the 
discourse of a Liberation Materialist Theology we need to particularise 
these bodies. It is particularly important here to identify personal bodies 
by their names and stories and special characteristics of dissidence and 
adaptation in our contemporary history.
2
 
In this, Althaus-Reid issues a clarion call for theologians to grapple with bodies in 
particular, as they are situated with the specific vulnerabilities of their flesh and blood 
and the specificity of their local lives, instead of in the abstract. She notes the bloodless 
orderings of bodies, the neatness sought in a systematic comprehension of bodily 
relations, and suggests that such theological organisation does not have enough 
anchoring it to the actual experience of the unique identities of human beings. She 
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proposes that Christian theology should turn around to base itself in encounters with 
actual bodies in love and the multiplicity of sexualities in evidence, giving not just a 
strictly harmonious reading but sounding the note of tensions between individuals and 
the way people‘s lives can come to include those tensions. 
The intent behind the approach of Indecent Theology would make paying 
attention to particular bodies integral to what theology has to say to the world. 
Attempting by valuing difference to ensure marginal voices are heard obviates many of 
the concerns which I have already discussed, including the consequential absorption of 
many particular bodies into one in Ward‘s presentation of transcorporeality and the 
minimisation of creaturely collaboration with their Creator which comes from 
Hauerwas‘s notions of the formation of the body to the true Christian narrative. 
However, even though Althaus-Reid takes pains to explicate the shortcomings of both 
traditional and Liberation theologies where sexual and gendered bodies are concerned, 
using methodologies learned from Feminist, Postcolonial and Queer theologies, the 
results are strangely mixed. The writing keeps human bodies before the imaginations of 
readers, never failing to remind us of the specifically located nature of Althaus-Reid‘s 
theological sources—the people negotiating the political, religious and social realities of 
Latin America, where she grew up.
3
 But, in the process, those people and all of their 
idiosyncrasies often turn precisely into sources, placed at the service of theology. 
Bodies and their stories tend to become symbols, sometimes illustrations of what 
theology should be doing, but more often metaphors for how the discipline should be 
practised. The theologian who on one page complains that ‗Over the dead bodies, the 
bodies of people who suffered and felt their life to be sometimes intolerable, theology 
was written‘ on another page writes that ‗If Queer Theology is a body-grounded 
theology, that is, a theology based on the incorrigible, uneducated, libertine body, we 
may start by building a hermeneutical circle precisely from there, from that libertine, 
licentious and problematic body which refuses the Christian fixed exchange rate and 
makes of the redistribution of its own frontiers a precious thing‘.4 The bodies in love do 
not become absent from the theology, they just become obscured (one might even say 
eclipsed) by the theological method that is derived analogically from their stories. 
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This is not what Althaus-Reid sets out to do, and I feel more than a little reticent 
in my criticism of her work. As I have said, throughout her books, she constantly stops 
to remind us that theological systems ignore actual bodies at great peril. Yet, for all that 
she tries to do theology differently, it is as if the work is always being pushed towards 
treating bodies as metaphors, so that bodies and their stories represent some other 
reality—not an ontological but a methodological one. A person might wonder if there is 
just something inherent in the art of doing theology that skews thought away from 
particular lived lives; if even one who tries so hard cannot escape the trap, who can? 
Still, the attempt remains significant, and there are strategies for reading Althaus-Reid‘s 
work as a subversive, unsettling corrective which can find a theological route for bodies 
other than just one more systematising option. The particular stories continue to stand 
out, slipping from the grasp of any theological programme to construct their own way of 
seeing the world and providing a glimpse of that perspective. 
This chapter explores the indecent bodies of Marcella Althaus-Reid‘s theology 
and what happens to their particular stories. First, I look at her critique of what she starts 
out calling ‗North Atlantic theologies‘ but later ‗T-Theology‘, with ‗T‘ for ‗traditional‘, 
meaning ‗theology as ideology, that is, a totalitarian construction of what is considered 
as ―the One and Only Theology‖ which does not admit discussion or challenges from 
different perspectives, especially in the area of sexual identity‘.5 Along with discussion 
of her comments on the oppressive flaws of this ideological theology, I examine what 
she places against it, with more attention given to the details of how she puts forth 
sexual bodies. Second, I consider more carefully the movement past actual bodies which 
Althaus-Reid‘s theological method implies. Finally, I reflect upon strategies for helping 
the strengths of this theology to thrive in support of unruly, uncontainable bodies. 
 
Critiquing Theology’s Edifice of Lost Bodies  
 
Marcella Althaus-Reid‘s principal works all include a strong element of 
deconstructive theology. While she aims this at ‗T-Theology‘, in practice she concerns 
herself more precisely with the ways that various critical theologies have not been 
critical enough, specifically in the way they too often pay little attention to bodies and 
sex. Althaus-Reid looks most closely at Liberation Theology, arguing that the 
                                                                                                                                               
5
  IT 5; QG 172n4. 
 | 77 
 
movement‘s underlying assumptions related to gender and sexual identities actually are 
holdovers from the dominant, ideological theology which it has always striven to 
oppose. In her view, Liberation theologians‘ failure to question heteronormativity has 
stifled their efforts to transform society and continued the marginalisation of gay, 
lesbian, bisexual, transgendered and other people.
6
 Althaus-Reid does not mean to 
destroy Liberation Theology but rather to extend it, addressing further instances of 
systematic oppression by bringing sexuality into dialogue with political and economic 
issues through the embodied sexual stories of particular (namely Latin American) 
people.
7
 Lest one be left with the impression that Liberation Theology is the only 
culprit, Althaus-Reid also makes sure to point out where such other critical movements 
as Feminist Theologies make similar oversights. 
Traditional theology becomes an easy target in that it needs bodies at so many 
levels but refuses to acknowledge the necessary presence of certain fleshly aspects of 
those bodies. ‗Systematic Theology belongs to the order of Western Grand Narratives,‘ 
Althaus-Reid writes, 
and although built in a make-believe dualistic opposition of mind and 
body, the curious thing is that Christian dogmatics is built upon bodily 
struggles. In dogmatics, bodies touch others, are slippery or loving or 
aggressive. For instance, Christianity is related to bodily functions 
(artificial insemination and the birth of Jesus-God, issues of control of 
sexuality, torture, hunger, death, and the return of the killed body in 
resurrection). It is also about bodily relations such as the dogma of the 
Trinity which is a reflection of the social understanding of what we can 
call a ‗medieval family‘ pattern of hierarchical obsessions and 
Darwinian tensions, intrinsically male.
8
 
Not only is this theological control of bodies criticised as blatantly sexist, but its 
foundation in bodily relations is noted to be strangely distantiated by the way this sort of 
theology tells its narrative and uses its metaphors. Althaus-Reid remarks that ‗Theology 
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can see blood in wine but not blood in blood‘.9 Such systematic theology can only see 
the concepts to which material items in the world refer; bodies are set in place by the 
strands which tie them to the theological ideal—organising them and making them 
decent—and then materially disappear. 
The main problem Althaus-Reid has with Liberation Theology is that it does not 
bring enough of the lost body back. Women in particular are disembodied by 
theological discourse which focuses only on their poverty and not upon their desires.
10
 
Althaus-Reid observes that Liberation theologians, while maintaining that God‘s 
preference is for the poor, render love (whether for other people or for a vocation) pretty 
much ‗superfluous‘ for poor women, whose proper concern apparently should be 
subsistence.
11
 She tells the story of the famous Liberation theologian, Gustavo 
Gutierrez, who, when asked to comment on women and the priesthood, said something 
‗along the lines that women in Latin America did not care about ordination, but about 
feeding their children‘.12 The dismantling of oppressive systems runs along quite narrow 
political lines, and does not seem to include matters related to the intimate nature of 
bodies. All of this has Althaus-Reid musing that ‗a materialist theology such as 
Liberation Theology has been walking in the streets without noticing the life of the 
rebellious poor urban women who do not use underwear, and the richness of the 
metaphors for God, based on the interface between their sexuality and poverty‘.13 She 
suggests that a theology that is supposed to be materialist rightly should and could 
spend more time attending to the embodiment of human sexuality and gender than it 
does. 
Althaus-Reid‘s criticism of Feminist Theologies is similar, but even more 
pointed. She observes that, while Feminist Liberation Theology adds questions 
concerning gender to its hermeneutic of (political) suspicion, it has focused ‗very rarely 
on sex as ―having sex‖‘, and so neglects a significant aspect of human life.14 Conceptual 
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bodies overshadow actual ones. This leads to several different ways of denying matter 
and the body. The attempt to move beyond gender politics can represent a distaste for 
materiality; connecting this to discussions of the resurrection, which she suggests could 
be read as a new beginning without the messiness of flesh and bone and bodily fluids, 
Althaus-Reid notes that any ‗quest for transcendence in Feminist Theology, even in the 
context of political theologies, is still a quest for an out-of-body experience of purity‘ 
where ‗Purity contradicts materiality‘.15 Another consequence is a tendency to atomise 
the body—especially the female body—by reifying those bodily functions which can 
seem the least corporeal; when feminist theologians privilege ‗the female gaze‘, for 
instance, they are also choosing not to do a theology of ‗women's hands, legs, breasts or 
head‘ but ‗a theology from a fragmented female body‘.16 Althaus-Reid argues that, too 
often, the body is either ignored or controlled by a focus on those parts which can be 
deemed more transcendent or purer. 
To Althaus-Reid, the usual method of doing theology, whether that be a 
traditional, systematic theology or a Liberation or Feminist theology, focuses upon 
organising the experience of the divine, making the in-breaking of the holy neat and 
tidy, something people can handle and understand. She writes that 
Unfortunately for us in theology, when transcendence enters the scene, 
the body leaves. The body may remain of course at a symbolic level of 
exchange, but the real body, that is the body which speaks of the 
concreteness of hunger and pleasure, gets displaced.
17
 
This ‗real body‘ is too messy and unpredictable for theology, which finds this body in 
need of discipline, and one of the first theological moves for placing the unruly body in 
order is to elide differences within the human body and between bodies. As Althaus-
Reid puts it, where the life of the body and sexuality are concerned, ‗The contradictions 
are many. Unfortunately, theology has become the art of erasing them‘.18 The reach 
towards salvation—towards justice and peace, faith and hope, joy and love for all the 
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world—turns into a regime of fitting people (and bodies) into a limited number of 
categories. To do this, the theological treatment of human beings at the level of our 
bodies must find a way to deal with that incorrigibility of flesh and bone which refuses 
to be boxed up or pinned down; the thrust of Althaus-Reid‘s critique of the standard 
practice of theology is that the easiest way that it knows to deal with the body‘s 
excesses is to sanitise the body, to live at the symbolic level so that this purified body 
can point towards theological truth—and the price of this sanitisation is the loss of 
actual bodies. She charges tradition theology with wilful blindness and being violently 
reductive of reality. 
 
Indecent Theology as a Reconstruction of the Theological Body 
 
From critiquing theologies which lose the body, Althaus-Reid sets out to 
theologise differently. Her ‗Indecent Theology‘ strives to bring the body back into 
theological sight, and has come under the umbrella of Queer Theologies, in which 
theologians ‗introduced the body into theology, bodies in love, bodies entangled in 
ethics of passion—and transgressive bodies at that‘.19 In such a move, the bodies and 
stories of real people, their infinite varieties of sexuality and their unique ways of 
constructing relationships, come to be seen as a proper field of discussion for theology, 
not through the imposition upon them of structures, but as subjects who can teach about 
the nature of ultimate meaning. Althaus-Reid declares that  
We may say that language and the materiality of bodies constitute the 
matrix of theology which leaves traces, and to find a queer, strange God 
in Christian theology means that we can read a different and even 
unlawful theology in reverse. It is us, the strangers in Christianity, who 
now can write the traces of a strange God among us.
20
 
With this turn towards the strange, towards bodies at the margin, to write a theology of a 
God who loves from the margins, too, Althaus-Reid moves to a constructive theology. 
This sets the stage for her to champion the particular stories of particular persons. 
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It is from the unknown bodies at the social and religious margins that Althaus-
Reid generates a theology of bodies in love. As this is ‗a theology made from the 
different shapes that come from the encounter‘, the different types of bodies to which 
Althaus-Reid points become significant for the form of the theology.
21
 First and 
foremost, they are bodies which feel pleasure and desire as well as pain.
22
 The body‘s 
capacity for pleasure in meeting with other bodies underlines all the different types of 
bodies which Althaus-Reid discusses, and the infinite variety of ways that people can 
find pleasure leads to a theology which embraces bodies with an infinite variety of 
sexualities: gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, heterosexual, and those who are 
uncertain. Yet the Indecent theologian‘s queering of the Christian tradition goes beyond 
and cuts across the usual categories, too. She introduces the ‗libertine body‘, drawing 
upon both a history of bodies assembled to seek political liberation and bodies in 
relationships which continually recombine to generate a theology ‗with its own built-in 
hermeneutics, a sexual hermeneutics which provides us with body-maps, with a 
cartography of wild dreams, of transgressive movements in search of radical 
breakthroughs in our ways of thinking‘.23 There is also the ‗nomadic body‘ which never 
settles in a fixed location and is not produced in serenity but in wandering encounters 
with others; this body ‗is the unsatisfied body in transit which carries with it oddities 
from the journey‘, ‗which crosses borders between unnameable countries, and is given 
away by tranversal kisses and re-configurations of desire‘ while ‗searching for God‘s 
nipples and soft lips and trying to bite them in oblique ways in order to achieve some 
oblique transcendence in their lives‘24. In addition, Althaus-Reid mentions the 
‗deterritorialised body‘ and the ‗body without organs‘ (that is, ‗without rules or 
codifications‘) which relate to the idea of ‗a destabilised sexual body‘.25 What can be 
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noticed from all of these is their transitory nature and circuitous approach. None of the 
types of bodies highlighted by Althaus-Reid remain static; they all shift constantly, 
either in terms of their location or liaisons with other bodies, so that the shapes which 
they generate are fluid. This tentative, open nature forms the heart of Indecent 
Theology‘s methodology; there is no closure, no fixing of boundaries—or, rather, these 
bodies have the ability to render boundaries permeable.
26
 Because the theology is open-
ended, the persons narrating their stories need not be fixed in circumscribed roles, 
sexual or otherwise. Instead, they may seek and teach ways to love in the flesh, 
travelling routes back and forth that cover the range of possible territory, transgressing 
boundaries which would separate people one from another. 
The shape of these tentative and fluid bodies generates room for the uniqueness 
of individuals, and Althaus-Reid strives to bring back lost bodies by turning theological 
attention to actual people. In her writings, she specifically gives her ear to the 
indigenous women of Latin America, as well as people marginalised there because of 
their sexuality, hoping to learn strategies of theological resistance from their attempts to 
resist colonialisation. Using these strategies, she turns to the reinterpretation of doctrine 
such as Christology. Althaus-Reid writes: 
From the images of the Peruvian Coya women of Latin America, who do 
not wear underwear under their colourful skirts, comes the metaphor of a 
Latina, feminist approach to hermeneutics. Coya women kneel in the 
church mixing the odour of their sexuality with their prayers, while their 
babies sleep on their backs wrapped in an apron. The Coyas‘ sexuality, 
their children, their Christianity, and even the baskets of produce which 
they sell in the market accompany them when praying to Christ. And 
that is a starting point for a Christology done from women‘s bodies. The 
fact is that the christological process starts not with the first meetings of 
church councils but with the construction of the Christ, the Messiah, a 
process that depends on the interrelationship of a man called Jesus and a 
community of women, men and children.
27
 
This is a theology ‗from below‘: Althaus-Reid seeks to move towards what God is 
doing from the experience of particular women in their religious devotion—moving 
from flesh to spirit rather than from spirit to flesh. In wanting to draft ‗a Christology 
done from women‘s bodies‘, she presents a desire to bring the totality of the lives of 
these particular, indigenous South American women into the question of how one 
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interprets the significance of Christ. This involves a dialectical ‗construction of the 
Christ‘, moving between the very specific Jesus of Nazareth and any specific human 
community. In her view, the grounded nature of such theology addresses the situational 
needs of humanity more closely than traditional theology. The body becomes ‗the space 
of salvation‘ and ‗Redemption is…a praxis of our past and a sexual praxis which 
accommodates the effects of the love life on people‘s bodies‘.28 
 
Where Have All the Bodies Gone Now? 
 
The desire to work out of human particularity—to note what is irreducible about 
specific human bodies and the stories which they carry—demonstrates a belief that the 
local is an important part of being human; the hermeneutic here does not immediately 
erase the local in favour of the universal. Althaus-Reid seems to be sensitive to the 
differences of human beings; in fact, at one point she defines Indecent Theology as a 
‗denunciation of sameness, while acknowledging identity formation as necessary‘.29 
This represents a move to take the body seriously in what its sensual experiences can 
teach theologians. But this is where the problem lies: the bodies of these Coya women 
and other marginalised people are for teaching theologians and making theology, at 
least in the way Althaus-Reid constructs Indecent Theology. In the long passage quoted 
above, she declares that it is ‗from the images of‘ these women that a hermeneutical 
‗metaphor‘ comes. The Christology is ‗done from women‘s bodies‘ (my emphasis). 
Somehow the bodies of these women have become resources, raw material for the 
construction of a better theology. This metaphorical turn appears throughout Althaus-
Reid‘s writing whenever she moves to reframe theology. The underwear-less lemon 
vendors of Buenos Aires become ‗a living metaphor for God, sexuality and the struggle 
in the streets‘.30 Bisexuality becomes a marker for ‗the theologian‘s vocation‘, a way of 
thinking theologically ‗irrespective of her chosen sexual identity‘.31 All the body types 
mentioned above—the libertine, the nomadic, the deterritorialised—become 
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metaphorical sources for theological methodology. In such moves, the local and the 
particular are taken seriously, but only insofar as they can provide an improved general 
principle. The Coya women ‗who do not wear underwear‘ become figures or ciphers as 
the theologian turns their images into metaphors, and places the metaphors into a new 
symbolic order; the actual women and their stories are less important to the scheme than 
the symbolic order is. 
Instead of a companionable relationship among different human beings, the 
theological process becomes closer to the relationship between observer and observed. 
For instance, Althaus-Reid explains that ‗Indecent Christology is the outcome of critical 
action/reflection into the complex relations between women‘s work and modes of 
production‘.32 Yet, who is doing the reflection? This seems less an offer of hospitality 
for all people to join in theology‘s work and more the utilisation of certain women as 
the theologian interprets them. And if their images are little more than tools for the 
improvement of theology, how far is this from forgetting the women in their reality at 
all? None of this is essentially different from the theological method which Althaus-
Reid critiques, though her method uses new and different bodies for providing 
metaphors for the divine. 
 My objection to the theological process here does not mean that I believe what 
Althaus-Reid is trying to do is totally invalid. I sympathise greatly with the desire to 
reformulate theological doctrines so that they are not subservient to a patriarchal and 
colonial paradigm in which they contribute to shackling people instead of liberating 
them.
33
 However, the tendency to turn people into symbols for the purpose of theology 
makes me wary. Even if this is for a sympathetic reason, the process treats people as 
material to be mined. In the last paragraph of a chapter contesting christologies, 
Althaus-Reid writes that ‗The point of critical reality is where poor women can end the 
Christian split between body and spirit in a drastic way, or God will continue to be 
thought of as a sort of ―illusion of substance‖ or idealist starting point which feminists 
and post-colonialists alike have renounced together with the master‘s authority‘.34 Is it 
the poor women who are ending the disastrous split, or is the theologian doing so from 
the symbol which she makes of those women? The Coya women appear at the 
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  Althaus-Reid, ‗On Wearing Skirts without Underwear‘, FT/IT 87. 
33
  Althaus-Reid, ‗On Wearing Skirts without Underwear‘, FT/IT 87-9. 
34
  Althaus-Reid, ‗On Wearing Skirts without Underwear‘, FT/IT 94. 
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beginning of the chapter and again at the end; they disappear among the forest of theory 
in between. At the end, they are said to inspire the process of Indecent Theology.
35
 The 
line between attending to the presence of others and appropriating their experience 
seems to be very thin indeed. 
In listing some of the characteristic traits of Queer Theologies, Althaus-Reid 
writes that  
We start our reflections from our own sexual stories. We lift God‘s skirts 
after having lifted our own first. In lifting our skirts we remind ourselves 
of our own identity at the moment of doing theology while we remain 
committed to theological honesty. It is from an alliance of sexual 
epistemologies in disagreement with heterosexual ideology and not vice 
versa that we reflect on grace, redemption and salvation.
36
 
While this calls for people to maintain an awareness of human bodies and their stories, 
this is only the beginning. What is significant is the ‗alliance of sexual epistemologies‘: 
we gain methods for determining how we know about relationship and move from them 
to our theological reflections. The peril here is that people can become nothing but 
illustrations for the theologian, figures who prop up the argument the theologian wants 
to make. Then there is no body but the image of a body. A dualism remains between 
body and spirit, between the material and the transcendent, not that the material depends 
upon the transcendent for its existence but that the material is used as a step towards 
finding what is transcendent—a better theological system. Once the local and specific is 
thus used, what happens to it? It is consumed, the means to the end of understanding. 
That a theologian such as Marcella Althaus-Reid, who focuses so much on 
critiquing the way traditional theologies lose bodies, nevertheless so often turns people 
and their stories into methodological metaphors and signs is more than a little 
depressing. Must all theology deal in this ‗symbolification‘ of human beings and their 
narratives? Althaus-Reid herself speaks of traditional theological method as a 
‗Chupadero‘, a ‗sucker‘, which absorbs all theological forays into itself, destroying 
attempts to be liberated in difference.
37
 It seems that, for all her effort to the contrary, 
Althaus-Reid also succumbs to the force of this ideological cast of theology. Bodies 
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  Althaus-Reid, ‗On Wearing Skirts without Underwear‘, FT/IT 94. 
36
  Althaus-Reid, ‗Queer I Stand‘ 107. 
37
  IT 103. ‗Chupadero‘ was the name given to Argentinian interrogation centres and prisons during the 
time of the Military Junta in the nineteen-seventies. 
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become figures set against traditional theologies, but their flesh-and-blood unruliness 
fades away in the face of the new conceptual bodies which Indecent Theology and other 
Queer Theologies propose. 
It might be argued that this critique assumes far too naive a reading of symbols 
and metaphors. According to this objection, the wariness about turning people into 
symbols disregards the sophistication of what Althaus-Reid is doing—that she is not 
obliterating bodies but overlaying them with symbols. To this point of view, the 
metaphors of Indecent Theology create new understandings of the world, adding to 
what is there rather than diminishing it. This is a strong objection. In part, theological 
discourse attends to symbols generating systems of meaning; in part, theology functions 
to organise symbols, enabling discussion of how experience relates to meaning, and to 
explore how metaphors destabilise and enliven those symbols. However, there is a 
difference between attaching symbols to people and turning people into symbols, and a 
difference between using new metaphors to extend theology‘s range and making the 
metaphor the most significant goal of theological reflection. If people are ever symbols, 
then they are very complex ones, always eluding final definition so that just when you 
think that you have figured out a person, another facet appears, another depth to that 
person‘s existence and character. According to Althaus-Reid, Queer Theologies 
(including Indecent Theology) resist too-easy definitions.
38
 Yet, if in these theologies 
‗The different bodies of the people of God reflect precisely the multiple bodies of God 
in the Trinitarian kenosis of omnisexuality and the presence among us of polyamorus 
[sic] divine concerns‘, as Althaus-Reid proclaims, when do these bodies get the chance 
to reflect themselves?
39
 As practised here, this theological move of extrapolation from 
the stories of people to the character of God moves dangerously close to treating people 
as things by making them tools for theologians. And, well-intentioned or not, you can 
far more easily manipulate a thing than you can a person, subject or agent.  
 
Retaining Indecency: Althaus-Reid and a Possible Recombination of Bodies 
 
I believe, however, that there are ways to construe Althaus-Reid‘s Indecent 
Theology which hold onto her insight that theology should include bodies in love, those 
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  Althaus-Reid, ‗On Queer Theology and Liberation Theology‘ 95. 
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  QG 110. 
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actual bodies which do not fit the stereotypes of theological decency. Instead of a 
theology which mainly generates general principles of how to think about God and 
humanity metaphorically from the various ways that human beings relate sexually, the 
emphasis should be placed on the way Indecent Theology calls theologians to follow a 
path of ‗diversity, dis-order and justice‘.40 Instead of only starting from real bodies, 
lives and stories, this theology may be constructed as a way of reading, of seeing or 
listening to the world, which returns to these bodies as well. Creation and creatures shift 
from being the raw material for the production of theology to being theological subjects; 
that is, we all live theological lives as we are, as we relate to one another, and not just 
(or even primarily) as symbols which point to theological systems.  
First, one can read the sexual stories to which Althaus-Reid refers not as 
symbols or generators of symbols but as parables which serve to unsettle theology and 
theologians. This gives primacy to the critical nature of Indecent Theology as it works 
to deconstruct the oppressive elements tied to traditional theological systems; bodies 
become provocations, their presence keeping theologians from getting too comfortable 
in organising the world. Because the marginalised bodies at the heart of Althaus-Reid‘s 
writings do not fit neatly in any compartment, they disquiet even Indecent Theology, the 
language of their flesh and blood subverting the easiness of the methodological 
metaphors. Of course, this reading does not erase the tendency to move quickly from 
actual to conceptual bodies, and could itself concentrate so much on the parable that 
actual persons are forgotten again. But as practitioners of a critical theology following 
in the footsteps of Liberation Theology, Althaus-Reid does not forget to call upon Queer 
theologians to seek a theological praxis of compassion and service within the 
communities which are the sources of their metaphors.
41
 This turns Indecent Theology 
into a type of prolegomena which allows one to concentrate theologically on difference 
and particularity, and thus to bring back lost and forsaken bodies. 
Second, one could spin off a return to bodies from what Althaus-Reid herself 
says in linking theologies (including Queer and Indecent ones) with fictions. She writes 
that 
Expressing a fictional account, literature expresses and re-discovers truth 
which could not be expressed in real life in another way. So it is with 
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theology: theology‘s main function is to be fictitious. It aims to lie in the 
sense that its mission is to express the inexpressible, the utopia of the 
Kingdom, the intuitions manifested in vague suspicions and intuitions of 
different orders in sacred and human society. That is the real meaning of 
the prophetic role of the church, understood in a critical way. Queer 
Theology, by basing its reflections in libertine epistemologies, rescues 
different forms of imagining love which exist among us and which may 
lead us to different and better understandings of God and life.
42
 
While this does not represent a fully-thought-out interdisciplinary account of literature 
and theology, the idea of literary manifestation of intuited possibilities could cut across 
the limitations of methodological systems—even if fiction is not always based on ‗the 
inexpressible‘ or ‗vague suspicions‘. In this case, the imaginative power of both 
literature and theology could provide a route for bodies in all their fullness to be 
presented, and in their irreducibility to hamper any temptations towards flat, simplistic 
readings of persons and their stories. Imagination can help ensure that theologians do 
not turn bodies into things, moving people to take other people seriously: to listen to 
another‘s voice, and to attend to what another has to say in the making of the world.43 
Finally, alongside Althaus-Reid‘s metaphors, she continually points to the 
extravagances produced by bodies which refuse to be pinned down. Indecent Theology 
ends with a declaration of ‗The excessiveness of our hungry lives: our hunger for food, 
hunger for the touch of other bodies, for love and for God; a multitude of hungers never 
satisfied which grow and expand and put us into risky situations and challenge, like a 
carnival of the poor, the textbooks of the normalisers of life‘.44 In From Feminist 
Theology to Indecent Theology, there is a chapter called ‗Doing the Theology of 
Memory‘, where Althaus-Reid presents how a group of women in El Salvador dealt 
with atrocities against them by memorialising their experience as a community. The 
                                                                                                                                               
42
  QG 130. This idea of theology being ‗fictitious‘ may be compared to Charles Winquist‘s notion of 
theology as a ‗minor literature‘ (Winquist 127-37). Both see theology‘s literary function as acting 
against the grain of majority understandings and systems of thought. Particularly in The Queer God, 
Althaus-Reid points to works of literature as case studies from which she hones the sexual 
epistemologies and metaphors for theological method. 
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  As an example of this, the book Fugitive Pieces, by Anne Michaels, to a large extent tells the story of 
rescuing people from being turned into symbols even by those who love them, fleshing out memory to 
construct lives from the pieces that one finds (as discussed in more detail in the second part of this 
thesis). In her literary exploration of the tragic reverberations of the Holocaust, Michaels evokes what 
happened when ideologues turned Jews from human beings into figuren—into things (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 1996, 165-6). Admittedly, this is an extreme example, but it does show that 
theologians should always be wary of our contributions to how people are seen, how the other is 
construed, how stories are going to be read. 
44
  IT 200. 
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memory of their stories became integral to the women understanding what happened to 
them and orienting their own stories so that they aligned not simply with tragedy but 
with hope in the telling. Althaus-Reid here gives first place to what she calls ‗a critical 
Theology of Memory done from the underside of history‘ and seems to pay attention 
less to a metaphor she constructs from the image of people and more to what particular 
people have done with their stories.
45
 Similarly, The Queer God ends with examples of 
activist strategies practised by various Queer communities, pointing to the ‗many forms 
of political and theological aspiration written from the body of the excluded‘.46 In such 
examples, Althaus-Reid suggests a very different hermeneutic than she does with her 
methodological metaphors—one where the other is allowed to be other, to offer and 
give, instead of being used.
47
 
All three of these strategies, taken together, may provide a way to focus on those 
parts of Marcella Althaus-Reid‘s Indecent Theology which privilege the incorrigible 
unruliness of particular bodies. What matter here is emphasis. The critical side of 
Indecent Theology concentrates on destabilising boundaries so that bodies become 
unbound. These liberated, fluid bodies are bodies in love, bodies made unstable by the 
desire to embrace and be embraced by others; in such passionate instability, each 
person‘s everyday life of love, in the concreteness of joys and troubles, remains 
particular to them and their relationships. Unfortunately, the subversion of the 
boundaries of bodies can go too far: concrete, particular bodies can disappear into 
conceptual bodies when actual bodies are seen mainly as the starting point for 
producing a set of symbols to govern theological method. As can be seen throughout 
much of Althaus-Reid‘s work, bodies then become types to help us understand such 
terms as God, grace, and salvation. However, if a reading of this work emphasises its 
critical side and the types are not considered the goal, then the bodies can reappear, 
standing at the margins, perhaps, but still concrete and personal. After all, if we can 
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  Such activist strategies using theology rather than being used by theology are akin to representations 
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caused by them, see Hall 495-6. Rather than leaping quickly over actual bodies, such imagery 
attempts to persuade people to see members of marginalised groups—such queer bodies—as existing 
within God‘s love because of their particularities, and their particular sufferings. 
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write the traces of a strange God, we can also write the traces of strange bodies and their 
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hilosophical, theological, and literary theorist Paul Ricoeur is known mostly for 
wide-ranging studies of metaphor, narrative, history and hermeneutics. Yet, 
among his substantial corpus of writings, there winds a recurring thread of 
material concerning the self and identity, turning often around the idea of the narrated 
life and the pull of ethics. While Christian theologians as homileticians and scripture 
exegetes have gravitated to his reflections on Biblical interpretation, his focus on the 
embodied nature of the self provides a good vantage point to continue any attempt to 
discern the body. Dan Stiver, considering the significance of Ricoeur for Christian 
theology, writes that 
Ricoeur‘s anthropology, which in a sense is the focus of his entire 
philosophy, also resonates with movements in theology. Theology‘s 
recovery of a holistic, embodied self is also in its nascent stages and has 
yet to be fully appropriated in Christian formation, education, ministry, 
preaching, and counseling, not to mention the speculative understanding 
of the afterlife. Such an embodied and social understanding of the self as 
Ricoeur‘s offers a constructive dialogue partner to theology as 
theologians try to rethink the way in which they have tended to denigrate 
the body and the world in favor of the ―soul.‖ The conception of the 
social self particularly relates to the church‘s concern to relate to the 
often rootless and alienated modern person.
1
 
Here, Stiver points to the way Ricoeur‘s construal of the human person as a being with a 
story, located as a body in relationship with others, allows for a strong value to be 
ascribed to bodies within the human pursuit of a meaningful response to divine mystery. 
This high esteem for embodied life combines with Ricoeur‘s extensive work on 
narrative and metaphor to present bodies with all their particularities as agents capable 
of restorative action in the world: when narratives reconfigure understandings of the 
world and metaphors redescribe meaning, they redefine a person‘s bodily place in the 
world by transforming possibilities. Not only do these bodies have stories, they also 
make them. Along with this, because Ricoeur‘s formulation of a poetic redefinition of 
the world requires a relationship of difference—between disparate things linked 
metaphorically or disparate situations linked by a plot—his notion of embodiment has 
less of a tendency to collapse particular bodies one into another. All of this would seem 
to make Ricoeur a strong ally for any theologian seeking to maintain the significance of 
material, physical life. 
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However, any such alliance with the work of Paul Ricoeur requires much more 
nuance. His constant desire to maintain tension between systems and viewpoints can 
cause the objects in tension to drift into fixed, hierarchical relationships. When Ricoeur 
extrapolates from a specific story to its narrative meaning, that meaning appears to gain 
value over the story itself, and the particular is subsumed into the conceptual. In a 
similar but inverse move, the explorations generated by theological discourse are 
labelled ‗second-order‘, that is, as commentary or critique upon ‗first-order‘ sacred texts 
(including attempts to live a holy life), thereby downplaying the creative aspect of 
theological writing. Thus, either by turning the story into representative material for 
something else or by curbing the range of theological creativity and thus the capacity for 
human beings to collaborate with God in doing God‘s work, the importance of bodily 
particularity is diminished. The body threatens to disappear once again; in fact, one ends 
up unsure if the body was ever there. Still, Ricoeur‘s refusal to limit the capacity of 
metaphor and narrative to generate possible worlds may, with care, become a tool to 
subvert his own theoretical structures. The questions that he provokes become more 
important than the barriers he erects; story-making bodies remain unfinished and 
malleable in their own capacity to participate in remaking the world. 
In this chapter, I investigate the place of bodies and embodiment in the writings 
of Paul Ricoeur. I begin by looking at how he describes human selves and actions as 
embodied in several works that focus on his notions of philosophical anthropology, such 
as Fallible Man and Oneself as Another. Following this is a look at how Ricoeur 
presents the redefinition of the world through the possibilities of text and imagination. 
The chapter then turns to the problematic construal of narrative and meaning which 
leads to the potential devaluing of particular bodies and their specific stories, before 
ending with a reflection on ways that Ricoeur‘s writings can be read against themselves, 
so that his work on the power of the imagination to transform the world might become 
part of a supportive matrix for the concrete particularities of bodies and their stories.  
 
Searching for the Body in the Work of Paul Ricoeur 
 
In much of Paul Ricoeur‘s writing, his thoughts on embodiment must be intuited 
from what he implies; however, he does make explicit statements on the body, mainly in 
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work on human will and identity.
2
 In the book Fallible Man, he summarises well the 
starting point of his approach to embodiment, declaring that 
The first meaning I read in my body, insofar as the body is a mediation 
of appearance, is not that it is finite, but precisely that it is open onto.... 
It is this openness onto...which makes my body an originating mediator 
"between" myself and the world; it does not enclose me, like this bag of 
skin which, viewed from the outside, makes it seem like a thing in the 
midst of things. It opens me onto the world, either allowing perceived 
things to appear or making me dependent on things I lack and of which I 
experience the need and desire because they are elsewhere or even 
nowhere in the world. The body opens me onto the world even when it 
isolates me in suffering; for the solitude of suffering is still haunted by 
the threats of the world to which I feel myself exposed like an 
unprotected flank. It opens me to others insofar as it expresses, that is to 
say, displays the interior upon the exterior and becomes a sign for others, 
decipherable and offered to the reciprocity of consciousness. In a word, 
my body opens me to the world by everything it is able to do. It is 
implicated as a power in the instrumentality of the world, in the 
practicable aspects of this world that my action furrows through, in the 
products of work and art.
3
 
Here, Ricoeur presents the body as much more than a vessel for human consciousness 
or the soul; in reality, the body is not, as he puts it, ‗a bag of skin‘ which encloses a self, 
but is that part of a person which opens him or her to the rest of the world through 
sensory perception and through enabling various methods of communication. In other 
words, even if the concreteness of the body does function to limit human beings to a 
finite location in the universe, its more important function, for Ricoeur, is to give access 
to the world and thus to expand a person‘s existence. As the vehicle by which one 
knows that which is other to oneself, the body actually does not come to mind very 
often, unless something has gone wrong, unless some affliction has affected the body‘s 
ability to open up the world to a person. More than this, in providing access to that 
which is outside a person, the body also functions to make one‘s interior life accessible 
                                                                                                                                               
2
  When looking for the views of Paul Ricoeur on any specific subject, including the body, a person 
needs to note that these views developed over time as reflected in the progression of his writings. One 
can identify stages in his work which are related to different focal points: these include writings on the 
will (in books such as Freedom and Nature and Fallible Man), on metaphor (as in The Rule of 
Metaphor), on narrative and history (as in the three volumes of Time and Narrative), on identity and 
the self (Oneself as Another and other writings), and history and memory (as in Memory, History, 
Forgetting). None of these foci are self-contained, however; certain motifs and topics recur under the 
auspices of a later project. For discussions of this, see Stiver; Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur: The 
Owl of Minerva; and Mark I. Wallace‘s Introduction to the collection of Ricoeur‘s essays about 
religion, FS 1-32. 
3
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to others: essentially, Ricoeur describes the body as a text which others may read to 
learn about a person (though their interpretive may be inaccurate). Additionally, the 
body‘s connection to the world gives a person the chance to manipulate and affect the 




Ricoeur takes up the question of embodiment again in Oneself as Another, 
examining the role of bodies in the maintenance of any particular person‘s identity. He 
writes of ‗the notion of person‘ as being ‗a single referent possessing two series of 
predicates: physical predicates and mental predicates‘.5 He also lists the attributes of 
bodies as being ‗directly localizable, discrete, continuous in space, and stable in time‘.6 
These things Ricoeur connects to identity in terms of ‗sameness‘; one person‘s body can 
be recognised as being the same from one instant to another, which aids in being able to 
say that the person met now is the same as that person who had been met in the past. 
The significance of the body for selfhood lies in the fact that, because a particular 
person must be linked to a particular body, selfhood cannot be made a function solely of 
what Ricoeur calls ‗mental events‘. He writes that ‗the person cannot be held to be a 
pure consciousness to which would then be added, in a secondary role, a body‘.7 When 
you refer to a person, you refer to an entity with various characteristics and mannerisms, 
which are not all products of that person‘s interior life but also are physical, not only the 
way she or he looks, but including how he or she walks and the attitude addressed by 
the body. This returns to that idea of the body‘s productive role: embodied actions and 
habits participate in generating the identity of a self. 
                                                                                                                                               
4
  Loretta Dornisch, in Faith and Philosophy in the Writings of Paul Ricoeur, observes that Ricoeur in 
Freedom and Nature thinks of the body as the founding source for motives, including not only such 
driving forces as hunger and thirst but also other motives because their importance must always be 
weighed against those bodily yearnings (Dornisch 54-5). Dornisch also notes that it is the desiring 
body that is impelled to action (61). Though the first of these observations may seem to be very much 
about the interior life, both actually point to an orientation of the body towards production, pushing 
self-awareness outwards, with both motivating to action. Dornisch reflects that Ricoeur‘s conception 
of the body means that the meeting of person and world at the point of the body can be described 
‗through an image of openness or an image of light‘ (72). This demonstrates the high value Ricoeur 
places upon the body. 
5
  OA 33. 
6
  OA 36. 
7
  OA 34. 
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Yet, for Ricoeur, identity cannot rely on the body alone; the productivity of the 
body, along with providing characteristics particular to a specific person, also generates 
difficulties. It is through the body opening one to the world that a person perceives the 
finitude of their existence: Ricoeur argues that people learn about physical limitations 
by observing how a change in the orientation of the body alters one‘s perspective of the 
world, so that, because any one person may experience many different perspectives 
simply by changing position, that person learns that no single perspective affords a view 
of the whole world.
8
 As much as the body contributes to the production of personal 
characteristics, it also produces discontinuities which problematise the question of 
identity. Ricoeur notes that, even though specific bodies go with specific persons, a 
disconnection remains between the experience of the body as ‗a public entity‘ and the 
experience of personal consciousness as a private one.
9
 No matter how much a person‘s 
interior life becomes available upon the surface of the body in signs others can interpret, 
that interior life can never be wholly known by another. To Ricoeur, to argue that it is 
enough to say that the physical body maintains a person‘s sameness is wrong because 
this neglects the question of whose body a body, any body, actually is. The problem is 
one of possession, of my body or your body, a problem complicated when one realises 
that the body makes a strange possession because it is ‗untransferable property‘, bound 
to a particular person.
10
 The limitations the body teaches when you discover that the 
world and other people are separate from you, combined with this issue of possession, 
ensure that the body is not the end of questions elicited by pondering selfhood and 
identity. 
The difficulties which Ricoeur notes revolve around two main issues connected 
to identity. The first appears in the title Oneself as Another: that one defines oneself by 
reference to another person. Ricoeur observes that ‗I cannot speak meaningfully of my 
thoughts unless I am able at the same time to ascribe them potentially to someone 
else‘.11 That one even asks about the identity of oneself assumes another person entering 
into one‘s field of being. This requires a stronger opposition than ‗someone‘ and 
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‗someone else‘; it needs the personal reflexivity of ‗I‘ and ‗you‘ to force a real question 
about selfhood rather than keeping to impersonal observation about human beings at a 
remove.
12
 Ricoeur, ever the hermeneut, makes selfhood rely upon the possibility of 
communicating one‘s beliefs and imaginations to others. 
The second issue is the notion of identity itself. Ricoeur points out that identity 
actually involves two different concepts: sameness and selfhood.
13
 Identity as sameness, 
the concept most easily upheld by appeal to the body, refers to uniqueness, resemblance, 
continuity, and permanence in time: in other words, identity is determined by 
establishing the identical nature of one instance of a specific person or thing with 
another.
14
 The problem that Ricoeur finds with this notion of re-identification lies in the 
connection of continuity and permanence in time. Most organic beings change over 
time, yet we talk of a woman, for instance, and the girl she once was as being the same 
person; Ricoeur also posits an artificial device whose parts have all been gradually 
replaced, which one would say is the same item.
15
 Both examples require the concept of 
a governing structure, a genetic code or a definitive form, to ensure that the continuity 
which happens has stability over time. Ricoeur queries whether this structural 
determinism is enough for identifying a self; he argues that our experience of what 
constitutes a person suggests otherwise.
16
 He observes that ‗human lives become more 
intelligible when they are interpreted in the light of the stories that people tell about 
them‘.17 When it comes to a person, we associate the identity of a self with memories of 
specific events, with the experiences that one has, as well as particular relationships in 
which a person participates, none of which can be summed up solely by reference to 
that person‘s genetic code.  
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  OA 39. 
13
  He identifies these using the Latin idem and ipse respectively. Paul Ricoeur, ‗Narrative Identity‘, On 
Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation 189-92, and OA 115-25. As is often the case with 
Ricoeur‘s work the short essay summarises much of the longer work, especially the fifth and sixth 
studies of OA, ‗Personal Identity and Narrative Identity‘ and ‗The Self and Narrative Identity‘, in 
which much of the material for this consideration of body and narrative may be found. 
14
  Ricoeur, ‗Narrative Identity‘ 189-90. 
15
  OA 117. 
16
  OA 118. 
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  Ricoeur, ‗Narrative Identity‘, 188. 
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In the face of this quandary, Ricoeur turns to identity as selfhood, which he 
expresses in terms of a person‘s ‗character‘ and the notion of ‗keeping one‘s word‘.18 
‗Character‘, Ricoeur declares, ‗designates the set of lasting dispositions by which a 
person is recognized‘; that is, character includes the array of beliefs, attitudes, habits of 
expression, interests and biases whose combination are unique to a specific individual.
19
 
A particular person can be said to act in or out of character, for instance, so that the 
identification of a person is made by checking what that person does against what is 
known of that person. However, ‗keeping one‘s word‘ has to do with a willed 
faithfulness to a promise maintained over time, something which is not limited by 
character but still speaks of one person‘s permanence in time.20 In other words, loyalty 
to a promise can be to something which is against character, but even so represent 
stability over time as it is oneself which keeps the promise. The potential clash between 
character and the keeping of one‘s word also signals an opposition of sameness and 
constancy—it shows a difference within the notion of identity, even of identity as 
selfhood. 
To address the various paradoxes of identity, Ricoeur proposes what he calls 
‗narrative identity‘: this moves beyond a structural determinism of such things as 
genetic code by fixing the identity of oneself to the particular story of one‘s life—to be 
more precise, narrative identity refers to the way people forge their identities through 
the stories they tell about themselves. To summarise: Ricoeur argues that people 
construct their identities by putting the events which they experience into a narrative 
order—what he terms ‗emplotment‘—modelled after fictional or historical stories.21 
Such wielding of narrative joins together the fact that one possesses both a body and 
                                                                                                                                               
18
  OA 118. 
19
  OA 121. 
20
  OA 123-4. 
21
  The term ‗emplotment‘ has a long pedigree in translations of Ricoeur‘s work, beginning with TN vol. 
1 37f—something he notes himself in OA, 143 n4. As specifying the action of putting events into a 
narrative order, the word seems to have become quite associated with Ricoeur, though it should be 
noted that not all translators resort to it; for example, J. N. Kraay and A. J. Scholten, the 1987 
translators of what they called ‗Life: A Story in Search of a Narrator‘ use terms like ‗the act of 
plotting‘ and ‗the operation of plotting‘ instead, as seen in RR, 426. The same article appears as ‗Life 
in Quest of Narrative‘ in Wood, On Paul Ricoeur, where David Wood chooses ‗emplotment‘ to 
translate Ricoeur‘s French (21). Along with these articles and the books TN and OA, see the chapters 
‗The Human Experience of Time and Narrative‘, ‗The Function of Fiction in Shaping Reality‘, and 
‗Narrated Time‘ in RR, 99-116, 117-36, and 338-54, respectively. 
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experiences of that body, of acting through that body and being acted upon.
22
 Ricoeur 
writes that ‗It is precisely because of the elusive character of real life that we need the 
help of fiction to organize life retrospectively, after the fact, prepared to take as 
provisional and open to revision any figure of emplotment borrowed from fiction or 
from history‘.23 All the excessive events of the body, the unruliness and untidiness, 
together with one‘s own idiosyncratic experience of the world, may be connected by the 
way we see them to be connected, by fashioning them into stories—with the key 
proviso being that a new event or insight could change the overall plot. Selfhood 
becomes a function of the narrative understanding of one‘s life. 
Yet, Ricoeur‘s analysis of the embodied self does not end with human 
imagination forming a coherent and complete plot from the events a person experiences. 
Instead, Ricoeur presents the trio of ‗describe, narrate, prescribe‘ as the operational 
structure of being a self in relationship with others.
24
 One describes events that happen 
to oneself and then makes them intelligible—to oneself and others—by narrating them, 
sketching out how the events connect in time and to the themes that one has discerned in 
one‘s life. Narration forms a pivot, however, to the next step, prescription, by which one 
extends one‘s life story; that is, the trends in one‘s narrative suggest what might come 
next. Ricoeur states that, along with organising one‘s past, ‗the narrative also recounts 
care‘ by revealing the ‗projects, expectations, and anticipations by means of which the 
protagonists in the narrative are oriented toward their mortal future‘.25 The same 
narrative imagination which calls for attention to new possibilities and a willingness to 
rearrange the stories of oneself as one‘s situation changes also allows a person to 
imagine the way life could be different. This constitutes an ethical imagination, a 
visionary faculty that urges one to act in a particular way toward others in the world—
the world to which one is opened, remember, by one‘s body.26 For Ricoeur, this means 
that the answer to the question ‗Who am I?‘ becomes the slightly counter-intuitive 
‗Here I am!‘ by which one claims a position with regard to moral commitments.27 
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  This is what Ricoeur states is needed as he builds his argument in OA, 132. 
23
  OA 162. 
24
  OA 114. 
25
  OA 163. 
26
  OA 164. 
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Interior understanding must be embodied by exterior action; this is the story-making 
body. 
 
Imagination, Creativity, Reconstruction 
 
Embedded in the notion of a narrative identity for an embodied self lay 
Ricoeur‘s general conceptions concerning language and creative imagination, which 
revolve around metaphor and, of course, narrative emplotment. Although the two 
imaginative processes differ in degree and reference, with metaphor referring to the 
basic building blocks of language and poetry and emplotment to the organisation of 
events in the lives of literary or historical characters, they both assume a surprisingly 
similar functional shape. Both begin with the world that one perceives or experiences, 
whether that be in the form of words or events; in both, a person reorganises those 
initial perceptions, the words or events, bringing them into relationship with one 
another, and out of that relationship produces new meanings and possibilities. With 




For Ricoeur, metaphor stands at the heart of the way language works. Speaking 
very broadly, what happens with metaphor is that one takes a word referring to one 
specific entity or event and describes it by use of another, mostly unrelated term. By 
correlating two different terms, the meanings (or semantic fields) of both are altered, 
even if only slightly. Such a redescription of words has the power to change how 
readers or hearers perceive the world. Ricoeur writes that 
we can say that poetic language has a mimetic function inasmuch as it is 
a heuristic fiction preparing a redescription of reality. If it is true that 
poetry gives no information in terms of empirical knowledge, it may 
change our way of looking at things, a change that is no less real than 
empirical knowledge. What is changed by poetic language is our way of 
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  OA 167. 
28
  Both the metaphorical process of redescribing the world and the narrative process of refiguring the 
world may also be related to Ricoeur‘s general hermeneutical arc which postulates that, in the process 
of interpretation, people move from a naïve to a critical to a post-critical understanding (also known as 
a second naiveté). Stiver graphically maps a possibility of connecting the hermeneutical arc with other 
imaginative and creative processes in Theology After Ricoeur, Figure 2, 75. Note the similar triadic 
structure of the ‗describe, narrate, prescribe‘ process of narrative selfhood discussed above. 
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dwelling in the world. From poetry we receive a new way of being in the 
world, of orienting ourselves in this world.
29
 
By being able to change a person‘s perception, a metaphor can change a person‘s 
behaviour and reality. Metaphors take apart the way people think they know and then 




With narrative and emplotment, the material is different, as is the terminology 
that Ricoeur chooses—all based on the root ‗figuration‘, the shaping and reshaping of 
experiences into an ordered figure—but, as with metaphor, the active heart of the 
process is the generation of new ways to see and comprehend the world. In this case, 
though, ‗the world‘ includes its history; refiguration is a chronological function. As 
recorded in an interview, Ricoeur states that his ‗work on narrativity‘ extends ‗his 
inquiry into the inventive power of language‘, where  
the analysis of narrative operations in a literary text, for instance, can 
teach us how we formulate a new structure of ‗time‘ by creating new 
modes of plot and characterization. My chief concern in this analysis is 
to discover how the act of raconter, of telling a story, can transmute 
natural time into a specifically human time, irreducible to mathematical, 
chronological ‗clock time‘.31 
Ricoeur argues that human beings organize their experience of time narratively; the 
resulting emplotment creates something new, ‗human time‘ that is differentiated from 
the strict chronology which timepieces attempt to measure. The transmutation of time is 
a way of making sense of the world just as much as metaphors and models are. 
Imagination again plays a key role, with the ability to imagine alternate pasts affording 




                                                                                                                                               
29
  Paul Ricoeur, ‗Word, Polysemy, Metaphor: Creativity in Language‘, RR, 85. 
30
  Ricoeur‘s most intensive study of Metaphor is The Rule of Metaphor. However, a number of articles 
summarise Ricoeur‘s thought on the matter, including ‗Word, Polysemy, Metaphor‘ and ‗Metaphor 
and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics‘, RR, 303-19. 
31
  Paul Ricoeur, interview with Richard Kearney, ‗The Creativity of Language‘, RR 463. 
32
  Paul Ricoeur, ‗Narrated Time‘, RR 352-4. See also Ricoeur, ‗The Function of Fiction in Shaping 
Reality‘, RR, and ‗Can Fictional Narratives be True?‘ The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human 
Condition, ed. A.T. Tymieniecka 3-19. For studies of Ricoeur‘s conception of narrative and 
emplotment, see Kearney, On Paul Ricoeur, esp. the chapter ‗Between Imagination and Language‘ 
35-58, but also ‗Between Poetics and Ethics‘ 99-114; see also Stiver 100-36. 
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All of this seems to be conducive to keeping in mind the material particularity of 
human bodies and their stories. Ricoeur‘s conceptions of the creative operation of 
language require a body in that they require a shape within the world; they also require a 
shape that can produce new things, augmenting the world, as the processes Ricoeur 
studies call people to have the ability to relate them—the new meanings from 
metaphors, or the stories which they compose—to others. As Ricoeur declares: 
There is no function of imagination, no imaginaire, that is not 
structuring or structured, that is not said or about-to-be-said in language. 
The task of hermeneutics is to charter the unexplored resources of the to-




Imagination must have an instance, some type of material existence, in order for 
communication to occur. This instance links past and future, and the fact that Ricoeur 
places narrativity at a similar place in the heart of selfhood, linking description to 
prescription—with the story-making body—renders it possible for Ricoeur to carry over 
the world-making properties of creative imagination in language to the productive 
nature of bodies in their relation to one another and the world. 
 
Prospects of Losing the Body in the Work of Paul Ricoeur 
 
Although it seems that, in Paul Ricoeur, we have discovered a thinker who not 
only takes the body seriously but also attends to the surplus nature of creativity in the 
processes by which bodies manifest the formation of selves, some of the tensions pull so 
strongly that gaps open up and threaten to swallow bodies whole. Even a quick scan of 
Ricoeur‘s oeuvre will reveal a thoroughgoing penchant for separations and differences; 
most of his philosophy relies upon the tension and friction produced by bringing two 
different entities or concepts together. Because of this, Ricoeur cannot allow any 
alliance to be unproblematic. But this in itself is not where the body may be lost; in fact, 
the general tension creates a space for the lived (and living) body to thrive. The 
quandary lies instead in the impermeability of so many of the boundaries Ricoeur 
presents, together with a strangely hierarchical valuation. The prime example occurs in 
the observation that Ricoeur not only wants to hold philosophy and theology in tension 
with one another, he refuses to allow any admixture between them. Thus, when he 
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  Ricoeur, ‗Creativity‘ 471. 
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published most of his Gifford Lectures as Oneself as Another, he decided not to include 
theological works which had originally been part of those lectures; instead, he published 
the lectures with overtly theological content separately, all because he did  
not want to insinuate that the self, formed and informed by the biblical 
paradigms, crowns the self of our philosophical hermeneutics. This 
would be to betray our unambiguous affirmation that the mode of 
Christian life is a wage and a destiny, and those who take it up are not 
led by their confession either to assume a defensive position or to 
presume a superiority in relation to every other form of life, because we 
lack criteria of comparison capable of dividing among rival claims.
34
 
This protestation curiously functions simultaneously to diminish and exalt the self 
formed by Christian faith: the religious self may not be superior to the identity which 
Ricoeur analyses through his philosophical hermeneutics, but as it seems to be of a 
wholly other order, it remains incomparable. In the end, the strict separation between 
theology and philosophy to which Ricoeur adheres points towards two different models 
of the body and materiality in his writings, one being extremely positive and the other 
decidedly mixed in value.
35
 
As we saw above, Ricoeur‘s philosophical hermeneutics tend to lead to a 
productive, story-making body, situated in the world by relating to others. His 
theological writings, however, underscore a tendency to place meaning at a conceptual 
rather than a material level. When Ricoeur writes about imagination and the Bible, he 
posits that the key for finding the significance of a narrative or poetic work lay in 
applying that work to one‘s life, or to one‘s perception of life in the world.36 Yet, this 
application works mainly in terms of the concepts which are being communicated by 
the work—the meanings which exist at some remove from the work itself, meanings 
which the work represents. Take parables, for example: Ricoeur states that ‗the 
narrative-parable is itself an itinerary of meaning, a signifying dynamism, which 
                                                                                                                                               
34
  Ricoeur, ‗The Summoned Subject in the School of the Narratives of the Prophetic Vocation‘, FS 262-
3. This quotation is also discussed in Stiver 235. 
35
  Stiver also notes Ricoeur‘s attempt to compartmentalise theology and philosophy (28, 158, 231, 238-
47). Stiver argues that this is a self-deception on Ricoeur‘s part, as Ricoeur continues to use religious 
language and sensibilities in his specifically philosophical writings. He also suggests that it is a 
modernist remnant in a mostly postmodernist philosophy which would be more thoroughly 
postmodern if it recognised that boundaries are porous and that philosophy and theology cannot, 
indeed should not, be kept separate. Still, Stiver himself perpetuates the distinction, as he does not 
really see Ricoeur as doing theology but as a philosopher whose work theologians can adapt—even 
when Ricoeur writes about theological issues, these are ‗religious writings‘ (29). See also 186. 
36
  Ricoeur, ‗The Bible and the Imagination‘, FS 146. 
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transforms a narrative structure into a metaphorical process, in the direction of an 
enigma-expression…the kingdom of God‘.37 In other words, the parable functions to 
signal a meaning that comes from elsewhere. 
While reflecting on the importance as well as the problems of narrative 
theology, one of the issues Ricoeur discusses is ‗the transition from narrative to explicit 
theological discourse‘.38 This in itself is not so problematic; in fact, it is probably good 
to be reminded that narrative (fictional or historical) is not the same as theology. 
However, Ricoeur continues by stating that ‗non-narrative modes [in the Bible]… by 
contributing to the full meaningfulness of biblical narratives, start the transfer from 
mere storytelling to the grasping of the enduring signification of the stories 
themselves‘.39 In other words, the meaningfulness of any story in relation to theology 
comes from outside the story, and more significant than the stories is the process of 
grasping their significance. The phrasing that Ricoeur chooses shows an explicit 
valuation: even if meaning cannot be divorced from the form that generates it, it is still 
the meaning that is most important. In a concluding note, Ricoeur grudgingly gives 
approval to a quote from Dietrich Ritschl saying that ‗Stories, in their typical linguistic 
form of narration, are not the forms of expression but the raw materials of theology‘.40 
Thus, metaphor and emplotment can change the world, but the emphasis lies upon the 
process of metaphorisation and signification more than in the particular metaphors or 
narratives and the works which embody or portray them. 
If, then, particular stories can be seen as raw materials for more exacting work—
for the different register of linguistic work that is theology, let us say—these particular 
stories stand in peril of falling to the side, of being deemed less important than the 
finished product of theological craft which reveals the full meaningfulness of the work. 
If particular stories are deemed less important this would suggest that the particular 
people whose experiences the stories share out may also be found less important than 
some overarching movement. In Ricoeur, as in so many others, it would seem that 
particularity is beholden to abstraction once again. The bodies which carry these stories 
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  Ricoeur, ‗The Bible and the Imagination‘, FS 147. 
38
 Ricoeur, ‗Toward a Narrative Theology: Its Necessity, Its Resources, Its Difficulties‘, FS 246. 
39
 Ricoeur, ‗Toward a Narrative Theology‘, FS 246. Emphasis in the original. 
40
  Ricoeur, ‗Toward a Narrative Theology‘, FS 248 n19. 
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waver in and out of view, their substantiality waiting to be subsumed by a grander 
concept, concrete pains and joys obscured. 
This could be related to a linguistic thread that appears early on, in Fallible Man, 
where, even though Ricoeur points to the importance of embodiment, he also writes that 
‗the Heart‘ is connected to ‗Care‘ so that its ‗fundamental openness or availability is 
always opposed to the greed of the body and living‘.41 Life and the body are associated 
with greed, while upper-case-‗h‘ Heart has all the high-minded ideals like sacrifice of 
self for others. This blatant linguistic positioning of the body below interior motivation 
wanes; however, Ricoeur does include in Oneself as Another a rather odd argument 
about the brain being phenomenologically separate from the rest of the body, founded 
on the fact that you never really experience your brain, but experience everything else 
through it.
42
 With this discussion, Ricoeur sets up his counter-argument to those who 
question the essentials of identity using puzzling episodes in science fiction which 
involve the scientific altering of a person‘s brain, locating all features of human identity 
in the brain‘s materiality.43 Even so, Ricoeur‘s apparent separation of the brain from the 
body also distances from the body the faculty of thought and the seat of most of the 
functions by which people construct their selves through narration. This separation of 
the body from one‘s interior life and will reappears near the end of the book, when 
Ricoeur hierarchises different kinds of suffering, arguing that in such things as 
‗disesteem of self and hatred of others…suffering exceeds physical pain‘.44 Although 
the narrated self must be able to act in the world, the process at the heart of this seems to 
be removed from embodiment. 
At the same time as he attaches ambiguity to materiality‘s value, Ricoeur moves 
to limit the creativity of the embodied self. The connection between fiction and life-
narration only goes so far—Ricoeur takes pains to point out that he is referring to 
people being narrators and not authors of their own lives. This is particularly noticeable 
in his essay ‗Life in Quest of Narrative‘, where he writes about narrative identity as 
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  FM 104. 
42
  OA 132-3. On reading this, one imagines that Ricoeur could not have been a sufferer of migraines. 
43
  This opposition is provided from Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, and is addressed in ‗Narrative 
Identity‘ as well as the fifth and sixth studies in OA. 
44
  OA 320. 
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being formed by a person‘s comparison of her or his life with the various narrative 
voices which populate the stories that we read, stating that 
We can become our own narrator, in imitation of these narrative voices, 
without being able to become the author. This is the great difference 
between life and fiction. In this sense, it is true that life is lived and that 
stories are told. An unbridgeable difference does remain, but this 
difference is partially abolished by our power of applying to ourselves 
the plots that we have received from our culture and of trying on the 
different roles assumed by the favourite characters of the stories most 
dear to us. It is therefore by imaginative variations of our own ego that 
we attempt to obtain a narrative understanding of ourselves.
45
 
In their construction of narrative identity, Ricoeur portrays people primarily as 
performers ‗trying on roles‘, experimenting to see what might fit their experience of 
life. People apply to their own lives the ‗narrative voices‘ of characters with whom they 
identify, but there is no option for people to create original characters as authors would. 
The body is only story-making, then, to the point of putting together building blocks of 
narrative.
46
 Still, this arguably is what authors do in any case: weave already-known 
elements into a new variation. Ricoeur‘s ‗narrator‘ acts very much like an ‗author‘ 
rather than the character in a story which recounts the tale, yet still Ricoeur seems 
compelled to differentiate between the two. 
Again and again, Ricoeur separates fiction from history, fiction from life. In 
addition to what has already been noted, he addresses in Oneself as Another what he 
sees as the main objections to his idea of narrative identity—all based around the 
difference between fiction and real life—by declaring that, while the objections are 
‗perfectly acceptable‘, ‗they do not seem to me to be such as to abolish the very notion 
                                                                                                                                               
45
  Ricoeur, ‗Life in Quest of Narrative‘, 32-3. As mentioned previously, another translation of this essay 
into English exists and, while this quotation is not substantially different in either version, the question 
of authorship over against narration comes out very differently in another spot in the same paragraph, 
where ‗Life in Quest of Narrative‘ has ‗that we learn to become the narrator and the hero of our own 
story, without actually becoming the author of our own life‘ (32, italics in original) and ‗Life: A Story 
in Search of a Narrator‘ has ‗we learn to become the narrator of our own story without completely 
becoming the author of our life‘ (437). 
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  Ricoeur‘s treatment of creativity and narrativity in his strict distinction between narration and 
authorship may be compared and contrasted with Hauerwas‘s story-formed ethics, discussed in 
Chapter Two. At first glance, the difference between the two thinkers is more obvious: Hauerwas 
argues that Christian lives receive their shape from the overall Christian story in which they find their 
place; Ricoeur‘s formulation of narrative identity gives people more leeway to shape their own stories. 
On the other hand, both Hauerwas and Ricoeur deny authorship to people; for both of them, fiction‘s 
main purpose where identity is concerned is to be instructive—Ricoeur thinks of constructed, existing 
art as a ‗detour‘ which provides room for ‗self-interpretation‘ on the way to a refigured understanding 
(‗Narrative Identity‘, 198). 
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of the application of fiction to life‘.47 These objections include: a continuation of the 
discussion that people are not their own authors; that people experience themselves in 
the midst of their life stories while fictional narratives have beginnings, middles, and 
ends; and that real life stories are always implicated in the stories of others (parents and 
communities, for examples) so that people actually face multiple versions of their own 
story, while fictional texts create unique worlds separate from one another.
48
 The 
instrumentality of fiction in Ricoeur‘s formulations also appears in the way he favours 
realism, setting ‗literary fiction‘ against such genre writing as science fiction.49 It is 
almost as if his own work to bring fiction and real life into a productive relationship 
frightens Ricoeur into protesting their difference.
50
 
This possible ‗fear‘ connects to the idea that theology functions as second-order 
discourse, as critical commentary upon the sacred texts which are the real focus of 
faith‘s hermeneutical discipline.51 At the same time that narrative is seen as ‗raw 
material‘ for theology, the purpose of theology becomes elucidating texts of religious 
experience. The important texts are actually those which report divine discourse, 
whether these be sacred texts or a spiritual communication between God and a believer 
that is made manifest in the experiences of the believer; theological texts are not really 
first-order, creative discourses in their own right.
52
 This means that bodily materiality is 
doubly obscured: first by the higher value given to conceptual meaning, and second by 
the limitations put on human creativity. 
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  OA 161. Italics in original. 
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  OA 160-1. It is surprising that Ricoeur accepts the last of these objections; certainly he must have 
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  See also Helen M. Buss, ‗Women's Memoirs and the Embodied Imagination: The Gendering of Genre 
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Theology after Ricoeur, 28. 
52
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identification of theology as critical commentary that relies upon other texts, even praising it as 
maintaining the high position of sacred text (74-9). Though the strong emphasis here could be that of 
Stiver rather than Ricoeur, the approach belied by Ricoeur‘s writings seems quite consonant with this. 
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The Possibility of the Body in Ricoeur in Spite of Ricoeur 
 
Ricoeur moves beyond a simple collocation of the self and the body toward a 
productive body, the story-making body, what he calls ‗homo capax‘, the capable 
human being.
53
 But Ricoeur himself confesses that he is unsure whether his focus on the 
ability of people to construct their pasts, moving from description to prescription 
through a capacity for narration, might not sufficiently take into account the infirmities 
which may afflict the body or the suffering inflicted by people upon one another.
54
 In 
saying this, he implies that perhaps his construal of the embodied self is a little too neat, 
a little too reliant upon the mental manipulations of persons reflecting upon their 
experiences. One can extrapolate from this that, since it is not only pain and suffering 
that result in the body‘s messiness, there are other factors which can destabilise 
Ricoeur‘s formulation here, too: love, joy, desire, dangling one‘s feet in cool water 
while sitting on a dock in the middle of a hot day. In his own observations, Ricoeur 
points back to places in his work which, if they had a stronger emphasis in the whole, 
might alleviate some of the problems. 
For an example of how this re-reading of Ricoeur might proceed, look at Helen 
M. Buss‘s essay ‗Women's Memoirs and the Embodied Imagination: The Gendering of 
Genre that Makes History and Literature Nervous‘, in which Buss provides a feminist 
interpretation of Ricoeur‘s work on the imagination and the self. Buss emphasises the 
embodied nature of the imagination, proclaiming that Ricoeur‘s own language and use 
of metaphors encourage her to focus on the idea that the self belongs just as much to the 
body as to history and, that being the case, that the imagination is gendered by the 
particularities of the body.
55
 She brings Ricoeur into conversation with Judith Butler, 
portraying them basically as collaborators in constructivist notions, where ‗acts of the 
body…participate in making new meanings‘.56 Buss then looks to women‘s memoir-
writing to exemplify this. The re-reading and resulting conclusions are possible because 
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  Paul Ricoeur, ‗A Response by Paul Ricoeur‘, Paul Ricoeur and Narrative xxxix. 
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  Ricoeur, ‗A Response‘, xxxix-xl. 
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  Buss 88-9. 
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  Buss 92. 
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Buss figures that the meaning-making redescription of the world detailed in Ricoeur‘s 
analysis of metaphor is a concept strong enough to trump his insistence on the 
separation of fiction and history.
57
 
In his essay on narrative theology, one of the problems Ricoeur finds with the 
narrativists‘ approach is that it prioritises what he calls the ‗Christian pattern‘ which 
constrains all discord in the stories of the world to the necessary concord of the one 
universal salvation history that Jesus mediates.
58
 Stories that do not fit are made to fit, 
or ignored. Rather than the chronological pattern which is too often assumed in a 
Christian theological consideration of canonical biblical narrative, Ricoeur reminds 
readers that the overarching story to which the Bible refers is not actually a ‗closed‘ 
story, with beginning, middle, and end. There may be complete stories within the all-
encompassing story by which the faithful construe history, and these smaller stories do 
illumine the trends of the larger, but that larger story itself is not complete and hence 
cannot be contained or fully known. Ricoeur declares that  
There are stories of the exodus, of the passion, and even more 
fragmentary stories such as the story of Joseph or that of Peter‘s 
betrayal. But the story of the partnership between God and Israel is, as 
such, not only open and ongoing but unfathomable and unspeakable.
59
 
This openness to the story—to history—generates an open space for particularity, as an 
unfinished story demands more details. A story that has not been closed even defies the 
concepts which have been determined to govern its process, for there may always be a 
twist in the plot or a development of an existing situation which clarifies or makes 
ambiguous what one thinks one knows. A concentration on the openness of narratives, 
as well as on the changeability of oneself, can bring back to the forefront the story-
making body. 
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  Buss 87-8. 
58
  Ricoeur, ‗Toward a Narrative Theology‘, FS 238. 
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A Note about Feminist Epistemologies
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n considering theological approaches to bodies and stories, I have looked most 
closely at four thinkers, two associated primarily with the investigation of the body 
(Graham Ward and Marcella Althaus-Reid) and two with the issue of narrative 
(Stanley Hauerwas and Paul Ricoeur), albeit in different ways and not without each of 
them exploring to some extent the issue of the connection of bodies and stories. One of 
the tendencies they all share is a deep unease about the limitations of bodies and the 
partial and located nature of the stories contingent upon them. They move theologically 
to erase boundaries between bodies, or to subordinate personal stories to an overarching 
faith narrative or a deep structure, or to treat persons and their embodied lives as 
symbolic representatives of some other truth. I speak of such moves as tendencies 
because they by no means happen all the time, nor even are they necessarily intrinsic to 
the thinkers whose work I have investigated; writing by the same thinkers in different 
contexts may approach the issues involved from quite different angles. Yet, the 
inclination remains: a theological propensity to abstraction tends to look beyond the 
body, to seek meaning elsewhere and level out the complexity of embodied life. 
Accompanying this tendency is a hierarchy of valuation which, in placing the spiritual 
(understood variously) above the material, makes it far too easy for people to read a 
relationship of domination, of oppressive power over others, over certain bodies of 
particular people and their stories. 
Seeing the way this tendency seems tied to theological method leads one to ask 
if it is simply a predisposition of the discipline: does the doing of theology necessarily 
lead to an underappreciation of the material world as theology seeks the ways of the 
divine? Does theology always collapse diversity into commonality by way of 
abstraction? Perhaps, as a discipline, it tends to; however, not every theology does. In 
the beginning of their book Controversies in Feminist Theology, Marcella Althaus-Reid 
and Lisa Isherwood write that 
One of the strengths of feminist theologies has always been the ability to 
include many voices within the debate. Of course detractors have seen 
this as a weakness, complaining that it signals a lack of internal 
methodological cohesion—as Mary Daly warned us years ago 
masculinist theology bows down to methodolatry and we should not do 
the same. This is not the same thing at all as having no method and no 
cohesion, it is however about creating space for diverse voices to express 
what they experience about the divine among and between us. It is about 
respect and an overwhelming belief that the divine cannot be contained 
I 
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by any one group whoever they may be and however blessed and 
sanctioned they believe themselves to be.
1
 
The authors note plurality of voice as a key characteristic of feminist theology; indeed, 
while the title of the book speaks of ‗feminist theology‘ in the singular, the text enacts 
multiplicity by referring to ‗feminist theologies‘ from the start. They turn the esteem 
given to the idea of a single, unified theological view, voiced from one location using 
one method, upside-down: they declare that such singularity is actually reductive and 
cannot account for the full complexity of the experience of God by human beings in 
their embodied lives. This is a theological method which seems to suggest that, no, the 
doing of theology does not necessitate a distancing from the particular. 
At its heart, this alternate notion of how theology works involves a certain type 
of logic concerning what knowledge entails and what truth is. To be able to say that 
many voices have something to say about the truth means that you believe that each of 
those voices may speak with some aspect or degree of truthfulness. It is a question of 
how one knows truly. This also inscribes a fragmentation of truth; it parcels out access 
to truth in the various understandings of meaning, and so pulls away from an idea that 
Truth is some separate entity that must be discovered on the other side of any 
actualisation of it. If Christian theologians wish to be a little less haunted by plurality—
or to see bodies in their particularities of location and time, desire and storied 
identities—then we need to be able to accept such a dividing of truth in the way we 
know.
2
 In other words, a feminist theology which encourages not only multiple voices 
but also multiple visions as told by those voices, can go far in remedying some of the 
problematic tendencies that I have noted in various theological assessments of bodies. 
To look more closely at this alternate notion of what theology does, one may 
direct one‘s attention to its roots, to the thinking about sense and knowledge which 
enables it. One may follow the hint given by feminist theologies and turn to the feminist 
                                                                                                                                               
1
  Marcella Althaus-Reid and Lisa Isherwood, Controversies in Feminist Theology 1. This provides a 
good example of the way any one of the four thinkers highlighted in this thesis may not be bound to 
the theological tendencies that have been observed in some parts of their work. 
2
  This is not to say that theology has not traditionally seen any nuance in its understanding of 
knowledge and truth. Christian theological epistemology generally involves tension between different 
kinds of knowledge, as can be seen, for example, in credal statements which attempt to hold together 
such notions as one and three, or human and divine. But, in this, truth can still remain quite 
circumscribed; one can argue the tension is observable because we, in the creaturely limitations of our 
embodiment, cannot see the whole truth. On the other hand, this is also not to say that there are no 
theological traditions which do not circumscribe truth in such a manner; numerous mystical and 
apophatic traditions would argue that truth cannot be fully known. 
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philosophies, specifically varieties of feminist epistemology, which underpin them. 
Feminist standpoint theory, introduced previously in the concluding section of the 
chapter on Graham Ward‘s theology, is one of the strongest currents of this 
epistemology. As mentioned, the roots of standpoint theory lay in attempts to uphold an 
epistemological methodology which recognises that research cannot be free of bias; in 
other words, any attempt to find one universal and neutral knowledge concerning any 
given subject is doomed to failure. Instead of trying to determine this one truth, 
supporters of standpoint theory argue that researchers should seek to analyse what they 
observe from the point of view of their own experience quite self-consciously, because, 
if they do, there is a greater chance that they might remain aware that others possibly 
have a different experience, asking different questions that lead to a different 
understanding of what is true.
3
 Such awareness would lead to making room for alternate 
viewpoints. 
A common criticism of standpoint theory is that it is epistemologically 
relativistic—that the idea that there can be more than one knowledge that is observably 
true concerning the substance of the world suggests that no one rational system for 
determining knowledge is necessarily better than another—thus undermining the 
scientific project for a rational understanding of all that is.
4
 One response to this critique 
is to note that standpoint theory does not refer just to points of view but to engaged 
points of view. The theory is explicitly activist, calling practitioners to struggle to 
uncover not only what different understandings are but also how the dominant theory 
impinges upon the vision of the less dominant group; uncovering the vision of those 
who stand at the margins can then lead to changing the relationship between dominant 
and oppressed groups.
5
 This is the point where standpoint theory becomes specifically 
feminist. What needs to be noted is that standpoints are understood in relation to one 
another, as part of a network that requires difference and particularity.  
                                                                                                                                               
3
  See Dorothy E. Smith, ‗Women‘s Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology‘, FST 30, for an 
illustration of how observers may not necessarily see all the truths of what they observe: the author 
cites a time when she saw through a train window a man, a woman, and three children and assumed 
they were a family. 
4
  Sandra Harding, ‗Introduction‘, FST 10-2. Regardless of actual critique, the cry of ‗Relativism!‘ is 
definitely seen as a criticism that must be addressed by standpoint theorist, as the index in the reader 
shows no less than nineteen references to the topic. 
5
  Nancy Hartsock, ‗The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist 
Historical Materialism‘, FST 36-7. 
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A second response to charges of relativism comes in what Sandra Harding calls 
‗strong objectivity‘: that traditional empirical notions of objective knowledge—known 
simultaneously from nowhere in particular and everywhere in abstract—are actually 
‗not rigorous or objectifying enough‘ because they do not factor in variables such as 
embodiment and location.
6
 Harding contends that cultural particularities affect every 
step in the scientific process, starting from the researcher‘s choice of questions to ask 
about a subject, and that the only real way to unveil such cultural bias in a knowledge-
producing community is to examine the process from the perspective of those on the 
margins of the community; she declares that ‗strong objectivity requires that scientists 
and their communities be integrated into democracy-advancing projects for scientific 
and epistemological reasons as well as moral and political ones‘.7 By including in one‘s 
investigation questions such as whose knowledge is being discussed and what are the 
aims of the people who are producing that knowledge claim, a researcher, rather than 
being relativist, can strive to determine which competing claim to truth is better.
8
 
Harding states that ‗the subjects/agents of knowledge for feminist standpoint theory are 
multiple, heterogeneous, and contradictory or incoherent‘ with one another, and even 
with themselves, as everyone is liable to be a member of multiple communities 
implying a variety of commitments; however, this plurality does not make the theory 
relativist or pluralist, but instead makes it realistic in seeing the need to identify all the 
interests which are involved in research.
9
 
Elaborating on the idea that no knowledge claim can be neutral, the philosopher 
of science Donna Haraway has written about what she terms ‗situated knowledges‘, 
observing that the belief that any person can possess ‗infinite vision‘ can only be an 
illusion, as the production of human knowledge always originates with embodied 
persons.
10
 As has been noted throughout this thesis so far, bodies have limits; thus, any 
insistence on vision as embodied means that vision, and any knowledge, is unavoidably 
                                                                                                                                               
6
  Sandra Harding, ‗Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is ―Strong Objectivity‖?‘ FST 128. 
7
  Harding, ‗Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology‘ 136. 
8
  Harding, ‗Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology‘ 131-2. 
9
  Harding, ‗Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology‘ 134. This denial of pluralism/relativism could be 
what makes standpoint theory so easy for a theologian such as Graham Ward to pick up. Note the way 
he incorporates plurality into his argument in CTRP but still ends by privileging Christian theology. 
(See Chapter One above.) 
10
  Haraway 86-7. 
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partial. Indeed, Haraway argues that, because all knowledge is embodied, or physically 
and materially situated, and the quest for transcendent vision is false, then ‗only partial 
perspective promises objective vision‘.11 She also notes that ‗The knowing self is partial 
in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply there and original; it is always 
constructed and stitched together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to 
see without claiming to be another‘.12 In other words, the admission that you only know 
in part aids in keeping you from ignoring the perspectives of others. This suggests that 
adopting the view that knowledge is partial makes it easier to produce a space where 
those voices and visions which have been repressed might be able to make themselves 
known, augmenting the fullness of the complexity of knowledge. 
A situated knowledge demands a high value for the consideration of particular, 
concrete, and material bodies. Yet Haraway‘s argument extends beyond the edge of the 
body to refer to bodies in relationship to one another. She sums up her position by 
declaring  
I am arguing for politics and epistemologies of location, positioning and 
situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition of being 
heard to make rational knowledge claims. These are claims on people‘s 
lives; the view from a body, always a complex, contradictory, 




The ‗view from a body‘ is a located view, situated in a specific place, and relies on its 
proximity to other bodies for the details both of sight and what is seen. Haraway posits 
that the ‗boundaries [of bodies and their locations] materialize in social interactions‘ in 
that they ‗are drawn by mapping practices‘ performed by people in the encounter of 
body with body.
14
 One person‘s partial knowledge depends upon another‘s—depends 
upon trusting others also to have partial knowledge which might fill in what you are 
missing.
15
 This trust entails a certain ethic of relating to others in which you defer not to 
those stronger than you but to those who are weaker (the privileging of visions from the 
                                                                                                                                               
11
  Haraway 87. 
12
  Haraway 90. 
13
  Haraway 92. 
14
  Haraway 97. 
15
  Haraway notes that ‗location is about vulnerability‘ and that it ‗resists the politics of closure‘ (93). 
Valuing location in knowledge claims means being open to additional knowledge, even if that forces 
you to adjust what you believe you know. 
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margin which has already been mentioned) while, as Haraway warns, guarding against 
‗the danger of romanticizing and/or appropriating the vision of the less powerful while 
claiming to see from their position‘.16 The ‗view from a body‘ demands honesty about 
your location on a map of your proximity to other bodies and their knowledges, as well 
as generosity towards the perspectives of those others. 
Feminist standpoint epistemology and principles of strong objectivity, therefore, 
constitute a rich resource for doing a theology which strives to deconstruct a monolithic 
insistence on the singularity of claims to truth. The theory opens up the possibility that 
theology could rejoice in the messiness of the body, including voices as different as 
Ward, Hauerwas, Althaus-Reid and Ricoeur, allowing each of them to speak of truth as 
they see it and augment the world without having to say that one voice is the sole 
possessor of the most correct knowledge. This is, of course, not new, and has already 
entered theological discussion.
17
 However, approaches to the theory by different 
theological discourses may lead to quite different outcomes than what I have suggested; 
for instance, as seen with Ward, incorporating standpoint theory into Christian theology 
may generate a positive view of multiplicity to a degree, but still not greatly change the 
obscuration of particular bodies. The determination of what happens depends on the 
emphasis given, on interpretative choices. Thus, on one hand, Ward prioritises the 
agonistic nature of the standpoint theory which declares that a standpoint must be 
achieved by contestation.
18
 On the other hand, Pamela Sue Anderson chooses to 
accentuate the collaborative element derived from the theory‘s call for empathy.19 
Standpoint theory‘s contribution to theology varies hermeneutically; what theologians 
determine such epistemology supports must derive from yet another source. 
                                                                                                                                               
16
  Haraway 88. For other, similar discussions of the temptation of turning an identification with marginal 
voices into a covert subjugation of them by their supposed champions, see bell hooks, ‗Choosing the 
Margin as a Space of Radical Openness‘, FST 157-8, and Uma Naraya, ‗The Project of Feminist 
Epistemology: Perspectives from a Nonwestern Feminist‘, FST 218-21. 
17
  Besides Graham Ward‘s discussion of the theory, feminist standpoint epistemology figures 
significantly in the work of Pamela Sue Anderson. See her book A Feminist Philosophy of Religion, 
specifically the second chapter; and ‗An Epistemological-Ethical Approach to Philosophy of Religion: 
Learning to Listen‘, Feminist Philosophy of Religion: Critical Readings, eds. Pamela Sue Anderson 
and Beverley Clack 94-5. 
18
  See, again, the last section of Chapter One above. 
19
  Anderson‘s prioritisation of empathy is noted by Harriet A. Harris, ‗A Theological Approach: 
Struggling for Truth‘, Feminist Philosophy of Religion: Critical Readings 77. See also Anderson ‗An 
Epistemological-Ethical Approach‘ 95. 
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Haraway‘s discussion of situated knowledges inspires the use of words like 
‗topography‘ and ‗mapping‘—language of geography and cartography. Similar imagery 
appears in another feminist philosophical source, from a different location, the works of 
Michèle Le Doeuff. In her book Hipparchia’s Choice, Le Doeuff writes of orientation, 
disorientation and reorientation as philosophical projects. To demonstrate the 
relationship of these terms, she asks you to imagine yourself as a weary traveller 
arriving at an Italian city, pulling out a map and proceeding to figure out directions to 
where you want to go. You pick out a landmark to look for along the road you are on, 
but are disoriented when you cannot find that landmark. Eventually you realise your 
problem: you have pulled out the wrong map, that of a different Italian city, and your 
landmark does not exist where you are.
20
 Le Doeuff shows that it is not just a matter of 
orienting oneself and one‘s geographical location by map-reading, you also have to 
choose the correct map. If you cannot find the correct map, you might have to make it. 
Similar to advocates of standpoint theory and situated knowledges, Le Doeuff 
notes that philosophy is never really disinterested or non-cultural, observing this in the 
course of investigating the place (or lack of place) of women in the history of the 
discipline.
21
 But whereas the various feminist standpoint theorists draft principles like 
‗strong objectivity‘, presenting the logic ready-made for easy appropriation by others, 
this does not appear to be Le Doeuff‘s style; her writing evinces more of a questioning 
and problematising approach—a Socratic method, one might say—pointing to 
difficulties presented by systems of seeking knowledge as the difficulties appear.
22
 Her 
emphases are different, too. Le Doeuff‘s observation of the partiality of knowledge, 
while noticing this as bias and interest, accentuates the idea of partiality as 
incompleteness. She advocates a philosophy which would ‗abandon its wish to be a 
speculation which leaves no room for a lack of knowledge‘ and ‗cease wishing to mask 
the incomplete nature of all theorisation‘.23 Alongside this, Le Doeuff underlines a 
                                                                                                                                               
20
  HC 200. 
21
  See ‗Long Hair, Short Ideas‘, PI 100-17, for one instance of this discussion, and HC for another. 
22
  Fascinatingly, the methods and location of the investigators are different enough that the trajectories 
of standpoint theorists and Michèle Le Doeuff do not cross in their own works. For all that they are 
both interested in feminism and the liberation of subjugated voices while alluding to the embodiment 
of knowledge claims, Le Doeuff does not appear in the index to FST while, likewise, none of the 
principal theorists behind standpoint epistemology appear in the indices to PI and HC. This separation 
in itself provides evidence for the situated nature of knowledge. 
23
  PI 126 and 118. 
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notion of philosophy as a collaborative effort. She eschews a construal of philosophy 
which binds the discipline to eminent philosophers who hand on a complete project to a 
student, master to apprentice, in favour of philosophy as a collective enterprise ‗which 
has moved and moves on from age to age, is orientated in different directions, taken up, 
pursued and redebated, which does not have the strongly structured unity of a 
tradition…but is not constantly being radically undermined either‘.24 Truth and 
knowledge become shared property. 
Le Doeuff‘s two emphases have several implications. If philosophy is a 
collective project which recognises its unfinished nature, then practitioners may drop 
back as necessary to allow others to step forward—a productive humility-in-the-face-of-
truth. With this comes the notion of the ‗heterogeneous genesis‘ of anyone doing 
philosophy—that there is not just one source for a person‘s thought and behaviour but 
many, what Le Doeuff terms the ‗multilinearity‘ of one‘s existence that comes from a 
plurality of relationships with family members and friends, with neighbours and 
strangers, with books and other texts, and with one‘s own imagination. Simultaneously, 
any person goes on to be one of many strands of influence on other people.
25
 This plays 
against any notion that philosophy can be an isolated discipline. Instead, philosophy 
becomes ‗a fellow-traveller of conflicts which arise outside of its realm and which, 
similarly, will be resolved (if at all) outside it, by means which do not rely upon its 
inherent power‘.26 The search for knowledge exists as an exercise in participation and 
cooperation. Moreover, under this construal, philosophy and philosophers have fewer 
problems accepting knowledge and wisdom which is not traditionally philosophical. 
During a discussion of the achievements of the movement for women‘s liberation in 
France despite its variety and theoretical incoherence, Le Doeuff tells how  
                                                                                                                                               
24
  HC 204. Le Doeuff‘s critique of the personalisation of philosophy can be found in PI 117-20 and 126-
7, and HC 201-5. Note that Le Doeuff does not deny that the person of the philosopher has a role in 
the pursuit of the discipline—she notes that one is ‗obliged to establish a harmony between the person 
one is and what one writes‘ and admits the truthfulness of a teacher who once told her that ‗you will 
teach not with what you know but with what you are‘ (HC 159 and 201). The problem lies in making 
this personal nature of philosophy the basis for a master-pupil relationship which preserves 
philosophy‘s special nature, making philosophers, in their possession of wisdom, ontologically better 
than those who are not philosophers. When this is tied to an ideal of a singular truth and the notion 
that the finding of this truth by a philosopher can be completed, it results in the possibility that one 
particular philosopher is all that is needed for a philosophical truth-project in any one age, making 
everyone else (especially people on the margins) superfluous. 
25
  HC 170-2. 
26
  PI 118. 
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When one thinks one has been trained in ‗rigour‘, which, in principle, 
forbids one from advancing something which has not yet been entirely 
thought through and well-founded, the discovery that whispered, 
impressionistic stories and openly subjective viewpoints can lead the 
way to an understanding of the most vital things is a real lesson, which I 
have not yet fully integrated, but which teaches the following: it is better 
to allow yourself to start speaking before being completely sure that you 
can justify what you say; otherwise, you will never speak at all.
27
 
Le Doeuff opens the way for speculation at the same time that she provides a foundation 
for interdisciplinarity. Philosophy, as the search for the best way of thinking, becomes a 
risky venture, trusting in others; but this makes it creative, too.
28
 
Were any theological project to pick up and try to incorporate the suggestions of 
these various feminist philosophies which highlight the partiality and situated nature of 
knowledge, adding to that the importance of cooperation in the work that the project is 
attempting, the ramifications might go a long way towards keeping particular, concrete, 
and material bodies in mind. Certainly, to me, these epistemologies imply that the four 
views of the body on which I have focused do not have to eliminate one another; the 
incompleteness of knowing means that Ward‘s malleable body, Hauerwas‘s story-
formed body, Althaus-Reid‘s indecent body, and Ricoeur‘s story-making body abide in 
proximity to one another, moving closer together or farther apart depending on needs 
and desires that are not altogether predictable, each of them proclaiming some aspect of 
truth. Additionally, especially with Le Doeuff‘s work that demonstrates the significance 
of creative imagination not only for inspiring philosophy, but also for the precise form 
in which philosophers work out their thoughts in writing, these theoretical conceptions 
make space for thinking of disciplines such as philosophy and theology as arts, as 
practices of creative writing, as places where materiality and form matter—where 
bodies matter—in the goals which the disciplines pursue.  
 
But there is still more. 
                                                                                                                                               
27
  HC 221. 
28
  Le Doeuff writes of philosophy as an ‗action‘, something which appears when ‗people get to grips 
with the fringe of unknowing which borders every field of knowledge and overflows from it‘ (HC 
175). It seems to me that ‗fringe of unknowing‘ has similar implications for other disciplines, 
including theology; limitations to what is known mean that room for creative reflection exists. Of 
course, theology and philosophy are different precisely at the point that Le Doeuff notes in a quotation 
above—philosophy does not have ‗the strongly structured unity of a tradition‘ while theology of any 
faith does involve traditions. But one does not have to construe tradition as being without variation or 
newness; a living tradition evolves according to circumstance and personal relations. 
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At the end of ‗Vision‘, a short story by Alistair MacLeod, the narrator connects 
his reflections upon the story he has just told to a recollection of something he and a 
friend used to do when they were boys: 
And when the wet ropes of the lobster traps came out of the sea, we 
would pick out a single strand and then try to identify it some few feet 
further on. It was difficult to do because of the twisting and turning of 
the different strands within the rope. Difficult to be ever certain of our 
judgements or to fully see or understand. Difficult then to see and 
understand the twisted strands within the rope. And forever difficult to 
see and understand the tangled twisted strands of love.
29
 
The narrator wonders at the unfathomable nature of human relationships, the twist and 
tangle of how people interact, noting how certain aspects rise into sight at certain times 
and places before disappearing again. Not that the strands are unknowable, but their 
place is determined by their relationship with other strands—and that relationship is 
ever in flux. 
When Michèle Le Doeuff writes about maps and reorientation, she notes that the 
process is not only a question of figuring where you are; it is also about where you want 
to go and how to get there. She notes that ‗the precise space of reference‘ is also ‗the 
space of a projected journey‘ and that the movement to reorient oneself involves ‗the 
recognition of how the precise space connects to the intention of travelling‘.30 But this is 
a question fraught with perils. It is not always easy to figure out where you want to go. 
As noted above, Le Doeuff herself observes that you have to have the right map. And 
bodies, though present, are not always readily visible—yet we know they are there, we 
know from our bodies and from those around us, from the stories we tell and the stories 
we hear. Mapping out where we want to go in addition to where we have already been 
requires more than just theory. It demands the complexities of choice. 
This directs us to the second part of my inquiry into discerning the body, where I 
start to try to map bodies in relationship, to plot those ‗tangled twisted strands of love‘.
                                                                                                                                               
29
  Alistair MacLeod, ‗Vision‘ 167. 
30
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odies wait. 
They wait in morgues, in tombs, in hidden graves, for their secrets to be 
untangled. They wait behind doors, too, in closets and in beds, by telephone 
receivers, in doctors‘ offices and bank queues, for secrets to be played out, not only for 
others but by those others. Bodies wait for their reflections to form in the eyes of a 
lover, a brother, a colleague, a killer. 
Bodies wait to be read, and for their own stories to be told. Bodies wait to be 
told and to tell, to relate themselves to others, for others. They narrate the landscape, 
scratching notes in the margins, colouring outside the lines, leaving pieces behind, 
residue not only on the surface of the earth, but on the skin of another person, on the 
vellum of their memories and dreams. Bodies resist subsumption by classification, into 
doctrine, into being nothing more than the lesser term in a metaphor; their stories 
remain open, to tell another chapter, or to be part of someone else‘s unfolding narrative. 
Sometimes, though, you cannot wait; you go looking for other bodies to tell you 
the truth, go looking for ways to learn about yourself and those you hold dear. 
Sometimes you need to go where the past has written on your flesh, make yourself 
vulnerable to contact with others, to try to find a future. The story of your body in 
company with others is a risky tale of discovery. Thus, we turn to the story of Anil 
Tissera, going home to expose the truth of bodies, thinking, perhaps, that old bones lie 
still. Learning a little of what happens in the complicated tangle of touch made by the 
contingencies of bodies whose stories wind together even for the shortest of moments. 





The Bodies that Remain: 
Anil’s Ghost  
and 
‗This sweet touch from the world‘
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ichael Ondaatje‘s novel, Anil’s Ghost, declares the truthful witness of 
bodies. However, just as bodies are not simple, neither is this witness. Set 
in the midst of Sri Lanka‘s civil wars, the story follows Anil, a forensic 
anthropologist, as she returns to the land of her birth to aid in human-rights efforts to 
document atrocities perpetrated by rebels, insurgents and government forces alike. She 
reads what has happened to people from their remains: bones are her text. Beside her 
works a Sri Lankan archaeologist, Sarath, who reconstructs the past from ruins, stone 
and ancient inscriptions. For such vocations as theirs, artefacts seem incontrovertible 
evidence for establishing the reality of what has happened. Yet, the reading of any 
artefact, whether human tissue or human made, is an act of interpretation. In the face of 
human wounding and human relationship, in painful and joyful interaction, this reading 
of forensic and archaeological records becomes destabilised. In Anil’s Ghost, what 
seems like a straightforward scientific investigation of bodies is revealed to be 
complicated not only by the politics of crisis but also by the messiness of personal 
stories playing out in relationships. Although the attempt to read the truth from bodies is 
never dismissed, it remains an attempt that cannot be completely accomplished. Clarity 
is muddled by love and emotion, which hinders the efforts to interpret the truth from 
bodies and remains. But the bodies do remain—not just the corpses that are being 
investigated but the bodies of the living, too—and they all give witness: only this 
witness is borne less in scientific enquiry and more in the touch between people. Touch 
defines bodies, their stories, the shape of the stories. Yet, this is not a simple definition: 
touch does not have only one signification. Here bodies interact with both love and fury, 
to create and to destroy. Sometimes the love destroys and the fury creates. Still, touch 
gives the possibility of life, the call back to the possibility, the truthful witness of story 
to memory, to human being. Touch calls back to the fullness of being alive and of 
having known others, attended to others. In the end, there remains ‗This sweet touch 
from the world.‘1 
Anil’s Ghost tells the story of people caught up in war and crisis through bodies, 
and thus its pages are full of images and motifs of bodies. There are dead bodies and 
body parts; there are the bodies of those whose stories are being told, and who are 
witnessing the stories of others around them. There are representations of bodies: 
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ancient carvings, modern Buddhas, references to films and photographs. In this chapter, 
however, I concentrate on picking out just a few of these threads that weave through the 
complex structure of the novel. I begin with the way Ondaatje portrays the reading of 
bodies through other bodies, the interplay of flesh and word. I then examine how these 
readings become problematised. Finally, I turn to the touch that remains. 
 
The Truth of Bodies 
 
After Anil begins her work in Sri Lanka, she and Sarath discover more-recent 
skeletons among ancient ones at an archaeological site. Because access to the site is 
restricted to government workers, Anil realises that these bodies could prove the 
existence of human rights abuses in the country. One of the skeletons is complete, 
including a skull; they name the remains ‗Sailor‘. Using her forensic skills, Anil sets out 
to determine what happened to the person whose bones they have: 
She began to examine the skeleton again under sulphur light, 
summarizing the facts of his death so far, the permanent truths, same for 
Colombo as for Troy. One forearm broken. Partial burning. Vertebrae 
damage in the neck. The possibility of a small bullet wound in the skull. 
Entrance and exit. 
 She could read Sailor‘s last actions by knowing the wounds on 
bone. He puts his arms up over his face to protect himself from the blow. 
He is shot with a rifle, the bullet going through his arm, then into the 
neck. While he is on the ground, they come up and kill him.
2
 
Anil reads events as they have been inscribed on the body: the bones become her text. 
They are ‗facts‘ and ‗permanent truths‘. Once the remains have been uncovered, the 
assaults that the person has suffered cannot be imagined away. Physical attacks leave 
physical traces which tell a clear story to one who is trained to read them, one who has a 
hermeneutical skill learned not unlike the gaining of a language. The body carries a 
story with it because that story has been physically impressed upon it. 
Still, the impression left upon human remains does not necessarily come from 
traumatic sources. The book talks also of ‗markers of occupation‘ which are signs of 
what the person did in life, stresses caused by habitual movements and poses which can 
reveal identity by determining the vocation or avocation of the deceased.
3
 In actuality, 
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Anil‘s forensic reading of a body does not begin with possible perpetrators, but with the 
victim. We are told that 
The central truism in her work was that you could not find a suspect 
until you found the victim. And in spite of their knowledge that Sailor 
had probably been killed in this district, in spite of details of age and 
posture, her theorizing of height and weight, in spite of the ―head 
composition‖ that she had not much faith in, it seemed unlikely that they 
would identify him; they still knew nothing about the world that Sailor 
had come from. 
And, in any case, if they did identify him, if they did discover the 
details of his murder, what then? He was a victim among thousands. 
What would this change? 
She remembered Clyde Snow, her teacher in Oklahoma, 
speaking about human rights work in Kurdistan: One village can speak 
for many villages. One victim can speak for many victims. She and 
Sarath both knew that in all the turbulent history of the island‘s recent 
civil wars, in all the token police investigations, not one murder charge 




In order for the work to mean anything—to the international community, to any human 
rights committee—they would have to be able to tell the history of at least one person 
who was lost. Thus they marshal all the scientific evidence that they can, from soil 
samples to bone analysis to forensic entomology. They also get a recommended local 
artist, Ananda, to reconstruct the head from the skull. Interestingly, the words of Anil‘s 
teacher also point to what the book itself is doing: if ‗One victim can speak for many 
victims‘, then one story can speak for many stories. Though readers might presume that 
Anil’s Ghost assumes a cause-and-effect order for politics and war and the involvement 
of people, the novel is less concerned with the cause than with the effect. There is no 
attempt to explain the wars, just to describe life in such a time and, through the portrait 
made, to witness to the truth. 
As mentioned, the skills which Anil uses are like a language. To be more exact, 
the skills are closer akin to palaeography. Ondaatje makes this explicit by having a 
forensic anthropologist work with an archaeologist whose mentor had been a self-
described epigraphist. Even though Sarath himself declares early on that he finds the 
pairing ‗odd‘, the kinds of intuition used by both professions, and the skills with 
remains, are similar.
5
 Later, Sarath‘s brother, Gamini the doctor, makes the connection 
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explicit when he talks about Sarath‘s former teacher‘s skill at reading carved texts. ‗A 
skill…to decipher inscriptions,‘ Gamini says. ‗Wonderful! To study history as if it were 
a body.‘6 Gamini‘s words turn artefact into body, implying obliquely that the stone with 
its inscriptions is in some way alive or once was. In any case, the two interpretive 
disciplines lie closer than one might have expected. Both read the marks on a tissue of 
surface, the writing that makes a text by its presence. In both disciplines, the definition 
of an object‘s importance comes from the act of that object being marked.7 
What binds Anil the forensic anthropologist and Sarath the archaeologist is a 
mutual desire for reconstruction. At one point, Anil, musing about her co-worker, 
considers how 
His desire, he had told her, was to write a book someday about a city in 
the south of the island that no longer existed. Not a wall of it remained, 
but he wanted to tell the story of that place. It would emerge out of this 
dark trade with the earth, his knowledge of the region in chronicles—its 
medieval business routes, its presence as a favourite monsoon town of a 
certain king, as revealed in poems that celebrated the city‘s daily life.8 
Sarath wants to uncover the lives that have been buried; he wants to tell the story of a 
place in order to bring its memory to life, and thus resurrect its society in the memories 
of present-day people. The story itself would be spun from material memory, from the 
detritus that has been left behind from long-ago human lives. Sarath desires to bring the 
past to light using a physical hermeneutic.
9
 
Carvings, inscriptions, old ruins: they all take on a certain lushness in Anil’s 
Ghost. They are palpable histories, frozen expressions from the past, words that are 
embodied in material signs so that their utterance is less ephemeral. If the reading of 
such signs is like the skill at reading human remains forensically, even so are the two 
                                                                                                                                               
6
  AG 193. 
7
  The way Ondaatje presents the body as a surface on which identifying stories may be read is quite 
similar to Paul Ricoeur‘s notion of the body as that which makes the interior of oneself knowable to 
others. See FM 19-20, as well as my discussion of this in Chapter Four. This construal of the body‘s 
connection with others may also be compared to Maurice Merleau-Ponty‘s ‗chiastic body‘ in Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty: basic writings, ed. Thomas Baldwin 247-71. 
8
  AG 29-30. 
9
  Cf. the other two Canadian novels which I am examining in this thesis, Jane Urquhart‘s A Map of 
Glass and Anne Michaels‘s Fugitive Pieces. Both of these join Anil’s Ghost in involving in their 
subject matter some form of reflection upon the reconstruction of a vanished past. The other two 
novels I study reflect less and attempt more reconstruction within the body of their texts. 
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texts of flesh and stone aligned by Ondaatje. In a passage on Palipana, Sarath‘s teacher, 
Ondaatje writes that 
He spread his fingers over every discovered rune. He traced each letter 
on the Stone Book on Polonnaruwa, a boulder carved into a rectangle 
four feet high, thirty feet long, the first book of the country, laid his bare 
arms against this plinth that collected the heat of the day. For most of the 
year it was dark and only during the monsoons would the letters be filled 
with water, creating small, perfectly cut harbours, as at Carthage. A 
giant book in the scrub grass of the Sacred Quadrangle of Polonnaruwa, 
chiselled with letters, bordered by a frieze of ducks. Ducks for eternity, 
he whispered to himself, having pieced together what he had picked up 
in an ancient text. A secret.
10
 
It is not ‗eyes‘ that decipher the runes; instead, they are ‗traced‘ by ‗fingers‘ and 
embraced by ‗arms‘. Body and inscription entwine; they read each other. Their physical 
natures, interacting, create worlds—or, perhaps, the representations of worlds, with the 
encounter of human body and archaeological record becoming a geographical tableau, 




But if flesh and stone lie so close together, if one can read history like a body or 
divine the truth of an event from human remains, then all of these stand open to the 
same difficulties. Texts shift, and are lost. Evidence may not be enough to prove a truth. 
Interpretation is fraught with personal elements that change the understanding of any 
signification. Ondaatje hints at such problems, at instability in the process of reading, 
from the start of the novel. Anil’s Ghost begins with warnings about the truth-seeking 
effort. First, Ondaatje presents a memory that Anil has from her time doing human-
rights work in Guatemala. She and others return to a dig at a mass burial site to find a 
woman sitting in the grave, staring at two bodies that lie side-by-side. They could be her 
missing husband and her missing brother. The author declares that 
There are no words Anil knows that can describe, even for just herself, 
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  AG 83. 
11
  In correspondence to this image of a meeting that creates something new, cf. Paul Ricoeur‘s notion of 
metaphor in which the meeting of two terms creates a new reality. See Ricoeur, ‗Word, Polysemy, 
Metaphor‘, RR, 65-85, and The Rule of Metaphor, passim, but particularly the section ‗Towards the 
Concept of ―Metaphorical Truth‖‘, 247-56. 
12
  AG 6. Italics in original. 
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Ondaatje warns the reader that the book moves around and among the indescribable. 
The remains themselves, the remnants of bodies, lie inert; they depend upon the bodies 
of others to give them meaning through attending to them, through becoming aware of 
their significance. This attending itself cannot be contained. It may be glanced at, hinted 
at, but the scientific fact itself just points to it.
13
 
Shortly after this, a second passage reminds the reader of the fragile nature of 
the archaeological record left by human history. The passage describes a cave in China 
which once sheltered sacred Buddhist art. However, upon discovering the site an 
archaeologist plundered it, carving out the stone Bodhisattvas, dismembering them and 
dispersing them to museums around the world. The story of the cave is mentioned as 
told in a lecture: 
‗Nothing lasts,‘ Palipana told them. ‗It is an old dream. Art burns, 
dissolves. And to be loved with the irony of history—that isn‘t much.‘ 
He said this in his first class to his archaeology students. He had been 
talking about books and art, about the ‗ascendancy of the idea‘ being 
often the only survivor.
14
 
Artefacts can only be the partial remains of any society, and what does remain easily 
crumbles away. If the idea is all that is left, then the past is not recovered: the idea 
ascended is not the same as it was. Not only that, but far worse it is that those who love 
the past also destroy it; bringing artefacts into the light allows the items to inform the 
present-day world, but also imperils their integrity. Ondaatje heightens the pain of this 
by deliberately highlighting the bodily nature of the carvings in his description. It is not 
simply stone that is fragmented, but ‗[h]eads separated from bodies‘ and ‗[h]ands 
broken off‘.15 This echoes the violence done to human beings, to flesh, in war. This also 
suggests that, while archaeology and other readings seek truth, seek facts, such readings 
themselves carry a potential for violence.
16
 
                                                                                                                                               
13
  Ondaatje‘s destabilisation of the reading of bodies is reminiscent of John D. Caputo‘s complaint 
against the phenomenologists that their meaning-making and -imparting bodies are always whole and 
perfect, always able to communicate in their ‗propriety‘, while real bodies are most often broken and 
malformed, and that this makes the idea that all can be learned by touch unachievable. See Against 
Ethics 195-6. 
14
  AG 12. Italics in original. 
15
  AG 12. 
16
  Caputo, in the chapter of Against Ethics called ‗Jewgreek Bodies: An Antiphenomenological 
Supplement to the Lyrical-Philosophical Discourses‘, has much to say about broken and disease-
ridden bodies, but quite little about the potentiality of violence in human attempts to read the truth in 
one another. When Caputo does talk about potential for violence, he makes this a function of the 
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All the way through the narrative, then, the search for truth on which the two 
main characters embark is rendered problematic and destabilised. Stone crumbles; 
history, stories, memories, lives get buried. Even when Ondaatje has a character 
proclaim faith in the forensic exercise, he uses allusion to undercut the certainty. When 
Anil talks of the facts of death as ‗permanent truths‘ (as discussed above), she says that 
these truths are the ‗same for Colombo as for Troy‘.17 Why Troy? It is one of the most 
famous ancient places and like Colombo a location of conflict and violence. The quest 
to find the site of the ancient city forms part of the epic story of modern archaeology. 
Yet, the desire to locate Troy was fuelled by the literature that made it significant, 
which made the name known to history: Homer‘s Iliad. Only the discovery of a place 
which could be called Troy can do nothing to verify the events of Homer‘s epic. One 
might say that the truth of the story remains. But Troy was destroyed; its citizens speak 
barely in whispers. The permanence of these truths is elusive. If it is the same for 
Colombo as it is for Troy, then for Colombo the truth is bound up in unverifiable 
stories, too. 
Ondaatje also portrays both Anil and Sarath as doubtful of their own enterprise 
at times. The reader expects Anil to be idealistic, the activist hoping that her work will 
give a foundation for civil rights to be re-established. Yet, she labours under no illusions 
that the wounds of atrocity can simply be made better or erased—that her work at 
naming unidentified remains and discerning the circumstances of their death could heal 
completely the people who had lost loved ones. Ondaatje writes that 
She used to believe that meaning allowed a person to escape grief and 
fear. But she saw that those who were slammed and stained by violence 
lost the power of language and logic. It was the way to abandon 
emotion, a last protection for the self. They held on to just the coloured 
and patterned sarong a missing relative last slept in, which in normal 
times would have become a household rag but now was sacred.
18
 
                                                                                                                                               
response of the strong to the powers of obligation and solicitation emitted by the weak or marginalised 
Other (215). (Interestingly enough, it is always the Other who is marginalised in Against Ethics.) The 
violence depicted is intentional, forming an attempt to stop that solicitation which haunts the self 
faced by the Other. Ondaatje, however, points to a less intentional violence that happens simply by 
trying to communicate and to learn, an obliterating gaze coming from the invasion of good intentions. 
Caputo‘s critique of the phenomenological meeting of bodies and sense could have been filled out by 
reflection upon the violent potentialities inherent in the propriety of Merleau-Ponty‘s presentation of 
the visible body. See Caputo, Against Ethics, 201, and Merleau-Ponty, Basic Writings, 251-7, where 
he brings the tangible and the visible together so that vision is a kind of touching. 
17
  AG 64. 
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  AG 55-6. 
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Meaning was not, then, for survivors themselves. They had loss; they had the hole made 
when someone you love is torn away from you, leaving you clinging to bare—physical, 
but bare—tokens of that life. Truth uncovered cannot fill that hole. However, this does 
not mean that the work is worthless. Anil‘s struggle is the work of mitigation, a quest to 
release a population from the grips of fear so that grief can go on naturally. She 
continues to strive to undo the ‗scarring psychosis‘, as it is described, so that fewer 
people will have to experience the pain.
19
  
Of course, Anil has been away, learning her skills in the wider world. Sarath has 
lived through the crisis, continuing to do his archaeological work even as society 
devolved around him. He ponders ‗discoveries made during the worst political times‘, 
thinking of an episode when he and his teacher had gone into a cave with a makeshift 
torch to view carvings while all along unknown attackers were picking up people for no 
apparent reason, making them disappear; he reflects how ‗[h]alf the world, it felt, was 
being buried, the truth hidden by fear, while the past revealed itself in the light of a 
burning rhododendron bush‘.20 He asks the question, ‗what would the truth bring them 
into?‘ and answers himself: ‗It was a flame against a sleeping lake of petrol‘.21 As far as 
Sarath has seen, the truth has the capacity to beget violence by adding fuel to the cycle 
of vengeance. All that the truth would do would be to allow the justification of one‘s 
violence against another. Thus, while he worked to uncover the past and give it life 
anew, Sarath observed that the living world around him was burying itself, in making 
people disappear, in murder and the hiding of bodies.
22
 Here turmoil pushes life below 
the surface, and truth is in the act of submergence.
23
 
While Anil and Sarath apparently cling to different ways to think about the 
consequences of truth, both have a very similar idea of what makes truth. For them it is 
always the truth, composed of the facts of what really happened. The truth is the reality 
which, when hidden, can be excavated by skilful techniques, similar to the way a reader 
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  Cf. the submerging of the body into the flesh in Caputo, Against Ethics, 208-12. Contingencies that 
act against the ‗agent body‘ force a ‗reduction‘ to flesh, which Caputo sees as an anarchy which 
contracts the world into vulnerability, turning people from those who act to those who are acted upon. 
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reaches meaning by interpreting a collection of lines and dots which have marked up a 
surface. They have an overtly hermeneutical approach to truth, and seek to work by a 
type of exegesis. When they question truth, or the finding of it, Anil and Sarath actually 
question only the application of truth. Yet Ondaatje does not allow his characters to face 
truth so easily, and hints that the reader should be suspicious, too. You may see this, for 
instance, in the event of the reconstruction of the head of Sailor from the skull. After 
much struggle Ananda finishes his work and Sarath and Anil go to view the sculpted 
head. At first, Anil registers a sense of wonder at the revelation of this person whose 
bones she had been addressing: it is ‗As if she was finally meeting a person who had 
been described to her in letters, or someone she had once lifted up as a child who was 
now an adult‘.24 She finds herself surprised also by the ‗serenity‘ and the lack of 
tension, that it is ‗A face comfortable with itself‘.25 But Sarath declares that the 
peacefulness is the problem, because it is ‗what [the artist] wants of the dead‘.26 He 
reveals to Anil that Ananda‘s own wife was among the disappeared, that for three years 
he has not found her, that the sculpted head is peaceful because that is the only way 
Ananda can deal with the loss of his wife—by imagining her peaceful in death.27 They 
realise that the head is ‗not a reconstruction of Sailor‘s face‘, regardless of all the work, 
the artistic technique, that had gone into it.
28
 This realisation is, in a way, a crisis of 
truth. The reconstruction of the past, which began as the step to follow excavation, 
carries with it the creativity of the art, a multiplication of the truth that does not simply 
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  AG 188. 
29
  Cf. Ricoeur, ‗The Function of Fiction in Shaping Reality‘, RR, 130: ‗The thesis which I want to 
elaborate here, and incorporate within the problematic of fiction, is that images created by the talent of 
the artist are not less real but more real because they augment reality‘. 
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The Truth of the Surgeon’s Scalpel 
 
The destabilisation continues with the addition of Sarath‘s brother, Gamini, to 
the story. Gamini is a surgeon who has found himself dealing with all the trauma to the 
human body that modern war can create—what happens when hot metal and explosives 
meet flesh. The doctor‘s job is to read a body yet another way: not forensically or 
archaeologically, but through diagnosis. From the signs written—the wounds inflicted 
or incised—the doctor reads the state of the flesh, determines what needs to be done to 
save: that is, the doctor determines what might be done, what may or may not be 
possible. Gamini‘s practice of this medical reading leads him, on the one hand, to 
dispute the idea of finding a truthful answer, to reject the idea that one side or another is 
in the right.
30
 The narrator tells us how the onset of civil violence changed the outlook 
of Gamini from his early days as a doctor in his first posting: ‗In one of the hospital 
texts that the young doctor Gamini read was a sentence he became excessively fond of: 
In diagnosing a vascular injury, a high index of suspicion is necessary.‘31 Though the 
medical text almost certainly refers to suspicion concerning the injury—about where the 
most pressing harm to the body has actually been done—this ‗high index of suspicion‘ 
extends to the doctor‘s approach to the human beings around him as possible 
perpetrators who write their desires so violently upon the flesh of others. 
On the other hand, Gamini does see truth in the practice of healing, a practice in 
response to wounding or illness. Although truthful answers may evade the diagnosis of 
the cause of any injury, mending the injury is either successful or not. While Gamini 
asserts that his failed marriage and his brother‘s research mean nothing, he implies that 
medicine—his work, and not his familial identity—is the only thing that has meaning.32 
The struggle to preserve life acts as a protest against the inhumanity of political 
violence. The novel recounts an incident when Gamini is involved in a difficult 
operation on the heart of a young boy to repair a congenital defect. During the 
operation, the wounded from an attacked village begin to stream into the hospital, but 
Gamini refuses to stop tending to the boy: he ‗was not going to leave him alone, betray 
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him in his sleep‘.33 That beautiful boy had potential, the possibility of life in the face of 
terrible bloodshed. What other truth could there be, Gamini‘s character asks, both of 
Sarath and of Anil, as if the truths which they seek to reconstruct from the past mean 
nothing for the innocents who need saving.
34
 
Still, the opposition of the caring profession of Gamini to the more scientific 
callings of the anthropologist and the archaeologist is not stable. Ondaatje refuses to let 
the doctor get the upper hand. Although it appears that the medical touch champions a 
truth which seeks out the human and denies the political, the novel asks the reader to 
look more carefully. Gamini, the caring doctor, does not want to know the stories of the 
people whom he treats. He likes how the wounded come in and are sorted not by any 
other history but that of their injuries. The doctors and nurses tag these patients by what 
sort of treatment they need; names only come later, for records.
35
 When Gamini has to 
examine the photographs of bodies that have been found, so that he can make reports 
for Amnesty International, he covers the faces, refers to the bodies only by the number 
of their file, concentrates on the wounds. He does not want to recognise anyone, to 
know them in the way that comes when you know a name. Eventually those who send 
him the photographs from the morgue learn to cover the faces themselves.
36
 While the 
doctor‘s reluctance to have much to do with the dead is in part a grasp at life, it is also a 
denial of the particular lives of those who have been killed. Their stories are reduced to 
the wounds which they have suffered. 
Part of this has to do with Gamini‘s own character. His family had called him 
the Mouse when he was growing up, because he had been quiet, observant, the youngest 
who was never really the centre of attention. He was ‗invisible‘.37 As an adult, he 
maintains ‗distance and anonymity‘, prefers strangers to the intimacy of family and 
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   Cf. Caputo‘s criticism of phenomenologists, philosophical ethicists and theologians vs. practitioners 
of lyrical-philosophy, with the latter being more open to obligation‘s call to attend to the Other in 
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and Anil. 
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 His professional life as a doctor in the midst of war serves only to increase his 
distance from others: ‗His duties made him come upon strangers and cut them open 
without ever knowing their names…. It seemed he did not approach people unless they 
had a wound, even if he couldn‘t see it‘.39 He knows the intimacy of bodies, the intricate 
inner workings of organs, bones, and nerves, but that intimacy only masks emotional 
distance. Ondaatje writes of Gamini that ‗it was his own heart that could not step into 
the world‘.40 His life is in stasis, moving on the edge of sleep and waking but never 
fully awake or at rest. Even the truth of injured flesh and medical treatment which he 




In the end, bodies are just as much artefacts for Gamini as carvings are for his 
brother, and just as much an encoded text to be deciphered as they are for Anil. What 
difference does it make that the bodies with which he concerns himself are still alive, 
that the possibility for physical repair might remain? For all three of them, Anil and the 
brothers, truth waits to be discerned—to be read using the techniques of their 
profession. These are techniques of professional touch to be precise. What is written on 
the body is the sign of the truth that has happened to the body, a truth which has been 
inflicted, exacted, carved into, inscribed or authored by someone else. Those with the 
professional touch read these signs with their fingers, looking for the truth behind them. 
However, Anil’s Ghost places this hermeneutical approach to seeking the truth beside 
other narrative elements which critique and destabilise its certainty. The truthful witness 
of bodies which Anil and Sarath seek is problematised by the slippage and erosion of 
the past, by the physical erosion of evidence and the instability of memory. Their 
precise, scientific touch upon their body of evidence stands alongside the different truth 
which emerges from the artist Ananda‘s personal reconstruction of the skeleton‘s head. 
The medical reading of Gamini questions the work of Sarath and Anil but in turn is 
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  Considering n. 34 above, Ondaatje‘s deconstruction of Gamini‘s seeming humanitarianism might also 
give Caputo‘s readers pause. Is heeding the call of obligation enough? As Gamini shows outward 
signs of response to obligation may not demonstrate an actual vulnerability of oneself to another. 
More than action, some relationship is needed, and this is not guaranteed. Yet, perhaps responding to 
obligation allows for the possibility for the defences of the stoniest, most guarded of hearts to 
crumble. 
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questioned by Gamini‘s distance and inability to recognise the particular human stories 
of the victims of violence whom he treats. The novel as a whole provides a constellation 
of readings which refuse any claim that one specific gaze possesses the truth. As the 
plot unfolds, finding truth becomes increasingly complicated. When Anil and Sarath 
succeed in identifying the skeleton they find and learn what happened to the man, their 
project unravels; political forces end their partnership and all the scientific evidence 
which Anil has gathered is ignored. Technique alone cannot withstand the oppressive 
violence which acts to diminish social humanity. 
 
A Truthfulness of Touching Bodies 
 
Still, although Anil’s Ghost subverts the certainty of the truthful witness of 
bodies as read by the professional, technical touch, that is not the only type of touch that 
the novel portrays. Intertwined with the technical touch are instances of a more personal 
touch which provides a relational reading of bodies. The flux of touching, the way 
contact unfolds over time: this fluidity of the body in relationship defines a personal 
truth—not a truth that is necessarily subjective and hence unreliable, but a truth that 
radiates from the entirety of a person‘s being. This personal truth is read in relationship, 
defined by the ways that the edges of one person meet those of another.
42
 In Anil’s 
Ghost, Ondaatje presents a body‘s truthful witness in the way it contacts other bodies. 
The outline of meetings of flesh-and-bone persons incorporates the shape of the story. 
This witness remains a palpable if fluid truth. It is performative. The characters 
enact truth, and the descriptions of their touching become the witnesses which define 
meaning in the story. While the technical touch strives to read a body, construing that 
body as an instrument to find truth, the personal touch proclaims a participation of 
bodies in the witness that they give: the bodies themselves are the truth. When all the 
techniques for reading and interpreting truth are not enough, the touch itself remains. 
This does not mean that no ‗reading‘ or interpretation of the body occurs, only that the 
                                                                                                                                               
42
  See CC 66-74, on the personal nature of touch, which he argues involves the intimation of ‗relational 
difference‘ in a way that corporeal boundaries do not just come into contact but that a person reaches 
across those boundaries, affirming the existence of the other‘s individual self. Ward‘s discussion 
includes a critique of Merleau-Ponty for not realising that touching one‘s own body brings no 
intimation. Ward‘s discussion of touch here, beginning with the healing touch of Jesus, is quite 
comprehensive in its focus of the positive, generous aspects of touch in making people present to one 
another. For a different take on touch, see Gabriel Josipovici, Touch. 
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witness which is being portrayed by the touch is not reducible to the knowledge which 
is gained from a reading of the marks inscribed on one body or another. The witness is 
more descriptive than prescriptive, but not only descriptive, for the touch prescribes 
itself—touch circumscribes a body, and to circumscribe a form is also to construct it. 
The personal touch orients a relationship to the world, and connotes the nature of that 
relationship. 
Yet, as Ondaatje spins his tale, he refuses a simple finality even to this answer. 
The incidents of touch in the novel reflect life in all of its chaotic messiness; that is, the 
touch depicted is not one-dimensionally good.
43
 Ondaatje does not present touch as 
always being creative, constructive, helpful and nurturing. For instance, the plotline 
recounting the story of Anil‘s affair with the married Cullis reveals that the relationship 
ended in a desert motel room when he refused to let her go and she stabbed him in the 
arm with a knife.
44
 That contact sums up all the secret intimacy of their relationship, the 
souring of joy, and the unhealthy nature of their hold on each other. This glimpse at the 
intimate history of a protagonist also echoes the violence which reverberates throughout 
the novel‘s landscape. For most of the novel, the protagonists deal with the 
consequences of violence, with reading the wounds on the body. However, this builds to 
the one direct description of an act of violence as part of Sri Lanka‘s civil war, the 
suicide bombing in Colombo that killed the country‘s president. Here the touch of one 
body upon another defines the ultimate move of desiring power over the other: the 
obliteration of all definition, the annihilation of bodies. As Ondaatje describes it, 
because of security, the bomber 
had to approach [the president] in a public place, with all the 
paraphernalia of devastation sewn onto himself. He was not just the 
weapon but the aimer of it. The bomb would destroy whomever he was 
facing. His own eyes and frame were the cross-hairs.
45
 
                                                                                                                                               
43
  Along with Caputo‘s presentation of touch in ‗Jewgreek Bodies‘, Against Ethics, the potential 
negativity of touch in Anil’s Ghost is very different from most theologians and phenomenologists of 
touch, e.g. Ward, who seems only to skirt the violent possibilities of touch. When Ward does discuss 
negative possibilities involved with touch, he concentrates on the fact that distance is not always 
bridged by intimacy, and on the fear that one might either be absorbed by the other or not integrated. 
There is little mention of any touch which might be bodily destructive, suggesting that the discussion 
mainly remains at the level of the ideal, while Ondaatje strives to evoke complexity. 
44
  AG 100-1. 
45
  AG 293-4. 
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Here is the intimacy of violence, an orientation of the body towards another for the 
express purpose of a touch which obliterates. For the bomber, all is concentrated in 
direction, like the force of an arrow heading to its target; he has no other answer to the 
truth, whatever his truth might be. To a certain extent, this contact represents the 
ultimate failure of the professional touch‘s hermeneutical search for truth, for there will 
not be enough remains to read. The writing on the body in this case totally overwrites 
the page so that all is marked, all incised, and no surface survives. But, of course, the 
novel does not end there.
46
 
In the face of violence, there is another type of touch which Anil’s Ghost 
catalogues. Beginning with the woman sitting in a grave in Guatemala, the image of 
familial tenderness recurs constantly. A mother holds a child, a brother tends a brother. 
Sarath recalls a rock carving of ‗a single line depicting a woman‘s back bent over a 
child‘.47 The carving records tenderness in stone, yet the timbre of this tenderness 
remains ambiguous. Sarath 
remembered how they had stood before it in the flickering light, 
Palipana‘s arm following the line of the mother‘s back bowed in 
affection or grief. An unseen child. All the gestures of motherhood 
harnessed. A muffled scream in her posture.
48
 
The strength of the carved line lies in the emotions which it conveys, but the specificity 
of those emotions is either hidden or indistinguishable. That is, grief and love wind 
around one another: it is love that enables grief at an absence, while great grief signifies 
great love for the one who has been lost. Because of this ambiguity, the artwork can 
evoke joy and sorrow, perhaps even simultaneously. Just as the carving encapsulates a 
relationship between mother and child, the image of familial tenderness encapsulates 
the complexity of touch in Ondaatje‘s novel. This leaves much for the reader to decide. 
                                                                                                                                               
46
  It is not only that there are nurturing touches and destructive ones, though: that is too black-and-white. 
There are also depictions of touch that is ineffectual in the face of the breakdown or limitations of the 
body. For example, the reader learns at interludes of the fading of Anil‘s relationship with the woman 
Leaf, eventually discovering that their pulling apart comes from Leaf‘s personal disintegration as 
Alzheimer‘s destroys her memory. Here no amount of touch can undo the loss done to the body; the 
distance between friends can only grow ever larger. This ebbing away of meaning from touch is 
depicted as being just as bad as sudden violence. 
47
  AG 156. 
48
  AG 157. 
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In the grief of love depicted by the image of contact between characters, which demands 
a stronger hearing, the grief or the love? Can you even have one without the other?
49
 
Three particular scenes of touching in Anil’s Ghost exemplify these questions: 
Ananda‘s tenderness towards Anil when she is weeping at the realisation of his loss; the 
pietà scene between the brothers, Sarath and Gamini; the painting of the Buddha‘s eyes, 
ending with that touch of concern from the nephew to Ananda—this sweet touch from 
the world.
50
 All of these are demonstrations of love wrapped up in grief; yet they may 
also be read the other way around, as demonstrations of grief wrapped up in love. 
Indeed, they turn inside-out constantly. Anil‘s tears flow because she has learned that 
Ananda‘s wife is among the disappeared; she had been sceptical of him, scornful of his 
ability to reconstruct the head, disdainful of his drunkenness, but all of this falls away 
and cracks open her heart as she wanders too close to his grief. She cries finally for the 
pain of all the mourners of her homeland, and it is one of them who turns to console her: 
‗He moved two steps forward and with his thumb creased away the pain around her 
eyes along with her tears‘ wetness‘.51 So grief responds to grief, producing a kindness, a 
moment of love. Gamini‘s caring pours out of him at the sight of his brother‘s body, his 
brother killed presumably by shadowy forces of authority that did not like the way he 
helped an expatriate anthropologist. Faced with Sarath‘s still form in the morgue, the 
doctor does the only thing he knows: ‗He could heal his brother, set the left leg, deal 
with every wound as if he were alive, as if treating the hundred small traumas would 
eventually bring him back into his life‘.52 Yet this seemingly ineffectual touch speaks 
                                                                                                                                               
49
 Cf. SD 63: ‗To love as if we‘d choose/ even the grief‘. This also indicates limitations in Caputo‘s 
construal of true fleshly bodies. Against the active, agent bodies of philosophers, Caputo offers 
jewgreek bodies of flesh, bodies which are smelly, suffering, broken, confused, lost in chaos, 
encumbering, disintegrating, etc. They are everything that the ideally whole, active bodies are not—
and that is the problem. Caputo‘s jewgreek bodies are the extreme examples of flesh-and-blood 
unruliness, and only in the sense of pain and physical suffering. He downplays the pleasures of the 
body, joys and desires; more than this, he does such things as listing ‗genital smells‘ in connection 
with ‗the odors of disease and death‘ (Against Ethics, 204). Even though he avers that the flesh is also 
the site of ‗carnival and carnal joy‘, almost all of the examples Caputo uses to delineate flesh are 
decidedly negative. Much of this is probably a matter of rhetorical choice in an attempt to persuade 
readers. However, it still presents only part of the reality of the flesh. What is missing is what can be 
seen in Anil’s Ghost and in Michaels‘s poem: the presence of tenderness, the mixture of love and grief 
which coincide with one another. Caputo‘s jewgreek bodies, in their own way, are as one-dimensional 
as the bodies he criticises, and unwittingly uphold a binary construction which places degeneracy and 
deterioration with flesh, and gives little room for an embrace, a kiss, or a caress. 
50
  AG 186-7, 287-90, 305-7. 
51
  AG 187. 
52
  AG 287. 
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the intimacy of brothers in the immediacy of loss. Lastly, Ananda returns to his ritual 
role as a painter of the eyes of the Buddha; he hangs above the world, looking out and 
into a mirror, painting the eyes on the great statue. Ananda sees the land from above, 
sees patterns of wind and weather, of living creatures, all the conflict and struggle 
minimised in distance. It is ‗a seduction‘ as he sees the birds, the ‗tiniest of hearts in 
them beating exhausted and fast, the way Sirissa [his wife] had died in the story he 
invented for her in the vacuum of her disappearance. A small brave heart‘.53 He had 
lived with his loss by imagining the possible peacefulness of his wife‘s death, a 
courageous beauty made mythical, transformed. But his nephew‘s touch—a simple 
touch of concern upon Ananda‘s hand—brings the artist back to earth, to the rich depth 
of love and grief making and supporting the fullness of one another. 
In all of these passages, one reading gives way to another. When Anil breaks 
down in Ananda‘s grief, she has been in the midst of judging his reconstruction of the 
head in her forensic terms. She has ‗felt that she knew every physical aspect about 
Sailor‘, that by reading his life from his bones she has known him, but the liveliness of 
the sculpted head catches her off-guard.
54
 The simple question of whether the head is a 
good reconstruction or not, whether it exhibits a fact, no longer suffices. Instead, the 
head becomes a word about the loss that is inflicted on people when loved ones have 
been torn from them.
55
 In the morgue, Gamini tries desperately to read his brother like 
any wounded patient presented to him. He reads childhood scars (which is how he has 
identified his brother‘s body from a photograph) and remembers the stories behind 
them; he reads what his brother‘s killers have done to him.56 Yet all the clinical 
deciphering keeps leading him to the irreducibility of his brother‘s death, leading him 
                                                                                                                                               
53
  AG 307. 
54
  AG 183-4. 
55
  When Sarath asked Anil for whom she was weeping, she replied, ‗Ananda, Sailor, their lovers. Your 
brother working himself to death.‘ She was suddenly faced with the ‗mad logic‘ of it all, and how 
there was ‗no resolving‘ (AG 184). For all that she seems to have acknowledged the shortcomings of 
her technical, forensic hermeneutic, to be confronted by the awfulness of human vulnerability was still 
an affront. At that moment she read the signs left on the world not as markers towards truth but as 
evocative of truth in their own sadness. 
56
  Among other things, Gamini thought of ‗the gash of a scar on the side of your elbow you got crashing 
a bike on the Kandy Hill‘, responding to his brother as he attended his body (AG 287). He thought of 
how torturers seek out their victims‘ vanities—and so broke the hands of an archaeologist (AG 289-
90).  
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not to the body of a patient but to his own brother, to their relationship which, though 
never easy, is still the relationship of family. At that instant 
Sarath‘s chest said everything. It was what Gamini had fought against. 
But now this body lay on the bed undefended. It was what it was. No 




The body is no longer a cipher for something else, for a truth to be sought elsewhere; 
the simple presence and absence of Sarath thwarts Gamini‘s normal attempt to distance 
himself by means of a technical touch. 
The situation in the passage at the end of the novel with Ananda and his nephew 
works slightly differently. For one thing, his technical touch is not quite the analytical 
tool for reading as that employed by either Anil or Gamini (or Sarath, for that matter): 
his touch and its reading are those of a craftsperson. As Ananda oversees the 
reconstruction of a dynamited statue of the Buddha, he reads the stone fragments like a 
giant jigsaw puzzle, his touch the artistry of putting pieces in place.
58
 The goal is the 
artefact, and less what the artefact says. Much of this is also a technical reading—based 
on the techniques needed to knit the stones together again—as is Ananda‘s approach to 
the painting of the eyes on the new statue of the Buddha: only the latter is a technical 
approach to religion, ritual and tradition, as shown, for example, in the way it is 
mentioned that Ananda had taken the time the previous day to climb the ladder up 
against the statue and figure out the most comfortable position for his work.
59
 However, 
the technical craft involved in Ananda‘s artistic touch goes further as it puts him in 
position for the seductive gaze mentioned earlier. Up there, following the sightlines of 
the Buddha, the temptation is to move from a technical touch towards a totalising, 
technical vision, objectifying everything and everyone in view.
60
 However, his 
nephew‘s touch grounds him again, reminding the reader (and Ananda, perhaps) of the 
                                                                                                                                               
57
  AG 289. 
58
  AG 301-4. 
59
  AG 305. 
60
  Compare Donna Haraway‘s discussion of ‗infinite vision‘ and the ‗conquering gaze from nowhere‘ in 
‗Situated Knowledges‘, FST. Haraway critiques the infinitely empirical, infinitely objective view that 
pretends to have transcended its body and not to be seeing with an eye, for this is a view which 
distances the perceiver from whom and what they are perceiving. Such a theoretical construction of 
vision lends easily enough to becoming a tool of domination, a way to see over other people. Ondaatje 
here reminds us that such distance is also dangerous for the one who sees: in itself it is a loss of 
perspective and a false vision which does not allow you to connect with others and truly live. 
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creative and relational aspects that go with the technical ones: a different way to read 
the world. 
Because it is not that the new way of reading—the alternative hermeneutic—
annuls what comes before it. The technical touch remains; there is still a place for 
reading the witness of bodies, whether those bodies be bones or stones. What 
Ondaatje‘s novel implies, however, is that this technical reading is not all that exists; it 
does not hold all the truth. Indeed, much of the truth lies in the space between, in the 
unquantifiable intention and attention of touch between human beings. Without that, the 
other‘s witness—or the other‘s attempt at a truthful witness—can be misleading or 
incomplete. Any attempt at a definitive truth remains partial, yet the attempt must still 
be made. One might say that Anil’s Ghost ends with a turn from strictly truthful witness 
to faithful witness, and not just the witness that bodies give, but a witness to the body 
itself, a witness to embodied life, humanity, personhood, relation. Here is a breaking 
down of witness, of the ‗knowing eye‘; here is the presentation of the instability of the 
simple reading-as-finding of truth to a participation in witness, the irreducibility not just 
of the body but of the connections between bodies, of the location of one‘s body in 
relation to other bodies. Here is a reading-as-making (and expressing) of the truth. 
 The technical touch focuses on what has been written, on the truth that can be 
deciphered from the marks and signs, the former touches which have left their traces on 
the body. It is all about the interpretation of what has been received. However, even the 
touch that reads not only receives but also gives. Ondaatje presents a touch that writes 
and creates as well as reads. When Anil is comforted by Ananda, she has the impression 
that his hand ‗kneaded the skin of that imploded tension of weeping as if hers too was a 
face being sculpted‘.61 When the narrator tells of the scene of the two Diyasena 
brothers, it is written that  
this was a pietà between brothers. And all Gamini knew in his slow, 
scrambled state was that this would be the end or it could be the 
beginning of a permanent conversation with Sarath. If he did not talk to 




And Ananda‘s nephew‘s touch at the end is in the context of the two statues, the new 
Buddha and the old, reconstituted one which Ananda ‗had helped knit together from 
                                                                                                                                               
61
  AG 187. 
62
  AG 288. 
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damaged stone, a statue that was no longer a god, that no longer had its graceful line but 
only the pure sad glance Ananda had found‘.63 In the poignant realm of deepest feeling, 
of grief and love, of grief made possible by love and love demonstrated in grief, the 
moment of touch provides a moment of possibility. Not a possibility that undoes what 
has happened, that is capable of reversing tragedy, no, never that; but the moment of 
touch impresses a connection from one to another. The moment of touch is a moment of 
writing, of sharing fragments. Instead of only finding the truth, of discerning and 
interpreting truth, bodies here reach across unfathomable gulfs to make truth. They are 
faithful to the fragility of one another, to the vulnerability of existence and the insight 
that only in entering that fragility and vulnerability can possibility remain. 
Though mutuality is important here, this is not a straightforward dialectic, not 
simply an exchange that is giving and receiving. It is not a question of two rival 
hermeneutics in total opposition to one another, each striving to supersede the other. 
Ondaatje presents neither a resolved clash of hermeneutical visions nor an everlasting 
conflict. Note that the two statues at the end of the book do not square off against each 
other, but rather they both gaze north together while standing at a remove from one 
another.
64
 Sharing a common direction, both kinds of touch support one another in their 
interpretative work of outlining bodies and their stories, of pointing to the complexities 
of persons by showing them in contact with others. Overall, this is an hermeneutic that 
does not negate any reading, or raise one over another, but intertwines them like strands 
in a rope, not only strengthening one another, but making each other possible. And it is 
a neverending process, for the strands in this rope are not limited to the novel‘s 
characters and plot twists, but include the readers, who are forced to interpret the 
direction of the narrative arc, to become part of the story themselves, participating as 
first one strand, then another takes prominence, first one strand, then another 
submerges, not to disappear but to hold up what has emerged.
65
 
                                                                                                                                               
63
  AG 307. 
64
  AG 306-7. 
65
  In ‗―A Flame against a Sleeping Lake of Petrol‖: Form and Sympathetic Witness in Selvadurai‘s 
Funny Boy and Ondaatje‘s Anil’s Ghost‘, Patricia P. Chu also speaks of different hermeneutics, 
though she calls them responses, ‗readerly‘ or ‗writerly‘. She also points to many of the same 
passages that I do. However, Chu makes more of the dialectical opposition between the two and less 
of their necessary support for each other. Chu has it that the two Buddhas will gaze at each other, that 
the writerly, the pure, sad, and human renews the characters at the end. This renewal may indeed be 
the case (and I would choose to imagine it so) but the novel reaches farther and deeper than that, and 
refuses any simplicity. 
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Tension, tendency, attending, intending, tenderness: the connection of all of 
these becomes no accident in Anil’s Ghost. Though Sarath and Anil, among others, seek 
out the hardness of what remains solid and truthful, it is softness, the flesh that gives 
shape to bones, which stays with us. This softness holds both vulnerability and 
fondness, both that which is a sore spot and that which makes life worth living. 
Tenderness means carrying ghosts with you, carrying responsibility as a marker in your 
flesh, as part of your body. But the ghosts, together with the tales of touching, of 
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odies linger. 
The feel of another person dances on your skin, where you touched him, where 
she touched you. You carry the moments of contact, sometimes of tenderness, 
sometimes of menace, sometimes of indifference. But the ghosts of the flesh tend to 
you. They impress themselves upon you, layer upon layer, moulding the contours of 
your world. 
By the end of Ondaatje‘s novel, the ghosts of Anil Tissera have evaded the 
closure of the professional, technical touch. The people she has left behind, the vision of 
the truthful witness of bodies, the dead who speak her grief, memories of contact: all 
swirl around her and others, binding them, making them participate in what is personal. 
Bodies linger, teaching and learning the intimacy of the particularities of matter, of the 
intimate touch that matters, the stories remaining to be cherished. Even fragmentary 
remnants relate presence. What the theologies I explored neglected to see: to take 
bodies seriously is to discern precisely how they are at hand to one another. 
Still, for bodies to relate requires more than just touch; they need position, the 
place of their proximity. This, too, the theologians I have looked at largely ignore; for 
them, locations are mainly starting points from which they set off in their quests for 
meaning, and so are soon left behind. But bodies in relationship are located 
contextually. Anil, Sarath, Gamini, Ananda and others relate the way they do because of 
their ties to Sri Lanka and its history; their bodies are tuned by the place, marked by all 
that happens around them. The specifics make the land important, not the generalities. 
But just as the place and its story inscribe them, they also leave their trace on the land. 
They intimate their embodiment to the earth, shaping the landscape in turn. Thus, beside 
the touch of personal concern, the body may also be discerned in the tale of its presence 







Jane Urquhart‘s A Map of Glass  
and  
Intimate Geographies
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And this, essentially is what maps give us, reality, a reality that exceeds 
our vision, our reach, the span of our days, a reality we achieve no other 
way. We are always mapping the invisible or the unattainable or the 
erasable, the future or the past, the whatever-is-not-here-present-to-our-
senses-now and, through the gift that the map gives us, transmuting it 
into everything it is not…into the real.1 
 
his is the power that maps have: with them, we mark out the emplacement 
and displacement of people and objects, connecting stories, bodies, 
landscapes and memory. We use maps to give shape to our experience; with 
cartography we turn the world into landscapes, the earth into an ordered, sensible 
image. The maps we make go beyond city plans and road atlases, becoming a graphic 
field for recording multiple complicated relationships. A map, then, is interactive: it has 
to be read, interpreted. To read the map is to change it, add to it, subtly shift its 
meanings; to read the map is also to interact with others who are reading. Participants 
write on each other, and are written upon. Through mapping, they construct the reality 
of their bodies in the world. 
But bodies are not just objects on maps. If the map-readers who join together to 
write and draw maps of their worlds are drawing upon one another, bodies transform 
from being subjects of maps to becoming maps themselves. This is the image which 
appears in Jane Urquhart‘s novel A Map of Glass, which offers a writer‘s image of 
mapping the world that its characters and readers inhabit, tracing bodies in their 
relationship with one another.
2
 When Urquhart examines the complex interactions 
between maps of landscape and maps of human relationships, she presents bodies as the 
maps that people read in their tentative quests to know one another and themselves. 
Even as the locations of people are worked out through the tracing of bodies‘ 
relationships in the world, the bodies themselves are also traced, or marked, by their 
proximity to one another. Bodies are touched into understanding, but that touch leaves 
its own marks—traces are inscribed, and every writing on the body, of the body, is a 
writing over. These body-maps are fragile—their fabric can fray or be whittled away to 
                                                                                                                                               
1
  Denis Wood with John Fels, The Power of Maps 4. 
2
  I am being quite precise when I talk about ‗a writer‘s image of mapping‘. As far as I know, Jane 
Urquhart is not a trained geographer, and neither am I. While I touch tangentially upon mapping as the 
discipline of geography might understand it, this is to throw light upon a literary use. This image of 
mapping is not necessarily the same as what geographers and cartographers actually do when they 
map. 
t 
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whip-sharp edges—but bodies share this instability with other maps, whose meanings 
never remain as permanent as they first appear. Such instability allows meaning to grow 
as well as to fade. Just as mapping, being a hermeneutical exercise, multiplies 
meanings, so does the tracing and retracing of bodies. 
A Map of Glass begins in winter, with a man suffering from Alzheimer‘s disease 
attempting to reach his ancestral island home, only to fail and die on the ice. The book 
ends with the image of a toy boat sent off down the river, past the same island, to the 
ocean, where the immense power of the waves destroys it. In between, the author 
explores the maps we make to chart the stasis and movement of bodies. The book 
comes to life in the space created by unresolved tensions: at one extreme is stasis, being 
fixed to the ground of your life in such a way that you are not free to roam, to explore; 
at the other is being out of place, drifting, lost without a home where you can anchor 
your own story. Both poles are places of death, yet the novel does not suggest any 
resolution for the tension. Instead, the stories told to the reader trace the spaces in 
between. These tracings have no end; they intricately tie the questions ‗Where am I?‘ 
and ‗Who am I?‘ to ‗Where are you?‘ and ‗Who are you?‘, and from these draw 
potential for life and hope. In A Map of Glass, the possibilities that live in our stories of 
loves and losses become the tracings that we leave behind. These traces of what and 
whom we hold dear may be almost imperceptible, but are also extremely volatile, 
simultaneously capable of creativity and destructiveness. Still, tracing the lines of 
intimacies, and then retracing them by narrating their stories, creates something new, 
augmenting the possibilities of the world.  
This chapter uses the lens provided by Jane Urquhart‘s A Map of Glass to 
explore bodies and stories as tactile maps. Following a discussion of the general 
structure of the novel, I examine the symbolic implications of the three-dimensional 
maps which one of the protagonists, Sylvia, makes for a blind friend. I examine maps as 
symbolic fabrics, laden with signs which refer both to their own textuality and to the 
world outside their borders, and reflect upon what the lines traced between characters 
create. Then, I attend to the destructive potential of these things: the fragile connections 
which can shatter, leaving shards whose jagged edges make the traces of intimacies cuts 
and wounds. The chapter ends with a look at the possibilities for the readers of tactile 
maps of glass to pick up these fragments, attempting to piece them back together again. 
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The Structure of A Map of Glass 
 
Urquhart‘s novel centres on Sylvia, the lover of the man who dies from 
Alzheimer‘s, and her communication with Jerome, the artist who found her lover‘s 
body. The book has three parts. The first part, ‗The Revelations‘, introduces the two 
protagonists, narrating their individual stories and the way they come together when 
Sylvia leaves home to find Jerome without informing her husband. The story Sylvia 
tells of her love affair is also the story of her life, of her lover‘s family and its 
connection to the land, and of the love affair‘s connection with landscape. From the 
beginning we find that the dying man, Andrew, has a connection with geography; the 
last few words that stick in his memory are of topography.
3
 The reader later learns that 
Andrew was an historical geographer, occupied with such tasks as ‗mapping the scant 
foundations of houses abandoned by vanished settlers‘.4 Geographical and cartographic 
language intertwines with the story of Sylvia‘s lost love, unfolding among the 
flashbacks, giving form to the memories. Meanwhile, Jerome is struggling with his own 
past, with the trauma of discovering a dead body and his childhood memories. 
The second part, ‗The Bog Commissioners‘, is Andrew‘s story of the previous 
four generations of his family, the Woodmans, written in notebooks Sylvia lends to 
Jerome. This is also the tale of Timber Island, which became the family home after they 
immigrated from Britain. The island housed Andrew‘s great-great-grandfather Joseph‘s 
shipbuilding and timber-exporting empire, but the title of the section of the novel refers 
to Joseph‘s previous job in the British Isles, as a member of a Crown commission to 
investigate and report on the condition of bogs in Ireland.
5
 While doing that job, Joseph 
had conceived of a massive plan to drain the bogs, producing rich agricultural land to 
feed the people of Ireland. The British Government dismissed this outright, leading 
Joseph to leave in a huff to start a new life in the colonies. The big dream of altering 
landscapes, as well as concomitant regret over what was lost, haunts the story of the 
Woodmans, with devastating and surprising consequences. 
                                                                                                                                               
3
  MG 1-4. 
4
  MG 38. 
5
  MG 154. 
 | 152 
 
The eponymous third part of the book returns to Jerome and Sylvia, who has 
been located by her husband. The story focuses on the last meeting of the bereft lover 
and the artist, the end of Sylvia‘s narration, after Jerome and his girlfriend, Mira, have 
read the Woodman notebooks. Sylvia relates what she knows of Andrew‘s final days, 
and Jerome is at last spurred to reveal the secrets of his own past. 
The structure of the book functions as a map in two ways. First, the middle 
story-within-a-story constructs a narrative map for the characters and the plot. In the 
opening section, Sylvia orients her own narrative by reference to her dead lover‘s 
family history, pointing toward it with hints and quotes; in the last part of the novel, the 
action is anchored in the shape and imagery of the Woodman story.
6
 Second, all three 
parts are tied together through recurring symbolic imagery. For instance, one version of 
a sixteenth-century painting by Joachim Patinir, St. Jerome in the Wilderness, appears 
as a poster Mira has given Jerome; the same artist‘s work also leads to Andrew‘s great-
grandfather Branwell‘s obsession with murals of landscapes throughout ‗The Bog 
Commissioners‘.7 Such imagery links the narrative chronology of Sylvia and Jerome to 
the longer history of the Woodmans, and also constructs a map for the reader, with 
traces of meaning to follow like cartographic symbols, like the blue line representing a 




                                                                                                                                               
6
  Sylvia‘s orientation toward the journals becomes most explicit near the end of ‗The Revelations‘, after 
she has given them to Jerome to read. She runs over quotes from the story in her mind, and recalls her 
habitual nocturnal perusal of the notebooks: ‗And then, the following day, when she was alone, Sylvia 
would say certain sentences aloud, knowing that by doing so she could evoke a scene quite different 
than the one in which she stood or walked, could make her own kitchen disappear, for instance, and 
cause the shadow of a barn door on sandy ground, the glint of lake, leaves twisting in a breeze appear 
in its place‘ (MG 139-40). In the third part, reading the journals appears as a focused activity for 
Jerome and Mira (299-304, 319-24), and speculative continuation of the journals‘ story which Sylvia 
writes becomes her final words to Jerome, as well as the novel‘s climax (364-9). 
7
  See MG 25, for the first description of the poster, and 163-5 for Branwell‘s description of the painting 
he saw in the Louvre. In the third part, Sylvia‘s husband looks at the poster and asks Jerome if that 
was one of his pieces (355), and Sylvia refers to the ‗turquoise landscape that [Branwell] had  carried 
with him for most of his life‘ during her continuation of the family story (366). While the painting 
represents the artistic goal of Branwell, it also is emblematic of Jerome‘s story, not only because of 
the name of the saint, but because of his struggles with interior and exterior wildernesses as well. Like 
St. Jerome and his lion, Jerome the artist makes friends with a feral cat, who follows him home (24-8). 
In the third part, after hearing stories of Hindu gods, Jerome reflects that he himself is ‗far from 
godlike‘ but ‗resembled more a tattered, starved saint: thin, almost defeated, trudging back from the 
wilderness‘ (304). 




In A Map of Glass, Sylvia‘s story is complicated by the fact that she may or may 
not have an autism-spectrum disorder.
8
 She finds human interaction difficult, but has an 
eye for the details of objects and locations. This allows her to befriend Julia, a blind 
woman for whom she makes tactile maps of the county in which they live. 
―She‘s blind,‖ Sylvia explained [to Jerome], ―but touching a map is one 
of the ways she is able to see. I didn‘t think I could do it at first, didn‘t 
think I could translate landscape into texture on a board. But then I know 
the County so well; I suppose that made it easier.‖9 
Sylvia presents what she knows and loves of her home as maps made out of a variety of 
materials—everything from fabric to wood—which symbolise varieties of terrain. The 
symbolism must be very exact, not just portraying ‗water‘ but water that can be rough, 
not just a beach but one ‗filled with small, smooth stones‘.10 This is because Julia ‗not 
only wanted to know how to get to a place…she wanted to be able to see what was in 
the vicinity‘.11 Using her imagination, Julia could experience the world through touch. 
When Sylvia tells her friend that ‗she knew a man whose profession allowed 
him to explore not only geological phenomena but also the traces of human activity that 
were left behind on the textured surface of the earth,‘ Julia comments that ‗the whole 
world is a kind of Braille‘.12 Note that Julia‘s association of exploration with a reading 
and writing system specifically involves tangible human traces: we human beings not 
only read the earth‘s story from the stones, but also write our own story in the dust. Of 
Andrew, Sylvia says that ‗He claimed that everywhere he went he found evidence of the 
behaviour of his forebears: rail fences, limestone foundations, lilac bushes blooming on 
otherwise abandoned farmsteads, an arcade of trees leading to a house that is no longer 
                                                                                                                                               
8
  This is mainly referred to as Sylvia‘s ‗condition‘, and once as her ‗disability‘ (88). 
9
  MG 123-4. 
10
  MG 68 and 146. 
11
  MG 69. 
12
  MG 68. 
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there.‘13 These are ‗remnants‘ and the ‗sad refuse‘ of lives lived, but still they remain; 
they have been written upon the world and so become material memory.
14
 
The image of tactile maps, of reading and writing by touch on the landscape, 
extends far beyond those maps produced on boards or paper; the characters of the novel, 
their bodies and relationships, become tactile maps for one. This is true of Jerome—his 
relationship with Mira, his memories of his parents—but Sylvia‘s life provides the most 
explicit examples. Sylvia talks about how her affair with Andrew ‗opened the door of 
the world for her‘, let her experience what she had never known before.15 Replete with 
her memories of intimacies, Sylvia implies that touch and caress draw the boundaries 
that remap and thus remake her existence. The narrator says that Sylvia ‗had never told 
Andrew how touch, until him, had been a catastrophe for her, how having leapt over the 
hurdle of touch, he would then become a part of her‘.16 Bodies connect to landscape in 
passage after passage: for example, Sylvia speaks of ‗the sense that while we held each 
other we were, in turn, being held by the rocks and trees we could see from the windows 
and the creeks and springs we could sometimes hear running through the valley‘.17 The 
                                                                                                                                               
13
  MG 96-7. 
14
  MG 97. Another aspect of this is Urquhart‘s portraying human interpretations of landscape as 
marking the earth and shaping our narratives. One of the prime examples of this is Timber Island. The 
island‘s character derives from its location at the end of Lake Ontario and the beginning of the St. 
Lawrence River; ‗The Bog Commissioners‘ opens by describing how the workers inhabiting the 
island divided between those who believed the island was in the lake and those who believed it was 
part of the river, and how this division was influenced by language and nationality (153-4). Urquhart 
depicts Timber Island as a place of change, and particularly of decay and loss. Jerome is on the island 
to record the end of winter and the revelations that come when the snow melts (hence the name of the 
first part), observing signs of long-gone human life, such as an old grave marker, before he finds 
Andrew‘s body (11-31). The Woodman notebooks relate the end of the island‘s industry, but even in 
its heyday the island‘s products seem temporary, the wooden ships susceptible to treacherous coasts 
and dangerous storms—one of Branwell‘s sister Annabelle‘s favourite pastimes was painting images 
of smashing, sinking schooners (158)—and the rafts sent downriver become only ‗the most temporary 
of constructed worlds…engaged in the artificial evolutionary process that was thrust upon them‘ as 
they briefly became floating villages before being broken up at the ports where they were loaded into 
ships destined for Europe (198-9). An island‘s containedness makes it a good laboratory for 
experiments in imagination (cf. Shakespeare‘s The Tempest), but even more so Timber Island is 
always a body in flux, much like the human bodies Urquhart portrays. This depiction of the island 
recalls Judith Butler‘s observation at the beginning of Bodies that Matter: ‗Not only did bodies tend to 
indicate a world beyond themselves, but this movement beyond their own boundaries, a movement of 
boundary itself, appeared to be quite central to what bodies ―are‖‘ (ix). The isolation of the island is 
an illusion; it is constantly being acted upon by waves and ice, and it is connected to the world around 
it. Its identity is given to it through the interpretations of various people who light upon it—and, in 
turn, it effects change in the lives of those bodies which become contingent to its liminal location. 
15
  MG 117. 
16
  MG 38. 
17
  MG 339. 
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touching of flesh depicts a web of various levels of intimacy, but also extends beyond 
this to write relationships upon one‘s memory. The exception is Sylvia‘s relationship 
with her husband, Malcolm, who—the narrator often and expressly tells the reader—
never touches his wife‘s body, even when helping her with the clasp of a necklace.18 
One suspects that Malcolm, a doctor, thinks of Sylvia more as patient than wife; he has 
rejected her tactile map and can never be truly alive with her.
19
 
For Sylvia, living originates with memory; her tactile map is composed of 
remembered details from her clandestine meetings with Andrew. Rather than reading 
this map to learn of landscape, she scours the landscape for its record of her love. She 
holds onto a geography textbook not for what it might tell her about the earth but 
because of ‗the incised lines that would indicate that Andrew had marked a particular 
passage with his thumbnail‘, so that she could feel ‗this practically invisible, frail trace 
of him on the printed text‘.20 When he finally disappears, missing their last rendezvous, 
she takes his journals and notebooks away with her because ‗the ink on the page‘ was 
‗the last trace of his moving hand‘.21 Such texts help Sylvia remember Andrew‘s hands 
moving over another surface, over her skin, writing on her heart. 
Put together, such examples show the literary relationships of the novel tracing 
out a space within which people move and touch. One‘s body becomes familiar with 
another body not statically, but in the way they move towards and away from each 
other. Our tactile maps are formed by habit and routine, too, by recurrence in the 
movements by which we change our proximities, something that social geographer 
Kevin Hetherington notes, writing that ‗Whereas we enter our houses through the front 
door, we enter our homes through our slippers‘.22 Our experiences of a space are 
constructed from the feelings that accumulate with our presence in that space. We locate 
ourselves by touch. Yes, that touch is fragmentary—as Hetherington notes, it is ‗local, 
specific, incomplete, multiple, personal, erroneous perhaps‘—but deep connection 
                                                                                                                                               
18
  MG 314. 
19
  This ignoring of the body-as-map does not extend as far as the medical profession itself. Indeed, in 
one instance, Sylvia thinks of the textbooks in her husband‘s study, and she goes ‗to sleep comforted 
by the thought that someone, anyone, had taken the trouble to attend to a tragic alteration of the body, 
as if they had wanted to draw a map of its regions, then explore its territories‘ (317). 
20
  MG 92. 
21
  MG 347. 
22
  Kevin Hetherington, ‗Spacial textures: place, touch and praesentia‘ 1939. 
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comes from piecing together an interpretation of the world from the fragments with 
which we are presented.
23
 Although his article uses as examples the space created by the 
visually impaired navigating museum exhibits through touch, and the devotional space 
generated by human contact with religious relics, this creation of spatial understanding 
does not occur only with things.
24
 As we see with A Map of Glass, we also draw maps 
of human connection from the collection of our experiences with one another, the 
contact of bodies which each have their own perspectives. 
 
Bodies and Fracture 
 
In the book, Sylvia strives to learn as much as she can about her lover‘s last 
journey, examining maps to imagine what happened to his body, ‗to add some 
information to the long, sad message of Andrew‘s silence‘.25 She seeks to follow 
Andrew himself, who once told her that ‗there was always a mark left on a landscape by 
anyone who entered it‘.26 However, Sylvia discovers that this is not as easy as it might 
seem; the man who spent his life recording a vanishing past to reconstruct its landscape 
                                                                                                                                               
23
  Hetherington 1942. 
24
  The connection to saints‘ relics in Hetherington 1940-1, is especially interesting in light of the motif 
of St. Jerome/Jerome the artist in MG (see n. 7 above). Hetherington points to scholarship analysing 
how relics in their specifically situated shrines make present something (or someone) absent: the 
touching of objects which carry particular values and meanings invokes those values and meaning not 
just because of the objects, but because of the way they are arranged in a specific space. We can 
connect this to Urquhart‘s novel in that, for Jerome and St. Jerome as painted, the relic‘s praesentia 
are carried in the narrative; for Sylvia, the journals, notebooks and other texts which she has salvaged 
from her former meeting place with Andrew become relics which keep alive her memory of love. 
Hetherington also makes a passing reference to another theological connection by pointing to the 
Eucharist as doing something similar, though he takes this no further. I would develop this to argue 
that sacraments, too, make a tactile map: contact with physical elements set in a context of narrative 
and theological meaning shapes people, providing a way to see the world. At a very basic level, the 
physical elements of sacraments mediate between persons. One person applies the sign of water to 
another; one person shares a portion of bread, a cup of wine, with another: such actions map physical 
memory through the meeting of bodies. 
 In any case, Hetherington limits his argument to things and places, showing the way these connect to 
familiarity and the sense of being at home; I would expand this to other people in the touch of flesh to 
flesh, an intimacy also capable of giving the sense of being at home. This is complicated by the issue 
of intentionality or accident. During one scene in Urquhart‘s novel, when Sylvia is visiting Julia, 
Sylvia proclaims that she can infer no difference ‗between touch and collision‘, and Julia replies that 
‗There is being touched, and then there is touching, and attached to both of these things there is 
intention.‘ In response, Sylvia makes explicit the great hermeneutical question: ‗But how do you 
know for sure what is intended?‘ (MG 70). In part, the entirety of the novel is an exploration of that. 
25
  MG 348. 
26
  MG 326. 
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did not leave much of a trace of his own—certainly no trace of their affair, unknown to 
anyone but them.
27
 ‗Landscapes are unreliable‘, Sylvia muses; they ‗are subject to 
change‘.28 Sylvia thus realises one dark undercurrent of the exercise of mapmaking: 
while you attempt to represent the landscape, it continues shifting, however minutely, so 
that you are always only documenting a past.
29
 Thus, a map is the result of a violent 
attempt to arrest the earth, but it remains a phantom. At one point, Sylvia places maps 
alongside ‗objects‘ and ‗vanished children‘ in ‗the family of the dead‘.30 And though 
she had once found solace only in this past‘s family, after experiencing love and loss 
Sylvia admits 
I have not been close to many people, Jerome, but I know that once they 
leave us they become insubstantial, and no matter how we try we cannot 
hold them, we cannot reconstruct. The dead don‘t answer when we call 
them. The dead are not our friends.
31
 
The tactile maps—the bodies that we experience—are only fragments, never a 
possession of all the world.
32
 
The fragmentary nature of maps in the book is also reflected by the title‘s 
reference to Robert Smithson‘s artwork, The Map of Glass (a quote from the artist also 
serves as the book‘s epigraph).33 In 1969, Smithson created this piece by heaping 
broken glass in a field, then waiting for bright sunlight before 
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See Wood; Geoff King, Mapping Reality; and Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The Power of Projections, 
particularly the beginning but throughout, for various discussions of what maps do, and their political, 
social and historical power in representing and making territory. 
30
  MG 76. 
31
  MG 368. 
32
  Another example of this comes after Branwell‘s beloved wife dies, when he takes to praying her 
rosary, being ‗moved by the knowledge that his wife‘s fingers had travelled over the surface of the 
beads that his own fingers were touching now‘, only to find that ‗in the end, like all his other attempts 
to reach her now, this would become unsatisfying‘ so that eventually even the sight of the rosary 
became too painful for him to bear (279). 
33
  The quotation, from Smithson‘s Collected Writings, is ‗By drawing a diagram, a ground plan of a 
house, a street plan to the location of a site, or a topographic map, one draws a ―logical two 
dimensional picture.‖ A ―logical picture‖ differs from a natural or realistic picture in that it rarely 
looks like the thing it stands for‘. This draws attention to the devious nature of maps, and alerts the 
reader to the potential need for a high degree of suspicion. 




Intriguingly, Smithson refers to his Map of Glass as a map of Atlantis; 
describing the moment the light came out, he writes that  
A luciferous incest of light particles flashes into a brittle mass. A 
stagnant blaze sinks into the glassy map of a non-existent island. The 
sheets of glass leaning against each other allow the sunny flickers to 
slide down into hidden fractures of splintered shadow. The map is a 
series of ‗upheavals‘ and ‗collapses‘—a strata of unstable fragments is 
arrested by the friction of stability.
35
 
Smithson highlights the fragility of the ‗map‘ and how the sunlight brings out the 
appearance of effervescent transience. That Urquhart chose to allude to the work and the 
artist through her book‘s title, epigraph, and—as shall be seen—discussions in the body 
of the text could indicate several connotations: a desire to emphasise the elusive nature 
of the map; that Timber Island is like Atlantis, a place that inspires fantasies and 
utopias, whose history is associated with lost splendour, and whose story is 
reconstructed imaginatively; or that the world of the narrative is a delicate composition. 
The allusion carries a diffusion of meanings, just like Smithson‘s island of glass pieces. 
In the text of the novel, the sight of great slabs of ice during the spring breakup 
reminds the artist Jerome of Smithson‘s work. He recalls being attracted by ‗the 
brilliance and the feeling of danger in the piece: the shattering of experience and the 
sense of being cut, injured‘.36 He has the impression that ice piled on the shore is 
something of an artistic gift—until he finds Andrew Woodman encased in it. Much 
later, while talking to Sylvia, Jerome makes the connection again, pondering the 
possible reference of Smithson‘s title, saying: ‗I‘ve never known if he meant a map of 
the properties of glass, or if he was referring to a glass map, which would then be, of 
course, breakable‘.37 Perhaps, for Urquhart, the reference is to both: the properties 
might refer to how glass allows one to see through it but also reflects light, so that the 
novel shows how the maps we make provide a lens for seeing the world and a mirror for 
seeing ourselves; yet a map made of breakable glass implies the maps that we construct 
                                                                                                                                               
34
  For pictures of the artwork, see Elyse Goldberg, ―Robert Smithson: Photoworks: Hypothetical 
Continent—Map of Rroken [sic] Glass: Atlantis‖. For a description and another picture, see Robert 
Smithson, ‗Incidents of Mirror-Travel in the Yucatan‘, Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings 133 
n1 and 132 (second figure). 
35
  Smithson, ‗Mirror-Travel‘, 133 n1. 
36
  MG 18. 
37
  MG 337. 
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(tactile and otherwise) are unstable and fragile. They are as insubstantial as the dead and 
as ungraspable as memory.
38
 
Opposed to images of tactile maps as tools of discovery and world-construction 
are images of the pain involved when one person‘s imprint is inscribed on another‘s. 
Fingers and skin, Urquhart reminds us, do not simply receive information passively; 
they also cut. Touch ‗causes fracture‘.39 Sylvia thinks of ‗the risks two people took 
simply by being alone together in the same room. Murder, love, collision, caress, were 
they not all part of the same family?‘40 She herself had moved away from familiar 
things toward ‗tension and deceit and the growing knowledge of inevitable 
bereavement‘ and she did not know why.41 Jerome dreams of Smithson‘s Map of Glass 
reflecting broken, shattered fragments of his father in its shards.
42
 The ‗approach of 
someone significant in your life, a friend, a lover, an enemy‘ becomes like ‗lightning.‘43 
Sylvia has ‗scraped [her] memory like a glacier through [her] mind‘ trying to remember 
every detail, trying to remember the ‗when‘ of every storytelling time with her dead 
lover.
44
 She recalls that long before she lost him, she was walking through ‗the territory 
of aftermath‘, leading finally to an embrace already bereaved.45  ‗That,‘ she says,  
                                                                                                                                               
38
  If Urquhart read the note in Smithson‘s Collected Writings about The Map of Glass, she might also 
have read the end of the article on the same page, about art installations created at various sites in 
Mexico‘s Yucatan peninsula, of which art Smithson states all that is left is ‗memory-traces‘ and that 
‗Remembrances are but numbers on a map, vacant memories constellating the intangible terrains in 
deleted vicinities. It is the dimension of absence that remains to be found…. Yucatan is elsewhere‘ 
(Smithson, Collected Writings, 132-3). Similar comments could, it seems, be made of the novel‘s 
characters and their stories, which cannot bring back loved ones who are gone, or restore dear places 
that have been altered forever. If one considers the depiction of art within the novel, Smithson‘s words 
are comparable to the sentiment of the closing images of the second part, which describe the gradual 
destruction of Branwell‘s greatest mural: ‗Finally, the fractured wall paintings would be covered by 
no fewer than ten layers of paper flowers and paste [from wallpaper] and the landscape would be 
forgotten altogether. And, in the end, a tenant suffering from the effects of a particularly cold winter 
would punch a stovepipe hole into the wall above the fireplace in the upper west room, little knowing, 
as he did so, that he had completely destroyed Branwell Woodman‘s carefully rendered moon‘ (MG 
293). 
39
  MG 87. 
40
  MG 336. 
41
  MG 332. 
42
  MG 145. 
43
  MG 366. 
44
  MG 368. 
45
  MG 341. 
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was when I knew that emotionally he had fully entered me, and that 
from then on his grief would be my grief, his story my story, his 
enormous waves of feeling, my feeling. I had felt almost nothing until 
him, and now I would continue to carry all of the rage and terror and 
anguish that he would leave behind, that he would forget.
46
 
Her lover has been mapped upon her, not just in joy and the memories of pleasure but in 





Maps of Glass, Maps of Flesh 
 
For all of this, A Map of Glass also reminds us that the shards of aftermath may 
reflect tenderness along with brokenness. Although memories seem to reach for the 
ungraspable, and the novel tells stories of losses that seem total, the stories themselves 
remain: artistic compositions and loving renderings, bittersweet though they might be, 
maintain the traces of life in all its complexities. For example, in the second part, after 
the death of Joseph Woodman, Annabelle decides to organise his office; while doing 
this, she discovers maps he made while working for the bog commission in Ireland. All 
of her life, Annabelle‘s father had ranted over his time in Ireland, convinced the country 
and its people symbolised all that was chaotic, backward and troublesome, yet the maps 
that she found were beautiful, ‗drafted with such exquisite care they could only have 
been made with love‘.48 Annabelle was stunned by the riddle, wondering, 
How was it possible that her father could render the very landscape that 
had been the source of his humiliation with such meticulous affection? 
There was something wistful and tender about the maps, and Annabelle, 
strolling once again among them, began to understand that her father 
must have been bruised by experience or filled with longing at one time 
or another. None of this made any sense at all in the face of the tyrant he 
                                                                                                                                               
46
  MG 343-4. 
47
  This jagged-edged, fragmentary nature of maps may again be compared to sacraments. They, too, are 
maps of glass, holding their own peril. Some of this lies in the stories that they remember. Along with 
the idea of a washing-away of sins, baptism carries the concept of being baptised into the death of 
Jesus. The telling of the story behind the Eucharist often begins with ‗On the night that he was 
betrayed‘ (See 1 Cor. 11:23). Embedded in the story is failure, not only the treachery of Judas but also 
the failure of all the disciples to keep watch, to stay with Jesus, to accompany him. The main action of 
the Eucharist, indeed, is a breaking of bread called the Fraction: a tearing of one loaf into pieces so 
that it may be shared with many. Sacramental maps are maps of fragments, fragile webs of islands of 
memory standing close to death, with most of the territory unexplored. 
48
  MG 228. 
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had been in his prime, or even the confused old man he had turned into 
later, and yet there was no denying that the younger man who had made 
these maps was one with vision and heart.
49
 
The maps of Ireland—the works of art—point Annabelle to aspects of her father she 
never knew, an artistic side irretrievably lost, never once met. However, the maps 
remain, a sign of what had been lost, a tender body that could be reconstructed in 
Annabelle‘s imagination. She might think of the unknown characteristics of her father 
as ‗a gift she had never been given‘, but the maps actually present her with that gift, 
producing a new vision of the past.
50
 
Near the end of the novel, Sylvia laments the terrible way that her love was lost, 
the horror of Alzheimer‘s making the man she loved forget her and the details of their 
story. She describes what it is like when ‗His body knows what to do, but his mind has 
forgotten, his heart has been stilled‘.51 Without memory, the body seems to have no 
story. But though the story-less body leads to the sharp ache of her pain, the body is also 
the site where meaning remains. Sylvia ponders what could possibly matter about her 
traceless love, and comes up with this: ‗What matters is that we ever met at all, the 
miracle of the life I never could have lived without the idea of him, and the arm of that 
idea resting on my shoulder‘.52 While the writing that her lover traced on the world 
seems all but erased, readers of the novel see that the traces of his life remain because 
they have been mapped in Sylvia; she incorporates all the slight traces of their time 
together into the roots and branches of her life, and this allows her to flourish in ways 
that had been impossible for her before. Such maps of glass, though they are fragile and 
full of potential sorrow, provide more than just an orientation for living in the world. 
Their tension gives them life.
53
 
Even as Sylvia carries the story of her lover with her, even as Annabelle picks 
up a trace of her father‘s complexity in the maps he had made so long before, so does 
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  MG 228-9. 
50
  MG 229. 
51
  MG 368. 
52
  MG 369. 
53
  In this, Urquhart even plants a note of suspicion against her emblem-creating artist, Robert Smithson. 
Even though Smithson suggests that maps do not always resemble what they represent, and that 
absence is all there really is in art‘s transitory nature (see n34 and n38 above), the way the story of the 
art—and the love—remains suggest that absence is not all there is in the relations of bodies. 
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the reader take up the map. Gingerly perhaps, cautious of the sharp edges, the reader 
picks up the fragments of stories, memories, places, seeking to join in tracing the almost 
imperceptible marks made by contact between bodies. And, all the while, those marks 
are being traced upon the reader, until the story of Sylvia and her love, of Andrew and 
his family, of Sylvia‘s meetings with Jerome, and of the other stories they all touch 
become mapped on the reader, too. But remember, landscapes are unreliable. They 
change. They fade. Still, this is what allows them to hold the traces of our touch, to be 
able to tell stories: to cry out to be mapped.  
A map is a symbolic fabric, a web of glyphs which, in the arrangement of their 
proximity to one another, represent values and meanings for its readers in their attempts 
to orient themselves to one another and the world. A map is an essay at turning the 
wilderness into landscape. However, the wilderness is in the map itself, in the 
interpretation of the one who engages in it, in the exercise of weaving the symbolic 
fabric from what is known amid passion and peril. In A Map of Glass, though, we find 
that maps are not just charted on paper, that people in their intimate lives together 
engage in charting by touch, a tracing out of bodies that makes maps of flesh. These 
maps draw the landscape of memory, not just to tell us where we are, but to lead us, 




 | 164 
 
odies insist. 
They refuse to be forgotten, to slip from mind and memory. Bodies cry out to 
be heard; even when they are quiet, when they huddle in a corner, when time 
or other people have silenced them, their presence witnesses to the complex of their 
existence, for no one is without a story, unknown though it may be.  
Bodies make demands which cannot totally be ignored. If people turn away, the 
earth will notice; bodies imprint their insistence simply with their passage from one 
place to another, or their abiding in one location on the surface of the earth, always 
making subtle waves even in a sea of stone. Theologians—at least, those who are 
children of Abraham and know the stories of Eden and after—should know this.  When 
Cain killed Abel and shrugged to God, ‗Am I my brother‘s keeper?‘, the Lord replied 
that Abel‘s blood cried to him from the ground. 
A great theological question: ‗Am I the body‘s keeper?‘ 
Sylvia and Jerome discover an answer in the enduring insistence of bodies and 
the impression which relationships make on the landscape. Sylvia is not supposed to be 
able to love—not that way—but bodies teach her otherwise. Jerome tries to isolate 
himself from the lineage of his body, but it cries out from the ground of a stranger‘s 
story. Yet, if bodies wait to be read, and linger on your skin, they also demand readers 
to interpret them. Bodies insist on a response to the fragments of lives, the snatches of 
songs, the beckoning lined-out by limbs, syllables that beat in the blood. They demand 
attention be paid to the materiality of grief. One body asks another to pronounce their 
name correctly. In the process, in the shaping of their stories, they invite people to 
participate in the construction of the world; to reflect on this, we listen for fugitive 
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Any discovery of form is a moment of memory, 
existing as the historical moment – alone, 
and existing in history – linear,  
in music, in the sentence. 
Each poem, each piece remembers us perfectly, 
the way the earth remembers our bodies, 
the way man and woman in their joining 





o praise memory is to praise the body‘ writes Anne Michaels, in a long poem 
entitled ‗Words for the Body‘.2 Imagery and poetic devices throughout her 
writing link memory, story, history, narrative to the physical, to the body, 
and, in turn, to the body‘s experience of the earth: Michaels explores narrated moments 
of body and memory as illuminated in geology and weather. Her novel, Fugitive Pieces, 
like her collections of poetry, observes these narrated moments with a precision of 
metaphor that presents a world of lyrically beautiful language. However, this becomes 
problematic as readers realise what sort of story the novel is trying to tell. Fugitive 
Pieces is a book about the effects of the Holocaust on those who escaped, and on their 
children. The novel describes memories which are not beautiful, memories of pain and 
loss, in which, the victims are people whose very humanity has been written off by their 
enemies; Michaels calls this ‗the power of language to destroy, to omit, to obliterate‘.3 
The topic and the events of the plot jar against the exquisite gracefulness of Fugitive 
Pieces‘ poetic prose.  
And yet, Michaels has one of the two protagonists, Jakob Beer, a poet and 
translator, write of poetry as being ‗the power of language to restore‘.4 Where Jakob is 
left with fragments of his own story, with the pain of others embedded in his flesh—as 
he survived the Holocaust, but his family did not—poetry becomes the art of piecing 
together fragments, of allowing a new embodiment of life. Through poetry, Jakob 
translates the losses of his shattered life into possibility, a newness which is enacted 
                                                                                                                                               
1  Anne Michaels, ‗Words for the Body‘, WOMP 48. 
2
  WOMP, 48. 
3
  FP 79. 
4
  FP 79. 
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when he finally finds true love. The fullness of his relationship with Michaela, his 
second wife, embodies the possibility of a better future. Still, this does not negate the 
discomfort and instability generated by the novel. How can anyone turn the Holocaust 
into a story with a happy ending, into a love story, without being, at best, reductionist? 
Michaels herself acknowledges the problem by making sure there are no easy answers: 
Jakob‘s story, comprising the first two thirds of the book, has no conventional happy 
ending at all; the second part, which tells the story of Ben, an admirer of Jakob‘s poetry, 
also ends uncertainly.  
But Michaels is still pointing to poetry as a language of restoration—only it is 
not just in the plot of the story that her novel tells. At one point, Ben is told, ‗when we 
say we‘re looking for a spiritual advisor, we‘re really looking for someone to tell us 
what to do with our bodies‘.5 Reading Fugitive Pieces is a tutorial in learning what to do 
with the body. The form of the book, as a collection of fragments around gaps and 
silences, with complex allusions and metaphors in densely poetic prose, weaves new 
possibilities for the reader in imaginative engagement with the text. Michaels plays with 
formal literary markers in order to bend and blur genres. Fugitive Pieces, essentially, is 
a book-length prose poem. Just as imagery ties remembrance to the body and physical 
existence, intimating that the meaning of what we experience exhibits itself materially, 
so the meaning of Michaels‘ novel is bound intricately to its form. In turn, by enacting 
the possibility for restoration in the form of her writing, Michaels suggests that the 
importance of shape for a body lies in how shape is imagined and re-imagined, and in 
how this can reconstruct the world. 
In this chapter, I examine in turn the novel‘s claim that language has power both 
to destroy and reconstruct. To sharpen my investigation in each case, I turn to the work 
of Elaine Scarry, observing that Anne Michaels‘s novel, in representing bodily 
destruction and reconstruction, closely echoes the structure and themes of Scarry‘s 
analysis of The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. This leads to an 
overview of the poetic prose which Michaels employs, arguing that the author strives to 
enact the creative power of language with her choice of diction; I also address criticism 
of the notion of restorative language. Finally, I discuss the way Michaels uses the form 
of Fugitive Pieces in an attempt to offer to the reader the possibility of imagining 
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restoration. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what the importance of form in 
literature implies for notions of the body and meaning. 
 
Fugitive Pieces and The Body in Pain  
 
The truth is why words fail. 
We can only reveal by outline, 
by circling absence. 
But that‘s why language 
can remember truth when it‘s not spoken. 
Words in us that deafen, 
that wait, even when their spell seems 
wasted; 





In the fictive world of Fugitive Pieces, Michaels uses her poetic representation 
of the world—intertwining flesh, earth, and memory—to chart the consequences of 
language‘s power on the body, both destructive and creative. A synopsis of the novel 
shows the extensive range of this theme. As mentioned, the novel has two parts. The 
first part, the bulk of the book, is the story of Jakob, and his response to the way the 
Holocaust has shaped his life, through the murder of his parents and friends, and 
particularly the disappearance of his sister, Bella. The tale begins with his escape from 
the deadly fate of the rest of his family, and his rescue by Athos, a Greek geologist 
working at an archaeological dig in Poland. Athos takes Jakob to a Greek island to wait 
out the war. After the war, Athos accepts an invitation to teach at the University of 
Toronto, taking Jakob with him. The story of Jakob‘s attempts to come to terms with 
history follows him through one marriage (short-lived, to Alex) and into a second (of 
lasting love, with Michaela), through the course of his blossoming as a poet, and 
through the return to his foster-father‘s ancestral home in Greece. The second part of 
Fugitive Pieces, the story of Ben, takes the examination of history‘s repercussions to the 
next generation; Ben is the son of Holocaust survivors, an academic fascinated by the 
connection of weather, biography, history and literature. His life is burdened by the 
weight of the sufferings of his parents, stretching his relationship with his wife to the 
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  ‗What the Light Teaches‘, WOMP, 116 [§8]. 
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breaking point. Having come into contact with Jakob through a mutual friend, Ben 
becomes fascinated with the poet‘s apparent serenity. After the older man dies, Ben 
travels to his empty home in Greece to seek the poet‘s hidden memoirs, and to find 
peace for himself. 
In their different ways, the protagonists of Fugitive Pieces are bereaved 
survivors; their loved ones have suffered because language and systems of belief have 
honed the edges of weapons. The tales of Jakob and Ben circumnavigate the terrible 
aftermath of the void created by the attempted annihilation of a people right in the 
middle of modern Europe; their bodies carry grief wherever they go. While they seek 
solace, trying to find some kind of truth in the texts embedded in the earth and written 
records of what happened, a chain reaction of language binds them to a violent erosion 
of the world. However, the book posits the possibility that beauty founded in love can 
make things new—that restorative language has the resources to oppose obliteration and 
liberate the afflicted from the bonds which diminish their humanity.  
By doing this, Michaels‘s novel traces a line very similar to what Elaine Scarry 
sketches in The Body in Pain. Scarry‘s work investigates first the dismantling of human 
worlds through the actions of those who use violence against others and then the 
construction of the world through the action of creative imagination. Her examination of 
violence focuses on torture and on war. She uncovers the way inflicting pain and injury 
upon others reduces their ability to function, disempowering their humanity by taking 
apart their bodies and, thence, their ability to sense and understand their world. Indeed, 
their world becomes an agent of oppression, twisted into collusion with the torturers or 
attackers.
7
 Conversely, in the second half of the book, Scarry reflects upon what she 
calls ‗the nature of artifice‘: the process by which imagination works to make, not just 
things and isolated texts, but the texture of the inhabited world.
8
 She argues that, 
whereas violence constricts life‘s possibilities, acts of creative imagining—whether they 
craft systems of belief or intentional, physical objects—work to expand the world by 
extending the body, altering the environment ‗without hurting‘.9 The opposite of 
destruction is the generation of possibility.  
                                                                                                                                               
7
  BP 48-51. 
8
  BP 181. 
9
  BP 176. 
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One might say that Michaels narrates what Scarry theorises. Thus, to outline 
more clearly the direction of Fugitive Pieces, I examine the novel in terms of the 
structure of The Body in Pain. 
 
‘The power of language to destroy’ 
 
Scarry writes of torture as ‗a language, an objectification, an acting out‘, and 
declares that ‗Nowhere is the sadistic potential of a language built on agency so visible 
as in torture‘.10 Such language creates a hierarchy of action, lifting up those with the 
authority to wield words above those who lack that authority. It creates the opportunity 
for the powerful to redefine the weak and further solidify their own dominant position. 
This observation of language‘s destructive power is strongly exemplified in Fugitive 
Pieces, when Michaels has Jakob reflect that 
Nazi policy was beyond racism, it was anti-matter, for Jews were not 
considered human. An old trick of language, used often in the course of 
history. Non-Aryans were never to be referred to as human, but as 
―figuren,‖ ―stücke‖—―dolls,‖ ―wood,‖ ―merchandise,‖ ―rags.‖ Humans 
were not being gassed, only ―figuren,‖ so ethics weren‘t being violated. 
No one could be faulted for burning debris, for burning rags and clutter 
in the dirty basement of society. In fact, they‘re a fire hazard! What 
choice but to burn them before they harm you.
11
 
This is language that acts with the goal of negation, unravelling any relationships that 
might exist, even between former neighbours. Such words bluntly turn human bodies 
into things, as if they are already corpses. 
The systemic nature of this brutality appears in Fugitive Pieces not only in 
descriptions of atrocities committed by Nazis and others against Jews, but also in the 
book‘s depiction of the regime‘s consumption of history. Athos becomes obsessed with 
writing a book about the SS-Ahnenerbe, a Nazi historians and archaeologists who sought 
to demonstrate the superiority of ancient Aryan civilisation. If they could not fit 
evidence to their conception of history, they destroyed it; in Fugitive Pieces, Biskupin, 
the site where Athos is working—and where he finds Jakob—is destroyed by the Nazis 
because it ‗was proof of an advanced culture that wasn‘t German‘.12 Language, in 
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11
  FP 165. 
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  FP 104. 
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orders given, impels the violent theft of history.
13
 Merely having hegemony over others 
is not enough—destruction has to be total, extending to making the victims believe they 
are worthless, too.
14
 Michaels shows that a totalitarian conquest of the body includes a 
conquest of memory, of stories and language.
15
 
Fugitive Pieces deals with the consequences of dehumanising language, leaving 
questions of motivation largely unanswered.
16
 Michaels offers litanies of atrocities. She 
tells of the child Jakob hearing his parents‘ murders, then seeing their bodies; of the 
inhabitants of ancient Jewish communities drowned in the Mediterranean; of the lives of 
Jews ‗purchased for a quart of brandy, perhaps four pounds of sugar, cigarettes‘.17 She 
outlines Jews being hanged from their thumbs, the desecration of cemeteries, the 
concentration camp inmates who were forced to carry boulders unendingly from one 
spot to another and back again, mothers who were handed the severed heads of their 
daughters, the burning of books, the bayoneting of babies, the gas chambers.
18
 The 
piling of indignities and sufferings along with and against the rich cadence of 
Michaels‘s writing jolts the reader with a souring of language. She moves us to the edge 
of the ruined lives which haunt the survivors, invites us to stare into the absence created 
by the loss of so many and so much. But only for a moment, only as they are buried. 
Exposing the language of torturing annihilation generates in turn a language of burial, 
                                                                                                                                               
13
  This accords with BP‘s discussion of how the dismantling of other people proceeds purposefully as 
those with power bestow upon themselves what they have stripped from their victims. Scarry refers to 
this as ‗the conversion of the enlarged map of human suffering into an emblem of the regime‘s 
strength‘ (56). 
14
  As seen when the young Jakob, only knowing one phrase in more than one language, cries out, over 
and over: ‗dirty Jew‘ (FP 13). 
15
  In the 2007 film adaptation of the novel, for which Michaels served as a consultant, one of the few 
additional scenes involving new dialogue consisted of the re-imagined father of Ben noting that 
Athos‘s work on his book was important because ‗Already people say the things I lived through never 
happened‘. The reference to the phenomenon of ―Holocaust deniers‖ points to just how insidious the 
attempt to conquer memory and history can be, affecting people long after the original events. 
16
  The book does allude to the issue, but only fleetingly is it made explicit. At one point, when Jakob is 
reflecting upon the book that Athos had been writing, he states: 
Our eyes slowly became accustomed to the darkness. Athos could speak of it, he 
needed to speak of it, but I couldn‘t. He asked endless questions to order his thoughts, 
leaving ―why‖ to the last. But in my thinking, I started with the last question, the 
―why‖ he hoped would be answered by all the others. Therefore I began with failure 
and had nowhere to go (FP 118). 
 
17
  FP 7, 42-3, 45. 
18
  FP 46, 50, 53, 93, 138, 168. 
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of drowning, of hiding, of celebrating what lies under the ground and in the smallest, 
darkest corners. The body disappears from sight. Sometimes people are snatched from 
view by others, sometimes people shrink away to escape notice, but in all cases images 
of a subterranean world fill the pages of Fugitive Pieces, from caves to graves, ancient 
and modern.
19




As unveiled by Michaels, this destructive linguistic power and its effects on 
Jews and others do not end with the Nazis.
21
 Indeed, Fugitive Pieces provides a long 
meditation on the way destruction, once started, does not stop.
22
 Along with Jakob‘s 
haunting obsession with what could have happened to his sister and the suffering this 
creates in his life, the entire story of Ben‘s relationship with his parents and its 
repercussions manifests the pervasiveness of the damage done. Take, for example, 
Ben‘s father‘s outrage at Ben throwing away an uneaten-but-rotting apple: hunger in the 
concentration camp had turned into a pathological obsession concerning food, and he 
abusively made Ben eat the apple (‗You—my son—you throw away food?‘).23 Ponder 
the way that Ben‘s parents never tell him that he had two older siblings who died in the 
camps before he was born, and how this secret, kept out of fear, leads to trouble in 
Ben‘s marriage when he finds out after his parents die that his mother had told her 
daughter-in-law.
24
 Ben laments that you cannot ‗separate fear from the body‘, that ‗My 
                                                                                                                                               
19
  For examples, see FP 39, 45, 76-7, 143. Note also the many passages referring to geological time and 
the exposure of history in the strata of the earth. One should mark, however, that the connection of the 
Holocaust to a subterranean world does not occur only with Michaels. Cf. the many memorials, such 
as in Berlin or Paris, which lead the visitor underground. Even though the Jewish Museum of Berlin is 
a huge structure, the section commemorating Holocaust victims is, again, underground, as well as in a 
concrete tower and a garden that feels underground. Memorials in Budapest are not underground, but 
they are concealed, tucked away in the courtyard of the Great Synagogue, or quietly on the ground 
beside the river. Perhaps what happened is so horrible that it must be hidden from the light of the sun.  
20
  In the introduction to BP, Scarry declares that the ‗unmaking‘ half of the book ‗is about the way other 
persons…cease to be visible to us‘ (22). 
21
  Not that it began with the Nazis. The diminishment of other human beings through the communication 
of hatred has a long history; in the case of anti-Semitism, this may be exemplified by the gallery 
devoted to the modern era in Berlin‘s Jewish Museum: although the room‘s space is filled by exhibits 
demonstrating the cultural achievements of Germany‘s Jewish communities, all along the wall runs a 
line of small type chronicling anti-Semitic comments of the last few centuries from people across 
Europe in chronological order. 
22
  At this point Michaels goes beyond BP: FP makes explicit the trauma of the lingering rot which words 
can instil, while Scarry‘s work necessarily focuses on the perpetrators and their immediate victims. 
23
  FP 213-8. 
24
  FP 251-3. 
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parents‘ past is mine molecularly‘: Michaels portrays the diminishment of humanity by 
the embodied language of violence as something like a congenital disease.
25
 
In the novel, almost nothing and no one is exempt from the way words can 
harm. Some forces intended to be benign end up twisted: there is the way Jakob‘s first 
wife cannot reach him in his world of burdensome history, the way her energy and 
modernity cannot dissolve his nightmares.
26
 Alex wants to save him from the shadows 
of the past, but he comes to believe that her au courant lifestyle is unravelling his 
identity, albeit unwittingly. And while the text is rather ambiguous when it comes to 
blame—it might just be Jakob‘s corrupted imagination—Alex still calls him ‗Jake‘ 
rather than Jakob, as if to signal with his name the person that she wants him to be, not 
who he is.
27
 With the cutting of one syllable, language can make a move to erase and 
change a person‘s position in the world. 
Even the perpetrators of brutalities themselves were caught in the turn of their 
own lie. ‗If the Nazis required that humiliation precede extermination‘, Jakob ponders, 
then they admitted exactly what they worked so hard to avoid admitting: 
the humanity of the victim. To humiliate is to accept that your victim 
feels and thinks, that he not only feels pain, but knows that he‘s being 
degraded. And because the torturer knew in an instant of recognition that 
his victim was not a ―figuren‖ but a man, and knew at that same moment 
he must continue his task, he suddenly understood the Nazi mechanism. 
Just as the stone-carrier knew his only chance of survival was to fulfil 
his task as if he didn‘t know its futility, so the torturer decided to do his 
job as if he didn‘t know the lie. The photos capture again and again this 
chilling moment of choice: the laughter of the damned. When the soldier 




The soldiers chose to fulfil the destructive conceit of the language they had been taught, 




                                                                                                                                               
25
  FP 280. This is perhaps a good place to remember that Fugitive Pieces is just one individual portrayal, 
as noted by Adrienne Kertzer in the article, ‗Fugitive Pieces: Listening as a Holocaust Survivor‘s 
Child‘. Kertzer strives to differentiate herself from Ben, who is to her the archetypal child of 
archetypal Holocaust survivors, in that she views her own childhood as somewhat less traumatic.  
26
  FP 141. 
27
  FP 144 and 148. 
28
  FP 166. 
29
  Scarry ends her chapter on torture with a discussion of how concentration camp guards and others 
were able to do what they did, pointing out that torturers bend the focus of their ethical regard to 
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All of this—all the words which call forth destruction, the ability of words to 
erase worlds through what they omit from discussion, words which turn a person‘s eyes 
away from the body of another—is a desolation of language. This language makes 
absence, trading on the pain and suffering of the human body. It is all too real, and there 
are altogether too many examples of how it works. Our words can make a sharp knife 
against the vulnerability of flesh, and the sheer weight of grief that this creates and 
maintains is unbearable. The screams of the victims, as Jakob imagines them, are 
‗somewhere in the galaxy, moving forever towards the psalms‘.30 As the world of the 
body shrinks, its reach dissipates into infinity. 
 
‘The power of language to restore’ 
 
But then Michaels audaciously suggests that attention to absence, to silence, 
gives a possibility of restoration, a possibility hinted at by that destination toward which 
the sufferers‘ laments yearn. She proposes that poetry (and all that goes with it) 
constitutes a more constructive side of language. The power of words could be diverted 
to other means than obliteration. That the same device—language—could offer 
radically different ends indeed accords with what Elaine Scarry posits in The Body in 
Pain, where she argues that the difference between a weapon and a tool is not in an 
object‘s intrinsic make-up but in the way it is used.31 When Scarry turns to investigating 
making, she notes that one problem with any account of making is the difficulty in 
determining a ‗model object‘; whereas torture and war easily provide representative 
examples of the diminishment of humanity, something equally representative for the 
creative side is much more elusive.
32
 In other words, because destructive language 
constricts the world, reducing finitude to an end point, its movement is much easier to 
track—it seeks to arrest everything in a controlling relationship of power. Creative 
language, however, by its nature of being open-ended generates ever more language 
                                                                                                                                               
themselves, worrying about the harm done to them by witnessing or participating in the enforcement 
of brutality, and so their attention can slip away from the fact that they are injuring another human 
being (BP 58-9). At this point, Scarry follows Hannah Arendt and Bruno Bettelheim, who both also 
point to the linguistic deflection from the reality of harm. 
30
  FP 54. 
31
  BP 173. 
32
  BP 177. 
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along with the forms that are being created, making specific examples much harder to 
grasp. Yet, it is precisely that open-endedness which Fugitive Pieces highlights in its 
content and form. First, the subjects of the events and discourse of the novel include two 
mechanisms of constructive imagination: creative arts, such as poetry and music; and 
redemptive love, the potential for a person‘s world and vision to be expanded in the care 
of an intimate relationship with another. Second, the novel attempts to manifest the 
‗power of language to restore‘ in its own language and form. All of these—form and 
content, poetry and love—entwine to offer the reader the possibility of participating in 
adding something new and hopeful to the world—but not easily, not without cost. To 
make the move towards a recovery of the body, they ask for the paradoxical embracing 
of absence, acceptance of gaps in what can be known.  
Poetry offers Jakob the consolation of searching for the secrets at the heart of the 
world. But the glimpse of meaning and understanding that poetry presents seeks what 
cannot be said, strives to address the unknowable and uncontainable. As Jakob reflects: 
I felt this was my truth. That my life could not be stored in any language 
but only in silence; the moment I looked into a room and took in only 
what was visible, not vanished. The moment I failed to see Bella had 
disappeared. But I did not know how to seek by way of silence. So I 
lived a breath apart, a touch-typist who holds his hands above the keys 
slightly in the wrong place, the words coming out meaningless, garbled. 
Bella and I inches apart, the wall between us. I thought about writing 
poems this way, in code, every letter askew, so that loss would wreck the 
language, become the language. 
If one could isolate that space, that damaged chromosome in 
words, in an image, then perhaps one could restore order by naming. 
Otherwise history is only a tangle of wires. So in poems I returned to 
Biskupin, to the house on Zakynthos, to the forest, to the river, to the 
burst door, to the minutes in the wall. 
English was a sonar, a microscope, through which I listened and 
observed, waiting to capture elusive meanings buried in facts.
33
 
This portrays poetry as a tool of diagnosis and discovery, a language which unveils 
experience and outlines the gaps where both absence and mystery exist. Naming the 
secrets allows one to relate to them, rather than to possess them and think that you have 
figured them out. At one point, Athos proposes that a sonnet is like ‗the linguistic 
investigations of the kabbalists‘.34 The reference to the Jewish mystical practice, in 
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which, at one level, a person seeks to discover the nature of God‘s presence in creation 
through a close reading of the language of Torah, suggests a poetics where words 
illuminate the shadows of our comprehension, yet the instrument of this striving 
remains that which is solid and visible, language at its most morphological, the straight 
lines and curves of written letters.
35
 The new constructions are fragile and more than a 
little tentative, but they remain new constructions.
36
 What Jakob suggests with the 
notion of naming the absence: if one could ‗restore order by naming‘, one could place 
oneself in a new and better position in a reconstructed world. 
Note, however, that Jakob deems himself singularly unsuccessful at the task of 
trying to ‗capture elusive meaning buried in facts‘. He says that ‗all I achieved was an 
awkward shrieking‘.37 Consolation and revelation do not contain the whole answer for 
him. But Fugitive Pieces does not stop with those two possibilities: poetry also reaches 
towards love, towards compassion and generosity. All of this comes together in the 
penultimate chapter of the first part, ‗Terra Nullius‘.38 In this whirlwind of a chapter, 
Jakob, his marriage to Alex having disintegrated, seeks refuge in the late Athos‘s 
ancestral home on the island of Idhra. Suddenly, a bewildering array of snippets of text 
weaves together: passages describing Jakob‘s life on the island, discourses on history 
and Jewish ethics, reflections on language and poetry, philosophical discussions of 
Nazism and the Holocaust. Three different strands are in italics: the first, a story about a 
woman named Zdena who adopts an apparently orphaned girl, is a text with no 
introduction or explanation; the second constitutes intrusions of Bella‘s voice as she 
practises on the piano, at first quite far apart and seeming to be simple memories, but 
growing in frequency as the chapter progresses until the reader realises that the voice is 
part of Jakob‘s imagining of Bella in a concentration camp; the third consists of two 
sentences embedded in the last two pages, representing Jakob‘s response. 
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  In the book Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, Gershom Scholem discusses the positive attitude of 
Kabbalism towards language, that the Torah ‗is to be regarded as the living incarnation of the divine 
wisdom which eternally sends out new rays of light‘, and hints that linguistic analysis means a search 
for the implications of the name of God written in the world (14, 17). By alluding to such mysticism, 
Michaels shows the high value she accords to language. 
36
  In CL 180, Michaels implies that poetry‘s attempt to generate visibility is a solidifying of shadows, 
like an image developing on film or ‗breath on glass‘. 
37
  FP 112. 
38
  FP 152-70. 
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As all of these texts intertwine, imagination‘s creativity is also being declared. 
Near the beginning, when Jakob arrives on the island, he starts to explore Athos‘s 
family library, and he quotes ‗a Hebrew saying: Hold a book in your hand and you‘re a 
pilgrim at the gates of a new city‘.39 He begins with the psalms, lines from which seem 
to set off the whole whorl of texts. This is also the chapter when the reader is told that 
Jakob starts working on what will become his first book of poetry.
40
 He recalls Athos 
saying to him, ‗Write to save yourself…and someday you‘ll write because you‘ve been 
saved‘.41 The reading and writing of poetry generate the process of Jakob being able to 
address his loss fully. In ‗Terra Nullius‘, Jakob‘s release comes not in a fantasy that his 
sister remains alive, but in being able to imagine the last moments of those in the 
camps, that even in their last breaths there could be a whisper of hope, of faith.
42
 He 
knows that what he has imagined is a composition that he has crafted, but that invention 
allows a reorientation of body. At the end of the chapter, Jakob is enlightened: 
All the years I felt Bella entreating me, filled with her loneliness, I was 
mistaken. I have misunderstood the signals. Like other ghosts, she 
whispers; not for me to join her, but so that, when I‘m close enough, she 
can push me back into the world.
43
 
What is restored is not the way things once had been, but the hope that the bereaved can 
embody life from day to day in the future.
44
 
In an interview given the same year that Fugitive Pieces was published, Anne 
Michaels stated that, in the book, ‗I wanted to look as closely as I could at how people 
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carry on, or how perhaps they not only carry on but carry an event with them and still 
move towards a place of love in the world‘.45 This is the territory of the final chapter in 
Jakob‘s story, ‗The Gradual Instant‘. Here, he meets Michaela, many years his junior, 
and they fall madly, happily, in love. Their love manifests physically almost from the 
beginning; it is described in their bodily presence to one another, words outlining the 
form of their intimacy. Jakob sees Michaela in the details of ‗her dark-brown eyes or 
her small hand disappearing into the shoulder of her dress to adjust a strap‘, finds that 
‗the noise of her whole body is in [his] ears‘, seeks ‗fugitive scents‘ on her flesh in 
order to ‗trace her day‘ through the herbal remnants of cooking and the sweat from a hot 
sun.
46
 The reader sees Jakob restored. Though he fears that ‗She‘ll see in my body the 
terrible things that have marked me‘, the generosity of her loving embrace transforms 
him, granting ‗Not the stillness of something broken, but of rest‘, so that he can say, 
‗Every cell in my body has been replaced, suffused with peace‘.47 His restoration is a 
return to the body in wonder and joy. 
Although the straightforward physical intimacy of this love may seem entirely 
different than poetry‘s power, Fugitive Pieces intricately connects them. In the previous 
chapter, Jakob mentions that ‗A poem is as neural as love; the rut of rhythm that veers 
the mind‘.48 Both poetry and love thread through the human body.49 Jakob muses how 
Michaela offers her ancestors to me. I‘m shocked at my hunger for her 
memories. Love feeds on the protein of detail, sucks fact to the marrow; 
just as there are no generalities in the body, every particular speaking at 
once until there‘s such a crying out….50 
Language‘s power of restoration manifests in the depiction of a very particular 
embodiment of love. Thus, Jakob can ‗cross over the boundary of skin into Michaela‘s 
memories‘.51 He can talk of the way ‗asleep, the pressure of Michaela‘s leg against 
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mine translates into a dream as warmth, sunlight‘.52 Everything dissolves into the poetry 
and love between bodies, what they declare to the world. 
The body itself, as a site of memory and relationship, becomes a poem. In 
Fugitive Pieces, Jakob‘s last recorded words are: 
My son, my daughter: May you never be deaf to love. 
Bela, Bella: Once I was lost in a forest. I was so afraid. My blood 
pounded in my chest and I knew my heart‘s strength would soon be 
exhausted. I saved myself without thinking. I grasped the two syllables 
closest to me, and replaced my heartbeat with your name.
53
 
Here, Jakob looks forward to the child he yearns to have. He puts a name, puts 
language, at the heart of things, so that the cadence of his life speaks; his body‘s 
restoration in love with Michaela links the past—the traumatic loss of Bella the beloved 
sister—to the future—the possibility of Bela/Bella, a child who would be shaped by 
love.
54
 If, for Elaine Scarry, the making of the world involves an extension of sentience 
into the external world through such activities as the fashioning of artefacts, for 
Michaels‘s Jakob, this extension of sentience comes in the form of the projection of new 
life, the hope of a child and all of that child‘s possibilities.55 In both, creativity means 
adding to the surfeit of the world, and expanding life‘s reach. Jakob does not forget the 
ones who are gone, but the grace of life with Michaela turns his face towards hope. 
 
Body, Earth, Memory: A Form of Restorative Language 
 
Waterworn, the body remembers 
like a floodplain, sentiment-laden, 
reclaims itself with every tide. 
Memory terraces, soft as green deltas. 
Or reefs and cordilleras— 
gathering the world to bone.
56
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Through an intricate complex of metaphors and imaginative constructions, 
Michaels depicts memory as embodied by human beings and by natural processes in the 
earth. Related to this is the sense that what happens to the body in the forces between 
people and the forces of nature impinge upon the remembered narratives of human 
lives. Artistically, the use of tropes such as metaphors and similes generates an 
imagined world where the boundaries between body, memory, and earth become 
unstable and the categories blur together. Yet, their boundaries never completely elide, 
and the tension between categories being simultaneously held apart and pulled together 
sparks a dynamic vitality which makes the text deeply sensual. That this relational 
vitality cannot finally be arrested produces the depth and strength of the bond between 
body and story in Fugitive Pieces. This sensuality of language in the novel becomes a 
key site for demonstrating the power of language to restore; it represents an attempt to 
evoke new possibilities for life out of the soil of death and the unruliness of bodies. 
At one level, ‗body‘ and ‗earth‘ are tied together by the virtue of both being 
material entities. In Fugitive Pieces, Michaels depicts a world where humanity and 
nature intermingle not just because human beings walk through an environment, but 
because the boundaries between bodies are porous. She writes that ‗Human memory is 
encoded in air currents and river sediment‘, and that ‗Eskers of ash wait to be scooped 
up, lives reconstituted‘; the human heart is ‗the size and heaviness of a handful of 
earth‘; stones are given the power ‗to hold human time‘ and also contain ‗organic 
history‘ in the geological processes that fuse them together deep underground.57 Yet, the 
meaning of these images is not made explicit; there is no code that allows one to 
decipher the thematic direction of the text. Instead, by way of literary alchemy, a reader 
may leap through the presenting phenomena to uncover underlying motives or construct 
enlightening truths. A reader may note that image of ‗eskers of ash‘ and recall that an 
esker is a ridge of detritus left by retreating glaciation, a landform created by what once 
would have seemed inexorable but since has disappeared—and then be offered possible 
conclusions about the glacier-like force of Nazism which deposited that ash, the remains 
of human beings. A reader may see the connection between a heart and a fistful of earth, 
and think about the solidity of what makes a human being, the connection to the dust 
from which we are said to come, and more. 
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This is, in many ways, the language of a poet—not just of Anne Michaels, but of 
the protagonist Jakob—who regards all the world as replete with meaning. Thus, a 
favoured poetic device in the novel is anthropomorphism. The earth remembers; the 
petrification of organic matter narrates a story. Hills experience ‗grief‘; Jakob‘s poetry 
makes people ‗hear the earth speak‘.58 Ben traces this to Athos, whom he calls ‗a 
splendid anthropomorphist‘ to whom ‗there [was] no thing that does not yearn‘.59 
However, the novel also employs a technique opposite to anthropomorphism, what 
might be called ‗geomorphism‘: applying natural processes metaphorically to human 
beings. This is apparent from the first line of the book: ‗Bog-boy, I surfaced from the 
miry streets of the drowned city‘.60 Not only does the novel invoke the image of those 
bodies found preserved in peat bogs, it also points out the process by which the bodies 
were preserved through sacrifice while the remains those who sacrificed them did not 
survive. The bodies had waited out their killers, aided by the powers of the earth.
61
 
Michaels alludes carefully to scientific processes. For example, she has Jakob muse that 
‗Athos replaced parts of me slowly, as if he were preserving wood‘ referring to a 
process in which tissue is chemically altered, but in such a way as not to damage the 
shape of an entity, not to obliterate its memory.
62
 Again, these are actions extending 
over time, over a person‘s own history, particularly as they connect with social and 
collective memory. In Ben‘s part, history is said ‗to grow in you until you‘re silted up 
and can‘t move‘.63 A person, as a being in history and carrying memory, is shown to be 
inextricably tied to the earth, as if our feet grow roots, and are simultaneously nourished 
and poisoned by the time in which we flow. 
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But if we are connected to the earth in the world of Fugitive Pieces, we are also 
connected to one another through that earth, over a bridge of nature. Jakob writes: 
When the prisoners were forced to dig up the mass graves, the dead 
entered them through their pores and were carried through their 
bloodstreams to their brains and hearts. And through their blood into 
another generation. Their arms were into death up to the elbows, but not 
only into death—into music, into a memory of the way a husband or son 
leaned over his dinner, a wife‘s expression as she watched her child in 
the bath; into beliefs, mathematical formulas, dreams. As they felt 
another man‘s and another‘s blood-soaked hair through their fingers, the 
diggers begged forgiveness. And those lost lives made molecular 
passage into their hands.
64
 
Thus earth and body and memory are linked: they flow into and among each other in the 
coexistence of pain and preservation. Looking from one angle, you see the inevitability 
of nature; peering from another, you see choice, a conscious will to remember, to hold 
the stories of the dead in one‘s own body. It is not just that body and earth are a 
continuum where truth shows itself from somewhere beyond; it is that our relationships 
bear out in the interconnections of nature and humanity. We learn our relationships, and 
thus ourselves and others, in a narrative manner. We know by memory. 
 ‗Every moment is two moments.‘ This is one of the refrains pulsing through 
Fugitive Pieces.
65
 Every experience leads to another, to a memory, to a possible future, 
to what is happening elsewhere. These double moments are solid; they are embodied. 
For Jakob, every touch recalls another.
66
 He cries out: 
I long for memory to be spirit, but fear it is only skin. I fear that 
knowledge becomes instinct only to disappear with the body. For it is 
my body that remembers them, and though I have tried to erase Alex 
from my senses, tried to will my parents and Bella from my sleep, this 
will amounts to nothing, for my body betrays me in a second. I have 
lived many years without them. Yet it‘s the same winter afternoon that 
draws Bella close, so close I can feel her powerful hand on my own, feel 
her gentle fingers on my back, so close I can smell Mrs. Alperstein‘s 
lotion, so close I feel my father‘s hand and Athos‘s hand on my head and 
my mother‘s hand pulling down my jacket to straighten me out, so close 
I can feel Alex‘s arms reaching around me from behind, and upon me 
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her maddeningly open eyes even as she disappears into sensation, and 
suddenly I‘m afraid, and turn around in empty rooms.67 
The ghosts that haunt a person do so precisely with the impressions they leave upon the 
body, touches from elsewhere or other times which similar contact can evoke, or 
moments engrained in the habits of flesh. The absent beloved becomes a part of you, 
precisely in the absence; that is, what Jakob describes is a physical yearning for the 
other.  
In presenting such a world, where truth dwells in the complexity of material 
impressions, Fugitive Pieces generates a place of imagination where meaning is found 
in constant reference from one body to another, one time to another. The way 
relationships matter is exposed for the reader‘s reflection, and the language invites the 
reader to engage in the play of language, to pit imagination against desolation. The turn 
from the diminishing, destructive power of language to a restoration through creativity 
is intended to be beautiful through making love ‗necessary‘.68 
One might, however, be forgiven for feeling uneasy at such a neatly optimistic 
conclusion. Poetic world-making and the bonds of intimate love do not seem like much 
of a response to the immense weight and horrible finality of all the obliteration of 
bodies charted in the novel. Does Michaels mean to suggest that one individual‘s move 
back into the world can balance the violent silencing of so many in the Holocaust? Such 
disquietude leads to the main criticisms which have been directed towards the Fugitive 
Pieces. Many critics refer to Theodor Adorno‘s declaration that ‗To write poetry after 
Auschwitz is barbaric‘.69 Méira Cook disparages Michaels‘s writing as too 
metaphorical, too ‗lush‘ with wordplay and beautiful imagery: Cook declares of certain 
imagery in Fugitive Pieces that it ‗provides a highly romanticized icon of what actually 
happened‘ so that ‗Michaels unwittingly conceals the decidedly unpoetic nature of 
genocide‘.70 Of a love scene between Jakob and Michaela, Cook continues: 
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When such metaphorically (over)lush language is used to express the 
romantic subplot, no contrast between form and content is possible and 
this failure results in a sentimental discourse….Perhaps the point is that 
when metaphoric language is used indiscriminately to represent both 
eyewitness account and romantic experience, the reader fails to 
distinguish between the relative importance assigned to each.
71
 
Nicola King writes that, in Fugitive Pieces, language—referring, apparently, in broad 
terms to ‗the powers of storytelling, of poetry, of love and the sharing of memory‘—‗is 
often foregrounded at the expense of ―what it‘s describing‖‘, and believes that 
Michaels‘s use of metaphors drawn from the natural world ‗mystifies human agency 
and offers moments of false consolation‘.72 Adrienne Kertzer criticises the way 
‗Michaels risks adopting a narrative strategy that tends…to distract and console many 
readers with the ―beauty‖ of her story, the pleasure of her intensely woven language‘, 
and speaks of ‗find[ing] Michaels‘s redemptive ―faith of the body‖…only more 
evidence of Langer‘s insight into our continuing need to invent consoling lessons in 
Holocaust narratives‘.73 Even an almost thoroughly positive assessment, such as that by 
Annick Hillger, asks, ‗Does justice forever belong to the realm of utopia?‘74 In some 
way or other, all of these critiques wonder if poetry and love have any real 
transformative power. 
To some extent, much of this criticism reflects a tendency to be suspicious of 
any serious possibilities of literary discourse concerning love. For instance, Cook‘s 
account minimises the role of love in the novel by referring to ‗the romantic subplot‘ 
and implying that ‗romantic experience‘ naturally cannot be as momentous as that part 
of the narrative discussing historic trauma. And if, to some of the critics, love connotes 
little more than a sense of whimsy, for several the place of poetic, metaphorical 
language in grappling with the depths of historical atrocity and evil is marked by 
outright scepticism. Note that, to King, metaphor ‗mystifies‘. It is as if, instead of 
metaphor‘s multiplication of meaning, where the Holocaust is concerned only the 
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starkness of clarity is adequate or, better yet, the admission that the representation of 
this clarity is impossible. To me, though, Kertzer‘s misgivings are the sharpest: does 
Fugitive Pieces merely represent a misguided attempt to make some meaning, some 
hope, out of what can only be an abyss, an aporia of irredeemable suffering, demeaning 
the victims by treating them as a lesson for future humankind? Does the book mislead 
readers into believing that creative imagination can transform the world for the better 
when it is really only words and love is not enough?
75
 
Yet, against simple readings, the novel itself subverts any simplicity of happy 
endings. The very first page tells us that Jakob and his wife die after being hit by a car, 
that they die childless: the hopes lit up by the end of the first part seem to have no 
fruition.
76
 The second part ends with Ben returning to Canada to attempt a reunion with 
his wife, Naomi, after they had been separated—great for Ben, but the reader only sees 
things from his point of view, and there is no telling whether his wife will even want 
him back.
77
 Ben‘s story itself is a response to Jakob‘s life, to the place of love and peace 
that the poet had reached; however, a close reading will see that, perhaps, that route to 
that place is not so easy to discern after all. Ben proclaims, in his narrative which is 
addressed to the late Jakob: 
I wanted to believe language itself had freed you. But the night we met I 
knew it wasn‘t language that had released you. Only a remarkably 
simple truth or a remarkably simple lie could put such peace in a man.
78
 
Poetic language, it would seem, is not simple enough; moreover, after noticing the 
powerful effect that a compliment from Jakob has on Naomi, Ben finalises his 
judgement on language‘s ability to restore with a curtly dismissive sentence: ‗As if talk 
could actually heal‘.79 As for love, Ben waves away its power, saying that ‗Even 
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Naomi, who thinks love has an answer for everything, knows that that‘s the real 
response to history‘—to say ‗screw you‘: because even love cannot find the dead.80 
Going beyond what Ben says, the events of his story also suggest that love does not 
always redeem easily. Apparently trying to replicate Jakob‘s discovery of new life with 
Michaela, Ben also attempts to find wholeness in love at first sight, having an affair 
with a younger woman while separated from Naomi. However, the romance with Petra 
does not turn out as well for him as Jakob‘s life with Michaela had gone; a few months 
of passion end with Petra ransacking Jakob‘s old house, where Ben was staying, and 
leaving when Ben stops her. Saddened and alone, Ben recalls an old friend‘s words and 
agrees: ‗The body…fools us perfectly‘.81 Overall, the way Michaels frames the story of 




Although Michaels uses metaphor and other devices liberally, she 
simultaneously ironises such poetic technique. She has Jakob proclaim that ‗It‘s no 
metaphor to feel the influence of the dead in the world, just as it‘s no metaphor to hear 
the radiocarbon chronometer, the Geiger counter amplifying the faint breathing of rock, 
fifty thousand years old‘.83 Suffering repudiates metaphorical distance—you cannot 
stand apart from it, yet you must. This enhances the instability of the text, undermining 
the readers‘ ability to take positions on what type of text they are reading. In the end, 
bodies bleed into earth and earth into bodies; while the physical processes of the earth 
betray a cosmic memory, the earth also records memory because it holds the trace of 
other bodies. The bodies buried in the ground, from bog-people to Holocaust victims to 
those beloved by the novel‘s protagonists, make that ground holy in the repository of 
memory—holy through the trace of what and who is absent. 
Yet, the matter does not end here. Michaels does suggest an answer to the 
perceivable impasse, a way to continue to maintain a transformative role for creative 
imagination and the language that goes with it; the answer may be brought into focus 
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with the help of Elaine Scarry: if, as noted above, the unmaking of the world ‗is about 
the way that other persons…cease to be visible to us‘, then the making of the world 
concerns the way other people become visible, ‗about the way that we make 
ourselves…available to one another‘.84 In Fugitive Pieces, in the dark of ‗Terra 
Nullius‘, after we read of the reduction of human beings to ‗figuren‘, we hear Jakob 
assert that 
There were the few, like Athos, who chose to do good at great personal 
risk; those who never confused objects and humans, who knew the 
difference between naming and the named. Because the rescuers 
couldn‘t lose sight, literally, of the human, again and again they give us 
the same explanation for their heroism: ―What choice did I have?‖85 
Here, too, the making of the world, the secret of truly creative imagination, is the way 
people are visible to one another. Therefore, the power of poetry to restore lies precisely 
in its power to render other people—and all the realm of their imagination—visible in 
such a way that you cannot deny or diminish their humanity. Language has power 
exactly where it is linked to action and a mode of being, to being available to others, for 
others, like Athos, like Michaela, like Jakob learns to be. Love is not a fluffy subplot, 
but an example of the actualisation of hopeful language in the body. Michaels makes of 
poetry an ethical obligation: if you can see the other, you must act to help the other, any 
turning away becomes wilful disregard. The necessity of love equals the necessity of 
others; indeed, why else would Jakob write his memoirs—he has reached that place of 
love, he could shy ever so much away from the pains of the past—except as an ethical 
offering? 
At the end of The Body in Pain, Scarry summarises her argument by suggesting 
that imagination points to what is essentially the generosity of making: she writes ‗that 
the imagination is bound up with compassion […] has an inherent tendency towards 
largesse and excess‘ and that its work is ‗continuous‘ and ‗ongoing‘.86 The poetic 
imagination, and love, cannot make up for what evils have been done, and certainly 
cannot forgive them, but do imply the way of justice, a way of seeing and acting. Not 
that this is foolproof, but that it offers a possibility. Michaels, in ‗Cleopatra‘s Love‘, 
writes that ‗ultimately the poem itself is a loose net, a sieve, both unviable and durable 
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as a physical object: a web of molecules that gives the illusion of wholeness‘.87 Creative 
imagination, in poetry and in love, may catch you in their net, wake you up, change the 
way you see. Not just in what is said, but in how. Fugitive Pieces is that loose net, 
relying on what the reader makes of it, but also ‗bound up with compassion‘, so that, if 
what it says is unstable, the way it says it offers in its form a possibility for restoration, 
for the complexity of hope, for the reader. 
 
A Lesson in Form; or, Reading Ben Reading Jakob 
 
Try to keep everything and keep 
standing. In the tall grass, 
ten thousand shadows. What‘s past, 
all you‘ve been, 
will continue its half-life, 
a carbon burn searing its way to heaven 
through the twisted core of a pine. 
At night, memory will roam your skin.
88
 
Reflecting on the nature of poetry and epistemology, Michaels has written that 
the poem attempts to represent as many layers of experience as 
possible—unified without loss of complexity—and with luck, manages 
to capture an instant partially, suggestive of the whole. This is perhaps 
more faithful to experience than we immediately think, for our 
knowledge is always partial—in both senses of the word. We rely on our 
perceptions and the perceptions of others; we never learn the whole story 




A living and vibrant sense of reality is created by a fictive sleight of hand; poets provide 
as much representation of reality as they can, and the perceiver‘s mind fills in the gaps. 
Fugitive Pieces follows this strategy, presenting pieces of the lives of its protagonists 
for discerning readers to collect and assemble. The author‘s choice of first-person 
narration for both parts of the book further heightens the ‗partial‘ nature of the 
narrative(s). The reader first learns of events through Jakob‘s memoirs, then through 
Ben‘s reminiscences and reflections, ostensibly made while he is in an airplane 
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returning from Greece to Toronto; a third voice comes in the form of the introductory 
note, which feels like the work of an editor or historian. As a writer, Michaels has made 
a specialty of imagining the voices of others; apart from the novel, a large proportion of 
her poems could be classed as poetic monologues given by characters historical and 
imagined.
90
 Her protagonists in Fugitive Pieces offer their perceptions, slightly 
different, a little off from one another, causing careful readers to begin to wonder if the 
narrators can be trusted; ironically, this questioning probably adds to the realism of the 
text rather than detracting from it. The technique of having two separate narrators 
generates a dense referential network within the book; the overlay of multiple layers 




But even this is too simple an account of Fugitive Pieces. The book does not 
give its two parts equal weight. Ben‘s story comes after Jakob‘s not only 
chronologically but thematically as well. Part II of Fugitive Pieces could be read as a 
very long letter addressed to the dead poet of the first part—Jakob is the ‗you‘ of Ben‘s 
narrative—and forms a very specific echo, response to and reprise of Jakob‘s memoirs. 
Sometimes Ben works this recapitulation very consciously, replying to his own 
experience of what Jakob said, wrote or did, or to reports about Jakob. At other times, 
the reverberations are more subtle, embedded in Ben‘s actions and observations and 
apparently unnoticed by the character, forming clues to be picked up by the reader. In 
                                                                                                                                               
90
  In her books of poetry, Michaels writes from the point of view of such historical personages as 
Johannes Kepler, Karen Blixen, and Kathleen Scott, wife of the Antarctic explorer. Many of her 
poems are first-person narratives, just as in FP; the reader is often left quite unsure whether the voice 
is meant to be Michaels‘s own or a character that she has imagined—or both. Perhaps her skill as a 
writer may be seen in the way critics react to her writing, particularly the ones who say that it is too 
metaphorical: most write as if the words meant to be Jakob‘s or Ben‘s are what Michaels believe; 
none that I have found spare much time to consider what it means that the voices they are hearing are 
carefully constructed, or that the voices are meant to be partial perceptions of history, memory, and 
the world. 
91
  Elaine Scarry, in another work, Dreaming by the Book, discusses the techniques of the human mind 
for imagining complex images, and how writers use such techniques to teach readers how to imagine. 
Although Scarry writes particularly about the depiction of images such as birds flying or the 
movement of skaters, her argument that writers ‗get us to move pictures in our minds‘ by overlapping 
many different images that are partially imagined to various degrees seems very similar to what 
Michaels is doing with narrative voice (see Scarry, Dreaming 74). The work of the imagination 
engages the reader as a participant and partner in creativity. 
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all of this, Jakob‘s tale remains the central story of the novel.92 The question becomes, 
what then is the purpose of Ben‘s narrative? 
I believe that Ben‘s story, this response to Jakob‘s, shapes a thought experiment, 
a lesson in form. Ben‘s story is an example of how readers can learn from Jakob‘s story 
a little of what to do with the body. Michaels offers her readers a possibility of poetry as 
that ‗power of language to restore‘. Not that Ben necessarily gets the reading right: as 
we shall see, there are plenty of occasions when Michaels appears to be showing that 
Ben misreads Jakob‘s story, sometimes disastrously. However, this demonstrates that 
the possibilities which the form of the book engenders are neither static nor closed 
where readers are concerned; readers are free partners in creative imagination, even if 
that means that we may go awry.
93
 Overall, the form of Fugitive Pieces, its body, seeks 
to make its story a pointer to truth by enlisting its readers in a continuous spiral of 
expanding meaning and the extension of its questions concerning the relations of the 
body. 
The basic events of Ben‘s story echo Jakob‘s. Ben‘s childhood emerges from the 
traumatic effects of violence, as does Jakob‘s; the memory of the past becomes a heavy, 
formative burden. Both seek the consolation and understanding of literary art, and both 
enjoin the natural world to provide metaphors to illuminate the meaning of events.
94
 
Both have close relationships with two women: where Jakob has Alex and Michaela, 
Ben has Naomi and Petra. The movement of Ben from Toronto to Idhra follows upon 
                                                                                                                                               
92
  That this is the case is confirmed by the recent film adaptation, in which Ben‘s story is reduced to a 
subplot and Ben himself to a minor character, a neighbour of Jakob and Athos in the apartment in 
which they live, almost an adopted member of their family. Most of the details of Ben‘s traumatised 
family life become slighter allusions and a feeling of menace noticed by Jakob, and Ben‘s interest in 
Jakob‘s serenity comes out mainly in a conversation they have after Ben‘s father has committed 
suicide. In the film, Ben and Naomi receive the honour of introducing Jakob to Michaela; Ben‘s 
subplot serves to help flesh out the characterisation of Jakob. 
93
  Ben‘s misreading of Jakob‘s story—as demonstrated in things Ben does not know (but the reader 
does) or gets wrong, as well as how Ben appropriates the poet‘s story—makes him an unreliable 
narrator. See Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction 273-8 for a discussion on how unreliable 
narrators affect the reading of fiction. Booth observes that authors presenting a reader with an 
unreliable narrator generate suspicion concerning what the narration communicates; this suspicion, in 
turn, helps to put emotional distance between the author and the narrator. Following Booth‘s theories, 
this distance has two probable functions in FP: first, the distance reduces the story‘s sentimentality, 
which quite possibly would have been overwhelming if the novel had ended at the close of Part One, 
with Jakob restored by love; second, it helps to generate in readers some sympathy for the complex 
character of Ben, humanising, in his ignorance and fallibility, someone whose actions do not promote 
a sympathetic response. 
94
  Jakob follows Athos‘s interest in geology; Ben is interested in the ungraspable instability of weather 
as shown in meteorology. 
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Jakob‘s similar movement, each case being a leaving of a relationship as well; and 
Ben‘s motivation for going relies upon Jakob‘s story in that Ben travels in search of 
Jakob‘s memoirs. The structure of the second part in terms of chapters also 
demonstrates the relationship between it and its predecessor, as each of the chapter titles 
in the second part is a repeat of a chapter title in the first part.
95
 At one point, Ben 
admits that ‗aftermath fascinated me‘, and while this refers to a childhood interest in 
abandoned buildings and industrial artefacts, it could refer just as much to his interest in 
Jakob.96 By the time the reader reaches Greece with Ben, he is peppering his own story 
with quotations from Jakob‘s poetry and other work. He writes that 
Your poems from those few years with Michaela, poems of a man who 
feels, for the first time, a future. Your words and your life no longer 
separate, after decades of hiding in your skin. 




When you read this, you get the feeling that Ben is about to attempt to be that ‗every 
man‘, to try to find a future for himself just like Jakob did. Indeed, that he applies to 
Petra lines of Jakob‘s poetry which were inspired by Michaela indicates that Ben wants 
Petra to be his Michaela, wants to be restored with a new love.
98
 Michaels even has Ben 
trace Petra‘s identity bodily during sex in a manner reminiscent of the way Jakob 
describes his discovery of Michaela‘s person through touch; only, Ben‘s account is 
much shorter and far less accomplished than the poet‘s.99 
                                                                                                                                               
95
  The chapters, in order, are:  
 Part I  Part II 
 The Drowned City The Drowned City 
 The Stone-Carriers Vertical Time 
 Vertical Time  Phosphorus 
 The Way Station The Way Station 
 Phosphorus 
 Terra Nullius 
 The Gradual Instant 
96
  FP 228. See also Ben‘s response to Jakob and Michaela‘s house on Idhra in Part II‘s version of 
‗Vertical Time‘. He treats it like a museum, saying that it ‗did possess the silence that is the wake of a 
monumental event‘ (267). 
97
  FP 267. The italics are in the original, and represent a quotation from Jakob‘s work. 
98
  See FP 274-7. 
99
  FP 276. Cf. pp 180-3, and, in fact, the entirety of ‗The Gradual Instant‘, for Jakob‘s embodied 
approach to Michaela. 
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The derivative nature of Ben‘s attempt to reprise Jakob‘s successful restoration 
comes through in so many ways. The reader gets a hint that Ben‘s copying is not perfect 
from a change in order of the chapter titles, and the omission of some altogether. 
Michaels further raises suspicions through the depiction of Ben misreading aspects of 
Jakob‘s life; an obvious example occurs when Ben finds a copy of Pliny‘s Natural 
History in the kitchen of the house on Idhra and assumes that it is ‗obviously mislaid‘, 
while readers know that, during the war, Athos had used Pliny‘s text as a cookbook, and 
the reference to it shows a continuing connection between the life of Jakob and 
Michaela and Jakob‘s debt of gratitude to his foster-father.100 Not only is Ben‘s 
perception partial, but it is not always correct and, once such errors are noticed, how 
much of Ben‘s account can be trusted? Michaels‘s ironic touch also works to undermine 
Ben. For instance, the incident of Ben reading Michaela‘s Master‘s thesis on ethics in 
museology finds him learning about the tragic figure of ‗Minik, the Greenland Inuit 
who was turned into a living exhibit at the American Natural History Museum‘ only to 
find that his father‘s remains were there, too, for everyone to see; despite being moved 
by the story, Ben never sees any connection to what he is doing, to how he—no matter 
how lovingly—is ransacking the home of the dead for his own desire to inhabit their 
lives.
101
 But most of all, Ben‘s story is problematised by the fact that Petra is not 
Michaela (and, for that matter, Naomi is not Alex), notwithstanding how much Ben 
wishes it to be otherwise. Arguably, Petra matches up better with Alex, and Naomi with 
Michaela, in terms of the way they attend to the past; both Naomi and Michaela give 
compassionate attention, while Petra and Alex, though they are not unkind, are not as 
interested in a restoration of what is remembered as part of their relationships.
102
 To be 
fair, though, it is Ben who reads the story incorrectly, just as he reads people 
incorrectly, if he bothers to try: he is so wrapped up in his misreading of Jakob‘s story 
and the fantasy that he builds from it, that he does not really listen as Petra tells him 
                                                                                                                                               
100
  FP 265. For Athos‘s use of Pliny‘s text during the war, see 38. The incident also shows the partiality 
of Ben‘s views in that, for the most part, he does not pay attention to Athos‘s part in Jakob‘s life; he 
does not know the whole story. 
101
  FP 262.  
102
  Like Michaela, Naomi is open to the wounds of the past, offering the consolation of presence; note 
how Michaela listens to the whole story of Bella, and how Naomi becomes a confidant for her 
mother-in-law (e.g., FP 182, 233-4, 247-9). Alex is, at best, indifferent to history‘s burden (as 
discussed earlier), and Petra is, after all, a young twenty-two-year-old woman, perhaps a university 
student, unsure of what to do with her life and travelling through Europe (276-7). 




 If the body ‗fools you perfectly‘, the stories you carry can do the same; 
if Ben‘s narrative is an echo of Jakob‘s, the echo resonates slightly askew. 
Near the end of Jakob‘s memoirs—the part he is able to finish before he gets hit 
by a car—he writes that 
There‘s no absence, if there remains even the memory of absence. 
Memory dies unless it‘s given a use. Or as Athos might have said: If one 




Jakob‘s text, his account of himself and his relations, becomes the map which he offers, 
to his hoped-for children, to any reader. The map describes a possible route for the body 
in the world, a way for memory to be sublimated in flesh, that can assist when you need 
to make decisions of touch and physical contact. This map can help keep other persons 
visible to you—only you still have to read it properly. Anne Michaels constructs the 
whole of Fugitive Pieces, with its various voices, with the frame around Jakob‘s 
memoirs, with Ben‘s response to the life of the peaceful other he has encountered, as a 
reading of the map; Ben‘s reprise itself is a possible reading, a case of attempting to be 
attuned to the constructive powers of language. Yet, Ben does not quite know what to 
do with his compass; his navigational choices lead him to squander love, to look 
without seeing and listen without hearing. The thing is, even though his narrative is, in 
so many ways, a misreading, with it Michaels still shows that creative power of 
language: a misreading is nonetheless something new, and becomes part of the narrative 
chain. By the end, Ben seems to understand that he has taken a wrong turn somewhere. 
Seems to understand: we, the readers, do not know for sure. Does Ben reunite with 
Naomi? Just how will the book inform our own perceptions of the world? Readers get to 
decide where to go, how to follow the map. Among the other images of earth and body, 
memory and maps, Fugitive Pieces offers the image of the fourteenth-century Catalan 
Atlas which, instead of filling in unknown regions with mythic monsters, left them 
blank, naming them ‗simply and frighteningly Terra Incognita, challenging every 
                                                                                                                                               
103
  FP 277. That Ben is a careless reader is also implied by the way that, even after he has found Jakob‘s 
memoirs, after Petra‘s leaving and before Ben heads back to Canada, he does not read the manuscripts 
carefully enough to note where he gets things wrong. Of course, the chronology of Ben and the 
composition of his narrative is unclear—is the reader to think of Ben writing out his monologue to 
Jakob‘s ghost as he goes along, or all at the end, while he is on the plane?—but his carelessness still 
comes out in errors in the composition or a failure to revise. 
104
  FP 193. 
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mariner who unfurled the chart‘.105 Readers opening the book are challenged by the 
blank spaces, the fugitive pieces, and we must explore them for ourselves, constructing 
an edifice of the imagination as we chart our routes among the vulnerabilities of flesh. 
As with Ben, there is no guarantee that we will always get things right. But don‘t 




There is a way our bodies 
are not our own, and when he finds her 
there is room at last 
for everyone they love, 
the place he finds, 





In its dense network of metaphor, imagery, narrative fragments and partial 
perceptions, Fugitive Pieces links its many parts and many levels into a nest for the 
imagination. The thematic interest in the materiality of memory and language, in the 
body and earth and organic transformation, not only extends throughout the prose in 
terms of the content but also is performed in the structure and form of the work. Jakob 
narrates his story in his memoirs; Ben reflects on Jakob‘s story, trying to adopt his 
restoration of the pieces of his life; readers must negotiate the path between them, 
making their own attempts to knit together the fragments, to choose an interpretation of 
the body. This makes perfect sense: if words are objects, if memory is carried in skin 
and bone, rocks and wind, then the shape of the text most certainly should also carry the 
imprint of what the writer is trying to say. Michaels asks her readers to pay attention to 
that shape. The texture of the book calls for a response of dwelling within the silences 
and absences; you receive impressions of characters—of people—and are offered the 
responsibility to imagine their lives.
107
 Because the perceptions which are given are 
partial, the net of imagination which is the entirety of the work can pick up where 
                                                                                                                                               
105
  FP 136-7 
106
  Michaels, from ‗Into Arrival‘, SD, 13-4. 
107
  A responsibility mentioned both by Ben and in words from one of Jakob‘s texts that Ben quotes (FP 
221 and 279). 
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questions arise in the plot; when you wonder if poetry and love actually can restore life 
in response to the deadly power of language to obliterate, the form of the book turns the 
questions back to you, asking you to see what the attempt might produce. In the process 
of looking for artistic truth, readings spin out many meanings, an excess, a generosity. 
Fugitive Pieces shows that the shape of a body—artistic or otherwise—resists 
any move to look beyond or behind the form for the real truth. Moves which treat the 
material merely as the medium for something else ignore the way a multiplicity of 
voices meet at the point of the body, and that such multiplicity cannot be explained 
away or simplified: the complexity, in its creation of density, is what makes the whole 
feel real. You can never perceive the totality even of your own body, let alone of all the 
world which touches upon your body, and what you do perceive cannot always be 
anticipated. Partial perceptions and perspectives are grounded in the place of the body, 
oriented by the direction in which your situation points you, so that you are always 
missing something, the blind spot which you cannot see, the area from which you are 
turned away. This may seem like an obscuration, a darkening of clarity with shadows, 
but it is the shadows which provide depth. You need the different perspectives, the 
different voices, to get a better picture; you need the help of others. 
For Anne Michaels and her writing, this means that beauty, love, and necessity 
flow into one another. ‗The poem,‘ she writes, ‗like love, is consciousness made 
flesh‘.108 To know poetically is to know bodily; love, and grief, can only be described in 
terms of the body—in terms of bodies in relationship, to be more precise. As Jakob 
says, ‗All grief, anyone‘s grief…is the weight of a sleeping child‘.109 In response to that 
bodily knowing, we are asked to be partners in making the world. We are asked to 
remember, to re-create, to be part of restoration. This is connected to an insight that 
Naomi, the character who quietly tries to do nothing but love, gives:  
The only thing you can do for the dead is to sing to them. The hymn, the 
miroloy, the kaddish. In the ghettos, when a child died, the mother sang 
a lullaby. Because there was nothing else she could offer of herself, of 
her body. She made it up, a song of comfort, mentioning all the child‘s 
favourite toys. And these lullabies were overheard and passed along and, 




                                                                                                                                               
108
  CL 183. 
109
  FP 281. See also 158. 
110
  FP 241. 
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Fugitive Pieces is like that song of comfort; yet, the process of singing the fragments as 




                                                                                                                                               
111
  I must admit that none of this actually rebuts Kertzer‘s criticism: this still presents FP as a lesson, 
although it is not quite the lesson that Kertzer fears—a consoling lesson constructed on the backs of 
the bodies of the dead. Instead, it is a lesson in reading and imagining, a lesson in remembering 
through form. Still, it remains a lesson, and the ethical question still stands of whether it is right to use 
the victims of the Holocaust (or of any genocide) as the foundation of any type of learning. But beside 
this stands another question, also open and unanswered: is it not just as unethical for nothing to be 
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odies digress. 
They slip over the surface of the landscape, following the direction of their 
yearnings. They meander mostly along the contours of the earth, trajectories 
turned by the shapes of stone and sand and water, the cast of forest and tangle. Yet, 
sometimes, dreams and ghosts impel bodies to cut across the lines, or try. There is 
always more than any one story can tell. 
Spectral (adj.): of a ghost, of an afterimage of a relationship between bodies; or, 
of the range of light diffracted through a prism. But even as bodies splinter on the 
impassable points, or slough off pieces on the scrabble they traverse, the bodies 
themselves are also prisms, for the storylines that go through them; bodies become 
points of convergence and divergence. 
I learned from Graham Ward the fluidity of the relating body, and, from Stanley 
Hauerwas, the power of stories to shape that body. Marcella Althaus-Reid taught me 
that bodies in love make more than a good place for Christian theology to start, while 
Paul Ricoeur described the way persons narrate their own bodies. However, none of 
them seem that comfortable with the digressions of bodies (transgressions, yes, at least 
with respect to Althaus-Reid and Ward, but not digressions), with wanderings, the way 
the body‘s desire to be in two places at once is realised in the multiplicity of stories. 
(Ricoeur comes close, but we recall how he keeps separate history and fiction). 
In Fugitive Pieces, the story of Jakob‘s body becomes many stories: first, with 
Jakob himself, and the links that he builds; then, with Ben‘s literary refraction of the 
poet‘s life; and, finally, with each reader and what they make of the story embodying 
Jakob‘s attempts to make life whole. The book becomes a whole spectrum of songs for 
the ghosts that haunt you. Yet there is more to be said concerning the different claims 
upon the body, those points where stories intersect. If readers pick up pieces and shape 
the body that they find, if books can help teach what to do with the body, then one 
cannot look just at the body, or the proximities of bodies to one another, or even to their 
travels, but must also attend to their intentions in getting from one place to another. For 
this, we walk with pilgrims, and trace their many routes. 





Catching the Body Against the Current: 
The Disjunctions of Embodiment  
and 
 The Man on a Donkey
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. F. M. Prescott‘s The Man on a Donkey tells the story of the religious 
changes in sixteenth-century England as the monarchy nationalised the 
church, and of the social upheavals and reactions engendered by the ecclesial 
break from Rome, specifically involving the suppression of the monasteries. The book 
focuses upon a group of characters based in the north of the country, and leads the 
reader to the Pilgrimage of Grace, an ill-fated attempt to restore the place of the 
traditional church by folk who were sure that the law that they knew would prevail once 
the true authorities saw reason. The Man on a Donkey is very much an historical novel, 
seeking to present readers with the world of the tale it narrates, a tale of people bound in 
their time. Prescott begins with an ‗Author‘s Note‘, in which she declares: 
The book is cast in the form of a chronicle. This form, which requires 
space to develop itself, has been used in an attempt to introduce the 
reader into a world, rather than at first to present him with a narrative. In 
that world he must for a while move like a stranger, as in real life 
picking up, from seemingly trifling episodes, understanding of those 
around him, and learning to know him without knowing what he learns. 
Only later, when the characters should by this means have become 
familiar, does the theme of the whole book emerge, as the different 
stories which it contains run together and are swallowed up in the tragic 
history of the Pilgrimage of Grace. And throughout, over against the 
world of sixteenth-century England, is set that other world, whose light 
is focused, as through a burning glass, in the half crazy mind of Malle, 
the serving-woman, and in the three cycles of her visions is brought to 




The Man on a Donkey sets about the art of reconstructing the past not so much through 
overwhelming one with the details of the way things were but rather through situating 
the characters in their time. Prescott chronicles the lives of five people who each have 
very different perspectives on the world, having very different stations; they are 
representative of different concerns, religious and social, and the deeds of the very 
powerful appear in relation to them, demonstrating the movements and connections of 




                                                                                                                                               
1
  MoaD 6. 
2
  See Georg Lukács, The Historical Novel 38-9, for a discussion of such a tangential treatment of the 
most important historical figures in the works of Walter Scott, and how this is deemed to enliven the 
representation of a time period. 
h 
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However, the connecting character of Malle, serving-woman and apparent fool, 
adds another element entirely. At one level, Malle functions as a narrative device to 
strengthen the ties of those whose lives make up Prescott‘s chronicle of the Pilgrimage 
of Grace: she constitutes a figure who comes into contact with all the main characters. 
At a different level, though, she simultaneously subverts all of their historical 
motivations: Malle‘s visions of Christ being incarnate not in the past but in her present-
day Yorkshire not only give a reason for all the main characters to seek her out, they 
also suggest to the reader a different view of history, a theological one. For all the 
situated nature of the characters, for all that the range of their choices are produced by 
the social position in which they are enmeshed, Malle hints that a change in perspective 
could give a change in direction as well.
3
 The novel‘s specifically Christian facet 
overlays the historical world with a theological one, not so that the one world negates or 
opposes the other, but so that they exist in a complicated relationship of tension, of push 
and pull. 
In this, The Man on a Donkey well illustrates the disjunctions of human 
embodiment, the gaps between the awareness of the body as one‘s world and the 
awareness of the world through the senses of the body—gaps, too, between the different 
worlds in which people dwell simultaneously. These disjunctions already appear in the 
‗Author‘s Note‘, with a fracturing of history into ‗the world of sixteenth-century 
England‘ and ‗that other world‘. One finds one‘s body split between worlds or, rather, 
inhabiting more than one place, depending on one‘s perspective, so that one can ignore 
simultaneous possibilities, or disavow them, but cannot reduce experience to a singular 
simplicity. The characters, in their embodiment, are all physically situated in history; as 
such, their knowledge and understanding are partial. Movements of cause and effect 
condition their actions; readers see that relationships and choices in any character‘s past 
affect (and sometimes effect) the way their possibilities are delimited. Yet, the 
characters still act out of their own peculiar beliefs and motivations, and out of what 
                                                                                                                                               
3
  As a character, Malle cuts rather a mysterious figure. Although she is the protagonist of the prologue 
and the epilogue, her appearance in the body of the narrative is sudden—one of the nuns of Marrick 
priory comes back from town with her, convinced that she is a mermaid (166-73)—and a full story of 
her origins is never given. In the ‗Historical Note‘ at the end of the book, Malle does not appear at all 
(749-50). This serves to increase the prophetic tone of Malle‘s presence, as the reader is left guessing 
at the character‘s place in the historical record. If you judge by the structure of the book, in which the 
chronicle format is broken to introduce the major characters by bringing the reader up to date with the 
characters‘ lives up to the point that they enter the chronological narrative, Malle apparently is not to 
be considered one of the protagonists—at least, not a protagonist of the history that is being told: she 
is, instead, the protagonist of the counter-narrative. 
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they believe concerning other people. Time and time again, misreadings of a situation, 
caused by a person‘s specific character or even a mere glance in the wrong direction, 
cause them to act in ways that, little by little, determine the path on which history will 
carry them. The slippages between what characters believe and what is actually 
happening thus become productive, generating new action and perspective even out of 
misunderstanding, and hinting towards an excess, a spiralling chain of events. At the 
same time, all the characters—except Malle, perhaps, who might be out of place, but is 
still more than any other character comfortable in her own skin—are remarkably 
displaced. They yearn to be elsewhere, or for their times and their world to be otherwise 
than they are. Such yearning works against an apparent determinism of history. On the 
one hand, the body appears in its historical place, subject to the time of the novel‘s 
setting, the physical site for the working out of class, power and politics; on the other 
hand, the body in a spiritual sense comes to suggest that this historical place is a 
construction, and is capable of reconstruction, as shown when Malle sees God 
embodied in the world and offering the consolatory prospect of companionship with 
human beings. Through The Man on a Donkey, one may see how the tensions generated 
by disjunctions, while they cannot be resolved, remain creative tensions, offering 
possibilities for understanding the fluidity of the body.  
In this chapter, I explore the disjunctions and displacements highlighted by The 
Man on a Donkey. After a brief discussion of the book as an historical novel, including 
examining the way H. F. M. Prescott formulated her historical work on pilgrimage, I 
turn to Paul Ricoeur. The way Prescott‘s novel deals with history can be linked to 
Ricoeur‘s discussion of the interpretation of the human understanding of time in the 
composition of narrative, particularly to the way human beings narrate or ‗emplot‘ 
events in order to navigate the difference between large tracts of time (even eternity) 
and the time that we sense.
4
 The chapter ends with a consideration of that fluidity of the 
body, and the gaps in our understanding and awareness of the body, exploring the 
nature of absence as seen in how Malle, seeking the embodied Christ, finds but traces of 
his passing—yet those traces remain a concrete witness—and, with this, a reflection 
upon how the disjunction between the historical and the theological might be interpreted 
in such a work of creative imagination. 
                                                                                                                                               
4
  The issue is the subject of his long work TN, but for this chapter I will mainly be engaging with what 
he himself terms a ‗schematic presentation‘ of the conclusions of that work‘s third volume, as 
presented in the essay ‗Narrated Time‘ [NT]. 
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Threading the Path of Time: The Man on a Donkey and Historical Narrative 
 
The imagined world of The Man on a Donkey is a world in parentheses. As the 
book begins with an ‗Author‘s Note‘, it ends with an ‗Historical Note‘, which informs 
the reader of the historical accuracy of Prescott‘s tale. This note gives examples of the 
evidence behind the words and actions of the historical personages who appear in the 
novel, making sure to name the most famous and powerful of them, such as Henry VIII 
and Anne Boleyn.
5
 The note also points out the documentary foundations of the 
characterisations of three of the five protagonists: Lord Darcy and the uprising‘s leader, 
lawyer Robin Aske, whose lives were well covered by contemporary chroniclers, and 
Christabel Cowper, the Prioress of Marrick, whose name Prescott took from a list of 
nuns and whose character the author deduced from the little evidence which she 
proclaims ‗suggestive of her personality‘.6 The other two protagonists, Julian Savage, 
illegitimate daughter of a lord and a peasant, and Gib Dawe, a priest who becomes a 
Protestant, are both inventions of the author‘s imagination.7  
Even so, readers can see that with these five characters Prescott attempts to 
cover a range of types, the better to flesh out the world at the time of the social upheaval 
constituted by the English Reformation. Aske is necessary as the prime mover of the 
action of the novel‘s plot. Darcy provides not only a narrative of what the change in 
church and state relations means for the nobility but also a means by which readers may 
gain a vantage point upon the English court and the political machinations of the years 
covered in the book. The prioress acts likewise for the monastic strand of ecclesiastic 
life, and projects the hierarchy of power in a religious community through her thoughts 
and deeds. Julian and Gib both stand among the lower classes and, although Gib 
presents the views of those who saw in Protestant theology a way to remake the world, 
both are characters whose lives primarily demonstrate the effect of social change on 
those powerless to shape it much for themselves. By weaving the tales of five very 
different characters together, Prescott allows a stereoscopic vision of the history: the 
                                                                                                                                               
5
  MoaD 749. 
6
  MoaD 749. 
7
  MoaD 749. 
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accounts from different vantage points overlap much like the way photographs of the 
same object taken from slightly different angles combine to create the appearance of 
depth because their shadows are slightly askew. Such a nuanced portrait works to 
convince readers that they are glimpsing the truest approximation of the past through 
the novelist‘s composition.8 
The attempt to show the broadest possible view of a past social world exists very 
much as an historiographical move; to examine an era in history through the lives of a 
group of people constitutes part of the effort to get as much documentary evidence as 
possible in order to represent the past and make it available for an analysis of how that 
past fits hypothesised trends of cause-and-effect and meaning. The more evidence you 
examine, the greater the probability of the accuracy of your findings. Prescott herself 
did not confine the technique to her novel-writing. In an historical book on late 
mediaeval pilgrimages to Jerusalem, though Prescott focuses on the account of one 
pilgrim, Friar Felix Fabri, she begins with a chapter examining a group of representative 
                                                                                                                                               
8
  This literary technique is similar to Anne Michaels‘s poetics in which the partial suggests the whole 
(see [29] above). Although Michaels is referring particularly to poetry, one might also describe 
Prescott‘s novel as ‗a loose net, a sieve, both unviable and durable as a physical object: a web of 
molecules that gives the illusion of wholeness‘ (CL 161). While it is impossible for a writer to capture 
fully and completely the past in which a novel is set for the work‘s contemporary readership, a writer 
can construct a textual world with enough historical elements within it that the reader‘s imagination 
can do the rest.  
  Prescott‘s weaving of different perspectives also serves to demonstrate the relational nature of 
historical narrative. When Lukács summarises the narrative aim of a novel which aims at realism as 
‗the portrayal of a total context of social life‘, he is pointing out that the story being told must be 
situated in terms of a believable relationship of all the parts, not just characters with other characters 
but also characters with the world around them (Lukács, 242). Admittedly, Lukács maintains that this 
novelistic attempt to depict society as a whole is not a characteristic peculiar to historical novels but to 
any truly realistic novel, but one could argue that it is particularly important for an historical novel 
because of the gulf between the experience of the reader and the world of the past. In any case, the 
fact that MoaD has such an array of protagonists allows the book more thoroughly to compose an 
overview of the social life at the time of Henry VIII. 
  Interestingly, both Lukács and Michaels criticise writing that succumbs to the temptation to 
overdo this. Lukács disparages any tendency towards what he calls ‗archeologism‘ in historical 
novels—the idea that paying slavish attention to technical, material detail of life in the past will 
generate a good novel about that past—declaring that this just serves to make the world of the novel 
‗strange and unfamiliar‘ so that a reader cannot actually connect with its imagined world very well 
(Lukács, 198). Michaels refers to what can happen if the multiplication of perceptions concerning an 
imagined world or moment goes too far as ‗a writer‘s false hope that mere plenitude of detail will 
swell into realism‘ (CL, 179). MoaD does not fall into this trap; the details of artefacts seem accurate 
but not intrusive, as the focus remains on the perspective of the characters, even if in third-person 
voice from an omniscient narrator. The realism does not come from a heap of accumulated factual 
details, but rather from the position of each character‘s gaze: their partial seeing, hearing, and 
knowing situates them in time and place, so that their limits generate the sense that they are more 
human, more embodied.  (See, again, Haraway, ‗Situated Knowledges‘, FST, for the discussion of 
partiality, position and epistemology; in a way, a novel like MoAD demonstrates the point that 
Haraway is making in showing that a plurality of embodied, limited and situated voices, speaking 
from embodied, limited and situated experiences, portrays best the fullness of a world.) 
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types of pilgrims. Prescott declares that ‗it will be well to try to set [the friar] against the 
background of his time, and among some of the vast company of pilgrims who made 
that same journey during the fifteenth century and left a record of their experiences‘.9 In 
doing so, she does not limit the people she profiles to being exactly contemporary to 
Felix Fabri—who made the journey twice, first in 1480 and again in 1483—for what 
matters more is that the historical record of their pilgrimage exists to be consulted, so 
that the group ranges from Margery Kempe in 1413 to Arnold von Harff, a noble, in the 
1490s. They make up a diverse group of devout laypeople, members of the nobility, a 
priest, a bishop, a collection of friars, and a canon who had long served as ‗secretary at 
the Milanese Embassy in Rome‘.10 This variety, while necessarily restricted to people 
having the means to leave behind their own documentation of their travel, nevertheless 
serves to broaden the reader‘s understanding of what the pilgrim‘s journey could have 
been like; thus, the historian in contextualising the narrative of her subject increases the 
possibility that readers might identify with that subject by striving to generate a fuller, 
deeper comprehension of people in the past. Prescott tells readers that they will turn to 
the testimony of these other fifteenth-century pilgrims ‗from time to time for some 
anecdote or comment which adds to our picture of the pilgrims‘ world‘.11 Details given 
from the perspectives of different pilgrims provide support for the main narrative which 
Prescott is examining. 
As a history, Jerusalem Journey remains primarily an account of a narrative; 
there is more presentation than analysis, more of the telling of the tale of the journey. 
Prescott basically retells Brother Felix‘s Evagatorium in Terrae Sanctae, with 
commentary on the events and additions concerning places and types of experiences 
from other pilgrims‘ records; however, she does not do this by presenting a translated 
edition of the Latin text, but by re-narrating the journey.
12
 This aspect of narration 
                                                                                                                                               
9
  JJ 14. 
10
  JJ 39. 
11
  JJ 18. 
12
  In this, JJ can be seen as a textbook illustration of Ricoeur‘s idea of the fictionality of history, 
including his work on the place of the imagination both in historiography and in the reading of 
history. See TN, volume 1, part 2, and volume 3, particularly chapter eight, ‗The Interweaving of 
History and Fiction‘ (180-92). Prescott‘s historical work certainly exemplifies what Ricoeur terms 
‗narrative history‘, the past understood as a story of what happened (TN, 1, 91). Now, understandably, 
Ricoeur strives primarily to show the narrative character of even the least narrative-like forms of 
history (see v. 1, 91 and 230), but in pointing out the importance of plot, characterisation and event for 
our understanding of the connection of history and the past, he demonstrates the place of a narrative 
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stands alongside the technique of a plurality of perspectives in connecting Jerusalem 
Journey to The Man on a Donkey. By the stories that they tell, both books, together with 
their readers, seek to construct a believable world which the imagination can inhabit. 
Yet, the two books go about their stated tasks very differently. Beyond their author 
identifying one book as a history and the other as a novel, the books approach the issue 
of particularity and universality from opposite directions. Jerusalem Journey uses the 
story of Brother Felix‘s pilgrimage, supplemented where needed by the stories of other 
pilgrims throughout the century, to present what pilgrimage would have been like 
generally; The Man on a Donkey, though the years it chronicles constitute lifetimes for 
its characters, brings its protagonists together, to a point in time, to present what 
consequences the circumstances around a particular event—the Pilgrimage of Grace—
might have had for specific people contemporary to and involved in that event.
13
 
To work as a novel, The Man on a Donkey must invite readers to enter its world 
to a much greater extent than Jerusalem Journey requires. Besides characterisation, one 
of the techniques which the historical novel utilises is what Georg Lukács calls 
‗necessary anachronism‘, referring to the need to bridge the gap between the 
incomprehensibilities of the past and the mentality of one‘s reader.14 The great marker 
                                                                                                                                               
such as JJ historiographically, as one end of a range of historiographical types, where the other end 
would be the purest analysis of statistical data possible. When Ricoeur discusses the ways that history 
and fiction function to aid one another, he writes of history as the attempt to move from the trace of 
the past to being able to see a world that is no longer, to try to see what you would see if you could get 
to the past‘s foreign country. Readers use their imagination for this type of seeing in a similar way that 
readers approach a work of fiction and imagine its world that is not immediately before them except in 
the text, so that ‗One and the same work can thus be a great work of history and a fine novel. What is 
surprising is that this interlacing of fiction and history in no way undercuts the project of standing-for 
[sic] belonging to history, but instead helps to realize it‘ (TN, 3, 186). Prescott‘s voice, the voice of 
the historian telling the stories of the pilgrims, uses arts of storytelling to present the pilgrims‘ world 
to people at a great remove from it. 
13
  In relation to the difference between the two books, one may also note Lukács‘s analysis of the way 
the main characters of historical novels tend to be peripherally connected to the prime actors in 
history—the famous people—in order to demonstrate the relationship between the novel‘s main 
characters and a socio-historical crisis. As Lukács writes, ‗The historical crises are direct components 
of the individual destinies of the main characters and accordingly form an integral part of the action 
itself. In this way the individual and the social-historical are inseparably connected in regard to both 
characterization and action‘ (200-1). The five chronicled characters of MoaD are all directly affected 
by the Reformation of the Church in England: Aske and Darcy are executed for their parts in the 
Pilgrimage of Grace; the prioress is turned out of the priory as it is placed in the hands of the nobility; 
Julian loses every chance of stability, comfort and love that she perceives; and Dawe, though an 
adherent of the New Learning, finds that his failure to negotiate Reformation politics, combined with 
overweening pride and lack of compassion, just feeds his anger, self-hatred, and despair. In JJ, 
Prescott strives to bring an era alive, and uses Brother Felix‘s fascinating account to illustrate and 
enliven. 
14
  Lukács 195. 
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of such anachronism lies in the language used in the novel, for in order to be 
understandable to present-day readers, the novelist composes the story in present-day 
language, with only a sprinkling of archaic words to flavour the text and remind the 
readers that they are concerned with the past.
15
 In so doing, of course, The Man on a 
Donkey creates a linguistic world that never existed apart from the novel and the 
imaginations of its readers. This appears even more forcefully in the form that Prescott 
chose to give to the work, that of a chronicle. Annals and chronicles have a long 
historical pedigree in documenting events—one might think of the Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicle, for instance—but Prescott gives the genre a modern twist. Few historical 
chronicles would have recorded the stories of characters like Julian and Gib, certainly 
not in the detail given in The Man on a Donkey. Rather than reaching for full 
verisimilitude, the chronicle technique creates an illusion of a document 
contemporaneous with the events it portrays, and thus helps to construct a world 
simultaneously unlike that of the reader and that of the actual past. The anachronistic 
combination of the chronicle genre and present-day readers‘ interest in the lives of all 
types and classes of people mark out a certain chronological slippage, a split between 
duties of faithfulness to the past and meeting the artistic needs of the present.
16
 
This slippage constructs an imagined space in which author and reader can 
explore the meanings of the narrated events and bodies. The story told is no longer only 
history, but history through the craft of the novelist, whose constructed world is set 
alongside the dual worlds that she herself perceives (and addresses): the socio-political 
realm, on the one hand, and the divine on the other. There is no simple bifurcation of 
                                                                                                                                               
15
  John Henry Raleigh, in ‗The Historical Novel as Work of Art and Tragedy: H. M. F. [sic.] Prescott‘s 
The Man on a Donkey‘ 13, notes that archaisms are restricted to the dialogue in the book, being used 
either for era-appropriate epithets and curses or for dialect words that mark a character‘s class or home 
region. While this is mostly true, there is another place that archaisms emerge—in theological 
descriptions connected with Malle‘s visions. (For examples, see MoaD 387 and 741.) 
16
  The chronicle technique does move beyond this ‗necessary anachronism‘ in the literary artistry that it 
provides for the story, as pointed out in Raleigh, ‗Historical Novel‘, 3-11. Using the form of a 
chronicle allows Prescott to telescope time, playing with the chronology so that during the climactic 
events time is stretched as more detail is given. The form lets Prescott have characters narrate events 
that have occurred outside the chronological entries or receive the narration of events which they do 
not witness. Prescott also uses the chronicle genre to set up a very sophisticated matrix of symbols, 
events and places, so that the reader continually is encouraged to compare what is happening ‗here‘ 
with what happened ‗there‘, as well as generating a seasonal cycle of events that will feed into the 
theological time of the novel. It should also be noted, however, that even though the novel is in the 
form of a chronicle, it does not cease to be a narrative (as Raleigh seems to suggest, ‗Historical 
Novel‘, 3) but rather rearranges the expectations of the narrative along episodic lines, all in conjuring 
up the world of the sixteenth century in a way that can be told to the twentieth (and later). 
 | 208 
 
worlds, however—something which can be seen in the characters themselves, for the 
chief characters all live simultaneously, not only in the two worlds singled out by 
Prescott in her opening ‗Author‘s Note‘, but also in the fictive world created by the 
writing of the novel. Following upon this many-faceted nature of creation, the story and 
the characterisation continually draw attention to forces which pull in multiple 
directions. 
One may see this in sharp relief at any of the times that the chief characters 
come in direct contact with Malle and her visions. It is not that those chief characters 
cannot perceive the existence of spiritual things—that they are totally blind to what 
Malle shows to the world—but that what they understand of spiritual matters is 
intertwined with their political and social natures. For instance, when Darcy goes to ask 
Malle what she has seen, hoping to get a sign for political action against the regime‘s 
new ways, she presents him only with the same sentence that she says to all the others: 
‗There was a great wind of light blowing, and sore pain‘.17 Eventually, waiting for 
something more on which to pin his hopes, Darcy says, ‗He would not resist His 
enemies. That I know. But for us it is different. Shall we  stand  by  and  see—and  
not—‘.18 Darcy is certainly not unaware of a conflict between approaches here, of 
different ways to see history, but goes on to continue in the path of the political choices 
that he has already made. 
The tensions presented in The Man on a Donkey between different approaches to 
seeing the world could be understood as conflicts in loyalty. When there are multiple 
possibilities for seeking meaning, to which do you ascribe the most weight, and what of 
the burden of the others whose existence and possibilities never actually go away? The 
book depicts the way different claims upon a person—and upon a person‘s body—stand 
almost as coexisting, but alternate, worlds because of variations in the direction of the 
eyes towards the one world. The reader sees the bodies of the characters claimed both 
by a socio-political web and by a religious nexus. The literary artistry of the book in 
making the characters come alive—in causing readers to care about what happens to 
them—reveals yet another claim, that of the personal. The characters live in the 
imagination in as much as readers see them as having personal claims over what 
happens to their bodies; that is, the depth of the characterisation shows when the 
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  MoaD 408. 
18
  MoaD 409. 
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historical conflict between the socio-political realm and the religious is mediated by the 
realisation that the characters themselves would be the ones with the most intimate 
connection to their bodies, the ones who feel pleasure and pain, the ones whose bodies 
are irreducible—certainly not reduced only to the claims that others have upon them. 
The novelist articulates the awareness of the splits and slippages surrounding claims 
upon the body, using literary technique to point them up. Characters may be aware, 
from time to time, of contradictions between personal, social, and religious ‗ownership‘ 
of the body, but it is the author who plots this cohesively. The nature of this book as an 
historical novel, then, not only presents a world of the past to the reader, but also 
arranges that past and the imagination of that past to suggest a certain reading, one that 
leads to questions about how different approaches might connect to one another. 
 
A Travel Guide: Walking along the road with a few words from Ricoeur 
 
In ‗Narrated Time‘, an essay following his magisterial work, Time and 
Narrative, Paul Ricoeur wonders how narrative‘s rearranging of events might change 
the human experience of time. Near the beginning, he declares that he wishes to discuss 
‗refiguration‘, which he defines as ‗the power of revelation and transformation achieved 
by narrative configurations when they are ―applied‖ to actual acting and suffering‘.19 
Admittedly, this covers an immense range of possibilities; even though Ricoeur himself 
states that he will focus on the aspect of time in human understanding, this cannot 
bracket out the fact that such ‗revelation and transformation‘ to which he refers alludes 
to a reconstruction of nothing less than the way human beings encounter the world 
around them, as well as one another, and the power that narratives have to affect the 
situations in which people live. Yet, although this involves some very large claims, I 
want to concentrate on the foundation from which Ricoeur unfolds his argument—that 
human beings experience time in an aporetic manner, divided between lived moments 
and that ‗immensity of time‘ whose scale approaches eternity—as instructive for 
examining the embodied disjunctions which The Man on a Donkey presents.
20
 What 
Ricoeur writes concerning the meeting of historical and fictional time provides a 
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  NT 339. 
20
  NT 343. 
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template for discussing the creative space created by the divided sense of the body 
which Prescott chronicles. 
Ricoeur portrays historical time and fictional time as two different but related 
ways of bridging the gap between lived time and cosmic time. He sketches historical 
time as having three elements which he calls ‗connectors‘.21 The first of these is 
‗calendar time‘, the activity of fixing time by means of naming seasons and years, and 
ascribing events upon this ordered chronological range by giving them dates.
22
 This 
process, Ricoeur argues, ‗integrates the community and its customs into the cosmic 
order‘.23 In other words, calendar time brings the moments of lived experience into 
relation with the grand expanses of what has happened in the past and what is surmised 
to happen in the future; the measured pattern of chronology carves time into 
manageable sections for human reference, giving the ability to situate events. The 
second connector to which Ricoeur points is ‗the sequence of generations‘.24 He calls 
attention to the way generations biologically mark time in terms of one‘s ancestry and 
progeny; he also notes that it is the overlap of generations that allows the chain of 
family memories to continue and to grow. This ordering of biological existence expands 
the moments of one person‘s life into the past and towards the future. Finally, Ricoeur 
cites as the third bridging element ‗history‘s recourse to monuments and documents‘.25 
For him, such records of the past act as traces, as still-existing remnants of what once 
was but is no longer; the artefacts maintain physical presence in the world, but in so 
doing witness to people or deeds gone by, representing that which is absent. The world 




Fictional time functions in a similar way in bridging lived moments to the 
expanses of cosmic chronology. A novel with its plot and characters generates a fictive 
world with its own calendar, sequence of generations, and traces of the past to be 
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  NT 343. 
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  NT 343. 
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  NT 344. 
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  NT 344. 
25
  NT 344. 
26
  NT 345-6. 
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narrated; even if a writer imagines such things differently, the categories remain. 
Ricoeur proposes that historical and fictional time differ at the level of intent, writing 
that 
We are aware that the ambition of the historian is that his constructions 
be also more or less approximate reconstructions of events which have 
actually happened in the past; whereas the novelist, even if…he projects 
something like a world of the text, leaves indeterminate the relation 
between his imaginary world and the actual world where the activity of 
the reader is situated.
27
 
Historians attempt to represent the past in some way, including by the interpretation of 
what really happened.
28
 Although this involves imaginary reconstructions, it is different 
from the composition of fiction in that fiction is not bound to fix the time that it seeks to 
imagine. Still, Ricoeur disputes the idea that this means that only historians aim to 
depict something that is real, arguing that if fiction and history were not closely alike in 
so many ways, they would generate no conflict with one another.
29
 To analyse how 
historical time relates to fictional time with more nuance, he utilises the connectors 
which he has already outlined for historical time. Ricoeur posits that ‗the response of 
fiction‘ to the aporetic nature of time is ‗to invent imaginative variations with respect to 
the cosmic reinscription effected by history‘.30 Novels create their ‗imaginative 
variations‘ by being free from the constraints that govern those connectors in history. 
The key seems to be that events in fictive worlds occur unmoored from the 
chronological systems by which human beings make sense of cosmic time. Not that 
plots do not unfold over time, but that the events of a story happen over and over again 
within that story, every time that it is read—though, with each reading, readers are also 
free to imagine the events differently, to notice things for the first time. This means that 
where, for history, time passes to a consistently measured beat, for fiction, time is 
bound by the beginnings and ends of stories, and what they suggest might exist beyond 
                                                                                                                                               
27
  NT 339-40. 
28
  In a discussion of methods for understanding the past-ness of the past in history, Ricoeur moves 
through the notion that history involves ‗re-enactment‘ which tries to bring the past to the same level 
as the present and then the idea that the nature of the past lives in its radical (unbridgeable?) 
‗otherness‘, finally to suggest that the best way of thinking about the past is analogically—‗To say 
what things were as, is to see them as‘. (NT, 347-8). The search for what really happened then 
becomes an exercise of imagined relation. 
29
  NT 349. 
30
  NT 351. 
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those borders, but inside those borders time plays to the whim of the imagination 
somewhat like music at the baton of a conductor. Ricoeur notes that ‗The exploration of 
the possible can thus give free rein to imaginative variations which have the experiential 
value of eternity‘.31 Fiction offers endless variation because the fictive worlds and their 
characters, freed from inscription in calendar time, live in a way such that the dead 
remain with the living despite the relentless sequence of generations, and the trace is an 
outline of that which is absent but may never have been there. 
According to Ricoeur, the power of fiction to take part in the refiguration of time 
lies precisely in the incongruity between fictional time and historical time. He declares: 
Thus it is in reading that the world of the text and the fictive experience 
of time which emerges from it intersect with the actual world of the 
reader, the world of my actual acting and suffering. The meaning of the 
work in the full sense of the word, its significance, if you will, is 
complete only in its more or less conflictual encounter between the 
world of the text and the world of the reader.
32
 
The imaginative variations on those elements which bridge lived time and cosmic 
time—the fictional orderings rather than the historical ones—gain significance as the 
reader compares what could have been with what she or he actually understands to have 
happened. This significance underlines both revelation and transformation in that the 
truth about the world which thereby is revealed changes the reader.
33
 
This works as a way to approach the point where a reader‘s specifically 
historical narrative encounters a separate fiction. However, what then do you do with a 
novel like A Man on a Donkey, with historical fiction? Here we have a narrative striving 
to be constrained by calendar time, even if elements (including whole persons) did not 
exist in history‘s version of that calendar, a narrative that mixes the two approaches 
which Ricoeur labels ‗disymmetrical‘.34 At first glance this would suggest that, perhaps, 
Ricoeur‘s formulation just does not work for an historical novel; there is too much 
mingling of genre going on, too much confusion of possibility and what really happened 
for one to follow a theory which seems to separate history and fiction over the question 
of claims concerning the truth. Another way to understand what it could mean for the 
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novel would be to infer that Ricoeur‘s construction of different modes or 
understandings of time emphasises the two worlds to which Prescott draws attention; in 
the world of Malle, the fictional coincides with the theological as the author weaves 
meaning into the historical events, and the significance of the novel may only be seen in 
the conflict between the two worlds. This interpretation works to a point. The tension 
between the political realm of sixteenth-century England and the eternal realm of the 
divine does indeed drive the novel. But the separation between the two realms, as 
already noted, is not total; the historical and the theological, representing in this case 
Prescott as historian and Prescott as creative writer, intermingle more than they 
intersect. 
Yet, to think that this apparent mismatch between Ricoeur‘s theorising and 
Prescott‘s writing causes one to disprove the other would be an oversimplification of 
both. Ricoeur ends ‗Narrated Time‘ with a discussion of the ways that history is like 
fiction and vice versa. Of history, he remarks that ‗The connectors that reinscribe mortal 
time upon cosmic time are all institutions, inventions that witness to the ingenuity of the 
productive imagination‘.35 He also talks about fiction‘s place in helping people in the 
present imagine the depths of the horrible, such as the Holocaust, for imagination which 
utilises a type of fictive account of the world enfleshes the statistics of the dead.
36
 Of 
fiction, Ricoeur observes that a story told is invariably related ‗as if it were past‘.37 A 
fictive account is set up alongside what is known of the historical past, functioning as an 
alternative which prompts new understandings of relationships and meanings. Ricoeur 
declares that 
The interpretation which I propose here of the quasi-historical character 
of fiction cross-checks with what I propose concerning the quasi-
fictional character of the historical past. It is because of its quasi-
historical character that fiction can exercise its liberating function with 
respect to possible hidden elements in the actual past. What ‗could have 
taken place‘—the object of poetry as opposed to history according to 
Aristotle—fuses the potentialities of the ‗real‘ past and the ‗irreal‘ 
possibilities of pure fiction.
38
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  NT 353. 
37  
NT 353. Interestingly, Ricoeur goes on to argue that a fictional account does tell of something that 
happened—something that took place for the ‗narrative voice‘ or ‗implied author‘, that is. 
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I take this to mean that fiction and history, by virtue of their resemblance to one 
another, collaborate in the work of revelation and transformation. They both reveal part 
of the truth of the world, and in that truth offer a reader the chance to follow along in 
the path of what has been perceived—a chance,  to reconstruct (or reconfigure, as 
Ricoeur would probably say) the narratives by which human beings mark actions and 
make decisions about possible actions. By the combination of the two narratives of 
time, Ricoeur declares that people fashion a ‗human time‘ that reconciles experienced 




Under this scheme, The Man on a Donkey becomes a meditation on how people 
work to reconcile the two kinds of time using different kinds of narratives telling about 
time, and on how human embodiment simultaneously is suspended in those narratives in 
ways congruent to the narratives. What the novel does and what Ricoeur postulates do 
not correspond in a simple, one-to-one analogy, however. The book works at various 
levels, and each of those levels reflects what Ricoeur observes about time‘s aporias in a 
different way. Within the world of the text, the characters find themselves negotiating 
among the claims that different narratives stake on them and their bodies; the two 
worlds of the political and the divine align with the gap between lived moments and the 
cosmic/ eternal. At the level of engaging with the text of the novel, author and readers 
tread a path between the historical and the fictional. For this, on the one hand, the text 
draws upon what is inscribed in calendar time and what may be discovered about the 
past from the documentary traces which have been left behind; on the other hand, the 
text, as constructed and imagined, embodies in what has been invented the pursuit of 
‗what could have been‘, an area which is imbued with values supplied by the choices 
made by the author. What is essential to realise is that, as with Ricoeur‘s formulation of 
the matter, there are actually two very different, though connected, gaps at play here: 
the gap in how people experience time, and the gap between the narrative methods by 
which people attempt to bridge the gap in what they experience. As an author, it would 
seem that Prescott wants to underscore the gap in experience through the story which 
she is telling, utilising the tension between the historical and the fictional to provide the 
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  NT 354. 
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energy that drives the story.
40
 The significance of what Ricoeur provides is that his 
scheme gives a structure by which one can discuss Prescott‘s novel. The rest of this 
chapter will follow that structure, looking first at the world of the text and what the 
characters demonstrate about the various ways that the human body is oriented 
simultaneously, then turning to the craft of the writer in seeking a theological and 
liturgical response to the formal gap between history and fiction, a response revealed in 
a discussion of the trace of the absent body. 
 
Fractured Person, Fractured Body  
 
At any one moment, a person is pulled in many directions—where they have 
been and where they are going; where they have imagined they have been, where they 
think they are going, where they want to go; what they tell others of these things, what 
is documented or traced in words and actions. If you have the chance to look closely at 
any person, it is possible to notice such divisions. Some are created by circumstance, 
some by self-delusions, and some by dreams and desires which can only approximately 
match with what is possible for individuals. Of course, one can only surmise how this 
works for any one person (even for oneself); motivation is hidden from view, and 
memories and imaginations are not always trustworthy. Fiction conjures up the 
possibilities, however, opening windows upon what is concealed. The Man on a Donkey 
is no exception to this. As mentioned earlier, the characters show evidence of divided 
loyalties as they negotiate different understandings of the world in which they live, a 
world itself depicted in the novel as divided. Not only are the characters pulled in 
different because of the differing claims upon them, but they do not see the totality of 
                                                                                                                                               
40
  One might notice that this places the theological with the fictional in terms of function. This is not to 
say that theological values are fictional, but that as they are brought into this text, their presence relies 
upon the author‘s creative choices in fashioning this particular fictive world. The author draws out 
theological meaning by telling this story in the way she does. In fact, the novel is inherently 
christological, going beyond the obvious title reference, Malle‘s visions of Jesus, and the allusions to 
the gospel narrative in plot and characterisation, to the novel‘s reflections upon the gaps between 
different modes of time. Christology, as the study of the identity and work of Jesus of Nazareth, 
precisely concerns itself with explaining what Christian faith acknowledges concerning one whose 
embodiment bridges the gap between different ways of understanding the world. Look, for instance, at 
the Chalcedonian Creed with its insistence on the person of Christ as being both divine and human, 
the two natures undivided but not mingled or confused. Christological reflection upon the Jesus of 
history and the Christ of faith also constitutes an investigation into the paradox of differing but 
intersecting narratives. By contemplating the possibilities for reconciling the various strands which 
pull at a body, The Man on a Donkey enacts a christological meditation. 
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what is happening. The novel points out the tragedy of the characters‘ partial vision, 
depicting this not only in what is said but at the level of the body, too. 
Take, for example, the characterisation of Robin Aske, tragic hero, leader of the 
Pilgrimage of Grace, the consequences of which destroy him. At first glance, Aske is 
the most sympathetic of the five chief characters of Prescott‘s chronicle. He stays true to 
his ideals, never giving up on the principle of law. To those who look for such things, 
he appears to be the Christ figure of the tale, with his gruesome execution 
corresponding to the crucifixion of Jesus.
41
 But this is not the full story; Prescott 
configures Aske in a much more complex manner. First of all, she never allows the 
reader to forget that Aske lost an eye in a childhood accident.
42
 His one-eyed nature 
becomes a cipher for his failure to see the full dimension of things that are happening 
around him. His partial blindness goes beyond the physiological wound to a wilful 
narrowing of his vision, as may be seen by looking at his encounters with other 
characters. He does not see his effect on Julian, who has fallen in love with him and 
whose last hope is pinned on the idea that she might be given in marriage to him, partly 
because he physically does not see her face and thus cannot see the depth of her 
anguish.
43
 Indeed, Aske never realises how much her dreams of him have shaped the 
course of her life; he is so busy worrying about the state of justice in England that he 
never really sees Julian as a person, and even his attempts at kindness (such as pledging 
friendship by planting apple seeds together without noticing that the girl was looking for 
far more) miss the mark.
44
 
Aske‘s personal pain resounds out of the divisions of claims in which his body is 
enmeshed, resulting finally in the extreme physical pain of his execution. Under the 
law, as a lawyer and a subject of the king, he and his body is pledged in service to the 
state. In a sense, his death stands as a transaction in which the king claims the body that 
                                                                                                                                               
41
  Henry VIII, hearing an appeal that Aske not be drawn and quartered, decided that a more fitting 
punishment would be for the rebel to be hanged in chains from the tower of the Keep at York until he 
died a slow death, presumably of exposure and thirst (MoaD 726-8). Aske‘s execution coincides with 
the climax of Malle‘s series of visions which recapitulate the life of Christ (MoaD 737-8). 
42
  Beginning at MoaD 111-3. 
43
  MoaD 437. 
44
  MoaD 437. A similar blindness is marked in his meeting with Malle, when he seeks a sign of God‘s 
approval of his purpose, sign of Christ riding in victory, but she speaks the one sentence pointing to 
the darkness of the suffering of God (428-31). 
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is owed to him, the body that failed to render due service to the crown.
45
 Yet, as a 
devout Catholic, Aske deems his body as also belonging to his God. He determines his 
course of action with these claims upon his body in mind. But by revealing his 
multivalent blindness the novel presents the human tragedy of Aske‘s story—his 
attempts to act justly have unintended consequences on people all around him—and yet 
this also fleshes out the humanity of his character. The claims of crown and religion 
upon his body cannot undo the fact that when Robin Aske dies, it is Robin Aske who 
suffers, Robin Aske whose world is unmade. 
In such characters as Aske, The Man on a Donkey emphasises that human beings 
are not free in our embodiment, but rather we are enmeshed in a series of intersecting 
and coinciding matrices of time and narrative. A paradox thus appears when one 
considers the body: it is both one and many. The body is many in that the claims upon a 
person‘s body all claim a different aspect of a person, a different way of thinking about 
the body. But the one physical body remains at the junction of all of these claims, even 
if the various claims pull it towards fragmentation, even if the body itself appears 
differently under shifting gazes. Perception of the body makes it malleable, as might be 




A Trace in Liturgical Time 
 
In his article about The Man on a Donkey, John Henry Raleigh argues that the 
defining ethos of the novel is tragedy. Certainly all the chief characters end tragically, 
dead or in some other way dispossessed. Raleigh does not confine this sense to only one 
aspect of the novel, writing that the book ‗is not only an historical tragedy but a 
religious tragedy as well‘.47 For proof he directs readers to how Prescott depicts Aske‘s 
end, claiming that such a climax reveals utter hopelessness, and that ‗the Christ evoked 
                                                                                                                                               
45
  See Foucault 28ff. for a discussion of the social and political ramifications of penal torture and 
execution, in which, once tortured, ‗the body has produced and reproduced the truth of the crime‘ and 
‗by which a momentarily injured sovereignty is reconstituted‘ (47, 48). The execution of Aske, then, 
is a manifestation of royal power reinstating its personal hold over the bodies of its subjects. In 
Prescott‘s telling, however, the ‗reproduction of the truth of the crime‘ is a reproduction of more than 
one truth; the crown inadvertently reproduces the passion of the Son of God in this other son of God, 
subverting state power by its own actions. 
46
  See the work of Judith Butler, for instance. On the malleability of the body, see the discussion of 
Graham Ward in Chapter One, above. 
47
  Raleigh 165. 
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in the novel is not the Christ of Easter Sunday but the Christ of Good Friday‘.48 To 
Raleigh, the work presents a belief that those virtues which Christians are called to 
enact as disciples remain only in the past; the story reveals Christian life and the 
possibility of redemption solely in the negative sense of the way the characters fail to 
see the hope that is offered to them. The only ones who can sense the presence of Christ 
are madwomen, like Malle, and children.
49
 The novel, in this view, tells the story of the 
failure of the divine world to make any lasting impact on the human world of politics 
and society and its history beyond the glorification of suffering. 
The Man on a Donkey is, indeed, a theological novel.
50
 However, Raleigh‘s take 
on the type of theology that the book presents is not the only possible interpretation. For 
one thing, the novel seems to follow a much more Johannine theology, so that the day 
of glory contains both crucifixion and resurrection, which leads to the time of the Spirit 
offering the community of the church. For another, Raleigh ignores passages which 
mention resurrection and hope, even though the chief characters miss these moments, 
such as when Gib Dawe, filled with the anguish over his own perceived worthlessness, 
fails to see the light that shines in the windows of the church even as he is fleeing, a 
light which the narrator interprets as indicative of the feast of Christ in joy with all his 
children.
51
 Beyond debating interpretations, though, one may note that the book adopts 
a theological form in the way Prescott has fashioned its structure to make Malle‘s story 
a unifying thread among the tale of years. In the opening note, Prescott writes of there 
being three cycles of Malle‘s visions. Roughly speaking, the first cycle is constituted by 
Malle‘s visions of episodes in the life of Jesus up to the point of his entry into 
Jerusalem, as reported by others who heard her speak of them. The end of this cycle is 
marked off by a description of the appearance at the priory of a stranger whom Malle 
follows out into the countryside before he disappears.
52
 The second cycle of visions is 
                                                                                                                                               
48
  Releigh 166. 
49
  Raleigh 167-8. 
50
  This point may be demonstrated in part by looking at the only other extended treatment of the novel 
which I know other than Raleigh‘s essay, and that is in a work of theology, Rowan Williams‘s Christ 
on Trial. Williams basically uses episodes of the novel as illustrations of the unexpected ways that 
God‘s presence is made known, and how that presence refuses to allow easy answers (13-5, 34-5, 79-
81, 126). 
51
  MoaD 742. 
52
  MoaD 384-7. 
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of the ‗great wind of light blowing, and sore pain‘.53 Each of these is recounted in terms 
of an encounter between Malle and one of the chief characters. The third cycle comes at 
the end; Malle receives visions related to the crucifixion, and wishes to tell the five 
main characters, each in turn, a specific message based on a vision; in every case, she 
cannot reach the person to whom she hopes to impart her words. Prescott structures the 
three cycles in two different ways: first, in each cycle, visions follow the order that the 
five main characters have come into the story and, later, will leave it. The visions also 
follow a liturgical calendar, from Christmas through Holy Week to Pentecost. 
With such an ordering of visions along liturgical lines, Prescott achieves an 
account of time which is alternative to the historical calendar by which she marks out 
the entries in the chronicle. Not only does the book thus create the semblance of a 
document for its ‗necessary anachronism‘, as mentioned above, it also supplies a ready-
made subversive reading to the historical time which that document narrates. 
Simultaneously, this challenges interpretations which would simply read Aske as a 
‗Christ figure‘, for even though he embodies some elements of the story of Jesus, 
particularly in his death, he is clearly not the Christ whom Malle sees in her visions. 
Just as the five chief characters find themselves pulled by conflicting narratives and 
claims upon their embodiment, readers also find themselves negotiating rival 
interpretations, forced either to allow their coexistence or to choose which interpretation 
should bear the most weight. Is the novel an historical tragedy, a cautionary tale against 
trusting in the power of justice? Is the novel more of a theological meditation which 
suggests that human beings are not locked into the ineluctable grind of corruption and 
desolation? Can it be both? 
Different readings of the novel reflect different perspectives on embodiment 
within the world, perspectives which co-exist tensely throughout the book. But although 
these viewpoints appear to lead to opposition to one another, the situation remains much 
more complicated, as may be noted by examining the primary scene in which the 
boundary between the two ‗worlds‘ melts away, when Malle follows the stranger who 
visits Marrick priory. Here the reader sees one of Malle‘s visions instead of hearing 
about it, and so does everyone at the priory: the stranger joins the workers in the kitchen 
for ale, and as he talks, everyone listens; the nuns notice the man, giving mixed reviews; 
and Wat, Gib Dawe‘s mute and developmentally-challenged son, sees the special nature 
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  MoaD 396, 408, 416, 430, and 448. 
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in him, joining Malle in following as the stranger goes.
54
 The political perspective in 
The Man on a Donkey manifests itself most clearly in the observations of the Prioress, 
who finds herself in turns fascinated and repelled by the man‘s presence as she watches 
from the distance of her window: the stranger, for all his earthy appearance, carries with 
him an unquantifiable dignity which is dangerous to accepted structures of authority.
55
 
Prescott lets her readers in on the secret shortly thereafter, if they have not already 
discerned it, for the stranger is a Man-with-a-capital-M, ‗Him‘ who is known and 
marked for who he is only by the half-crazy, the wounded and the animals—and those 
readers, though after the fact and from a vantage point outside of the world of the 
novel.56 In contrast to the reaction from historical, institutional time‘s thread in the 
story, Malle and Wat assert no claims upon this Christ. The closest they get to him is 
when he turns around at the gate and looks at them, stilling them in their tracks.
57
 Most 
of the time they are watching his back as he is walking away, until he disappears among 
the trees of a wood. While the description of encounters with the stranger inside the 
priory complex points to people trying to fit him into their conceptions of the world, the 
description of the episode outside the priory focuses on the way this Christ, simply by 
his presence, effects transformation in the world.
58
 The narrator declares: 
For God, that was too great to be holden even of everywhere and 
forever, had bound Himself into the narrow room of here and now. He 
that was in all things had, for pity, prisoned Himself in flesh and in 
                                                                                                                                               
54
  MoaD 384-6. 
55
  The Prioress first judges the man ‗an ugly vagabond knave‘ before being unsettled by the fact that, 
when the man walks ‗under the lintel of the gate-house…something in the way he carried himself 
made it seem, though it was amply high, too low and mean for him to pass beneath‘ (MoaD 385). Her 
final opinion rests in hostility, as she concludes that ‗this is one of those whose humour it is to grudge 
at rich men, and would pull down all to be as wretched as they‘ (MoaD 385-6). 
56
  Ducks and sheep joined in procession with Malle and Wat as they followed the Christ-stranger as far 
as the gate in the wall which marked the edge of priory lands (MoaD 386). One also should note that it 
is only after the stranger leaves the priory complex that Prescott shifts references to him from ‗man‘ to 
‗Man‘. 
57
  MoaD 386. 
58
  As Christ passes under the branches of the trees, the text proclaims that ‗the little twigs seemed to clap 
themselves together for joy‘ (MoaD 386). Also, though the season is early spring, to Malle, after the 
encounter, ‗the ears of corn were full,…loaded with goodness‘ (387). The first of these is probably a 
reference to Isaiah 55:12, which is very interestingly contextually, for Isaiah 55 is a call to come and 
share is a world made new, a time when God declares that God‘s word ‗shall not return to me empty, 
but it shall accomplish that which I purpose, and succeed in the thing for which I sent it‘ (Is. 55:11); 
Prescott‘s invocation of this emphasises a perspective of faith in which the story of embodied life is 
not limited to tragedy. 
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simple bread. He that thought winds, waters and stars, had made of 
Himself a dying man.
59
 
The incarnation is depicted as a binding and emptying of God (kenosis). However, this 
enfleshing of God within materiality quite conversely liberates the physicality of the 
world; the body of Christ, passing by, fills Malle and Wat with such ‗joy‘ and ‗dread‘ 
that Malle declares, ‗We shall brast‘.60 This body expands the purview of all others. 
This reaching compelled by the presence of Christ incarnate in Yorkshire is 
always a reaching after or towards, and never a grasping. Still, contact occurs, though 
fleeting, a brushing of the body against God through the particularity of earth. After 
Christ has passed from view, Prescott tells of Malle and Wat that 
They crouched on the hillside, looking towards God, feeling God under 
their spread palms on the grass, and through the soles of their feet. 
Beyond, beyond, beyond, and beyond again, but always that which went 
still beyond—God. And here, with only a low wooden gate between, 
that thing which man could never of himself have thought, and would 
never come to the depth of for all his thinking, here that thing impossible 
was true as daylight, here was God in man, here All in a point.
61
 
They sense God through the ground—reading divine presence on the earth‘s text like 
Braille—but this presence is, at the same time, absent. ‗Beyond‘: the body which is the 
object of attention here does not stay still; in the motion of the body from one place to 
another, and thus in its change over time, the body disturbs what it passes over or 
through, making a mark, leaving a trace, drawing gazes, even followers, in its wake. 
This trace is not unlike Ricoeur‘s idea of the place of the document or memorial in 
historical time, a present sign of something that has passed. Both provide a connection 
between the one who perceives the trace and that other from which the trace remains. 
Ricoeur writes that ‗To follow a trace…is to effect practically the fusion of two sides of 
the trace‘, so that the person who does the tracing is, in a sense, simultaneously 
addressing and being addressed by both the present and the past.
62
 For history, this 
always means a looking back, a bringing of the past into the present; in The Man on a 
Donkey, though, it is not just the past that is being fused with the present, but rather 
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  MoaD 387. 
60
  MoaD 387. 
61
  MoaD 387. 
62
  NT 345. 
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multiple perceptions of time—several pasts and several futures—are connecting at the 
point of the present. Just as Ricoeur declares that ‗At this price we now no longer have 
to say that the past is something over and done with in any negative sense but can say 
that it is something that has been and, because of this, is now preserved in the present‘, 




Apart from this episode in the middle of the novel, the idea of a trace in 
liturgical time appears as the frame for the work‘s entire narrative. In a prologue called 
‗The Beginning and the End‘ Malle, having returned to the then-dissolved priory of 
Marrick after several years away, goes looking for the Christ she had seen so long 
before. She does not find any sign of him by the gate near the woods, in the kitchen, the 
Great Court, the prioress‘ chamber, the stables or the church. Finally, however, she 
comes to the Frater, which had fallen out of use during the priory‘s last few decades; 
there, Malle finds the remnants of the last meal the last eleven nuns ate before being 
turned out, as they had returned to the old communal practice of eating together.
64
 The 
epilogue, ‗The End and the Beginning‘, makes clear what Malle finds there in 
‗crumbled bread and empty egg shells‘, ‗a piece of broiled fish‘ and ‗half a 
honeycomb‘: a sign of the Lord‘s Supper, of real presence, for ‗She knew then that He 
had been there, and that they had given Him to eat of these things so short a time before 
that the comb still oozed into the dish transparent gold from its severed cells‘.65 Christ 
does not appear in the expected places—either in sanctuaries and great chambers or in 
the locations where Malle had seen him before—but is traced to a hastily-eaten meal, 
accompanying the nuns in their distress and disarray. The materiality of fragments of 
food, of leftovers and detritus, constitutes a concrete mark of bodily fellowship right at 
the aporia, at the place of disjunction. It is in the transitory nature of human life, in the 
flux of the body as demonstrated and produced by processes such as eating and drinking 
and the necessary worries of the daily round, that the trace which makes present the 
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  NT 345. 
64
  MoaD 11-3. 
65
  MoaD 745-6. 
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fruitfulness of multiple narratives may be found and followed. The trace requires the 
body‘s irreducibility.66 
 
Conclusion: A Body’s Trace, All in a Point 
 
The narrated times and lives in The Man on a Donkey aptly manifest the 
disjunctions at the heart of human experience of the body. People find themselves 
caught in many different currents at once; the body belongs to the social and political 
system in which people live and to the system of faith to which they adhere, all while 
being bound to the body‘s own concrete limitations, to the turnings and yearnings 
incarnated in specific locations and gazes. At the level of the body, then, even where we 
human beings are at our most individual, there we are also at our most plural in how we 
see and understand. There we slip and split along the many currents which carry us. 
However, if we keep to the idea of the trace, we can turn this around and see it from a 
different angle altogether. If the body is the site where human beings are aware of the 
disjunctions in our experience of self and world, it is also the place where the many 
currents of that experience move towards a confluence. The body connects the many 
worlds of different perspectives, forming a pivot where worlds weave together, 
intersecting at the point of the flesh so that at this material site the different currents 
become a multiplicity of possibilities, instead of only pulling the individual in different 
directions. Just as a document or memorial acts to fuse the present and the past, the 
body‘s pivot can be the trace which one can follow from one possible narrated 
perspective to another. Physical being enfleshes the coexistence of worlds—if by 
‗worlds‘ one means the plurality of ways that people experience the living of their lives 
and the forces that act upon them (the plurality of worlds to which Prescott points in her 
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  In many ways, this resembles the tactile maps and relational geography deduced earlier from Jane 
Urquhart‘s A Map of Glass, in which a person holds onto stories and memories of loved ones through 
the precious few physical traces left behind after death and other passings. However, what I am 
focusing on here is the idea that the junctions and disjunctions where bodies meet exist as several 
different intersecting systems of narration to which the body belongs simultaneously. The two 
chapters make a pair, investigating the multivalent aspects of tracing the body: tracing as in drawing, 
outlining, and imprinting; and tracing as in following, tracking, and traversing the distance between 
oneself and another. 
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opening note)—and provides a point of intersection of all the understandings made 
available to people by the different currents which carry them.
67
 
Holding the body as a trace does not and should not mean negating or even 
downplaying the experience of the body as the location of disjunction, however. The 
forces which splinter human worlds and problematise the choosing of any course of 
action remain; moreover, the reality of the different currents which act upon human 
beings and generate conflicts of loyalty do not affect the will alone but impinge upon 
the whole of (and wholeness of) life—the fates of the chief characters chronicled in The 
Man on a Donkey should show the book‘s readers that. The disjunctions of the body are 
capable of tearing into flesh and fragmenting life. What this means is that the body is 
simultaneously the site of junction and disjunction. Yet it is precisely the tension 
between these two contradicting tendencies that produces creative possibility. Because 
both are indissoluble, their combination undermines any desire to reduce embodied 
experience to one or the other, pushing people to negotiate the field generated between 
the contradictions: making sense of the events and stories in which any person is 
involved entails that person navigating the different currents in which she or he is 
embedded, choosing a path from among a range of possibilities, interacting not only 
with the forces of different worlds of perception but also with other persons. This 
navigation is a creative act, a participation in the making of the world. In The Man on a 
Donkey, Prescott points to this creative potential with the passage of Christ through the 
novel. This body, which refuses to be pinned down, represents both disjunction and 
junction in Jesus‘ suffering love. To Prescott here, God offers a way to orient oneself in 
                                                                                                                                               
67
  Theologically speaking, this recalls Tertullian‘s words: ‗Caro salutis est cardo‘, ‗the flesh is the pivot 
of salvation‘ (as quoted by Bynum, Resurrection of the Body 43). It is at the point of the materiality of 
creation that a fractured world‘s mending is worked out. That is, any hopeful narration of time must 
take account of physical being. Although Tertullian was thinking about the necessity for any doctrine 
of atonement and resurrection to be able to proclaim the redemption of the body because the body is 
the weakest part of human being and most susceptible to falling—not necessarily something I would 
want to stress—nonetheless the need for an account of the saving work of God to address the body 
can be maintained. Looking at this through the lens of the the body as a site of the meeting of many 
different currents pulling upon human beings, any attempt to narrate salvation must tell a tale which 
holds these currents together; what type of salvation would it be if it only affected one strand of 
existence but did nothing to remedy the brokenness and distortions in other areas of life? 
  In Christian theology, another way of putting this is christologically—to proclaim Jesus Christ as 
the person who, in his body, best shows the flesh as the intersection of perspectives and the pivot that 
connects worlds, the person whose materiality best exhibits the ability to hold together beneficially the 
tension of the junctions and disjunctions of life. 
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the world, to navigate joy and pain, to bring together heaven and earth, so to speak, ‗All 
in a point‘.68 
That is one reading. The great possibility of creativity in the way embodiment 
comprises both junction and disjunction also leads to an instability of meaning; 
interpretations may differ, perceptions will not be the same from one person to another. 
The Man on a Donkey, with its plurality of worlds and times, with the various possible 
strands of narration, asks readers to make a choice. The form of the novel, as a linear 
chronicle held between a prologue and an epilogue narrating a later moment, 
instantiates the choosing: which is the primary story, the history revealed in tragedy or 
the ironic tale of Malle made evident only to the reader‘s privileged vantage point? As 
noted above, Raleigh‘s article on the novel gives interpretative weight to the historical 
tragedy, so that the religious aspects of the book comprise, at most, a wistful longing for 
an era that has faded away, replaced by secular modernity. Raleigh writes that the 
book‘s Christ who ‗can be recognized only by madmen, simpletons, children, and the 
birds and the beasts of the field‘ is ‗A Christ receding backwards into the primitive 
origins of religious belief‘; he describes the Christian virtues of ‗Faith, Hope, and 
Charity‘ as being ‗reduced to faint echoes in the tragic world of the novel‘.69 Yet, truly, 
one might say, what else could you expect when all the hopes and dreams, and lives, of 
the five chief characters, followed closely for nigh on seven hundred fifty pages, get 
crushed by the religious, social, and historical forces which entangle them? The 
darkness can seem overwhelming. At the very end of the novel, Malle takes pages from 
illuminated manuscripts—all which have been pulled apart by the new, Protestant 
tenants of the former priory—and makes them into little boats. The pages include three 
passages from Julian of Norwich, and two from the Nicene Creed in Latin. Malle sets 
the words of hope and love into the river, and the book ends with them ‗dipping and 
dancing away towards the sea‘.70 Raleigh writes that thus ‗Hope in all its fragility is 
faintly adumbrated in the closing chapter of this ―panorama of sin and suffering‖‘.71 The 
literary critic portrays this ending as faith floating away along the current of time. But 
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  MoaD 387. 
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  Raleigh 167. 
70
  MoaD 748. 
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  Raleigh 168. 
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while the scene does have an elegiac sense, the little ships of faith‘s hope are not merely 
sailing off to be overwhelmed in the ocean: they are also, in a way, being offered to 
readers, presented by the author in terms of a choice readers can make. Is this the end, 
or is this the beginning, a possibility for seeing God as present among us and caring in 
the midst of suffering? The entire book can be seen to act as those fragile ships of 
words, caught in the currents which carry the body, too, sending out a world and its 
stories for readers to pick up and interpret. It is always possible that a reader will choose 
to see mainly the tragedy, or that a reader will catch hold of hope. This suspense, this 
catch of the breath at what is not, in the end, decided for us, generates creative potential 
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Sometimes they are lighter, less substantial than imagined; the gentlest ripple 
of breeze or wave will lift them, and the least amount of force spins them in a 
new direction. Sometimes, though, bodies are heavier than you expect, appearing to 
anchor the world in their weight: then, only great effort sets them loose. But bodies turn, 
and all their story-strands with them; their panoply of ghosts and dreams hang about 
them like a flotilla brought to bear on the assumed destination of their travels. 
Bodies turn like toy boats cast adrift. When Malle makes boats out of the leaves 
from illuminated manuscripts in The Man on a Donkey, you can imagine them slowly 
bobbing this way and that before settling into a current. You can imagine them also to 
be corporeal prayers, petitions offered up and gleaming in the sunlight. Likewise, at the 
end of A Map of Glass, when Jerome recalls a story of a toy canoe sent on a long 
journey downstream to the sea, you can envision the longings of a boy‘s imagination 
that convey that canoe past wondrous, far-off places. Both the expectation of adventure 
and the probability of loss become the freight of these vessels—but which one you 
choose to emphasise is your choice. Where the boats go and how long they last depend 
on outside forces, but also on the way they are made. That is, much depends on what 
readers bring to the choice, on where their faith lies. 
Bodies turn to the call of another, to the summons of a voice. This, too, is a 
choice: the decision to follow or not. This is something that Ricoeur saw; in his 
exposition of the narrative self, he has people model their own narratives after their 
favourite stories, deciding among the variations provided by the plots and characters. 
Much the same can be seen in The Man on a Donkey, with the proffered choice between 
claims on the body. A person is summoned to interpret among the many possibilities; in 
this judgement, one discerns the body.  
But sometimes bodies turn on the pivot of mystery. The unknown other becomes 
the character who knocks on the door of an author‘s imagination and begs to be put in 
writing. Strange lands enchant your dreams and beckon to your feet. Make-believe as 
the invention of the body, and not just trying on roles, is where Ricoeur does not seem 
to have gone. For this, the art that blurs fiction and history, author and story, we look to 





The Narrated Body: 
The Art of Identity and Sanctification  
in  
Frederick Buechner‘s Godric




 the American writer and Presbyterian minister, Frederick 
Buechner, has mused 
For who am I? I know only that heel and toe, memory and metatarsal, 
I am everything that turns, all of a piece, unthinking, at the sound of 
my name. Am where my feet take me. Buechner. Come unto me, you 
say. I, Buechner, all of me, unknowing and finally unknowable even to 
myself, turn. O Lord and lover, I come if I can to you down through the 
litter of any day, through sleeping and waking and eating and saying 
goodbye and going away and coming back again. Laboring and laden 
with endless histories on my back.
2
 
This ‗everything that turns‘ describes the motion of response, the body and the 
stories it carries directing its countenance towards the other‘s call. The question of 
identity is not only that basic query ‗Who am I?‘ but also ‗Who are you?‘ and ‗How do 
we fit together, you and I?‘, these last the results of our experience of and contact with 
those who are other than ourselves. We enact identity in all the ways that we meet the 
world, in the face that we show and in the stories by whose telling we seek, in concert 
with others, to make sense of the moments that we live. Yet of these stories it is not 
enough to say ‗labouring…with‘ as if those narratives are only burdens to be stoically 
endured; one need also say ‗labouring for‘. The stories in their endlessness are part of 
the art of formulating identity: woven together, they present a narrated body, a self, in 
the world of imagination generated between storyteller and listeners. 
 This chapter will draw out that art of identity by looking more closely at 
the work of Frederick Buechner, particularly his novel, Godric. In this fictionalised 
autobiography of a mediaeval English hermit, the title character narrates his life story as 
memories and reflections prompted by the unwelcome ministrations of a hagiographer 
who wants to present Godric as a saint. Episodes portraying the vantage point from the 
end of Godric‘s life and the people around him at that time intersperse the narrative of 
his memories. Essentially, the book creates its imaginary world out of the tension 
between two competing narratives, that of the hagiographer monk, Reginald, and that of 
Godric‘s no-holds-barred reminiscences. However, there is a third thread—that of 
Godric‘s body itself, which tells a complicated tale: the same body fails Godric, reveals 
his joys and his sorrows, and is that which he seeks to bring to submission in the path of 
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formulated by Ricoeur, see Chapter Four. 
2
  Frederick Buechner, The Alphabet of Grace 29. 
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asceticism that he follows. The body relates its story through no voice of its own but 
obliquely, through the observations of Godric, the art of the author, and even the 
imagination of the reader. If, though, for Buechner, a person comes to another ‗down 
through the litter of any day‘, then what meetings, feelings, and experiences are 
anchored in the body matter to what any person‘s self, any character, is, whether in 
fiction or not. Buechner has also written that ‗At its heart most theology, like most 
fiction, is essentially autobiography‘.3 What you write about, themes and mysteries and 
the grasping at meaning, reveal something about yourself, not to some void but to 
particular individuals who participate in the making with you. The art of identity in the 
book Godric involves more bodies than the fictional character and the historical 
personage; the bodies of the artist, the readers, the text—and now, dare I say, you—
have all been drafted into the composition of this world to work together to establish 
identities. 
To explore how these embodied narratives all connect, I begin by examining the 
novel itself, looking first at the different interpretations of Godric‘s life that characters 
propose and then at what Godric‘s body does both to disturb and to confirm these 
narratives. This chapter then turns to the world of the text as constituted by the author, 
the readers, and theological and literary assumptions, before presenting some 
conclusions about the work of literary and theological art in constructing a plurality of 
identities. 
 
Godric, book and body 
 
 Godric has already lived many years as a solitary when Reginald comes to him, 
sent by Godric‘s friend Ailred of Rievaulx to record the hermit‘s life and ‗unbushel the 
light of [his] days for the schooling of children‘.4 As a hagiographer, Reginald strives to 
declare the holiness of Godric‘s story that others may emulate him. The monk sets the 
tone for his version of Godric‘s life early on, giving the etymology of his subject‘s 
name as ‗God reigns‘ and saying that ‗It means when God comes down at last to weigh 
the souls of men, he‘ll not find Godric‘s wanting‘.5 He outlines every event in the light 
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4
  Buechner, Godric 6. 
5
  Godric, 17. 
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of godliness, seeing always an advance in God‘s work, interpreting even Godric‘s own 
objection that he foully sinned as nothing more than exemplifying the man‘s humility.6 
By the end of the book, while summing up the life he has chronicled, Reginald 
proclaims, 
Of Godric‘s sanctity there can be no doubt. Although he himself was 
wont to deprecate them, none can count the deeds of charity that he 




This becomes the church‘s official rendering of Godric, the solitary of Finchale on the 
River Wear. His life demonstrates the strain towards righteousness. 
Godric objects strenuously, however. Part of his antagonism stems from a 
dislike of the monk-writer‘s fawning nature. In a word to the reader, Godric admits that 
Reginald has ‗got him such a honeyed way that I‘m ever out to sour it‘.8 More than that, 
though, Godric does not want or believe in the saccharine take on his life; as much as 
the sinful acts of his past distress him, they are his past, and they cannot in good 
conscience be glossed over. In response he rails, 
Know Godric‘s no true hermit but a gadabout within his mind, a lecher 
in his dreams. Self-seeking he is and peacock proud. A hypocrite. A 
ravener of alms and dainty too. A slothful, greedy bear. Not worthy to be 
called a servant of the Lord when he treats such servants as he has 
himself like dung, like Reginald. All this and worse than this go say of 
Godric in your book.
9
 
He is stung by his own past, a penitent who does not think that he deserves the attention 
of a hagiographer and certainly not the appellation ‗saint‘. 
 Thus Godric spins out his own version. He tells of his childhood, his leave-
taking from home, his time as a merchant and then sailor turned pirate. He relates his 
work as a steward for a lord of the realm, and his time keeping a rather worldly bishop 
company. Always he lays bare his sinfulness. Where Reginald would say that Godric 
left home ‗to educate himself meticulously and persistently in the ways of worldly 
circumspection‘, Godric would say the ways of ‗worldly greed‘.10 Where his 
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hagiographer would say that Godric left the service of a nobleman ‗for love of Christ‘, 
the hermit notes how his leaving was selfish preservation from damnation, as it 
abandoned the innocent to fend for themselves in the clutch of a greedy and mean-
spirited landlord.
11
 And so on.  
Yet, despite his indignation at the whitewashing ways of Reginald, sorrow rather 
than anger sets the prevailing tone of Godric‘s reminiscence. Along with the 
confessions, Godric tells of pilgrimages, visions and his induction into the solitary life.
12
 
These accounts resonate with regret: for example, his second time on Lindisfarne, 
having gone there not to pray but to hide the treasures from his piracy, he thinks he sees 
St. Cuthbert himself but ‗his face was full of grief‘ and the vision vanishes leaving 
Godric kneeling ‗till [his] beard froze stiff with tears‘.13 The gift of second sight does 
nothing to cheer him—for he sees only what death will come to such as Perkin, a 
servant so dear he is like his own son.
14
 All his tales bind up together with leavings and 
with loss, with the parting of ways from family, friends and mentors—from all whom 
he loves. His sadness at his sins he feels most of all from the wounding he has given to 
those near and dear to him: his companion snakes, whom he has sent away in a fit when 
they were distracting him from his prayers; his partner at piracy, Mouse, from whom he 
parts with anger, never to see again; his father, not met again after Godric left home 
with barely a word, as his father dies while he was away.
15
 
Godric blames himself, the appetite of his flesh, the limitations of his body. 
After his snake friends have left him, he wonders if they forgive him, reflecting ‗If they 
but knew, it was not the coldness but the warmth of Godric‘s bowels for them that made 
him drive them off‘ for his earthy love of their company made it ‗hard to fasten on the 
airy love of God‘.16 He bemoans that even old age does not dull his lusts, wailing ‗Let a 
maid but pass my way with sport in her eye and her braid a-swinging, and I burn for her 
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  Godric 80, 86-88. 
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  See the chapters ‗How Godric fared on the holy isle of Farne‘, ‗Of Rome, a maiden, and a bear‘, and 
‗Of Elric, demons, and how Godric first saw Wear‘, among others. 
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  Godric 49. 
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  Godric 57-8. 
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  Godric 163-4, 93-4, 103. 
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  Godric 28. 
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although my wick‘s long since burnt out‘ and lamenting that ‗young Godric‘s dreams 
well up to flood old Godric‘s prayers‘.17 He despairs that 
Lust is the ape that gibbers in our loins. Tame him as we will by day, he 
rages all the wilder in our dreams by night. Just when we think we‘re 
safe from him, he raises up his ugly head and smirks, and there‘s no 
river in the world flows cold and strong enough to strike him down. 




Godric thinks of his body as the location of spiritual struggle, the true stumbling block 
on the pilgrimage of his efforts to be a good man. The body and the flesh distract one‘s 
self towards peril, being ever open to temptation. 
Not that the body in itself is evil unreservedly—the issue is never as stark and 
simplistic as that—rather, the body is where saintliness and sinfulness meet and mingle, 
and the problem lies in the confusion. The body constitutes the site of both suffering the 
greatest failure and enacting the greatest kindness, the most intimate attention given to 
another, only that greatest kindness all too easily becomes the greatest failure. This lies 
at the heart of the version of Godric‘s life that he would tell, wishing that Reginald 
would write that 
The worst that Godric ever did, he did for love. Nor was it an earthy sort 
that seeks its own but love that gives itself away for the beloved‘s sake, 




To Godric, the best and worst of himself entwine inexorably, and this manifests itself at 
the point of contact with those around him, particularly those he holds dearest. The 
‗worst‘ to which Godric refers here is an incident which occurs one night several years 
after he retires to his solitary cell along the bank of the River Wear. His unmarried 
brother and sister, William and Burcwen, have settled near him, the culmination of a 
passionately unstable sibling relationship chronicled throughout the novel. Godric sees 
his sister bathing, and he is flooded by a sudden confrontation with all his frustrated 
desires. He decides to avoid his sister thereafter, but she unsurprisingly construes this as 
a lack of love, and becomes truly sick at heart. Their brother eventually begs Godric to 
speak to her, and Godric‘s heart opens to her plight. He asks her to come to his cell, she 
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does, and all the intimacies of their hopes and dreams are unleashed. As Godric puts it: 
he thought that ‗by God‘s grace‘ he had ‗curbed [his] grosser sins at last‘ but then ‗all at 
once they broke their bonds‘ and ‗he lay with her whom ties of tenderness and love and 
holy law…forbade‘.20 But to Godric things got even worse: he tells how their brother 
came seeking Burcwen, Godric lied to him, and William in his worry went looking by 
the river—where he drowned. Love and horror tangle up in the meeting of bodies. To 
move towards another, to turn towards a relationship, does not just mean making 
yourself vulnerable, it also means making someone else vulnerable to you, to your body 
and your passions. If your identity involves all that turns at the sound of your name, 
then it includes this terrible risk of being and making vulnerable, too. 
In response to the tumults of his desires, Godric sets out to discipline his body. 
Starting from a bath in the Holy Land‘s Jordan River, he goes unshod all the way back 
to England and for the rest of his days.
21
 When he finally settles into a hermit‘s life, he 
takes to bathing often in the river to teach ‗old One-eye…a lesson that he never learned 
though wiser, you‘d think, for sixty winters‘ dunking in bone-chilling, treacherous 
Wear‘.22 He describes how the numbness frees him from his flesh, from himself, allows 
him to praise God ‗for all we lose, for all the river of the years bears off‘.23 Godric also 
wears an iron vest to mortify his flesh, sometimes going so far as to hurl himself against 
the stone wall of his cave home.
24
 To the hermit, this ascetic programme comprises a 
quest for self-control. He wants his identity to point to the assertion of the spiritual as 
master over the material. This mastery, though, is not a denial of the body; a vision 
Godric has of a fiercely passionate John the Baptist underlines this well by instructing 
the hermit to ‗Dwell here alone and by hot striving to be pure become a torch to light 
men‘s way and scorch the wings of fiends‘.25 The training of the body intends to purify 
the flesh for leading an agonistic life, battling temptations and mortal weakness to be an 
example of hope while fending off evil. 
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Yet, if Reginald‘s version tells of a saint who always triumphs over evil and 
Godric‘s version tells of a sinner who struggles valiantly to rein in his baser nature, it is 
here, in the discipline of the body, that a third version of the hermit‘s life emerges. First 
of all, it becomes clear that beyond the self-control, more than a little self-punishment is 
involved. He tries to pay for the pain he has inflicted upon others by afflicting himself. 
However, his body resists at every turn, as Godric admits when he notes that his flesh 
never learns the lesson he wants to teach. His desires slip their bonds, and not only 
when he strays into sin. They appear when Godric finds enjoyment in the natural 
world.
26
 They belie the script that the body tends towards sin, or that the body‘s desires 
do, as these also seek charity and loving-kindness for others in ways established 
corporeally. Godric kisses a leper out of mercy, and people come to visit him not for 
preaching but for his touch.
27
 The body becomes the site where blessing and grace are 
received, too. When Godric leaves home for the first time, the priest blesses his eyes, 
ears and lips, that he might ‗see God‘s image‘ in everyone, ‗hear the cry…of the poor‘, 
and speak ‗truth‘.28 When a maiden angel visits him while he is returning from a 
pilgrimage to Rome, she comforts him less with her words than with bodily tenderness, 
washing his feet.
29
 Even where his solitary life of holiness is concerned, the body does 
not simply offer an obstacle to communion with God in the world. The images given by 
the hermit who tutors Godric in the way of solitude is that he would ‗wear the river as 
[his] scarf‘, the sky as ‗cap‘, and the rain as ‗cloak‘.30 The meeting of body and world 
becomes essential to that kind of life of devotion. 
The body‘s version thus undercuts both Godric‘s and Reginald‘s versions: 
unlike what Godric says, the body is not always about contest, but unlike what Reginald 
sees, the body is not always inconsequential to sanctity, either. Yet, instead of simply 
refuting these narratives, the body as described weaves among them. Sometimes it 
confirms them, too. The body does fail: Godric finds himself unable to live up to the 
holiness he desires. His life story is a long tale of treacheries, sorrows, and leaving the 
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good fight behind. In the end, physicality holds a terrible fragility. Age means Godric 
cannot do what he could in the past, cannot do for himself what dignity would wish, and 
can control his body even less than in his prime.
31
 In his final moments, he loses motor 
control and the ability to speak, and cannot even rail at Reginald‘s book.32 For a last 
word, the body speaks ‗Frailty‘ and dumbfounds both Reginald‘s saint-making and 
Godric‘s ethic of struggle. 
Or, rather, the next-to-last word: it turns out that the body has been speaking a 
more final word throughout the novel. This is a word said in response, a word of 
reception. The body is not only the site where the self struggles against the self in a 
battle of the will, or where one only acts outwardly toward the world, but also where 
others move towards you—where others touch you. Although Godric has focused on his 
struggle to be good, his body has always marked the impression of others upon his life. 
Near the beginning of the novel, Godric speaks of friends and how he and they have 
inscribed their traces on one another, declaring, ‗What's friendship, when all's done, but 
the giving and taking of wounds?‘33 But though this mutuality of wounding which binds 
the best of friends guides Godric‘s sorrowful reminiscences, the friendship made 
evident at the point of touch, at the body, stretches beyond that. Where he fails, his 
companions move forward alongside with him, to keep contact, with comfort and 
tenderness. When Godric decides to carve his own tomb, Perkin helps him, then makes 
him try it out for size, which Godric does, but before the old hermit can haul himself out 
again, Perkin climbs in beside him. The two lie entombed only for a moment but that 
togetherness communicates enough for Godric to imagine a little less loneliness in 
death.
34
 Later, when Godric is dying, and he would ask forgiveness of Reginald if only 
he could speak, Perkin moves Godric‘s hand to bless the hagiographer‘s work.35 Even 
after Godric is dead, friends continue to attend to his body, as the two snakes return to 
keep watch from a distance.
36
 In the body‘s version, beside the frailty, relationship 
offers recapitulation, a manifestation of redemption. More than this, identity is revealed 
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not in struggles, successes or failures, but in the connections created and maintained, 
however tenuously, among one‘s self and others in the world. 
 
Autobiography and Interconnected Fictions 
 
‗I am everything…that turns at the sound of my name.‘37 In Godric, Buechner 
through his art as author demonstrates this. In the world of the novel, the artist works 
around the characters and with them, presenting images and generating implicit 
possibilities, knitting a space where grace may be seen. But what about the world 
outside of the text? What does it matter, and how does it connect?  
In the relationship between art and identity, the question for the novel becomes 
‗Who is the book Godric about?‘ Whose identity does the novel reveal, or proclaim, or 
imagine (or perhaps obscure)? If, as Buechner himself says, much of fiction is 
essentially autobiography, then the book tells about him. In many non-fiction works and 
in interviews, Buechner has made the connection himself between events in novels and 
events in his own life.
38
 About Godric in particular, Buechner has said that it ‗in a funny 
way, grew out of my memory and non-memory of my father‘.39 The author has linked 
the novel to gaining a new understanding of faith and growing old, to trusting God in 
the face of death.
40
 Psychoanalytic criticism would endorse Buechner‘s own 
explanations that much of his writing is ‗a form of self-discovery‘.41 However, Godric 
is not Frederick Buechner, no matter how often interviewers and commentators want to 
make connection between characters and plots revelatory of the novelist‘s own life and 
faith. Replying to one interviewer, Buechner said 
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At a time when I was in desperate need, out of that deep place came this 
holy old man about whom I knew nothing, and he became really for me 
a kind of saint. I can‘t explain it. The words were mine; I put every word 




Rather than simply a masquerade for himself, Godric becomes a person who addresses 
the author. This Godric never lived, but is more fully alive than most. 
One fancies a sly wink from the writer at his art. For all the talk about fiction as 
autobiography, something more seems to be happening here. The novel itself has an 
identity, created in the imagination of a literary world, not just of Buechner‘s but 
including the books and stories that the author has read and all the people he has known. 
In the self that swings towards another at the call of one‘s name, the whole array of 
connections between texts swings to address that other, too. Thus, the novel Godric 
carries its literary allusions with it. For example, Buechner very often talks about 
Graham Greene‘s The Power and the Glory when he discusses literature and religion.43 
In one interview, he goes so far as to declare that ‗Ever since I read that book, every 
work of fiction I‘ve written has been about a ―saint‖ like that whiskey-priest—not a 
plaster saint, not a moral exemplar, but a person whose feet are just as much of clay as 
your feet and my feet‘.44 Buechner‘s reading of Greene thus very explicitly informs the 
identity of the protagonists and other characters he has been crafting. He invokes the 
literary discussion on what it means ‗to be a saint‘.45 Godric performs a variation on the 
theme of the deeply-flawed person who nonetheless becomes a locus of God‘s grace in 
and to the world—in this case, pondering what might happen if such a person is 
recognised as saintly during his own life—and layering that depth tells us more about 
the hermit than we knew because we have met his like before. 
A second example has a less explicit source. In the novel, Buechner emphasises 
Ailred of Rievaulx‘s place as a friend of Godric, while neglecting other patrons of the 
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 A reader might call to mind that one of Ailred‘s most well-known works is the 
treatise Spiritual Friendship, in which the Cistercian abbot writes of the value of friends 
linked to his own distinctive reading of 1 John 4:16: ‗he that abides in friendship, abides 
in God, and God in him‘.47 Buechner does not mention the treatise in his novel, or 
anywhere else, according to my research so far. Thus, no proof exists that he wrote 
Godric with any thought of Ailred‘s Spiritual Friendship. However, the reader can still 
add the latter to the polyvalence of the novel, intuiting the hint that friendship‘s path to 
the presence of God deconstructs the win-or-lose dictum of Godric‘s ethos of spiritual 
struggle. Whether Buechner intended this or not, Ailred and his treatise become part of 
the constellation of embodied connections that make up the identity at play here. 
If these two examples seem to illustrate tenets of both intertextual theory and 
reader-response criticism, that is because they do. They show the interconnected nature 
of texts, the way words and phrases point to other fields of meaning and are transformed 
in the process; they also allude to the way a text‘s meanings are discerned at the point of 
reading and interpretation.
48
 In a way, they dilute the place of the author in determining 
who the book is about. Buechner in many ways is just as much a character as is Godric, 
only letting us know what he tells us about himself, and for all that he in so many places 
tells about his writing, the actual process behind the text remains more or less hidden. 
Yet, just because the author cannot be fully determined or known from his writings does 
not mean that the author‘s identity has no part in the reading. Buechner still wrote the 
book, composing the words and laying out themes and issues. The book is part of the 
face that he turns to the world, to the other people around him. Only, it is shared: once 
you have read the book, its story becomes another of those laid upon your back, another 
memory with which you turn in response to the call of your name. 
We have heard Reginald‘s version, and Godric‘s: the book as a whole, with the 
tale told by Godric‘s body, makes Buechner‘s version—Buechner‘s version of what it 
                                                                                                                                               
46
  For biographical information on the people around the historical Godric, see Victoria Tudor, ‗Godric 
of Finchale [St Godric of Finchale] (c.1070–1170)‘, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. For the 
information which would have been available for Buechner to consult when he wrote the novel see the 
1890 edition of the Dictionary of National Biography available as an archive of the online version 
cited here.  
47
  Aelred of Rievaulx, Spiritual Friendship 70, 66. 
48
  Thus I in turn invoke Julia Kristeva (see especially ‗Word, Dialogue and Novel‘, The Kristeva Reader 
34-61), Mikhail Bakhtin (The Dialogic Imagination), Louise M. Rosenblatt (The Reader, The Text, 
The Poem), and others. 
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means to be a saint. Readers can piece this together, looking at friendship‘s embodiment 
of faith and care going beyond the struggle to be good—can see also a life spent trying 
to understand. Early in the book, after Godric believes that Jesus has saved him from 
death, he wonders, ‗though saved him why or saved for what deep end he did not learn, 
nor has he learned it to this day‘.49 In a sense, all of the book of the life of Godric tells 
him puzzling over that riddle and, in the same sense, this is the question of identity for 
Buechner: ‗Who am I, that I am loved?‘ And if the saint plods along as clay-footed as 
the rest of us, which can be inverted to say that all of us in our own ways are saints, then 
all of us plod along after the answer to that question for the establishment of our own 
identity. Buechner does allude to an answer, later in the book, when he describes a 
vision that Godric has of ‗a face of shadows and of leaves‘ which mouths his name; to 
Godric, this face is Christ‘s own.50 The suggested answer, then, is to change the 
question into a statement of faith: ‗I am one who is loved‘. To figure out identity means 
in large part to figure out with whom you identify, and who will identify with you—
who will, for better or worse, stand beside you. This identification is embodied in our 
relationships. The relational mode extends to art, too; what is embodied in the book is 
not just the author‘s self-discovery but a quest enjoined mutually by writer and reader, 
always seeking the why and witnessing to being ones who are loved. 
Still, this is not enough. This continues to suggest that identity is something to 
be found among a group if not individually. This implies that art is but a tool for 
unearthing what is hidden. But as we have seen, Godric the character is an artistic 
creation, a new identity added to the world. If your identity includes all that you are, and 
that includes all the stories and poems and images you dream and share, then your 
identity continues to be created as much as your relationships grow and change. Our 
identity is not a fixed, focused point that we possess. A person is a constellation of 
embodied connections, a network of memories and dreams anchored in the body but 
played out in community, into the world, but this is always shifting and being remade; 
and, theologically speaking, it is that assemblage which God addresses. Your identity is 
a creative collaboration among yourself, your companions, and God. 
What we see in Buechner‘s novel is that Godric is more than what is said about 
him, more than what he says about himself, even more than what he does. His identity 
                                                                                                                                               
49
  Godric 16. 
50
  Godric 144. 
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appears and lives along all the connections negotiated between him and others, in the 
web spun in the world. So it is with everyone. Identity is always more complex, more 
creative and more mundane, pulling us bodily into the conversation and the imagining 
of worlds in contact with one another. Identity itself is an art, an art by which the reader, 
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odies carry. 
Worlds move with them on their shoulders; an array of perceptions swing 
round whenever they turn. Ghosts cling to their backs; memories and timelines 
write in plural on the surface of their skin. Bodies haul along the long and short lines of 
their relationships, the effects of loved ones and rivals entwined around them. Light 
journeys with them: the flare of visions leads them on, and hopes enable them to open 
their eyes. But the sharp edges of their spite go, too, and the jagged shards of broken 
hearts. 
Bodies carry their stories with them. As they travel, they map their wildernesses. 
They leave traces on all the people and places they touch. They weave the landscape 
into fabrics of words or music during the production and reading of texts. 
There are few bodies I know as well as fictional ones—probably not even my 
own. For this thesis, I have read of Anil, Sarath, Gamini, and Ananda; of Sylvia, 
Jerome, Branwell and Annabelle; of Jakob, Athos, Alex, Michaela, and Ben; of 
Christabel, Darcy, Aske, Julian, Dawe, and Malle; of Godric, Reginald, Perkin, 
William, and Burcwen: they populate my imagination as authors expose them to my 
attention and I (re)construct them from my interpretation of their stories. The 
protagonists who show me so much of their lives, their thoughts, and the travels of their 
bodies let me imagine them with a certainty that evades the workings of my own flesh 
and the people I touch. Yet, they do not show everything. These bodies have secrets, 
too, shadows on the other side of the text which lend depth and believability. 
In their variety and particularity, these fictional bodies are paradoxical. They are 
all more than they appear. Their flesh exceeds the expectations of boundaries in their 
contact with others, and with the bodies‘ grips upon the places and the points that 
signify greatly in their stories. At the same time, they are less than they appear. Their 
gazes, their grasps, and their gaits are partial. This partiality can only be arranged and 
directed by the partiality of the author and the readers, by their interpretations and 
decisions, either made during conscious and conscientious engagement with texts or 
inherent in other choices and inheritances which make up their identity. 
In this paradox of more and less, the fictional bodies link up with other bodies, 
all of which have greater depths than their surfaces show, but remain partial and 
particularly situated. Bodies appear in the play between physical limitation and mystery 
beyond words. In fact, it is this that the theologies which I explored neglected most: the 
playfulness of embodiment—the inventiveness and sheer, inexplicable exuberance that 
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bodies can exhibit. (Marcella Althaus-Reid‘s writing comes closest to this whimsy of 
bodies, but too soon turns talk of fetishes and bodies in love into conceptual talk of 
God.) 
Not that this playfulness negates the harshness and pain that bodies suffer. None 
of the novels studied in this thesis are especially light, whimsical reads (though there are 
many moments of playfulness, as shown, for instance, in the poetic language of Fugitive 
Pieces). The wounds on the bodies remain, and other burdens, too. But the playfulness 
of the art of identity demonstrated by Frederick Buechner and Godric does not limit 
itself to fictional bodies and composition. Human beings have active roles in 
determining the story of their proximity to one another and their trajectories in the 
world: in discerning bodies. 
Another great theological question: what, then, is God doing in this? It could be 
argued that this gives too much influence to people, and that any quick response such as 
to say that God makes the space for this art to happen is nothing but deistic. However, 
one can argue that God not only makes the space for people to knit together 
relationships and stories and maps of the world—and, in doing so, to participate in the 
reconstruction of the world—but God also keeps that space open; God calls people to 
become participants and companions in pursuing the goals of God‘s work, following the 
open-ended nature of the many stories that exist together in creation. Bodies, in all their 
complexities of constraint and creativity, remain pivots of salvation. 









When someone is away, when space 
   she usually walks through  
is empty, sounds he often makes 
   are gone, habits of two 
together are absent, you teach 
   yourself a change in what‘s 
expected. You shift how you step 
   into a room, the way 
you look at her picture or read 
   even the most casual 
letter he wrote. You learn to live 
   on edges. Which is fine, 
except the slightest breeze can touch 
   remembrance off, can send 
the heart skittering, arrest you. 
   Contact always lingers. 
  Thank God. 
 
  
heological bodies arise from attempts to understand the significance of bodies 
in the economy of salvation, in the purpose of creation, in God‘s mystery. 
Literary bodies appear as they are imagined and written and re-imagined by 
readers, as they play in the worlds of artistic creativity, calling from their place to ours. 




his thesis has asked, ‗What does it mean to discern the body?‘, which arises 
from a scriptural response to the sacramental practice (or, more precisely, a 
lack of sacramental practice) of a particular Christian assembly of a specific 
time and place. I have sought to explore human embodiment as the entwinement of 
bodies and stories, rife with physicality, limitation, and complexity, both in the works of 
theologians and in novels. I have seen bodies absorbed, overlooked and co-opted, turned 
into metaphors and the raw material for deep thoughts. I have also seen bodies slip their 
snares, telling their secrets, sharing the fragility of their irreducible flesh, lingering on 
one another‘s skin, insisting on being noticed, digressing from expectations, and 
carrying worlds. 
 
But still there is more. 
 
If liturgy is the worship discourse of a faith community, as I labelled it in the 
introduction to this thesis, it is a discourse of actions as well as words. Liturgies 
underwrite practices of bodies. Because sacraments use physical, earthly items—water, 
bread, wine—which take on meanings through contact with people in the context of 
prescribed language and action, they reveal the bodily nature of liturgies most strongly, 
but that bodily nature is not restricted to them. Praying, singing hymns, listening to the 
reading and interpretation of sacred texts, entering and moving through a worship space 
also entail embodied practices; contact with fellow worshippers before, during, and after 
services do too, as do encounters with people who are just nearby. Moreover, because a 
liturgy expresses the various theological traditions specific to a faith community, and 
simultaneously has a creative, artistic element, liturgy holds elements of both theology 
and literature. Discerning the liturgical body sharpens what has already been learned 
about bodies. 
Thus, in this final part of my thesis, I return for a closer look at liturgical 
theology. One common approach to studying the significance of liturgy is exemplified 
by Dom Gregory Dix‘s classic text, The Shape of the Liturgy, which seeks to identify 
the principles which drive liturgical action. Dix argues that the heart of liturgy is the 
Eucharist, and the heart of the Eucharist is that which it signifies, that which is the same 
in all instances of the celebration of the sacrament in any and every place. The problem 
with this is that it looks past actual bodies and their stories in the attempt to find a 
universal truth. This approach is common enough that even a critic of Dix‘s 
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interpretation of liturgical history will still join in seeking meanings on the other side of 
bodily practice. But the materiality of sacraments remains. 
The work of Gordon W. Lathrop reveals another attitude toward liturgical 
theology, arguing that the meanings of Christian liturgy lie primarily in the way that 
particular Christian communities enact them. In regular worship and devotion, faithful 
Christian assemblies find their approach to life reoriented even as they praise God; this 
reorientation is akin to finding one‘s way using a map. However, even this does not take 
into sufficient account the uniqueness of a whole, integral person, the great variety of 
bodies and relationships, or the shifting negotiations of interpretation and imagination; 
even as Lathrop attempts to value the local and the particular, he trumps that valuing by 
insisting on the universality and givenness of the geography which God imprints upon 
the faithful through liturgy. 
My response is to amend Lathrop‘s liturgical theology in light of my studies so 
far, and with the help of Charles Winquist‘s work on selves and community as projects 
of becoming, which notes the unruliness of bodies. I propose, as an alternative to the 
search for an authoritative shape or normative pattern, consideration of various liturgies 
as creative sites where people shape and are shaped by their stories and by the contact 
of bodies. I suggest sacraments should be explored precisely at the point of their 
particularities, following the many relational strands which enfold the observance of 
liturgy. I have argued that form and content go together in generating meaning. I have 
indicated that the partiality of knowledge, produced by the limitations of the body, can, 
rather than hindering people, provide a basis for understanding relationships, 
emphasising mutuality, and making room for imagination. If all of this is true, then 
discerning the liturgical body means turning to the bodies-in-relationship enacted in a 
particular liturgy, rather than focusing exclusively on what universal principles might 
lie behind sacramental observance. Rather than narrowness, a reduction of possibilities 
from the universal to the specifically local, a focus on the particular is a choice to speak 
from one standpoint, and therefore to acknowledge, implicitly, the existence of others. 
The particular resists the urge to totalise, to reduce everything to a single viewpoint; it 
necessitates a recognition of plurality.
1
 Thus, a specific liturgical location functions as 
one possibility among many, one story of bodies and the meaning that is expressed in 
their particular relationships. 
                                                                                                                                               
1
   See the discussion of standpoint theory in the concluding section to Part One above. 
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Of Shapes and Patterns 
 
TAKE. BLESS. BREAK. SHARE. These biddings call the followers of Christ to the 
sacrament of the Eucharist. They comprise the four-fold action set forth and celebrated 
in Dix‘s genealogical study of the rite. The body of Christ (bread and wine) mediates 
the body of Christ (the presence of Jesus of Nazareth) to the body of Christ (the 
members of the Church): much of Dix‘s book charts the development of Christian 
worship, outlining and extracting from ancient liturgical texts to demonstrate a basic 
continuity of Eucharistic observance since the beginning of the Christian faith. In a 
chapter entitled ‗Behind the Local Tradition‘, Dix asks ‗Can we hope to find in the 
primitive church, say in the second century, coherent universal principles which can 
guide our ideas about liturgy?‘2 Earlier, Dix states that ‗If we are to penetrate to the 
universal principles which underline all eucharistic worship, we must be able for the 
moment to think ourselves out of the particular historical approach which is our own, 
and to free ourselves from the assumption that it is the only or the original approach‘.3 
His book is mainly concerned with discerning which elements need to be present to 
constitute a Eucharist; Dix traces those elements historically, trying to determine what 
all recognised liturgies and descriptions of the Eucharist have in common. For him, 
these ‗universal principles‘ become definitive of what the sacrament is. He pleads for 
readers to have an open mind so that they might see past differences to a timeless heart 
which provides meaning to each and every observance of the Eucharist that has ever 
been. 
Take. Bless. Break. Share. 
 
Dix argues for two historical trends in early Christian liturgies, declaring that, in 
the time before the Council of Nicaea, the various Christian communities used different 
Eucharistic liturgies; later, as these churches grew together, so too did their worship 
practice. However, he also strives to demonstrate that an earlier (1
st
 century CE) 
uniformity existed, an original rite which diversified as Christianity spread 
                                                                                                                                               
2
   Dix, The Shape of the Liturgy, 208. 
3
   Dix 15. 




 Thus, diversification from the single tradition of the initial group of 
Jesus‘ followers later gave way to convergence—though this movement towards 
uniformity was never completely realised, and has always borne marks of the diffusion 
produced by the growth of the faith. The original practice, though, is the one which 
provides Dix‘s ‗standard or model‘ for the evaluation of any Christian liturgy, including 
those already in use and new ones would arguably carry within it the best reflection of 
what Jesus might have meant in instituting an act of remembrance, and the closest one 
could get to Christ‘s will for the church.5  
Not every scholar accepts Dix‘s interpretation of liturgical history; one objection 
is that  no textual evidence exists for the ‗original‘ liturgy Dix posits. An alternative 
theory is that a plurality of worship practices and understandings existed from the very 
beginning of the Christian church. Writing from this point of view, Maxwell E. Johnson 
proclaims that 
What we see instead in these centuries is not a single tradition of 
Christian worship ready-made or fully formed in a tightly constructed 
package to be handed on unchanged to subsequent generations of the 
church. Rather, what is encountered here are what we might call the 
various building blocks of that ―tradition‖ in development. And it is 
from these building blocks that the Church in subsequent generations 
throughout history, both through evolution in continuity with these 
centuries and by means of occasional revolution or reform in 
discontinuity, will pick and choose as it seeks to understand and express 
its ecclesial identity liturgically within changed historical, social, and 
cultural contexts in order to continue being faithful to the gospel.
6
 
Here, tradition does not refer to a discrete bundle of beliefs and meanings which have 
been handed down to the present and which need to be safeguarded for the future; 
rather, tradition is the interaction with the past necessary to construct the response of 
the present. Historically, then, Johnson argues that the liturgical practices of Christians 
have always been disparate; moreover, they have always involved a creative 
hermeneutics in which Christians have needed to pick and choose from a plethora of 
worship resources what best fits a particular place and time theologically. 
Dix‘s hypothesis has a teleological push: if there is one single, original tradition 
at the root of all the church‘s sacramental practice, then that can be the measure of the 
                                                                                                                                               
4
   See Dix 209-14 and 230-7, for his overview of his argument and of the theories of other scholars. 
5
 Dix 208. 
6
 Maxwell E. Johnson, ‗The Apostolic Tradition‘, 67. 
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church‘s practice now. The Shape of the Liturgy reveals this motivation quite clearly, 
when Dix suggests that if there is no ‗original universal type‘ to act ‗as a plain and 
practical guide‘, this ‗would rob the science of liturgy not only of all practical value to 
the church, but of its chief interest in the eyes of all but a few specialists who might 
continue to make it their hobby‘.7 Tracing the roots of Christian liturgy is an exercise in 
finding clarity of meaning, one truth upon which to stand. Yet, although Johnson‘s view 
appears to be in opposition to Dix, both end up embracing remarkably similar positions. 
Johnson also looks for what emerges from early Christian liturgical history to be, in his 
terms, ‗authoritative and normative‘ for the various practices of different Christian 
traditions today.
8
 Both Dix and Johnson appeal to an argument from origins—that 
whatever tradition can be traced closest to the lifetime of Jesus of Nazareth is a more 
authentic tradition—the difference being that Johnson‘s interpretation of the evidence 
leads him to conclude that there are multiple origins rather than one. He posits that, 
since early Christian liturgies remain recognisable to people in the twenty-first century, 
something universal must lie behind the continuity.
9
 Both Johnson and Dix seek to distil 
from documentary evidence the common essence of the Eucharistic service, even if 
Johnson refers to a ‗pattern‘ while Dix is looking for a ‗shape‘.10 
The unexamined assumption is that such a distillation of meaning will render a 
truth which is ‗authoritative or normative‘; neither scholar really entertains any other 
possibility. But this assumption leads both scholars in a quest for the universal that 
tends to look past the complexity of actual practice, because what Christian 
communities do in worship becomes  representative primarily of some deeper meaning, 
                                                                                                                                               
7
   Dix 214. 
8
   Johnson 67. The same phrase also appears on p. 68. 
9
  Johnson 67-8. 
10
  For example, Johnson (somewhat grudgingly) points to the work of Gordon W. Lathrop to discern ‗an 
authoritative, transcultural, timeless, and ecumenical liturgical ordo‘ with Justin Martyr‘s reports as a 
foundation (67). Lathrop‘s work, as represented by Johnson, is very much an effort to describe what is 
consistent among all the known traditions—to work out a common denominator for what can be 
considered Christian worship. This is quite similar to what Dix tries to do. The similarity between 
Dix‘s work and Johnson‘s increases when one realises that part of Johnson‘s critique of the earlier 
scholar apparently results from selective reading: Johnson states that ‗Dix…suggests that the precise 
Jewish origins of the eucharistic anaphora can be discerned from this Last Supper Passover (or 
Pauline) context‘ (44). However, Dix quite clearly strives to prove that the background of the 
Christian eucharist lay primarily in the chabûrah, a Jewish fellowship meal (Dix 50ff.). That Dix 
seems much more willing to question received understandings than Johnson lets on, and also seems 
much more open to accepting a variety of antecedent influences to the shape of the one original 
eucharistic liturgy puts them much closer together. 
 | 254 
 
something that lies elsewhere. Taking this to the extreme, liturgical practice is a façade 
that at best reveals truth and at worst hides it—but the practice itself does not matter 
much at all. Isolating universal principles, whether they provide guidance for churches 
today or not, can obscure the embodied nature of worship: to privilege meaning which 
transcends boundaries can result in ignoring the boundaries, as well as the particularities 
of individuals and their stories. The approach also privileges the ideal to which a 
liturgical text points—problematic when one realises that any particular congregation‘s 
worship practice only approximates the suggestions liturgical resources offer. The issue 
of authority itself constitutes a conundrum: who gets to define what is normative? 
The work of both Dix and Johnson reflects the idea that the universality of the 
truth is the measure of the particular. Without a focus on a singular universal, so the 
argument goes, there is no way to anchor the concrete instance, and no method by 
which people can agree in assigning value. Against this, I argue that paying attention to 
particular bodies and their stories, along with acknowledging the partiality of 
knowledge, does not mean that all values are levelled off. On the contrary, attending to 
concrete practice points towards an absolute value for the body because liturgical 
practice always requires some form of bodily participation. This is where the notions of 
strong objectivity, situated knowledge, the incompleteness of knowledge, and 
collaboration—as discussed in the conclusion to the first part of this thesis—come in. 
Considering meaning to be relative to a person‘s embodiment and location calls for 
people to work together to determine value in a shared project of attempting to 
understand a complex and nuanced world.  
Yes, the discussion of common ground among different instances and of the 
defining characteristics of complex phenomena is important for naming things, 
discerning the identity of actions and ascribing a portion of the meaning of embodied 
life. Such theological systematisation acts as a structural investigation, proposing an 
understanding of various bodies and stories and their relationships. Looking to formal 
principles allows people to discuss what something is, and to explore what group 
relationships might exist (in this, meaning is produced through categorisation).
11
 
                                                                                                                                               
11
 This categorisation is different from the use of bodies as stepping-stones towards metaphorical 
concepts which I critiqued previously in this thesis. Instead of using bodies as a resource for 
understanding something else—even the divine—categorisation involves the identification of 
similarities and differences, allowing the investigation of what the relationships between different 
bodies might reveal about them. 
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Although such formal understanding can give significant insights, it does not 
follow that this constitutes the only important type of knowledge. Restricting 
knowledge to principles and governing structures reduces the breadth of questions 
which investigators ask, particularly when privileging the ‗what‘ of things—the 
content—over questions of ‗how‘.12 For example, after Johnson demonstrates the 
likelihood that the earliest Christian liturgical tradition actually was a multiplicity of 
traditions, he proceeds to diminish the importance of this. He gives an exhaustive list of 
practical differences, declaring that 
The diversity we encounter in the first few centuries, then, is precisely a 
diversity in how things were done: how baptism and its various 
supplemental rites were celebrated; how Sunday and festival observance 
were structured…; how the meal, together with the proclamation of the 
word, was celebrated and its gifts gathered and distributed; how the meal 
prayers were to be prayed and what their various structural components 
were to be; how catechumens were prepared for initiation; and how the 
various ministries of oversight and service might be ordered.
13
 
Yet, for all of this, the ‗universal pattern‘ still ‗did appear to transcend local diversity 
and variety‘.14 The list of differences suddenly does not matter much at all; Johnson 
suggests that these merely are externals, while internally, the meaning of what these 
various churches did was really the same. This kind of argumentation ends up flattening 
the texture of embodied life, levelling material features to get to the ‗real‘ meaning 
which they, essentially, cover up. 
Resistance to the particular and the concrete in favour of the abstract crystallises 
in Dix‘s presentation of the eucharistic four-fold action, which neglects to mention a 
crucial bodily component of the rite: the actual eating and drinking. Instead, the fourth 
and final action, in his words, is ‗communion‘ when ‗the bread and wine are distributed 
together‘.15 You must make an effort to imagine the way that the elements are shared 
and then consumed; taking, blessing, and breaking each comprise very specific and 
quite circumscribed actions, but ‗distribution‘ is more amorphous. Ingestion, when the 
elements actually become part of human flesh, stands in a moment of liturgical silence. 
I suspect that the term ‗distribution‘ is used in order to contain all the multitude of 
                                                                                                                                               
12
 For more, see the discussion on ‗strong objectivity‘ in the concluding section of Part One. 
13
 Johnson 68. 
14
 Johnson 68. 
15
 Dix 48. 
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practices by which bread and wine make their way from person to person, and the many 
different rituals marking exactly when people should eat or drink, from one particular 
Christian gathering to another. It is an abstraction meant to hold all the local variations 
which, on close reading, manages to evoke very little about what happens.
16
 
Take the bread and the wine, fashioned and offered out of what has been 
harvested from the earth. Give thanks for what has been gathered and prepared, blessing 
God for what God has done, is doing, and will do. Break the bread, pour the wine. Share 
out the pieces and the cup, then eat and drink in attendance upon one another. Just so, 
hands proffer and receive the elements, break and pour. Eyes watch the sacrament 
unfold; ears strain to pick up cues, listen to the old tale, follow those prayers. People 
move: standing, sitting, kneeling, turning to each other, walking. Tongues pray and 
speak responses; lips accept food. Bodies are involved—but, sometimes, for all that is 
written about liturgy, you would not know it. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
16
 Observing the four actions is not restricted to Dix‘s account of the Eucharist, of course, for they 
correspond to Jesus‘ actions in the Synoptic Gospels‘ accounts of the institution of the sacrament (Mt 
26:26; Mk 14:22; Lk 22:19). They are, for example, mentioned as ‗four stages‘ of the Eucharist in the 
United Church of Canada‘s 1932 Book of Common Order (p. v) before Dix. However, the commonality 
of the reference does not change the analysis here; Dix still represents a liturgical reluctance to mention 
actual eating and drinking. 
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Interlude: An Invitation 
The presiding minister moves to the table to offer  
the INVITATION TO THE LORD'S TABLE. 
 
This is the joyful feast of the people of God! 
They will come from east and west, 
and from north and south, 
and sit at table in the kingdom of God. Luke 13:29. 
 
According to Luke, 
when our risen Lord was at table with his disciples, 
he took bread, blessed,   
broke it and gave it to them. 
Then their eyes were opened 
and they recognized him. Luke 24:30, 31. 
 
This is the Lord's table. 
 
Our Saviour invites all those who trust him 
to share the feast which he has prepared. 
O taste and see that the Lord is good. Ps. 34:8a.17 
 
You move from the pulpit to the table. The communion hymn has been sung. Prayers have 
been said, stories told, scripture read, a sermon preached: it is time for the feast, time to offer forth 
bread of life and a cup of heaven. You check your papers one last time: the words of Invitation you 
have printed out, the Great Prayer of Thanksgiving on the pages you have removed from their binder, 
the slips of paper with your own changes, and with the narrative of the institution. You check your 
notes, but people are waiting; the ones who have come from the edges of the map wait to be fed. You 
want everything to be just right. You stare at those first words. You were ordained for this. You 
were called into an order to serve at this table, to circle the world round a point of flesh, to remember 
the body and praise the mysteries of blood. You glance up and see everyone’s expectation. There is no 
more time. You take a deep breath, and begin. 
But that breath holds aeons. It holds the knowledge that you invite people to a strange 
feast. No one will eat to overflowing on the morsel of bread or get drunk from the sip of unfermented 
wine. This is not very much to anchor a person in their own skin, let alone in the embrace of another.  
Still, that breath carries the attention of bodies. Though what you see is not all eager 
anticipation. Look around. Faces also show weariness, boredom, and wary apprehension. Eyes 
follow the cast of thoughts to far-away places. You cannot fathom all their intimacies and 
resignations. You do not know all the lines that intersect here, all the narratives borne by these 
bodies, especially not all the other bodies they bring with them. Even so, you do know some, have 
                                                                                                                                               
17
 BCW 34. 
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been afforded glimpses, have walked some of the same topography. You are part of some of the same 
stories. You share in shaping them, and they in shaping you. 
After all, that breath you take takes you, too. Takes your secrets and your desires. Takes in 
the ones you fear and the ones you love. That breath takes what is inscribed on your body, the 
slightest sound of moving air a breeze off the entrance to an abyss getting ready to rewrite the words 
on your skin, to trace them again. You bring all that you are to this table. You bring the scent of a 
lover, the casual touch of a companion, the weight of nail marks in hidden places: sweet words, 
griefs and mercies. 
You also bring the agony of people who are not there, people who cannot, will not, ever join 
you at this table, though they might already be bone of your bone, flesh of your flesh, though their 
hands might steady you when you come near to falling, or their magnetism rearrange the direction of 
your molecules. A relative, a partner—persons of a different Christian tradition or another faith 
altogether: your body groans to the marrow with knowing that the person who kisses you good night 
and good morning could not receive the bread of heaven without becoming someone else. The body 
you preach to hold and heal the world tastes of ashes and bitter tears to them. Yet they love you, 
even as you point to hope the only way you know how: in fragments, to share.  
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Sacramental Geography: Part One 
 
The quest for liturgical principles Dix and Johnson engage in centres on 
distilling essential meaning from the ritual actions of Christian worship; it strives to 
determine what characteristics must be present to make an assembly‘s time of worship a 
truly Christian one. Yet that is not the only possible approach by liturgical theologians, 
as can be seen in the work of Gordon Lathrop. Although Lathrop also professes belief in 
a basic pattern at the heart of Christian liturgy (what he calls the ‗ordo‘), 18 he argues 
that the liturgy works to transform the way that people see the world around them and 
relate to it. As people understand the world differently under the influence of the ordo 
of worship, and as they craft liturgical words and actions from that world, they 
gradually change the world.
19
 
In the first book of a trilogy on liturgical theology, Lathrop concentrates upon 
the various items with which Christians interact in worship. These holy things 
(‗primarily a book, a water pool, bread and wine on a table‘ but also ‗secondarily fire, 
oil, clothing, a chair, images, musical instruments‘) constitute material objects which 
‗take on meaning in action as they are used‘ in a Christian assembly.20 These things are 
not restricted to articles which people may physically manipulate; Lathrop also refers to 
concepts, as, for instance, when he notes that the worshipping assembly ‗may be 
regarded as a thing, in the archaic old Norse and old English sense—that is, a gathering 
of people with a purpose, an assembly of the free and responsible ones‘.21 The key 
concept for Lathrop is what he calls ‗juxtaposition‘: while everything he points to has 
roots in ordinary, daily human life, new meaning happens when the things are placed 
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 That this conception of worship involves a positive change to human social orders becomes even 
clearer when Lathrop discusses the place of culture and ‗cultural materials‘, such as works of art, in 
worship (HT 222-4). He argues that cultural objects should be transformed to follow the purpose of 
the Christian assembly, not just at the level of individual works and the way that they fit with the 
values that a worshipping community strives to profess, but also in the very systems by which these 
objects are understood, so that cultural material is reordered and given new meaning in a liturgical 
context. In other words, this proclaims that participants in Christian liturgy should think differently 
about the culture which they inhabit; because they think differently, they act differently, modifying 
that culture. 
20
 HT 10. 
21
 HT 10. Emphasis in original. 
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beside each other in the context of worshipping God.
22
 Holiness is only manifested in 
such assembled relationship. The importance placed upon proximity causes Lathrop to 
emphasise the local nature of worship to a much greater degree than either Dix or 
Johnson. Lathrop declares that ‗since Christian liturgy only exists in local 
communities—ritual books being not the liturgy itself but only helps for maintaining the 
great tradition in actual assemblies—the local meeting is the proper focus for liturgical 
criticism‘.23 Liturgy is not the pattern but the action of a specific assembly, though 
theologians may look to patterns to help interpret, explain, and critique the liturgical 
action. 
If what happens in specific places as communities use things which have been 
deemed sacred becomes key for a theological understanding of liturgy, then exactly how 
those communities conceive the space interior and exterior to their locations becomes 
significant, too. Lathrop contends that liturgy, by orienting participants to the space 
around them in a certain way, acts like a map. He writes that  
It is proposed for us that God has a gracious map of the world, different 
from that drawn by national or ideological boundaries and only 
suggested by the history of sacred groves. In bath and word and meal, 
Christ locates us in that map, draws our experience into the experience 
of a meaningful world, of every here and every wild, untamable there, as 
now full of grace, as now waiting for grace. When culture forgets place 
and ideology lies about it, our being in Christ—that is, being in the 
meeting in these central things as they are empowered by the Spirit—
gives us a place in God‘s good world.24 
Christian liturgy not only has a pattern, it makes a pattern by ordering perception of the 
world. For Christ to locate Christians in a map of the world also means that Christ 
bestows that map—that participation in liturgy imprints a geography upon the 
participants.  
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 See HT 10-1, 42, 204-5, among just a few of the places where the writer points to juxtaposition. At 
first, the term seems weak for the production or revelation of meaning, as juxtaposition does not imply 
any necessary or causal connection between things other than close proximity. However, I think that 
Lathrop very intentionally uses the term ‗juxtaposition‘ to highlight the idea that Christian liturgy 
simultaneously involves harmony and tension; juxtaposition does imply comparison and contrast 
between things which, in turn, brings those who apprehend such things to the beginning of 
interpretation. Lathrop certainly stresses that the relationship between holy things and (holy) people 
does not remain static, and that the holy things of liturgy carry critique as well as affirmation (see 
specifically the chapter on ‗The Biblical Pattern of Liturgy‘, 15-32). 
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 HT 162. 
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 HT 109. Italics in original. 
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Lathrop goes into the implications of liturgy-as-map in more detail in his later 
book, Holy Ground. The interpretation that a map offers can become the conception 
which users have of the region in which they are trying to orient themselves. ‗In a 
certain sense,‘ Lathrop writes, 
map is territory. That is, maps are cultural artifacts conveying the values 
and meanings of a culture as it orients itself in the cosmos, in its own 
version of an ordered world. To the very large extent that ―territory‖ is 
also a cultural construct, a map of such territory can represent the value 




Insofar as a liturgy conveys certain interpretations about the world as God‘s creation, 
that liturgy reconstructs the world by redrawing the map. For instance, Lathrop refers to 
baptism as ‗an enacted mappamundi [sic]‘ because the sacrament, by initiating people 
into a Christian community, reorders their world.
26
 The map image presents liturgy as a 
conceptual system which inculcates ethical value towards creaturely life; Lathrop 
asserts that ‗this ordo does not so much articulate a specific ecological agenda‘ but 
‗does constantly, repeatedly, form its participants in a world-view that includes a love 
for the conditions of the flesh‘.27 He depicts liturgy as a map of ‗a few known centres‘ 
which orients the community‘s negotiation of the ‗surrounding wilderness‘.28 Liturgies 
delineate the lines by which worship traces and makes the world in which worshippers 
are situated. 
While Lathrop‘s mapping model uses a liturgical pattern as the measure of 
Christian worship, instead of thinking of this as a core which governs everything, he 
conceives the pattern as the shape within which can be plotted a range of possibilities. 
His insistence that Christian liturgy contains both affirmation and critique is important 
for imagining such a space: when Lathrop writes about his geographical metaphor for 
liturgy, the opposing pair becomes what he calls ‗locative‘ and ‗liberative‘ functions. 
Liturgy acts as a locative geography when it gives people a place, anchoring people to 
particular ground, acting against forces that would uproot people and cause them to drift 
in a state of insecurity and a lack of peace. This constructs protective limits and 
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 However, liturgy can be liberative when its map of the world allows 
people to imagine a place other than where they are; this counteracts any oppressive 
structures built around excessive localisation, when the limits around ‗home‘ become 
prison walls, particularly for the weak and the disenfranchised. Liturgy‘s liberative 
geography creates networks of mutual support for working towards a realisation of 
freedom and for holding onto a hope of salvation.
30
 When liturgy‘s ordo is fully and 
properly present, both locative and liberative functions operate in the Church‘s worship; 
anything else acts as a distortion to some degree or other.
31
 The tension between the 
locative and the liberative stretches the liturgical pattern into a shape and marks out a 
space. 
Such a conception of liturgy makes room, it seems, for difference and 
particularities. It upholds the idea that the flesh matters, and that bodies remain present 
in divine service. This would appear to address concerns I raised earlier. After looking 
closer, however, disquiet remains. Although Lathrop wants to use the imagery of 
geography, he circumscribes it quite severely. Note that his book on Holy Ground is 
subtitled A Liturgical Cosmology, not a ‗geography‘. To speak of liturgy as a map or 
geography is restricted to being a metaphor, he writes, because ‗Worship is, of course, 
no topography lesson, no essay on the interdependence of landmass, living creatures, 
and weather‘.32 He continues on to declare that 
There are limitations to the metaphor. We need to see that liturgy is not 
writing and study, not any kind of ―graphy.‖ The liturgy may be more 
like binoculars, map, and compass together in the hands of a group that 
is walking in the field. Or it may be the group‘s seeing a distant peak, 
finding a nearby spring, and, with that help, reading the map and 
walking carefully and accurately in the world.
33
 
On the one hand, this underlines a desire to show that the Church does liturgy in the 
world; Lathrop emphasises the praxis element of worship. On the other hand, though, 
this also pushes away notions of creative interaction: the part of geography that is 
                                                                                                                                               
29
   HG 99-100. For an example of how this works with baptism see HG 105-8. 
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  HG 100. An example of how this works with baptism is in HG 108-10. Lathrop draws his discussion 
concerning these dialectical forces from sociological studies of ritual mappings of the world, primarily 
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excised from the metaphor is exactly that part in which people engage in drawing the 
map and inscribing their own stories onto the world. As already mentioned, this is a 
given geography, a map that has been established from elsewhere (by God). The best 
that one can do is to follow the map correctly. So, although Lathrop readily recognises 
that there are many different kinds of maps through which human beings give order to 
the world and that the maps of creation that liturgy proposes stand ‗in dialogue with the 
other maps by which we live‘, the liturgical map remains exceedingly static.34 In the 
end, for all the emphasis on the local and the particular, what matters most of all is only 
how well those local communities demonstrate the overarching and unitary ordo. The 
danger facing any local assembly is that improper action will block the perception of the 
liturgical map; conversely, the best worship practices will clarify a common vision of 
the shape of the world that Christian liturgy makes available through interaction with its 
holy things.
35
 While human participation in God‘s work can reveal truth, there is a 
marked reluctance to say that human beings participate in making truth. 
Why does this matter? Certainly, questions concerning the precise way that God 
calls human beings to join in God‘s salvific work have a long argumentative history.36 
Yet, even barring a long discussion on the topic of the extent of human participation in 
the construction of the kingdom of God—however one might understand that—one can 
begin to adumbrate the place of the body and of flesh in creation. I believe that one 
cannot take the body seriously without also taking seriously the stories which that body 
carries. Even as Lathrop‘s idea of the liturgy-as-map esteems the local assembly, it 
seems to esteem the map more. The world-view of the Christian liturgy and the 
narrative told by its things and their patterns take priority over particular stories and 
imaginations in a way that suggests replacement. While some theologians might see this 
as a route to maintain the sovereignty of God and divine authorship of all that is, the 
account does not address human creativity and artistic gift except in a rather negative 
way. This surely leaves open the possibility of a tyrannical reading in which the 
goodness of the ordo, however merciful, subjugates all. It also does not do justice to the 
creative ways that human beings actually use maps: we add value to certain places—
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 See Hall, ‗The World and Humanity as Professed by Faith‘, in Professing the Faith 187-252, for an 
overview of the history of the theological discussion. 
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where we have been, where we have a story attached to a name, where also we dream of 
going. Add to this our relationships with other people, and the care our imagination 
takes in making meaning out of the proximity between us and those we know, and our 
desires and memories do leave marks on the world. To deny this means denying what 
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  See Hetherington, 1933-44, for a good introduction to the way maps, familiarity and value can be 
embodied. 
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Interlude: Anamnesis 
Holy and merciful God:  
you gave your Son for the life of the world,  
who, being truly and eternal God,  
took flesh and became human for us and for our salvation.   
Not as we ought but as we are able,  
we offer you thanks  
 for his incarnation,  
 for his life on earth,  
 for his sufferings and death upon the cross,  
 for his resurrection from the dead, 
 for his glorious return to your right hand 




Caro salutis est cardo 
 
Flesh is the pivot of salvation, 
Tertullian wrote, which means God's working out 
redemption through the hand writing down 
this poem, through eyes which read it and ears 
which hear it. Which means that leavening grace 
resounds, too, in the heart which beats these lines 
as a forge's bellows to fan aflame 
the white-hot coals seeded in the body 
by words, by touch or look, by time that's spent 
with someone dear. Only, it's the ashes 
from this burning which, piling up in flesh, 
can weigh you down, make your moments heavy 
with the inescapable other. That's 
the hardest part to trust, that this clenched weight 
is itself a seed, that God with great care 
will crack its husk open and bring a bloom 
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The Theologians and the Theorists: A Reprise 
 
Lathrop‘s construing the ordo of the Christian assembly as a map is not that 
different from the theological moves studied in the first part of this thesis. All of their 
authors, like Lathrop, strive to account for human beings‘ relationship to embodiment 
and materiality. All of them neglect some of the particularities of bodies even while 
trying not to lose sight of either embodiment or materiality. Of course, they are not 
looking for exactly the same answers or asking the same questions. Lathrop‘s 
presentation of liturgy as an orientation of perception constitutes an investigation into 
the purpose of Christian worship and what Christ‘s followers have been called upon to 
do. Graham Ward‘s discussion of bodies and their significance explores the connection 
between incarnation and salvation. Stanley Hauerwas‘s interest in bodies and stories is 
part of his overall concern with the way the Christian faith‘s narrative tradition forms 
individuals into a community. Marcella Althaus-Reid turns to bodies in her quest to 
liberate theological method from androcentric, imperialistic discourse. The analysis of 
embodiment in Paul Ricoeur‘s work stands alongside his examinations of creative 
language and identity as a component of his exploration of human capability. That they 
all set out on different routes of inquiry but still end up avoiding the unruly 
particularities of bodies points toward theological and/or philosophical tendencies 
additional to the primary aims of their projects. However, it is much too simple to say 
that Christian theology has always denigrated the physical body, and that the various 
theological endeavours which I have studied demonstrate that it is exceedingly difficult 
to escape the weight of the tradition.  
 When Lathrop treats liturgy as an orientation tool for figuring out what 
following Christ means for the way that one walks on the earth, he joins Hauerwas and 
Ward in seeking an explication of the function of liturgical practice—Ward, as has been 
noted, focuses on the Eucharist as the mediation of the body of Christ, while Hauerwas 
views Christian liturgy as a primary location for teaching and learning the gospel 
narrative which assembles the body of Christ. The three of them also join Althaus-Reid 
in looking to theology for an aid in determining right living, utilising theology‘s 
prescriptive aspects. Finally, Ricoeur seems the odd one out, but he also shows an 
interest in just relationships between persons. Yet, for all of them, few specific bodies or 
relationships ever appear, except as illustrations. The exception, of course, is Jesus, but 
even though he is a particular person who does not seem to be a mere illustration of a 
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concept, as Christ he is susceptible of assuming whatever shape theologians give him: 
Ward‘s transcorporeal Saviour, Hauerwas‘s Redeemer who reveals God‘s story, the 
first-fruits of Althaus-Reid‘s bisexual Christology, and Lathrop‘s map-making Messiah 
are as different from one another as are each theologian‘s interests. In other words, even 
the particularity of this man, Jesus of Nazareth, tends to fade from view. It just may be 
that an irresolvable tension exists between the impulse to share theological direction 
with as many people as possible and any desire to foreground the particularities of 
places and your neighbour; inclusivity can seem threatened by any particularity that 
emphasises difference, while the actual experience of multiplicity and the rich 
complexity of people and places quickly complicates ethical teachings. 
It also may be that the unpredictability of bodies in relationship, with particular 
choices and accidents of fate which bring a person into contact with specific bodies in 
specific locations, is too uncontainable for any systematic attempt at explicating the 
experience of divine mystery to accept. The unruliness of bodies, then, begs to be 
tamed, so that the temptation facing theologians is to smooth jagged edges as much as 
possible. Hence, Ward presents the notion that bodies are known only in relationships 
with other bodies, and that because of this they are always changing, yet attempts to 
make this instability palatable by fixing displacement within the ascended body of 
Christ; in the end, the messiness of embodied relationship is neatly contained within 
transcendent divinity. Hauerwas writes of bodies as being shaped by practices particular 
to the specific stories that people live by, which would make differences between sets of 
stories and their resultant practices extremely significant while celebrating bodily 
peculiarity; however, instead of attending to an ungainly, ever-multiplying plurality of 
human stories, Hauerwas chooses one version of the Christian story as normative and 
ignores or alienates all other narratives, thereby simplifying any account of the stories 
that form bodies. Althaus-Reid attempts to highlight the untidiness of the body by 
focusing on the intimacies of the flesh—the meetings of skin and bodily fluids by which 
lovers strain the boundaries between one another—but still rarefies bodies and their 
stories into concepts which govern theological method, allowing an opportunity for 
jagged edges to be ignored once again. For Ricoeur, the body is the pivotal location 
where a person meets the world, and is largely productive of meaning, but the 
unpredictability of bodily creativity and the narratives through which people understand 
their lives over time is nevertheless restricted so that they remain within respectable 
boundaries. Similarly, Lathrop values the local nature of liturgical observance and, with 
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it, the embodied nature of participants who follow the liturgical map, but largely 
confines the action of those participants to the interpretation of what has been provided 
for them by faith‘s ordering of the world; this carefully keeps the unruliness of the 
creativity of bodies under control. In all of these examples, the desire to promote the 
importance of the corporeal nature of human beings and their relationships runs up 
against a deep impulse to maintain the ability to manage the chaos produced by flesh. 
Of all the approaches to embodiment and meaning that I have studied, the only one 
which offers release from the impasse brought on by a fear of unruliness comes from 
the feminist epistemological humility which recognises that knowledge is always 
situated but incomplete: the urge to make bodies neat dissipates under the realisation 
that the quest for true understanding enjoins a person into collaborations where progress 
may be sparked by bodily desire and indiscretion. 
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Interlude: Epiclesis 
By your Word and Spirit, O God, 
sanctify these your own gifts of bread and wine, 
that the bread which we break may be to us  
a communion in the body of Christ, 
and the cup of blessing which we bless may be  
a communion in the blood of Christ.39 
 
You pray the words, calling down the Spirit of God, the breath of life, to stir up the bits of 
bread and ferment the grape juice. You pray for God to turn dismembering into remembering, to make 
flesh resonate, to play sinews like violin strings and bones like piano keys, to make all of our marrow 
sing. You pray God will make God’s presence known in passing the lightest of crumbs and smallest of 
cups from one person to the next, with a smile, a word, a silence, a name. You plead for God to fine-
tune all our ears, too, to listen to the offers and requests of others and, on hearing, turn.  
Communion in the body—the words intimate to you sanctuaries of embrace. 
Communion in the blood—abide, abide, as close as can be, meeting and mingling the beating 
of hearts.  
Because there are so many communions in the body and the blood: sensuousness of touch, 
hands holding, lips kissing, bodies entwining. You have seen this, known this, guessed this. Wherever 
people move towards one another, there is the risk of learning once again that bodies are flammable. 
Wherever people share in sustenance, even cubed bread and unfermented wine, the latent sparks 
threaten to fly. 
Abide. Abide. There are so many communions, and the prayer carries them all, asking for 
blessing. Stories of fragile hearts, glances that stun, the point between light and dark long sorrows at 
parting—or joining: all are communions. Brothers circling warily, collapsing on a couch in front of 
the television; polite conversation at the family dinner; ominous clearing of throats; the sense of one 
you love stepping out the door: all are communions. Fellowship, laughter, dancing, sing-along time 
on the road trip: all are communions. At the midnight crib, at wit’s end, at the death-bed, at the 
voiceless stop of the spine at the sight of your beloved: communions, all of them. 
Abide. Abide. There are so many communions present in this praying. 
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Sacramental Geography: Part Two 
 
In all fairness to Gordon Lathrop, his idea of the liturgy-as-map truly is an 
attempt to give a positive place to particularity, partiality and plurality in Christian 
liturgical theology. He declares that  
There is an appropriate, limited beauty in our ability to see only what is 
before us and to see farther only with exceptional instrumental help. 
From a Christian point of view, we are invited to love and respond to 




Lathrop also proclaims that the Christian liturgical map should never be a ‗polemic 
against all other cosmologies‘.41 Just as he notes that this map may be properly 
understood as both locative and liberative, his theological work strives for a balance that 
points to an anchoring of Christian identity in both the hope for the rejuvenation of 
one‘s own belonging to a particular community and the mission of seeking justice and 
peace for all. The problem is that this does not go far enough. Lathrop‘s theology still 
hesitates to ascribe changeability to the liturgical map—to allow bodies‘ stories to 
matter in such a way that they inscribe traces upon the world. This reluctance to see 
human beings as co-workers in making the world reveals a theological fear of 
instability: if the map can be changed, drawn and re-drawn over and over, there is the 
possibility that the map will not have the power to effect a redemptive reorientation of 
the world, as the peril of disintegration would be too great. Yet, without such instability, 
can there be any real, substantive positive change either? 
But Lathrop himself suggests an answer in the passage quoted above concerning 
partiality and the limitations of human sympathies: words about love. He notes that love 
is always specific and located. You love a person, a place, a thing, a group, or maybe 
even a situation, yet to love a person not for herself or himself but for what he or she 
represents—for what you ‗see through‘ them—is reductive of love, as it does not 
address the whole of embodied life. This suggests that love involves a relationship in 
which one enters into at least the possibility of knowing and being known. This appeal 
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to love links Gordon Lathrop to another, very different theologian, Charles Winquist, 
who, at the end of his book Desiring Theology, also turns to the ‗particular and singular‘ 
nature of the experience of love.
42
 Winquist writes that 
Romantic lovers often discover that their world has been transformed. 
The contingencies that are indexed on the trajectories of their love, a 
taverna where they first met, a shabby apartment, a city, are specifically 
valued with a different intensity. The world in its finite display is given 
importance in the lovers‘ discourse.43 
This, too, is geographical; to be more precise, it is cartographical, an exercise in map-
making. Lovers mark intimate places, scribing the topographies both of their bodies and 
of the locations bound up in the story of their love. Maps as we know them—on paper 
spread out before us, hanging on a wall, folded up in a pocket, inserted into a book‘s 
frontispiece as reader‘s aid—are flat representations of a multidimensional, uneven 
landscape, but upon reading a map and linking some of its symbols to places of personal 
significance, we begin to change the map‘s texture, disrupting the smooth surface as we 
layer it with varied intensities at points of events in our own stories. As Winquist notes, 
such value only has meaning because love is always ‗specific and contingent on place 
and time‘.44 In valuing this particularity of place, the theologies of Winquist and 
Lathrop approach one another quite closely, except that Winquist presents the ‗graphy‘ 
part of ‗geography‘ as integral to his theological discourse, and not as the problem that 
Lathrop assumes that it is. 
For Winquist, the transformation of the world effected by love‘s transformation 
of embodied relationships links to theology through the potent but fragile work of 
creating communities and selves. He declares that both the discourse of lovers and the 
thought of theologians seek ‗joy in populating one‘s world with ―matters‖ of great 
importance‘.45 Just like people in love, Winquist‘s ideal theologians go round attaching 
significance to points on the surface of the earth, to bodies and other materialities—the 
‗matters‘ that he mentions. Earlier in Desiring Theology, Winquist discusses ‗the 
                                                                                                                                               
42
 Winquist 149. 
43
 Winquist 149. 
44
 Winquist 149. Note that this specificity inherent in love is not restricted to the romantic variety; though 
romance provides Winquist with his most striking images, he also speaks of a child‘s love, and it is 
evident that love‘s variety includes friendship, sibling devotion, parental care, and more. 
45
 Winquist 150. 
 | 272 
 
incorrigibility of the body‘, pointing to the ‗animality‘ of human beings which issues in 
bodily desires and the susceptibility of the flesh to the impact of external forces.
46
 The 
resistance of bodies to being neatly pinned down gives them the potential to interrupt 
the smoothness of dominant cultural discourses. This, along with the importance of 
place, prepares the way for Winquist‘s conception of theology as a ‗minor literature‘ 
and the significant valuation that he gives to love. Winquist argues that theology does 
not have ‗a place of its own’ in the postmodern world; instead, it is left to ‗the margins 
and interstices of the dominant culture‘.47 But far from being the downfall of the 
discipline, this allows theology to be a discourse of resistance, to make space for itself 
by disrupting dominant discourses whose actions exclude and oppress. Thus, as a 
‗minor literature‘, theology uses ‗unsafe texts‘—that is, unsafe in that their meanings 
cannot easily be controlled—to provoke the realisation that no text is ever really safe or 
even complete.
48
 Of the strategies involved, Winquist recognises some as ‗topological‘ 
or ‗topographical‘ which ‗prepare surfaces for the recording or marking of theological 
texts‘ and are ‗for the liberation of excluded voices‘.49 Such strategies are deeply 
implicated with place and situated bodies because they work to insinuate theological 
discourse into specific locations, reinterpreting as they complicate the surface of what 
seems monolithic, making space for difference and freeing a place for the excluded 
other by elaborating endlessly upon reality.
50
 By working in the margins and interstices, 
theological thought labours to build up selves and communities under the realisation 
that this is always ‗a work of becoming‘, ‗always unfinished‘.51 This, then, is how the 
map-making of lovers is theological: it complexifies the experience of life, adding to the 
diversity of the world and liberating people from meaninglessness. 
Winquist‘s presentation of the tracing of relationships of bodies to one another 
and to place respects the creative capacity of human beings while recognising the 
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precarious nature of the geographies which we compose. The fragility of theological 
constructions of bodies in relationship derives from their foundation in love; as 
Winquist notes, ‗To be in love is to always be at risk‘.52 Nothing ever guarantees love 
will last, and love always depends on more than any single, solitary body. Indeed, the 
theological endeavour which Winquist projects is ever risky; minor literatures and the 
prospect of forever being in process are unsettled and unsettling. But this is not a 
problem for a discipline that precisely aims to unsettle. In Desiring Theology, the task 
of the topographies generated by theological thinking is to niggle people out of 
complacency by pointing out the strangeness of the textures of the world. 
However, while Winquist gives a strong reading of what Lathrop would call the 
liberative aspect of Christianity‘s liturgical map (though it should be noted that 
Winquist‘s work neither specifies Christianity explicitly nor mentions liturgy), Winquist 
gives less emphasis to the other side of topographical endeavours, what Lathrop calls 
locative: the recognition of home. Winquist spends most of his effort when discussing 
the significance of place in presenting them as other—stressing travel‘s allure in the 
defamiliarisation from one‘s normal life that helps to reconstitute understanding with 
new experiences.
53
 Everything is an adventure, a gamble with unknown outcomes. But 
this neglects the idea that some places are so thick with memories and meanings that 
they are familiar, ‗of the family‘; these make the home that anchors people, affording 
what safety there may be for bodies to have room to grow in a space of nurturing and 
care. If we return to Lathrop‘s concept of liturgy providing a reorientation of one‘s 
views of the world, a mapping of a community‘s place and direction, we can find a 
robust account of the way that maps help to place people, providing a sense of 
belonging in the texture of a specific tradition of worship. With both theologians 
recognising the subversive potential of theological geographies, what is needed is to 
combine Lathrop‘s liturgical sense of maps that nourish roots with Winquist‘s notion of 
human participation in the composition of topographies through the identification of 
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 Winquist 148. 
53
 Winquist 37-8. 
54
  William T. Cavanaugh, ‗The World in a Wafer: A Geography of the Eucharist as Resistance to 
Globalization‘, Modern Theology 15.2 (1999): 181-96, gives an altogether different theological view 
of maps and geography than either Lathrop or Winquist, presenting maps as primarily demonstrating 
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The imagined theological topographies resulting from a Winquist and Lathrop 
rendezvous return this thesis to Michèle Le Doeuff and her point that orientation 
requires not just reading a map properly but choosing the correct map in the first place. 
In effect, keeping this in mind means carrying around on your person a multitude of 
large-scale maps, a variety of plans charting landscape in close detail rather than 
breadth, from which you may choose depending on where you need or want to go. That 
choice will always be conditional. It will always bear the background knowledge that 
any map selected has edges beyond which might be uncharted territory; upon reaching 
an edge, you will be faced with other choices: to turn back, to plunge forward into the 
unknown, or to step out cautiously and draw your own map as you go. And the choice 
of map will depend very much on bodies—ones you meet, and ones you wish to meet. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
modernity‘s hunger for omniscience. Cavanaugh picks up Michel de Certeau‘s distinction between 
itineraries and maps, arguing that the Eucharist is an itinerary, a ‗spatial story‘ that tells how to move 
from one place to another, and not a map, which attempts to represent spaces in their ‗proper place‘ 
related to one another, thereby granting users a ‗detached and universal‘ view that gives control to 
those who own the making of the map (183, 191-2). But while these are important points, Cavanaugh 
does not reckon with the opportunity for a lack of charity towards others that arises from an itinerary‘s 
ignoring of places and people outwith its prescribed route, nor does he observe that people also use 
maps to get from one place to another, and that the attempt by mapmakers to render all territory 
homogeneous within the bounds of a map fails as soon as people read it and attach different values 
based on the level of their interest. 
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Interlude: Fraction 
The minister breaks bread in the presence of the people, saying: 
 
The Lord Jesus, 
on the night before he died that he was betrayed, 
took bread,  
and after giving thanks to God, 
he broke it and said, 
"This is my body, that is for you. 
Do this in remembrance of me."55 
Hear. After midnight the silence bends, twists  
and shatters; not with violent shout, no, 
not with the clamour of blade-bite and blow, 
nor angry footfalls, pushes, flurried fists, 
but with the lover’s summons to the trysts 
of early morn. From assignations flow 
the wedding song’s rehearsals and the slow 
ordination of passion. Of all lists 
of our Redeemer-King’s virtues, it takes 
a Psalmist’s to recount music. Listen! 
He sings for his bride. The woman flits in, 
her body called to the Lord’s nuptial bed. 
Hear the call and response, how each voice shakes  
what’s bred in the flesh, what the flesh gives as bread. 
 
The minister may pour wine into the cup, then lifts it, saying: 
 
In the same way, 
he took the cup after supper, saying, 
"This cup is the new covenant sealed in my blood. 
Whenever you drink it, 
do it in remembrance of me." 
Every time you eat this bread and drink the cup, 
you proclaim the Lord's death until he comes.56 
 
Drink. Yes, drink it all down. Don’t worry, 
it's only tears. They’re fresh, too, still warm 
with salt, with the memory of a cheek’s 
contours. Drink it! For I can’t tell you 
how many people have wept to fill 
your cup. Drink it deeply; know it is 
the barium of sorrow for the  
x-ray light of God’s face. Let this draught 
limn out your inward parts. God’s regard 
will follow the trace of bitterness 
out of the abjection of God’s self, 
the better to see your doubleness 
of heart and surgically refocus 
your love along passion’s treacherous edge. 
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 BCW 109. 
56
 BCW 109. 





Bodies in Touch: Storytelling, Writing, Loving 
 
Maps are imaginative constructions designed to help us to grasp our intimate 
implication with the world. They are expressions of our understanding of the form of 
our life lived in proximity to others, and the effects that we have on the many 
landscapes that we touch. As discussed above, maps are interactive compositions, too: 
by the intensity and contour of interpreters‘ attachment to the locations portrayed on 
maps, the interpreters build upon the depictions. This map-reading incorporates time 
with place in a complex relationship pivoting upon the body; that is, for an 
interpretation of landscape to be partially constructed by the values that the interpreter 
lays on certain locations assumes that the interpreter has a history, a life full of stories 
and aspirations, even, moments that have shaped and been shaped by bodies and their 
relationships. Topographies, chronologies, and flesh intersect. 
The interactivity of maps is very similar to that which the five novels I have 
studied ask of readers. With Anil’s Ghost, readers must interpret the relations of the 
different strands of narrative, the place of spectres that follow in characters‘ wakes, and 
what it might mean to participate in the witness of truth through being present to 
another. A Map of Glass offers up its stories of lost and fragile loves to be traced upon 
readers while they share in the novel‘s task of tracing out the complex marks which the 
characters leave on themselves, one another, and the world through which they move. 
Fugitive Pieces provides a lesson on what to do with the body and the possibilities 
which open up in reading lives; readers must negotiate between the two stories which 
are told, while the author and the text challenge them to join in the restoration of the 
world through the poetic, creative construction of imagined bodies and relationships. 
Readers are also challenged to make a choice in The Man on a Donkey: interpreting the 
many different claims on bodies within the interweaving narratives, readers must decide 
where the weight lies, on tragedy or on hope. Godric invites readers to join in the 
continuing creation of identity, not only of characters but also of authors, an artful 
collaboration involving writers, readers, and God. In each case, authors present a 
vulnerable text, knowing that even though they leave readers stringent instructions or 
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powerful hints, readers will make of the text what they will, and it will never be the 
same. 
In addition, each of the novels works out this interpretative interaction at the 
point of bodies and their relationships. Anil’s Ghost portrays people—a forensic 
anthropologist, an archaeologist, a surgeon—trying to read the truth from bodies, but 
suggests that such attempts, at best, do not tell the whole story and, at worst, delude and 
distort with their promise of power over the bodies that are being read. As another 
option, the novel posits personal, relational touch between bodies, contact which builds, 
along with truth, meaning in the midst of vulnerability. In A Map of Glass, bodies are 
shaped and marked by the perilous interaction of love and other forces within and 
without control. People leave traces on the landscape and on one another‘s bodies, 
augmenting the world with the artistry of joyous and sorrowing traceries. Bodies and 
geography are also integral to Fugitive Pieces, in which emotional processes are 
mediated through physical and geological ones. We know such things as love and grief 
in our bodies, and in our bodily experience of the world; they are related to us in our 
contact with one another, or in our yearning for that contact, aching for what has been 
lost. Readers of The Man on a Donkey are presented with the body as the intersection of 
a multitude of stories, as the place where you can follow the traces of different narrative 
claims. As the characters find themselves caught up in the diverse currents of history, 
different meanings shoot through the tissue of their bodies and relationships—meanings 
that come into relief (for readers, at least) in the response to one specific body passing 
through the novel, the body of Christ. In Godric, different accounts of the title 
character‘s life, as well as his attempt to discipline his body, are all belied by the tale 
that the body itself tells, with its own unruliness both sinful and saintly. The body‘s 
story manifests through Godric‘s relationships with the people and other creatures 
whom he encounters; similarly, the body of the character and the body of the text 
address author and reader, constructing links between stories, memories, people and 
places. The body is primarily relational. 
A common thread through all of the novels is a concern with the location of 
bodies in relation to one another and, hence, with emplacement and displacement. From 
Anil returning to Sri Lanka, to Godric making his home by the River Wear, the bond 
between bodies and place is complicated by the social structures and personal 
entanglements that surround people, and by the pushes and pulls of forces that act upon 
them. The consideration of emplacement and displacement approaches quite closely 
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Lathrop‘s notions of the locative and liberative functions of maps: the characters live in 
the space generated between the poles of being stuck in place and of being rootless, 
striving ever to negotiate a balance, to have both home and freedom from oppression. 
However, the novels make manifest an element that Lathrop and other theologians do 
not talk about very much: things that are accidents. The bodily negotiation of landscape 
and the reading of maps can seem so deliberate, so much a matter of choice. But so 
much about bodies‘ proximity to one another, and about location, occur unintentionally. 
Fiction excels at depicting the way we work at making meaning from happenstance. So 
Sylvia meets Andrew the geographer unexpectedly, and the resulting connection 
proceeds to explode her carefully contained world. Or Jakob is rescued from the 
Holocaust by a Greek scientist working on a dig in Poland. The unforeseen finds a place 
in the plot. Still, bodies remain erratic, from moment to moment threatening to do the 
unexpected, and mark the world with a trace that cuts against the grain.
57
 
At first glance, this might not appear to have much to do with liturgy and 
sacraments. After all, even granting the metaphor of map-reading and the importance of 
bodies, there is little that seems accidental about the celebration of a sacrament, 
regardless of the specific Christian tradition under discussion. While you can judge a 
chance occurrence to be sacramental, or like a sacrament,
58
 you cannot have a 
sacrament by chance: sacramental worship requires the right context, preparation and 
intent. Nevertheless, another way to look at this is to see that, in the novels, all of the 
unintentional events in characters‘ lives are taken up into their history. Their bodies 
carry their stories with them; the bodies of others also remain present, in the shape they 
give, the yearnings, aches, and memories which contribute in impelling a person‘s 
narrative forward. The novels and liturgies come together at this point of memory: in 
each novel, embodied memory both expands and restricts the purviews of the 
characters, breaking into the isolation of the self with the presence of others, but also 
anchoring that self in particular relationships with particular people and places; 
                                                                                                                                               
57
  I am grateful to Andrew Fullerton for pointing this out in conversation. The example he noted came 
from theatre, where subtle changes in the orientation of an actor‘s body in relation to another actor 
during a speech can make immense differences in meaning, but not all matters of staging are 
intentionally planned—sometimes they happen by accident during the rehearsal: they become part of a 
particular iteration of a play, and dramatic meaning is ascribed to the action only later, by actor, 
director, or audience. 
58
  My use of the general adjective ‗sacramental‘ is not to be confused with the more specific substantive 
use of the word in Roman Catholic theology. 
 | 279 
 
sacraments draw from the well of the past a story, a particular chronology, which 
contextures the present and the relationships in which one abides. The artistry of the 
novels enacts remembrance, picking up pieces and putting them together, inviting 
readers to do the same when joining in the imaginative construction of worlds and the 
characters who inhabit them. The liturgical actions of sacraments map physical memory 
through the meetings of bodies, along with prayer consisting of anamnesis, the work of 
remembrance, and epiclesis, calling upon God‘s Holy Spirit.59 
At a very basic level, the physical elements of sacraments mediate between 
persons. One person applies the sign of water to another; one person shares a portion of 
bread, a cup of wine, with another. The memory out of which you live is then not 
composed only of the stories of sacred tradition but also of and with the people among 
whom you worship God, and in turn among all the people with whom you live. In a 
Eucharistic prayer, for instance, one might give thanks to God for sending the Holy 
Spirit ‗that we might live no longer for ourselves, but for him who died and rose for 
us‘—and, if for him, then for all others.60 The anamnesis situates the participant within 
the community‘s story as it is remembered; the epiclesis calls on God‘s Spirit so that 
this might become a true ‗re-membering‘—a re-embodying of the presence of Christ in 
the story, a continuing of that story in community. Participation in sacraments not only 
locates a person in a sacred geography of time and space, but also projects forward from 
where a person is. 
At the end of my five studies of novels and literary bodies, in considering 
Godric and Frederick Buechner, I concluded that figuring out what one‘s identity 
embodies largely means figuring out with whom you identify, and who will identify 
with you—and that this is anchored in the body but played out in community. Liturgies 
                                                                                                                                               
59
 Although this is most explicit in eucharistic prayers, the same basic components exist in baptismal 
prayers, too, as the action of the sacrament is linked to giving thanks for the demonstration of God‘s 
presence in various events in the narrative of the faith‘s tradition, including the baptism of Jesus, but 
often events like the Exodus also. For examples of anamnesis and epiclesis in eucharistic and 
baptismal liturgies, see official denominational resources such as The Sunday Missal, revised ed. 
(London: HarperCollins, 2007) of the Roman Catholic Church, the various versions of the Book of 
Common Prayer used in churches of the Anglican tradition, the Book of Common Order, 2
nd
 ed. 
(Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press of the Panel on Worship of the Church of Scotland, 1996), the Book 
of Common Worship (1991) of The Presbyterian Church in Canada, and the book of the same name of 
the Presbyterian Church (USA) (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993). For analysis of 
anamnesis in the Eucharist, see Dix 243-7; for an analysis of remembrance in Christian theology, see 
Richard J. Ginn, The Present and the Past: A Study of Anamnesis (Allison Park, PA: Pickwick 
Publications, 1989). 
60
  BCW 99. 
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with sacramental awareness follow in this vein by being embodied texts of 
identification, discourses of trust and loyalty. Like the exercise in map-reading 
suggested by Winquist, participation in a liturgy holds out the possibility of marking the 
landscape with varying intensities of importance. Yet, it is a collaborative effort, 
standing with others, other people, other bodies, God. Moreover, it is continuous but not 
necessarily of constant progress; the hermeneutic is fraught with difficulty, inherently 
recognising the possibility of misidentification, mistrust, and disloyalty—and not only 
on the part of others.
61
  Bodies and stories trace a tentative sacramental landscape in the 
practice of worship, leaving much to remain wilderness. Relationships themselves are 
dangerous, demanding of us that nearness to others which renders us vulnerable.  
With this sense of the importance of bodies rising out of the particularity of 
stories, place and people—of those close enough to touch—a greater peril than the 
fragility of personal interconnections comes from the temptation never to look beyond 
what you already know. Even the defamiliarisation of moving toward the stranger, or 
toward some other place, can become regulated by contact that you can control, so that 
particularity promises nothing but narrowness of vision, blindness towards those whom 
you will never know half as well as the characters of your favourite novels. The worst 
iteration of this is a theology of patronage, of like only unto like. Nothing can dissolve 
this threat: it is a vulnerability borne by the unruliness of bodies. It is also a corollary of 
privileging difference and partiality that you could quite possibly overlook someone 
else‘s partial view with varying degrees of your own spite. But any alternative to living 
with this risk would mean turning from the way that materiality and form matter, 
denying significance to the elaborations woven into the landscape by the engagements 
of bodies. 
Near the end of A Map of Glass, Sylvia declares that ‗The dead are not our 
friends‘. They are whom we have lost, ones for whose presence we long but cannot 
have, and whose absence diminishes us. But Sylvia misses something, one hopeful thing 
that works to keep all this from closing in on itself. Her exclamation can be turned 
backward. The dead may not be our friends, but we are asked to be theirs. Asked to be 
friends of the absent and the missing. Asked to accompany them in the stories that we 
tell, and to allow their bodies to linger on our flesh. The bodies of others, of anyone, 
request that we tend to their wounds, that we bend our backs with care around them, 
                                                                                                                                               
61
 As discussed in Chapter Six above, n47. 
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that we sing on their behalf. This, too, is the urging of Jesus of Nazareth, remembered in 
Christian sacraments. Liturgical bodies carry with them the petition that persons trace 
lines of connection in attendance upon one another and in the presence of God. They 
ask us ‗to love as if we‘d choose/ even the grief‘.  
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Finale - Communion 
 
 
THE COMMUNION  
The minister and those who will assist  
in serving receive both the bread and wine.   
They then proceed to serve the people in  
the manner appointed. 
 
During the distribution there may be  
silence, scriptural sentences may be said  
or a hymn may be sung.62 
 
 
The hardest part about leading communion is not making sure everything is in order or that your 
speaking and your actions have been just right. The hardest part comes in that time after all the 
‘necessary’ words have been said, when the bread, and then the wine, is going out to the 
congregation, the time of sitting and waiting, the silence when all is let go. You have taken the part 
of Christ, but even you, the minister, must give it back. You, too, must be served. You, too, must be 




This pendant heart‘s 
vulnerability is the lodestone 
on my chest—care-heavy compass needle 
which turns me towards another‘s pole even while 
one end pricks my flesh. But for all its weight 
the heart hangs fragile, too, and if dropped would 
most certainly shatter, shards skidding off 
across the underfoot, miniature glass 
blades scything out of reach. Then just one prayer 
would remain:  that, at the end of all things, 
someone yet might find every time-worn piece 
and put them back together, one by one by one. 
&
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